--- title: "Credit Suisse's Greensill funds: limits, closure and recoveries" language: en canonical: https://dossiertwist.com/dossiers/greensill-capital-uk-limited/credit-suisse-funds/ as_of: 2026-10-22 keywords: ["Greensill Capital (UK) Limited","Greensill Capital Pty Limited","Lex Greensill","Greensill Bank AG","supply chain finance","Credit Suisse supply chain finance funds","SoftBank Vision Fund","Katerra","Fairymead notes","GFG Alliance","Sanjeev Gupta","trade credit insurance","BCC Trade Credit","Insurance Australia Limited","CLBILS","British Business Bank","administration","Grant Thornton","director disqualification","Treasury Committee"] --- # Credit Suisse's Greensill funds: limits, closure and recoveries **Question.** What were the Credit Suisse supply chain finance funds, how were their Greensill exposures limited, and what happened after they closed in March 2021? **Answer.** Credit Suisse Asset Management managed four supply chain finance funds that bought notes from Greensill programmes and had net assets of USD 10,016 mn on 26 February 2021. In July 2020 it agreed limits with Lex Greensill on the main fund's exposure to SoftBank Vision Fund-related companies and multi-obligor programmes, and in January 2021 a new deadline of 31 March 2021 was set; the funds' boards suspended redemptions and subscriptions on 1 March 2021, and by 30 November 2022 about USD 6.78 bn had been returned to investors. In February 2023 FINMA concluded that Credit Suisse had seriously breached its supervisory obligations in its Greensill relationship, findings that concern the bank, not Greensill Capital (UK) Limited. ## The four funds and their managers - Analysis: Supply chain finance is a form of short-term funding in which a financier pays a company's suppliers early and collects payment from the company later. Credit Suisse Asset Management's investor Q&A of 15 December 2022 identifies four Credit Suisse supply chain finance funds and gives their net asset values (NAV) at 26 February 2021: the Credit Suisse (Lux) Supply Chain Finance Fund, USD 7,253 mn; the Credit Suisse Nova (Lux) Supply Chain Finance High Income Fund, USD 1,834 mn; the Credit Suisse Nova (Lux) Supply Chain Finance Investment Grade Fund, USD 260 mn; and the Liechtenstein-domiciled Credit Suisse Supply Chain Finance Investment Grade Fund, USD 669 mn, a total of USD 10,016 mn. The largest of the four by net asset value, the Credit Suisse (Lux) Supply Chain Finance Fund (the Lux fund), is a sub-fund of Credit Suisse Virtuoso SICAV-SIF, a Luxembourg investment company with an umbrella structure of sub-funds holding segregated assets and liabilities. According to the High Court in [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch), the Lux fund's alternative investment fund manager was originally Credit Suisse Fund Management, which delegated portfolio management to Credit Suisse Asset Management (Schweiz) AG, and the fund held the beneficial interests in the Fairymead Notes, debt securities which had a principal face value of $439,999,710. [src-033] [src-035] - Analysis: The portfolio manager, Credit Suisse Asset Management (Schweiz) AG, dates from 2017. A press report (March 2017) of a Credit Suisse announcement said that Credit Suisse AG was transferring its Swiss asset management business to this new legal entity, which, subject to approval by FINMA, the Swiss financial market supervisor, would start operating at the end of March 2017 under its own licence as a manager of collective investment schemes, as part of a new holding structure jointly owned by Credit Suisse (Schweiz) AG and Credit Suisse AG; Michel Degen was named its chief executive, remaining under Eric Varvel as global head of asset management. The Swiss commercial register entry itself is not in the record; the company's record with GLEIF, the global register of legal entity identifiers (LEIs), gives February 2017 as its creation date. The company was deregistered in August 2024, when UBS Asset Management Switzerland AG succeeded to it, as the High Court recorded. The uncontentious facts recorded in [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch) give the reporting line for 2019 to 2021: Eric Varvel was Credit Suisse's Global Head of Asset Management between late 2019 and mid-2021, Michel Degen, head of the Swiss and EMEA asset management divisions, reported to Varvel, and Degen's team included Luc Mathys, head of fixed income asset management, and Lukas Haas, a portfolio manager at Credit Suisse Asset Management. [src-121] [src-113] [src-035] ## SoftBank's 2020 investment and the concentration limits - Analysis: In evidence in [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch), Lex Greensill described the Credit Suisse supply chain finance funds as the principal source of the Greensill group's liquidity, saying they had provided over $10 billion of funding; that description and figure are Lex Greensill's evidence, not findings of the court. The court did find that Lex Greensill thought, at the time of Katerra's financial difficulties