--- title: "Carillion and the state: public contracts, oversight and the collapse" language: en canonical: https://dossiertwist.com/dossiers/carillion-plc/government/ as_of: 2026-10-22 keywords: ["Carillion plc","Carillion","compulsory liquidation","Official Receiver","special managers","KPMG","Financial Reporting Council","Financial Conduct Authority","Insolvency Service","director disqualification","Richard Howson","Richard Adam","Zafar Khan","Philip Green","early payment facility","pension deficit","Pension Protection Fund","Royal Liverpool University Hospital","Midland Metropolitan Hospital","Tarmac demerger"] --- # Carillion and the state: public contracts, oversight and the collapse **Question.** How dependent was Carillion on the state, and how did the government respond to its collapse? **Answer.** When Carillion was liquidated on 15 January 2018 the Cabinet Office counted about 450 government contracts worth 38% of its 2016 revenue; the National Audit Office (NAO) counted around 420 public sector contracts and put their share at 33% of revenue (45% of UK revenue). After the July 2017 profit warning the Cabinet Office raised Carillion's risk rating to red, collected contingency plans from 26 public bodies and saw no basis to refuse around £1.9 billion of central government work that Carillion announced, including £1.3 billion of HS2 contracts. When Carillion asked in December 2017 and January 2018 for a £160 million loan or guarantee, a tax deferral and wider help, officials refused and the government instead funded a trading liquidation run by the Official Receiver, estimated beforehand at £314–374 million; in June 2018 the NAO reported its net loss as then estimated at £148 million, with a higher total cost to the taxpayer. Richard Howson, the former chief executive, argued that government procurement and sums owed to Carillion by public bodies belong in any account of the failure. ## How much of Carillion's work was public sector - Analysis: On the day of the liquidation, 15 January 2018, the Cabinet Office stated that Carillion held approximately 450 contracts with government, representing 38% of its 2016 reported revenue, and that its key central government contracts were with the Department for Education, the Department for Health and Social Care, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Defence and the Department for Transport. A notice issued the same day by the Insolvency Service and the Department for Work and Pensions gave the same figures, described the contracts as covering services for hospitals, schools, prisons and transport, and named the same departments other than the Ministry of Defence. The National Audit Office (NAO), in its investigation of 7 June 2018 into the government's handling of the collapse, counted differently: it found Carillion to be a strategic supplier to government with around 420 UK public sector contracts at the point of liquidation, including direct contracts, sub-contracts and special purpose vehicles delivering private finance schemes, and by value central government's sixth largest supplier in 2017. On the NAO's reading of Carillion's accounts, the £1.72 billion of UK public sector revenue in 2016 was 33% of global revenue of £5.2 billion and 45% of UK revenue. [src-008] [src-050] [src-052] - Analysis: The NAO's own list identified 423 Carillion contracts with public bodies at the point of insolvency in January 2018, most of them with schools: 312 with schools in England, 25 with NHS bodies in England, 22 with Network Rail, 14 with local authorities in England, 11 with Highways England, 10 with the Ministry of Defence, 6 with the Department for Education (including two Priority Schools Building Programme contracts), 6 with fire and rescue authorities, 5 with devolved government, 3 with the Ministry of Justice, 2 with HS2 Ltd and one each with the British Museum, British Transport Police, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, HM Land Registry, HM Revenue & Customs and the Home Office. Around 255 public sector contracts were included in the insolvency regime, a number the NAO noted differs from its estimate of around 420. [src-052] - Analysis: Measured by spending, the NAO's estimate for 2016-17 put the Ministry of Defence first at £510m, followed by Network Rail (£372m), NHS bodies in England (£287m), Highways England (£140m) and devolved government (£135m), with smaller amounts for other departments and bodies; the amounts shown totalled £1,685 million, against £1,719 million of UK public sector revenue in Carillion's 2016 annual report. For CarillionAmey, Aspire Defence Ltd, Carillion Kier JV, Balfour Beatty Carillion JV and Costain Carillion JV the NAO added 50% of each joint venture's reported revenue, which it assumed to be Carillion's share on the basis of ownership shares disclosed in Carillion's accounts. The NAO's examples of the work at the time of the collapse ranged from building the 58km Aberdeen Western Peripheral Route for Transport Scotland, with Balfour Beatty and Galliford Try, and electrifying the Glasgow to Edinburgh line for Network Rail, to facilities management for 49,300 homes of the Northern Ireland Housing Executive, construction and facilities management of the new Royal Liverpool University Hospital under a private finance initiative (PFI) contract, maintenance of parks, allotments, cemeteries and open spaces in the London Borough of Hounslow, facilities services for council schools (97 in Oxfordshire, 62 in Tameside, 63 in Stockport and schools in 23 other council areas), facilities management of 50 prisons across the south of England for HM Prison & Probation Service, and facilities management