--- title: "Evidence records" language: en canonical: https://dossiertwist.com/dossiers/greensill-capital-uk-limited/evidence-records/ as_of: 2026-10-22 keywords: ["Greensill Capital (UK) Limited","Greensill Capital Pty Limited","Lex Greensill","Greensill Bank AG","supply chain finance","Credit Suisse supply chain finance funds","SoftBank Vision Fund","Katerra","Fairymead notes","GFG Alliance","Sanjeev Gupta","trade credit insurance","BCC Trade Credit","Insurance Australia Limited","CLBILS","British Business Bank","administration","Grant Thornton","director disqualification","Treasury Committee"] --- # Evidence records **Question.** Which records support the articles? **Answer.** Full assertions with source references, qualifications, responses and known outcomes. The topic articles explain these records in context. ## Greensill Capital (UK) Limited: company record and 2016–2019 accounts - Documented: Greensill Capital (UK) Limited is a private limited company registered at Companies House under number 08126173; it was incorporated on 2 July 2012 under the name Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited and has carried its present name since 18 July 2012. [src-001] - Documented: Companies House lists the status of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) as "In Administration" and records its nature of business as SIC 64999, financial intermediation not elsewhere classified. [src-001] - Documented: The registered office of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) was moved on 22 March 2021 from One Southampton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2R 0LR to 4 Hardman Square, Spinningfields, Manchester M3 3EB, and on 15 November 2021 to 11th Floor Landmark, St Peter's Square, 1 Oxford Street, Manchester M1 4PB; since 20 May 2025 the address has been recorded as care of Grant Thornton UK Advisory & Tax LLP at the same building. [src-017] [src-006] [src-001] - Documented: Companies House shows the accounts and confirmation statement of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) as overdue: the last accounts filed were made up to 31 December 2019, the accounts to 31 December 2020 were due by 30 September 2021, and the last confirmation statement is dated 2 July 2020, with the next one (statement date 2 July 2021) due by 16 July 2021. [src-001] - Documented: Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) filed full accounts at Companies House for the year to 31 December 2017 on 6 July 2018, for the year to 31 December 2018 on 9 October 2019, and for the year to 31 December 2019 on 13 January 2021. [src-081] [src-017] - Documented: Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) changed its constitution three times in the months before its administration: Companies House records a resolution adopting articles of association with a statement of the company's objects on 9 November 2020, a resolution altering the articles with new memorandum and articles on 18 November 2020, and a further resolution altering the articles, with new memorandum and articles and a statement of objects, on 5 March 2021. [src-017] [src-035] - Qualification: The source is the Companies House filing index; the content of the resolutions and articles was not reviewed, so what was changed is not stated here. - Documented: On 25 June 2026 a form TM01 was filed for Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) terminating the appointment of Alexander David Greensill as a director with effect from 17 June 2026. [src-006] - Documented: The Companies House officer list of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) records 20 officers and 20 resignations, so no director or secretary of the company is shown as currently appointed. [src-003] - Documented: The Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation (GLEIF) record for Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) gives legal entity identifier 2138004D9J9DZUANAI93, first registered on 16 October 2014 and validated against Companies House number 08126173, with the previous legal name Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited. The registration status is "LAPSED": the renewal due on 28 March 2025 was not made. In place of parent relationship records, the record shows reporting exceptions for the direct and ultimate parent. [src-103] - Documented: The Solicitors Regulation Authority's register lists "Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (in administration)", head office in Manchester (SRA organisation number 605096), as an organisation where an SRA-regulated solicitor works, marked "Not regulated by an approved regulator for legal services"; the company appears there as a workplace of an in-house solicitor, not as a regulated law firm. [src-069] - Documented: In a letter of 4 May 2021 to the chair of the House of Commons Treasury Committee, the Financial Conduct Authority stated that Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) had been registered