around October 2020, that a default on the Fairymead Notes would have been existential for Greensill. The judgment also records that on 24 March 2020, after the Covid-19 market decline had affected Greensill's liquidity, SoftBank Group Corp. invested $1.5 billion in the Lux fund. An internal SoftBank presentation gave the purpose as supporting the operations of Greensill Capital, whose supply chain deals the fund financed, and a side letter required the fund to acquire only notes from the Greensill group's supply chain finance programme while the investment lasted. The investment, agreed to run until 18 May 2020 and extended at the request of Greensill Capital Pty Limited, was fully redeemed and the side letter terminated by 16 July 2020. Credit Suisse's investment bank also worked on the group's capital raising: a Credit Suisse presentation of September 2020 addressed a potential initial public offering, the group engaged the bank's investment banking department for its fundraising, Credit Suisse attended the board meeting of Greensill Capital Pty Limited on 10 November 2020 to report on the debt and equity private placements, and documents showed the department hoped to earn $40-50 million in fees over the next 12-18 months. By December 2020 TDR Capital was the main prospective equity investor, with a $350M order subject to Lex Greensill personally investing $25M. [src-035] - Analysis: Credit Suisse Asset Management agreed new concentration limits with the Greensill group in 2020; a concentration limit caps the share of a fund that may be exposed to one obligor (the party that owes payment), sponsor or programme. According to [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch), on 3 July 2020 Lex Greensill, Adam Milenkovic, Chief Risk Officer of Credit Suisse's asset management division, and Luc Mathys signed an agreement limiting the Lux fund's exposure to multi-obligor programmes, note programmes backed by receivables (amounts owed for goods or services) from several obligors, to 5% by 31 December 2020, and its exposure to SoftBank Vision Fund-related companies to 7% in total and 3% per programme. On 22 July 2020 two Credit Suisse executives recorded that Lex Greensill was 'okay by year end' with bringing Vision Fund-backed companies down to 5%. Exchanges in December 2020, quoted in the judgment, concerned compliance with the limits. On 11 December a Greensill group employee told Lex Greensill that meeting the 3% per-programme and 5% overall SoftBank-sponsor limits required Katerra to be zeroed out, and Lex Greensill replied that Katerra should be excluded from the calculation because Credit Suisse had not reported it to the regulator as part of the exposure, it being a multi-obligor programme. On 21 December 2020 Lukas Haas of Credit Suisse Asset Management wrote that the 5% limit for single and multi-obligor programmes 'agreed between Lex and CS senior management earlier this year' had to be kept, with 'absolutly [sic] no room to deviate'. [src-035] ## The year-end trade and the January 2021 terms - Analysis: On 31 December 2020 the Greensill group arranged a trade with Credit Suisse Virtuoso SICAV-SIF, the 'Secondary Trade', under which Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK), via Greensill Bank AG, was to buy all the outstanding Fairymead Notes, with a total notional value of $439,999,710, for settlement on 14 January 2021; the notes held by the Lux fund were due mainly on 15 March 2021, with the balance on 17 May 2021. It was common ground in [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch) that the trade was cancelled on 7 January 2021, and internal Greensill and Credit Suisse confirmations of the cancellation followed on 11 and 12 January 2021. The court found that the Greensill group lacked the resources to perform the trade at any point up to the settlement date, and the Fairymead Notes all defaulted on maturity in March and May 2021. Credit Suisse executives and Lex Greensill gave different accounts of the exposure-reducing trades at the time. On 5 January 2021 Eric Varvel recorded in an internal email, quoted in the judgment, that Lex Greensill maintained that the trades bringing Credit Suisse's exposure down from 15% to 5% had been put in the market by Credit Suisse and then accepted by the Greensill team, that Lex Greensill claimed to have confirmed this with legal counsel, and that Lex Greensill continued to push for three more months. Michel Degen annotated the email 'THIS IS NOT TRUE', writing that the trades had been agreed and that Greensill's middle office had simply not instructed them, and told Lex Greensill directly that the trades had been agreed. In the judgment it was common ground that the Secondary Trade was entered into on 31 December 2020, and the court found on the evidence that Lex Greensill and Michel Degen had orally agreed it on 30 December 2020. [src-035] - Analysis: On 4 January 2021 Lex Greensill wrote to Eric Varvel that the funds' concentrations at 31 December 2020 exceeded the year-end targets for