of around 320 Ministry of Defence sites in joint ventures with Amey and Aramark. [src-052] - Analysis: On the NAO's figures, central government work earned far lower margins than local government work. According to the NAO, Carillion targeted a net profit margin of 4.5% to 5.5% on its central government facilities management work. Advisers to its creditors found its 'central government' business unit profitable, though less so over time: operating profit was forecast at £9 million in 2017 on £647 million of forecast revenue (1.4%), low mainly because of losses on a large Ministry of Justice contract. The NAO's summary put the projected 2017 margin at 1%, compared with 13% to 15% on local government work for schools and hospitals. [src-052] ## Cabinet Office oversight: risk ratings and the Crown Representative - Analysis: The Cabinet Office began monitoring strategic suppliers, including Carillion, after publishing a risk management policy in 2012. According to the NAO, the strategic suppliers (27 at the time of its report) were shadowed by 16 crown representatives, who with Cabinet Office officials formed the Commercial Relations Board, meeting every six weeks to assign risk ratings. The Board raised Carillion's rating in 2013 over late payments to sub-contractors and returned it to green in August 2013 after Carillion signed the Prompt Payment Code; the rating stayed green until January 2016 and rose to amber in February 2016 after poor performance on a Ministry of Defence facilities management contract, and amber was maintained because of other concerns, notably the HM Prison and Probation Service prisons facilities management contract. Carillion told the Cabinet Office in April 2015 that it paid sub-contractors on government contracts within 30 days. Asked in June 2017 to review its payments, it reported paying suppliers on average 45 days after invoice date in the first five months of 2017 (33 days from receipt of a validated invoice), with almost one third of invoices paid more than 60 days later. The Cabinet Office told the NAO it was unable to verify this information. [src-052] - Analysis: The NAO found that the Board discussed raising Carillion's rating from amber to red on financial distress grounds on 18 July 2017 and confirmed the increase in September 2017 after seeking legal advice. On 29 November 2017, after Carillion announced that it expected to breach its banking covenants, the Cabinet Office proposed its highest category, 'high risk'. Carillion objected that the Cabinet Office already had the financial information such a rating required, that the rating would risk precipitating its financial collapse and that discussions with lenders were constructive. On 15 December 2017 the Board decided not to rate Carillion 'high risk', because officials were already receiving detailed financial information as 'insiders' and it did not wish to risk precipitating Carillion's financial collapse; it reserved the right to raise the rating later. [src-052] - Analysis: For part of 2017 Carillion had no Crown Representative. The NAO dates the vacancy from July to October 2017: recruitment was delayed when the Cabinet Office changed the requirement after the first profit warning to a person with experience in corporate restructuring, the Director for Markets and Suppliers took on the role in the meantime, and Carillion had a partnership manager throughout 2017. The House of Commons Work and Pensions and Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy committees, in their report published on 16 May 2018, placed the gap between August and November 2017, although Carillion issued three profit warnings between July and November; they recorded that it was owed to 'normal staff turnover' and that the government conceded a 'longer-than-usual delay' while it sought someone with experience of corporate restructuring. Officials told the committees that the July profit warning was a complete surprise and that 25 meetings between the government and Carillion were held between July and January, whereas the NAO counted around 50 formally arranged calls and meetings between the Cabinet Office and Carillion after the July warning. The committees concluded that the assignment of a Crown Representative 'served no noticeable purpose' in alerting the government before the July 2017 profit warning. Philip Green had described Carillion's relationship with its Crown Representative to them as 'transparent' and the 'key relationship' it had with government, and Richard Howson said he met the Crown Representative each quarter and on an ad hoc basis in between. [src-052] [src-039] [src-107] ## Monitoring and contingency planning after the July 2017 warning - Analysis: The Cabinet Office spoke to Carillion on 11 July 2017 about the profit warning of the previous day, began enhancing government contingency plans for its possible failure on 20 July, appointed the law firm Dentons on 24 August and appointed PwC on 17 September to advise on contingency planning and the consequences of insolvency, at a final cost of £600,000. By December, the NAO reported, it was speaking to the company nearly every day, and eight Cabinet Office and UK Government Investments officials had agreed to be Carillion 'insiders', receiving the same information as its major lenders, including cash flow statements. [src-052] - Analysis: On 20 July 2017 the Cabinet Office called together Carillion's central government customers and asked about their contracts and contingency plans. After the second profit warning on 29 September 2017 it asked for contract-by-contract plans by 17 November, and the Minister for the Cabinet Office later required completed