since 6 May 2014 as an "Annex 1" firm under the Money Laundering Regulations, so that the FCA supervised it only for compliance with anti-money laundering rules; that registration regime is different from authorisation under the Financial Services and Markets Act, and GCUK's wider activities, including supply chain finance origination and employer salary advance schemes, were not regulated by the FCA. After GCUK entered administration, the FCA decided, for the time being, not to cancel the registration. [src-016] [src-004] - Documented: The audited accounts of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) for 2017 report revenue of $115.9 million (2016: $42.1 million), of which $103.8 million came from supply chain finance products, an operating profit of $34.5 million (2016: an operating loss of $57.4 million) and a profit after tax of $31.9 million (2016: a loss of $54.4 million). At 31 December 2017 total assets were $368.9 million (2016: $152.6 million), total liabilities $270.1 million (2016: $117.7 million) and net assets $98.8 million (2016: $34.9 million); no dividend was paid. [src-082] [src-097] - Attributed: In the strategic report for 2017, the directors of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) explained that the 2016 administrative expenses of $99.5 million (2017: $86.1 million) included one-off impairments on historic loans; they said that after a strategic decision in early 2016 to improve the quality of the portfolio, the large losses of 2016 were not expected to recur. [src-082] - Qualification: This is the directors' own explanation in the strategic report; the retained accounts do not itemise the impairments or identify the loans concerned. - Documented: For 2018, Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) reported revenue of $233.6 million, 101% more than in 2017, made up of $112.5 million from supply chain finance products and $121.1 million of other income; administrative expenses of $193.5 million; an impairment charge of $13.3 million after the adoption of IFRS 9; and a profit after tax of $33.3 million. At 31 December 2018 total assets were $277.7 million, total liabilities $148.7 million and equity $129.1 million; no dividend was paid. [src-097] - Documented: For 2019, Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) reported revenue of $419.6 million (2018: $233.6 million), an operating profit of $37.5 million after impairment expenses of $47.3 million, and a profit after tax of $31.8 million. At 31 December 2019 its total assets were $682.3 million, including $251.1 million of cash and $281.7 million of financial assets; total liabilities were $527.0 million and net assets $155.3 million. [src-018] - Documented: Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) reported its 2019 revenue by region as $209.8 million from Europe, the Middle East and Africa (2018: $77.1 million), $176.2 million from the Americas (2018: $102.8 million) and $33.6 million from Asia Pacific (2018: $53.7 million). [src-018] - Documented: At 31 December 2019 the trade and other payables of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) were $448.8 million, including $219.5 million owed to fellow group undertakings and $197.3 million of accruals; the chief executive's statement in the accounts attributed the rise in current liabilities from $149 million to $513 million mainly to increases of $189 million in amounts due to fellow group undertakings and $168 million in accruals. [src-018] - Documented: Saffery Champness LLP audited the accounts of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) for 2017, 2018 and 2019 and reported each year that they gave a true and fair view of the company's affairs and of its profit for the year. Its report on the 2018 accounts is dated 1 July 2019, and its report on the 2019 accounts is dated 26 May 2020, four days after the directors signed their report for that year on 22 May 2020. [src-018] [src-082] [src-097] - Documented: Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) reported no employees other than its directors in 2017, 2018 and 2019; according to the 2019 accounts, the directors were paid by another group company. [src-018] [src-082] [src-097] - Documented: Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) raised equity by issuing shares for $37.8 million in 2016 and $32.0 million in 2017, including 320,000 ordinary dollar shares of $0.01 each issued at $100 per share on 29 September 2017; its share premium account stood at $134.8 million from the end of 2017 to the end of 2019. [src-082] [src-018] - Documented: Key management personnel of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK), including all directors, received $1,994,705 in 2016, $3,815,171 in 2017, $1,929,131 in 2018 and $14,643,229 in 2019 for their services to the company; most of this was paid by a fellow group company and recharged to GCUK as a management fee. The 2019 accounts attribute the increase to a doubling of the size of