SoftBank Vision Fund companies and for GFG Alliance (GFG), and made proposals that Lex Greensill acknowledged were 'counter to the agreement struck in the summer of 2020': no further purchases from Vision Fund companies until the target was met, early repurchase of all Katerra notes when the Greensill equity raise closed, and GFG reductions matching a plan being agreed for Greensill Bank AG with BaFin, the German financial regulator, of $200mm in January 2021, $100mm by 31 March 2021 and $150mm by 30 June 2021. The email described all GFG assets as 100% insured and cited more than EUR700mm of government-guaranteed COVID loans for which GFG was eligible and an IPO of GFG's Australian subsidiary LibertyOneSteel. These are Lex Greensill's proposals and descriptions as quoted in the judgment, and the record does not establish that the stated insurance cover or refinancing sources existed as described. Eric Varvel replied the same day that the right approach was to complete the trades that had been confirmed, keeping both sides on-side with the Credit Suisse board and FINMA, and that breaking confirmed trades was not the right direction. After the Secondary Trade was cancelled on 7 January 2021, it was agreed instead that the remaining Fairymead Notes would be redeemed over a longer period, on terms that Michel Degen sent Lex Greensill that day, 'discussed and agreed with our CEO and EXB', to be confirmed before Credit Suisse informed FINMA of an extension of its new guidelines to 31 March 2021: the notes of the Katerra multi-obligor programme (438mn) were to mature on 15 or 31 March 2021 or be bought back by Greensill by 31 March 2021, with no roll-over of maturities before that date, and Vision Fund-related notes were to be at or below 5% of each supply chain finance fund by 31 March 2021; Lex Greensill replied the same evening 'We accept those terms'. Minutes of the board of Greensill Capital Pty Limited of the same day record Lex Greensill reporting wider conditions: because of the limits the fund was no longer buying GFG and SoftBank portfolio company assets, with a potential impact on GCUK's liquidity, and Credit Suisse had agreed to suspend its new rules until the end of March and resume buying GFG assets on condition of a $100m reduction in GFG assets by the end of January (an aggregate $200m reduction for January), a GFG seller concentration limit of 9% by the end of March and 5% by 30 June 2021, a $150m buy-back of SoftBank portfolio company assets when the equity raise closed, and a 12-month option for Credit Suisse to buy $150m of shares at the equity-raise valuation. Those conditions are as Lex Greensill reported them to the board; Credit Suisse's own email of that day, also quoted in the judgment, sets out only the Vision Fund and Katerra terms. [src-035] - Analysis: Credit Suisse's own note of a call with FINMA on 8 January 2021, quoted in the judgment, records that its head of risk Lara Warner and Eric Varvel informed FINMA that the concentration risk to SoftBank Vision Fund-sponsored papers had been reduced to 16% by year-end, missing the internal 5% target set by the Group CEO because Greensill had flagged very late that it needed more time; that no regulatory breach was associated with this internal guideline breach; and that Greensill had been told Credit Suisse would not renew its programmes and would run down the funds, targeting a run-off exposure of 7 per cent by mid-March. This is the bank's record of what it told the regulator; in its February 2023 conclusions FINMA found that the bank had made partly false and overly positive statements to it about the claims selection process and the funds' exposure to certain debtors. Later descriptions of Credit Suisse's position come from Lex Greensill's emails to SoftBank, also quoted in the judgment. On 29 January 2021 Lex Greensill told SoftBank executives that Credit Suisse had agreed to drop its 31 January reduction requirements for Vision Fund and GFG exposures and to raise the available GFG limit, freeing about $125mm of operating cash for Greensill, on the sole condition that View Glass notes of $270mm notional, covered by the SoftBank-Greensill credit default swap (a contract protecting the holder against a borrower's default), were repurchased and settled by 5 February 2021, and asked SoftBank to buy them back. On 4 February 2021 a SoftBank Group email recorded that Masayoshi Son and Rajeev Misra had concluded that SoftBank Group and SoftBank Vision Fund 2 should not act, and SoftBank Investment Advisers paused the transaction the same day. On 24 February 2021 Lex Greensill told SoftBank Investment Advisers that Credit Suisse had sketched out a plan, to go to its board for in-principle support, for 'a committed underwrite of the entire GFG book', and on 26 February 2021 wrote that the SoftBank Vision Fund 2 investment committee had declined a proposed co-purchase of $300mm of insured GFG paper, of which Credit Suisse was to take $150mm and SoftBank Vision Fund 2 $150mm; no Credit Suisse statement about that plan