plans by 20 December. It ultimately received 65 contingency plans from 26 public bodies, 16 of which (62%) did not provide costed preferred options. The costed plans totalled £238 million; the largest was Network Rail's, whose £147 million estimate it described as a worst-case scenario, expecting actual costs to be much lower, followed by the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Defence. Highways England, the Metropolitan Police Service, Greater Manchester Police and several hospitals, including the Royal Liverpool University Hospital, submitted uncosted plans. [src-052] ## Contracts awarded after the profit warning - Analysis: According to the NAO, after the 10 July 2017 profit warning Carillion announced four central government contracts and three variations worth around £1.9 billion, including £1.3 billion of HS2 contracts; the NAO's summary counted eight contracts and variations in all. The circumstances differed. The two Ministry of Defence contracts had been signed before the warning but not announced, and the joint venture partners were required to step in if Carillion failed. HS2 Ltd had completed procurement before 10 July and signed shortly afterwards; on 12 July it commissioned consultants to re-run the bidding-stage financial tests, which Carillion passed on its 2016 accounts, and the contracts went to a joint venture whose other parties had to step in if Carillion failed. Network Rail confirmed the next phase of two electrification contracts in November 2017, having carried out financial due diligence in 2014-15; in two of the three variations a joint venture partner was obliged to take over Carillion's role, and in the other the contract had since been re-let in line with contingency plans. The NAO's summary describes the Network Rail step differently, as confirming the next phase of one contract worth £63 million after the September profit warning. The Cabinet Office did not believe there was a basis for refusing any of the awards. [src-052] - Analysis: The NAO's list of this work (its Figure 16) gives the detail: for HS2, two civil engineering contracts, Chiltern tunnels to Brackley and Brackley to Long Itchington, with joint venture partners Kier and Eiffage, total value £1,340 million, of which £10 million had been spent by 15 January 2018; for the Ministry of Defence, two facilities management contracts with joint venture partner Aramark covering 103 sites in Scotland and Northern Ireland and 130 sites in the north of England, awarded on 3 May and 28 June and announced on 18 July, total value £182 million, of which £4.1 million had been spent; and for Network Rail, three variations to existing contracts to electrify and upgrade track between London and Corby and between Glasgow and Edinburgh, with joint venture partner Powerlines Ltd, total value £365 million, of which £34.3 million had been spent. Local government also awarded work: on 3 October 2017 Leeds City Council awarded Carillion £4.1 million to construct a cycle superhighway, conditional on a performance bond from a third-party financial institution to protect the council in the event of Carillion's insolvency. [src-052] ## Lenders, the business review and the requests for support - Analysis: In parallel with arranging a new £140 million lending facility, Carillion allowed its major banking lenders to form a Coordinating Committee to represent creditors' interests in a restructuring, according to the NAO. The committee appointed advisers including FTI Consulting and on 23 October 2017 commissioned FTI to carry out an independent business review of Carillion's restructuring plan; on 22 December 2017 the lenders agreed to delay the date for testing compliance with the banking covenants to April 2018. The review remained in draft and was not seen by the Cabinet Office or lenders before the insolvency. In its draft executive summary, later published by the committees, FTI took the view that there were significant doubts about Carillion's true past trading position and cash generation because of its focus on enhancing reported profitability and net debt, that its business plan was too optimistic about disputed claims and short-term building work, and that their sensitivity analysis would raise additional funding requirements to £495 million by August 2019. These were the lenders' advisers' views in a draft still subject to agreement with Carillion's management. Former Carillion directors told the NAO that they did not see a draft of the report's main body until 13 January, objected to its analysis of their capacity to win future business and achievable margins as too pessimistic and as overstating capital needs, and said the funding estimate was reducing in ongoing discussions. The review was never finalised: in January 2018 the major banking lenders would not proceed without government guarantees and resolution of the pension liabilities, the Cabinet Office informed Carillion on 14 January that it would not provide support, and Carillion's directors applied to the High Court for liquidation on 15 January. [src-052] - Analysis: According to the NAO, in December 2017 Carillion's main creditors told it they would not give further short-term funding unless it also approached the government. The committees reported that Carillion formally approached the government for financial assistance on 31 December 2017, when this became a prerequisite of discussions with its existing lenders; by then the only relief granted had been an HMRC 'time to pay arrangement' deferring £22 million of tax liabilities in October 2017, and a further request to HMRC to defer £91 million of tax liabilities across the first four months