appears in the record. Days later, on 1 March 2021, the funds' boards suspended dealings in the funds and approved the start of their liquidation. [src-035] [src-032] [src-033] ## The bridge loan and Greensill's cash needs in early 2021 - Analysis: According to FINMA's press release of 28 February 2023, Greensill told Credit Suisse it was planning an initial public offering with the bank and first needed a bridging loan; the Credit Suisse risk manager responsible for the loan identified a number of risks in Greensill's business model and recommended internally that it not be granted, but a senior manager overruled the recommendation. That is FINMA's account in its proceedings against Credit Suisse, and the release does not name the borrowing company, the amount or the date of the loan. In its answer QoN026-01 to the Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) stated that elements of Credit Suisse's relationship with the Greensill group were managed by Credit Suisse in Australia and that there had been reports that this included the booking of 50% of a USD140mil bridging loan and involvement in a potential private placement or initial public offering that never took place; ASIC said it was engaging with Credit Suisse on these matters. ASIC relayed these reports without stating the booking as established, and no Credit Suisse response on the point appears in the record. [src-032] [src-034] - Analysis: A slide deck for the board meeting of Greensill Capital Pty Limited on 26 January 2021, quoted in [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch), listed among the 'Must Haves Q1 2021' the key outflows of GCUK: USD 140m to repay the Credit Suisse bridge loan and USD 125m of insurance collateral at the end of February, USD 400m for the Katerra repurchase in mid-March and a USD 40m Katerra balance at the end of March. Notes taken at the same meeting by an observer from SoftBank Investment Advisers recorded that the Katerra notes were all held by Credit Suisse Virtuoso, with $400M maturing in March and $40M in May, and that if Greensill ceased to be a going concern Credit Suisse could still claim under the Greensill Bank insurance policy, Greensill would need to pay $100M under the deductible (the part of a loss borne by the insured side) and 'TBCC' would effectively become another creditor of GCUK. These are an observer's notes of a board discussion, not a statement of agreed terms, and the judgment makes no finding on the deductible arrangement. GCUK's administrators later stated that on 4 March 2021 one of Greensill Capital Pty Limited's financial creditors accelerated a $140 million loan, calling it in early, and demanded immediate payment from GCUK as guarantor, which left GCUK unable to pay its debts as they fell due. The House of Commons Treasury Committee's report published on 20 July 2021 repeats that sequence and identifies the lender as Credit Suisse, and on 8 March 2021 the High Court found that US$140 million was immediately due and payable by GCUK as guarantor on a Credit Suisse AG facility to its holding company and that GCUK was cash-flow insolvent. [src-035] [src-031] [src-052] [src-029] ## Suspension, administration and recoveries - Analysis: On 1 March 2021 the boards of the four Credit Suisse supply chain finance funds suspended redemptions and subscriptions and then approved the start of their liquidation. Credit Suisse Asset Management's December 2022 Q&A gives as reasons the considerable uncertainty about the valuation of some of the funds' assets and the reduced availability of insurance cover for new investments, which made it unachievable for the funds to stay invested in line with their investment policies; management fees were waived. Lex Greensill told the Treasury Committee that Greensill failed because its principal insurance provider decided not to renew its cover and, ultimately, Credit Suisse determined, roughly a week before the administration, that it would no longer fund Greensill's business; Lex Greensill attributed the failure to that withdrawal of insurance capacity. At the hearing on 8 March 2021 at which the High Court placed GCUK and Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited in administration, the UK insolvency procedure in which an administrator takes over the running of a company ([2021] EWHC 700 (Ch)), counsel appeared for Credit Suisse Asset Management as noteholder, which the judge described as the beneficial owner of receivables whose funds had invested some $6.2 billion in them. Credit Suisse Asset Management did not oppose the orders, and Credit Suisse, as one of the lenders to the group, consented to them, as did the Peter Greensill Family Trust. In the funds' liquidation investors were repaid in instalments: Credit Suisse Asset Management reported that by 30 November 2022 about USD 6.78 bn had been returned to investors in the four funds in seven instalments and that, with the cash still held, the funds' cash position equalled about USD 7.4 bn, or 74% of their assets under management at suspension. [src-033] [src-031] [src-052] - Analysis: By the sixth payout on 15 December 2021 the four funds had distributed 68% of their combined NAV of 26 February 2021: 64.8% for the Lux fund, 63.4% for the Nova High Income fund, 95.4% for the Nova Investment Grade fund and 99.7% for the Liechtenstein investment grade fund, whose final payment of about USD 31.3 mn on 11 November 2022 brought its total returned to about USD 667 mn, 99.7% of its NAV at suspension (the Q&A gives the same 99.7% for both dates without explaining it). Recovery efforts focused on programmes totalling USD 2.3 bn at 26 February 2021, essentially related to GFG Alliance, Katerra and Bluestone; at 30 November 2022 the GFG, Katerra and Bluestone notes made up 76.8% of the Lux fund's remaining notional note exposure. The four funds had provisioned about USD 308 mn, adjusted for the closure of the liquidated Liechtenstein fund, for estimated external recovery costs from 2021 to 2026: USD 249 mn in the Lux fund, USD 58 mn in the Nova High Income fund and USD 1 mn in the Nova Investment Grade fund. The provision covered among other things the operating expenses of the supply chain finance infrastructure, such as GCUK and Citi/TMF, for administration, recovery, insurance and trustee services, with Credit Suisse absorbing internal costs; the main cost categories were legal advice excluding insurance (47%), insurance advisers (21%) and Greensill servicing costs (21%). [src-033] - Analysis: For GFG Alliance, Credit Suisse Asset Management agreed in October 2021 the full repayment, without a haircut (a reduction of the amount repaid), of the funds' exposure to GFG's Australian operations: an initial AUD 129 mn (about USD 96 mn), received in October 2021, and the remaining principal of AUD 240 mn (about USD 178 mn) with interest by mid-2023. By November 2022 about AUD 319 mn had come back from the Australian entities, AUD 152 mn to the Lux fund and AUD 168 mn to the Nova High Income fund. The remaining GFG exposure outside Australia was allocated in June 2022 as USD 651 mn to the Lux fund and USD 236 mn to the Nova High Income fund, and in November 2022 Credit Suisse Asset Management signed a non-binding term sheet with GFG and other creditors on a debt restructuring. In June 2022 it agreed with Bluestone and its shareholders a two-year standstill, a pause in enforcement, with recurring payments of up to USD 320 mn to all noteholders, calculated on Bluestone's operating performance, and a sharing of the proceeds of any sale of the Bluestone entities; about USD 11.5 mn had been received by 30 November 2022. Of the original Bluestone exposure of USD 850 mn, USD 690 mn related to the Credit Suisse funds and was allocated in June 2022 as USD 595 mn to the Lux fund and USD 95 mn to the Nova High Income fund. Credit Suisse Asset Management also reported in December 2022 that it had claimed for all insurable losses within the relevant limitation period: 17 insurance claims for the Lux fund covering USD 1,723 mn of exposure, of which 9 claims for USD 1,405 mn concerned GFG- and Bluestone-related entities, and 4 claims for the Nova High Income fund covering USD 469 mn, making 18 claims across the two funds for about USD 2.2 bn because one claim can cover both funds. All were claims under notes that included future receivables, amounts expected to become owed in the future. [src-033] - Analysis: Two exposures went to court. According to its December 2022 investor Q&A, on 22 February 2022 Credit Suisse Asset Management began proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia in New South Wales over the funds' Catfoss Renewables exposure, in order to be joined to insurance cases already before the court under the same policy. In the Q&A it said it expected the insurer to challenge the validity of the relevant policies across most, perhaps all, of its insurance claims, while its own firm position was that the policies were valid and the insurers' claims unfounded; the insurer's defence is described there only as Credit Suisse Asset Management anticipated it. According to the High Court in [2025] EWHC 1380 (Ch), the insurers' defences in the Australian proceedings included a general defence that a policy referred to there as the Parallel Policy was invalid, alleging that the Greensill group made misrepresentations and non-disclosures when it procured cover for counterparties including the Catfoss group; in [2026] EWHC 639 (Ch) the court described the contention that misrepresentations relating to Catfoss made policies providing cover of about US$4.6 billion void as a defence raised by insurers in the Australian litigation. On 25 September 2026 Insurance Australia Group announced that Insurance Australia Limited had agreed to settle, on confidential terms, the proceedings brought by Credit Suisse entities against it and other parties in the Federal Court of Australia, whose claimed amounts had an aggregate face value of about A$2.8 billion plus interest. [src-033] [src-030] [src-054] [src-005] - Analysis: For the Katerra exposure, disclosed