of 2018 was refused at that point, HMRC stating that it would have to be referred to its Commissioners. Carillion's urgent request of 31 December was followed by further versions on 8, 12, 13 and 14 January 2018. It said its restructuring would probably need 'virtually all' of its £1.5 billion of debts to convert to equity, and sought £223 million to bridge to April 2018: a £160 million loan or guarantee of bank lending from the Cabinet Office and a £63 million temporary deferral of tax by HMRC, contingent on the banks agreeing £60 million of further unsecured loans, the amount to fall if £39 million of disputed claims and invoices were settled. By 13 January it asked for the £160 million in five stages: £10 million in the week beginning 15 January and £10 million in the week beginning 22 January, each matched by unsecured bank lending; a guarantee on its early payment facility capped at £60 million–£70 million; a £110 million government guarantee to the banks; and a further £30 million guarantee for lending between February and April, matched by £40 million of unsecured bank lending. On 13 January 2018 Philip Green wrote a final letter to the Cabinet Office making the case for government guarantees of up to £160 million between January and April 2018. [src-039] [src-052] - Analysis: Carillion's wider requests, as tabulated by the NAO for 31 December 2017 to 14 January 2018, included up to £125 million from the government towards completing the Midland Metropolitan Hospital in exchange for an equity stake; help persuading the Pension Protection Fund, the pension trustees and the Pensions Regulator to accept a restructuring of its 13 principal defined benefit schemes that would extinguish £2.6 billion of liabilities; settlement of the HM Prison and Probation Service contract (claims and work in progress of £20 million); transfer of its equity stake in the Aberdeen Western Peripheral Route joint venture to the government at 'full value', with advance payment of part of its claims against Transport Scotland; an extension of the Ministry of Defence's Next Generation Estate Contracts with settlement of claims; help to exit loss-making contracts in the UK and the Middle East; protection from regulators' fines for actions before July 2017 (later withdrawn), which the NAO's timeline describes as immunity from penalties arising from regulatory investigations in the first formal request; and a commitment to give Carillion its 'fair share' of work and to prevent government customers and others from exercising rights to terminate contracts. Across the versions the requested tax deferral fell from £91 million to £63 million, and the loan or guarantee, initially unquantified, was put at £210 million and then £160 million. On 5 January the Cabinet Office told Carillion there could be no special treatment over future contract awards, and it told Carillion that it could not legally grant some of its requests. [src-052] - Analysis: A news agency report republished by a regional newspaper described Carillion's relations with two of its banks in the final days, saying that court documents, including a statement by Carillion's interim chief executive Keith Cochrane submitted to the High Court in London, showed Carillion owing almost £1.3 billion to its lenders with only £29 million of cash reserves at the collapse. According to the report, Cochrane said that Royal Bank of Scotland, one of its main lenders, had tightened funding terms three days before the collapse, taking 'unilateral action, which in the company's view undermined the group's efforts to conserve cash', by proposing that suppliers be paid two days earlier than planned, which hit liquidity by between £2 million and £20 million; Cochrane also accused Santander, another of its largest lenders, of putting the brakes on Carillion payments before it reversed its decision after talks. This is the interim chief executive's account as reported in the press; the court statement itself is not among the retained documents. According to the same report, RBS declined to comment, and Santander said its step had been prudent and that it continuously reviews its lending to reduce exposure to losses. [src-059] ## January 2018: the decision to fund a trading liquidation - Analysis: The NAO's timeline for January 2018 records that on 3 January the Financial Conduct Authority announced an investigation into the 'timeliness and content' of some of Carillion's stock market announcements between 7 December 2016 and 10 July 2017. On 5 January government representatives met Carillion, its major lenders and pensions representatives; Carillion estimated a requirement of about £275–£350 million and the lenders' advisers said it could well be more. On 8 January Carillion shared a draft business plan with the Cabinet Office and other creditors and made a more detailed request for support, and on 10 January it presented its business plan to creditors, reporting the loss of £655 million of cash from operations in 2017. On 12 January the major banking lenders said they would not proceed without government guarantees and resolution of the pension liabilities, Carillion reported that HMRC was not minded to support its tax deferral request, and the Prime Minister approved the trading liquidation option, which the chief executive of the civil service, the Chancellor and the Minister for the Cabinet Office had approved the day before. [src-052] - Analysis: The NAO found that the Cabinet Office decided that a trading liquidation, in which Carillion entered liquidation but continued to provide services until other arrangements could be made for each contract, was better than providing financial support. It cited concerns about Carillion's business plans, the legal implications, potentially open-ended funding commitments, the possibility of setting a precedent and the likelihood of further requests. Its options appraisal with PwC estimated a trading liquidation at £314m to £374m, an unsupported insolvency at £658m to £678m, a pre-sale of assets at -£49m to £51m and bridging investment at £233m to £267m, and the two cheapest options were considered too risky. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Minister for the Cabinet Office and the Prime Minister approved the preferred option in principle on 11 and 12 January 2018. On 14 January officials told Carillion that the government would not provide support but would fund a trading liquidation; its main creditors then also refused further support, and the board filed for liquidation with the High Court on 15 January. [src-052] - Analysis: Philip Green's letter of 13 January 2018 was written after the trading liquidation option had been approved: according to the NAO, the chief executive of the civil service, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Minister for the Cabinet Office had approved it on 11 January. Writing to John Manzoni, Permanent Secretary for the Cabinet Office, as chairman of Carillion plc, Green said that confidence in the group had been shaken by media reports and by the withdrawal of previously committed support from key banks, and that the group faced two options: short-term funding from HM Government and certain key banks to bridge to a restructuring, or an insolvency. The letter described the request as temporary support alongside commercial bank support, to be cancelled and repaid in full on completion of a restructuring that would include a debt for equity swap, with a commercial rate of interest in the interim; said the restructuring would likely involve adjustments to the Midland Metropolitan Hospital, Aberdeen Western Peripheral Route and HMPPS contracts and that the previous senior management team had all exited the business; and warned that an insolvency would be 'very disorderly and value destructive' and come at enormous cost to HM Government. These were the chairman's statements in support of a funding request; the committees later described the letter as a 'last-minute ransom note' in which Green hoped the government would conclude that Carillion was too big to fail. In a response to their report, published in July 2018, Green said he disagreed with many of its conclusions but would not comment while the investigations by the Insolvency Service, the FCA and the FRC were ongoing. The day after the letter, 14 January, Cabinet Office officials refused support, the lenders then said they too would not offer further support, and Carillion placed itself in compulsory liquidation on 15 January, by which time the Cabinet Office was broadly satisfied with central government's readiness; it found almost no examples of disruption to services. The committees concluded that the government was correct not to bail out Carillion. [src-058] [src-039] [src-107] [src-052] - Analysis: In the same letter Green stated that the board kept under review, with advice from Slaughter and May and Lazard, whether it was appropriate to continue trading; that if support from any source were withdrawn the board might well conclude there was no longer a reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation; and that it would then look to place Carillion plc and key operating subsidiaries into an insolvency process. Green wrote that the strong advice of senior insolvency practitioners at EY was that no contingency plan fit for purpose existed or could have been created in the time available, and that Carillion had provided information to the government's advisers to help them, in collaboration with EY, develop a contingency plan for an insolvency. That is the chairman's account of the advice the board received. The NAO recorded that the Cabinet Office had coordinated 65 contingency plans from 26 public bodies and was broadly satisfied with central government's readiness by the time of liquidation, while still seeking improvements in schools and local authorities. The Cabinet Office told the NAO that it had more difficulty persuading Carillion to do its own contingency planning and had asked it from October onwards to plan to protect the delivery of services; the NAO recorded that Carillion provided data to support the government's contingency planning. Carillion told the High Court that without funding it had been unable to identify any insolvency practitioners willing to act as administrators. It placed itself in compulsory liquidation on 15 January 2018, and the court appointed the Official Receiver to manage a trading liquidation, with PwC employees as special managers to assist the Official Receiver. [src-058] [src-052] ## The liquidation and its cost to the taxpayer - Analysis: In the Cabinet Office release of 15 January 2018, the Minister for the Cabinet Office announced that the government would continue to deliver all public sector services after Carillion's insolvency and would provide the funding required by the Official Receiver, appointed by the court as liquidator with partners at PwC as special managers, to maintain public services; the minister said that 'taxpayers cannot be expected to bail out a private sector company'. According to the NAO, the Cabinet Office asked the Insolvency Service to continue to operate Carillion's service contracts through the Official Receiver, gave the Official Receiver £150 million of initial liquidity, secured from Parliament in February 2018, and indemnified the