by Credit Suisse as 'Fairymead' in the Lux fund, Credit Suisse Asset Management chose litigation as its route to recovery, while pursuing insurance claims for GFG and Bluestone: on 23 December 2021 Credit Suisse filed two applications for document discovery in federal courts in California and Arizona, and on 3 August 2022 a preliminary application in the English courts for proposed proceedings against entities affiliated with SoftBank Group Corp. Credit Suisse Asset Management reported that at a hearing on 7 December 2022 the English court gave permission to bring the claim against SoftBank. In those proceedings the SoftBank defendants denied that the claimants had any entitlement to relief against them under section 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986, contending that the transactions were part of a linked set intended to put the Greensill group in funds; the claim, decided as [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch), was dismissed on 15 October 2025. [src-033] [src-035] ## FINMA's findings and other regulators - Analysis: FINMA set out its view of the funds in a press release of 28 February 2023 concluding enforcement proceedings. It stated that Credit Suisse launched the first of four supply chain finance funds with Greensill in 2017, Greensill acting as financing company, securitising the claims (packaging them into tradable securities) and transferring the securities to the funds, with specific insurance meant to secure most claims against buyer default. FINMA found that Credit Suisse's asset management company had little knowledge and control over the specific claims, which Greensill rather than Credit Suisse selected and reviewed, and that Credit Suisse left Greensill to arrange the insurance in its own name; the funds were distributed to qualified investors with their risk shown as low, and around ten billion US dollars was invested when Credit Suisse closed them at short notice in March 2021. FINMA also found that the funds' risk character changed decisively over time: in some instances Greensill transferred to them future claims that had not yet arisen and so financed some companies whose creditworthiness was doubtful, while Credit Suisse did not at first realise the consequences, had no knowledge or control over how many claims were actually contractually owed, and relied on the insurance cover organised by Greensill. These are findings about Credit Suisse's conduct made in supervisory proceedings against the bank, to which no Greensill company was a party; they describe Greensill's transfers only as seen in those proceedings and are not findings against a Greensill company or determinations about GCUK. [src-032] - Analysis: On the same day FINMA concluded its enforcement proceedings against Credit Suisse over its business relationship with Lex Greensill and the Greensill companies. It found that over a period of years the bank had seriously breached its supervisory obligations on risk management and appropriate organisational structures, had not sufficiently fulfilled its supervisory duties as an asset manager, and had made partly false and overly positive statements to FINMA about the claims selection process and the funds' exposure to certain debtors. FINMA ordered remedial measures, including periodic executive-board review of about 500 key business relationships, a responsibility document for about 600 senior managers and an audit mandatary to check compliance, and opened four enforcement proceedings against former Credit Suisse managers, saying it would not comment on those proceedings or the identities of the individuals. FINMA recorded that Credit Suisse had adopted a wide range of organisational measures based on its own investigation, revising governance structures and strengthening control processes, which FINMA supported. The findings concern Credit Suisse, not GCUK. In Australia, ASIC's answer QoN026-01 to the Parliamentary Joint Committee stated that Greensill Capital Pty Limited, the Australian parent of the group, which went into liquidation by resolution of its creditors on 22 April 2021 with Grant Thornton Australia as liquidator, was a major creditor of its UK subsidiary GCUK, and that ASIC was considering whether the parent's financial reports for 2018 and 2019 complied with the Australian Accounting Standards and whether the audits of those accounts complied with the Australian Auditing Standards. ASIC described that review as in progress, and no outcome of it appears in the record. [src-032] [src-034] - Analysis: According to a press report (June 2025), FINMA's full report, compiled in December 2022, was released during the trial of Credit Suisse Virtuoso's claim against SoftBank under a London court order. The report itself is not in the record; the press report quoted it as stating that the investments of large Greensill investors such as General Atlantic and SoftBank 'were primarily used to pay out private investors and to provide Greensill Bank, which was increasingly coming under regulatory scrutiny, with additional capital', and that under Lex Greensill's management the company had its own fleet of business jets. The quoted passage does not say which Greensill company received or used the funds. The same press report said the FINMA report showed that senior Credit Suisse managers received anonymous messages from 2018 questioning their 'character judgment' in choosing Greensill Capital as a partner and in giving it discretion over clients' money, and raising concern that a 'large proportion' of the loans went to companies in Sanjeev Gupta's steel businesses; according to the report, warnings continued until at least June 2019, and one senior manager forwarded the 2018 tip-off to Lex Greensill. FINMA's own February 2023 release states that the closure of another provider's Greensill-related fund led to enquiries at Credit Suisse in 2018 and that the media and FINMA repeatedly put critical questions to the bank, but does not quote the messages. The report was produced in FINMA's supervisory proceedings against Credit Suisse, to which no Greensill company was a party, and is not a court finding. According to the press report, a representative of Lex Greensill declined to comment, and UBS called the matter a legacy Credit Suisse matter whose conduct pre-dated UBS's acquisition of Credit Suisse. [src-045] [src-032] ## Merger into UBS and the Lux fund today - Analysis: In 2024 the Credit Suisse entities concerned passed to UBS companies. Credit Suisse AG of Zurich (CHE-106.831.974) was deleted from the Swiss commercial register on 31 May 2024, its assets and liabilities passing by merger to UBS AG of Zurich and Basel (CHE-101.329.561), as published in the Swiss Official Gazette of Commerce; its GLEIF record (LEI ANGGYXNX0JLX3X63JN86) shows it as inactive after a merger effective 31 May 2024, with successor LEI BFM8T61CT2L1QCEMIK50. According to [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch), Credit Suisse Asset Management (Schweiz) AG of Zurich (CHE-427.360.640) was deregistered from the commercial register of the Canton of Zurich on 30 August 2024, UBS Asset Management Switzerland AG having succeeded to its rights and obligations, and Credit Suisse Fund Management was deregistered on 1 October 2024, UBS Asset Management (Europe) SA having succeeded to it. The GLEIF record of the asset manager's LEI 529900QDWOQDW46HBC70 shows the entity as inactive following a merger and acquisition event recorded with effect from 29 August 2024 22:00 UTC, with successor LEI 254900SFTV4L52IHCW98. The Lux fund itself remains registered: the GLEIF golden copy of 21 October 2026 lists the Credit Suisse (Lux) Supply Chain Finance Fund (LEI 549300TIGSPHR48XV551) as an active Luxembourg sub-fund, first registered on 21 April 2017, with its address care of UBS Asset Management (Europe) S.A. at 33A avenue J.F. Kennedy, Luxembourg, and with relationship links to an umbrella fund and a fund manager. [src-061] [src-114] [src-113] [src-035] [src-104] ## Sources - [src-033] Company statement source · src-033 - [src-035] Judgment: Credit Suisse Virtuoso SICAV-SIF and GLAS Trust Corporation Limited v SoftBank Group Corp. and others [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch), The National Archives (Find Case Law), 2025-10-15 - [src-121] Media source · src-121 - [src-113] GLEIF LEI record 529900QDWOQDW46HBC70 (Credit Suisse Asset Management (Schweiz) AG), Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation, 2026-10-21 - [src-032] FINMA news release: FINMA concludes proceedings against Credit Suisse in connection with Greensill, Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority FINMA, 2023-02-28 - [src-034] ASIC answer to question on notice QoN026-01 (Greensill), Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Australian Securities and Investments Commission (published by the Parliament of Australia) - [src-031] House of Commons Treasury Committee, Lessons from Greensill Capital, Sixth Report of Session 2021–22 (HC 151), House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2021-07-20 - [src-052] Judgment: Re Greensill Capital (UK) Limited and Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited [2021] EWHC 700 (Ch), The National Archives (Find Case Law), 2021-03-08 - [src-029] Notice of administrators' proposals (form AM03) for Greensill Capital (UK) Limited and Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited, Companies House, 2021-04 - [src-030] Company statement source · src-030 - [src-054] Judgment: Secretary of State for Business and Trade v Greensill [2025] EWHC 1380 (Ch), The National Archives (Find Case Law), 2025 - [src-005] Court record source · src-005 - [src-045] Media source · src-045 - [src-061] Corporate registry source · src-061 - [src-114] GLEIF LEI record ANGGYXNX0JLX3X63JN86 (Credit Suisse AG), Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation, 2026-10-21 - [src-104] GLEIF LEI record 549300TIGSPHR48XV551 (Credit Suisse (Lux) Supply Chain Finance Fund), Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation, 2026-10-21