Official Receiver against proceedings or claims connected with the liquidation. The Insolvency Service told the NAO this was the first example of a public limited company continuing to trade while being wound up. The Cabinet Office would ultimately pay the net loss on the liquidation, then estimated at £148 million (the Official Receiver expected total costs of £522 million, including £50 million for the special managers), which the £150 million would cover. This was lower than the Cabinet Office's pre-liquidation estimate of £314 million to £374 million, but the NAO noted that the total cost to the taxpayer would be higher, because some public bodies were paying a 20% premium for post-liquidation services and some customers would incur replacement costs. [src-050] [src-052] - Analysis: The NAO reported that Carillion staff continued to provide public services and that the Cabinet Office believed almost all services continued uninterrupted. Carillion's joint venture partners took over many of the larger construction projects, the Ministry of Justice established a new government company to run the prisons facilities management contract, and construction of the two PFI hospitals, Midland Metropolitan Hospital and Royal Liverpool University Hospital, was stopped until the PFI investors found alternative construction companies. On 23 May 2018, 21 public sector contracts remained within the insolvency regime, and the Official Receiver expected all customers to have ended or transferred their Carillion contracts by the end of June 2018. [src-052] ## Were government contracts a cause? The official position and Howson's counter-claims - Analysis: The notice issued by the Insolvency Service and the Department for Work and Pensions on 15 January 2018, after describing Carillion's government contracts and naming the departments holding the key central government contracts, stated that 'these are not the cause of the company's present financial difficulties'. That was the government's position on the day of the liquidation. The NAO's investigation of June 2018 reported that in 2017 Carillion faced estimated losses of £91 million on its Aberdeen bypass joint venture, £83 million on the Royal Liverpool University Hospital and £48 million on the Midland Metropolitan Hospital, all public sector PFI projects, and that its central government facilities management unit was only just profitable. Richard Howson, Carillion's former chief executive, argued in a response to the committees' report, published in July 2018, that no analysis of the causes of the failure was complete without looking at how government and the wider public sector procured services from Carillion and failed to administer payments, and said that when he left substantial amounts were properly due to Carillion from government and government-owned entities on a range of contracts. [src-008] [src-052] [src-107] - Analysis: Howson's letter gave the prisons contract as an example. On the National Offender Management Service contract for facilities management of prisons in the south of England, the letter says, the government had 'completely underestimated' the size of the estate in its tender documents, which turned out some 60% bigger by number of assets, and Carillion bore significant additional costs for which it was not paid. Howson named the MoD on NGEC, Highways England, Transport for Scotland, NOMS and Network Rail as examples of government or government-owned bodies owing substantial amounts when he left, and said he understood similar large amounts were still outstanding at the liquidation. The letter does not quantify the amounts. The NAO recorded that in January 2018 Carillion put the disputed claims and invoices it wanted settled at £39 million; it also reported that the lenders' advisers attributed losses on the prisons contract to its being a 'first generation' outsourcing contract and to inaccurate tender assumptions, and that the government does not necessarily agree with the size of the losses on the four loss-making contracts it lists. Carillion's own January 2018 business plan described NOMS as a loss-making contract against which a group provision had been made in 2017 and added a further £11m for it. On the other side of the account, the NAO reported that many public sector customers, including the special purpose vehicles delivering PFI contracts, dispute outstanding invoices relating to the period before liquidation. [src-107] [src-052] [src-090] ## Sources - [src-008] Carillion declares insolvency: information for employees, creditors and suppliers, Insolvency Service (GOV.UK), 2018-01-15 - [src-050] Government protects essential public services as Carillion declares insolvency, Cabinet Office (GOV.UK), 2018-01-15 - [src-052] Investigation into the government's handling of the collapse of Carillion (HC 1002), National Audit Office, 2018-06-07 - [src-039] Carillion: Second Joint Report of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (HC 769), chapter on external checks and balances, House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees, 2018-05 - [src-107] Carillion: Responses from Interested Parties to the committees' report (HC 1392, Second Special Report), House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees, 2018-07-12 - [src-059] Media source · src-059 - [src-058] Letter from the chairman of Carillion plc to the Permanent Secretary of the Cabinet Office, 13 January 2018, House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees), 2018-01-13 - [src-090] Carillion Group Business Plan, January 2018 (published by the committees), House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees), 2018-01