the executive team, the granting of share options and the outstanding performance of the business. [src-082] [src-018] - Documented: During 2019 a member of the key management personnel of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) lent the company $25,000,000; the loan was fully repaid during the year. [src-018] - Qualification: The accounts do not identify the lender or state the purpose, terms or interest of the loan. - Documented: In 2019 Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) contributed $5,326,000 to the Greensill Capital Employee Benefit Trust; the contribution was recognised as a distribution directly in reserves and shown as a financing cash outflow. [src-018] - Documented: At 31 December 2017 Greensill Capital Pty Limited, the parent, owed Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) $136,396,264, whereas a year earlier GCUK had owed the parent $16,256,362; GCUK owed $238,881,818 to the parent's other subsidiaries. In 2017 those fellow subsidiaries charged GCUK management fees of $29,070,698, mainly for salaries, bonuses, travel and accommodation, the parent charged $1,967,300, and GCUK charged the parent $4,724,977 in interest. [src-082] - Documented: In 2018 the fellow subsidiaries of Greensill Capital Pty Limited charged Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) management fees of $58,731,997, mainly for employee costs, the parent charged $5,122,945 and GCUK's own subsidiaries $210,000, while GCUK charged interest of $2,266,310 to the parent. At 31 December 2018 the parent owed GCUK $50,553,731 and GCUK owed $30,452,731 to fellow subsidiaries. [src-097] - Documented: In 2019 group undertakings charged Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) management fees of $212.7 million (2018: $67.1 million). At 31 December 2019 group undertakings owed GCUK $12.7 million (2018: $50.7 million), GCUK owed them $219.5 million (2018: $30.5 million) plus $15.1 million of accrued fees. The accounts also record $9,000 of property rent paid to a member of key management personnel, $78,000 of revenue from an entity under common control of a member of key management personnel and $369,000 of administration services bought from an entity under common control. [src-018] - Documented: In 2017 Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) acquired 11,936,000 C shares in "GAM Greensill SCF SCSp" (GAM Greensill Supply Chain Finance Fund SCSp) in exchange for assuming a matching payment obligation of $1,207,438,000; the shares and the obligation were offset under IAS 32, so that their net carrying value was nil. [src-082] - Documented: In 2019 Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) subscribed a further $681,000 on 13 May and $25,000,000 on 19 June in GAM Greensill Supply Chain Finance Fund SCSp; the $25,000,000 was redeemed on 17 December 2019, leaving investments in subsidiaries of $793 thousand at the year end. [src-018] [src-093] [src-088] - Outcome: Notices published in Luxembourg's electronic register of companies and associations (RESA) on 21 March 2022 record that the shareholders of GAM Greensill Supply Chain Finance Fund SCSp decided on 2 March 2021 to put it into voluntary liquidation; a company-data aggregator summarising the Luxembourg register records the partnership as dissolved on 15 December 2022. - Documented: After selling its shareholding in Greensill Bank AG to Greensill Capital Pty Limited in 2018, Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) held contingent convertible loan notes issued by the bank worth $3,965 thousand at the end of 2018; at the end of 2019 it held contingent convertible loan notes and silent participations in the bank, a related party, worth $13,404 thousand, after a revaluation gain of $2,035,000 in 2019. [src-018] [src-097] - Documented: At the end of 2018 Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) held derivatives valued at $25,000 thousand, consisting of a warrant over the shares of another company valued with a model; at the end of 2019 it held derivatives of $51,561 thousand, relating to an equity warrant and foreign exchange forward contracts, and trading assets of $213,318 thousand held for a short time before distribution to investors. [src-018] [src-097] - Documented: The cost to Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) of its continuing involvement in assets transferred to unconsolidated structured entities, made up of the cost of providing insurance and credit default swaps for the end investors and the charge for expected credit losses on those assets, was $55.3 million in 2019 (2018: $18.7 million) and $71.8 million cumulatively; GCUK had no contractual obligation to repurchase any of the transferred assets. [src-018] - Attributed: According to the National Audit Office's July 2021 report, Greensill reported that the Greensill group provided $143 billion of financing in 2019 to more than eight million customers and suppliers in more than 170 countries, and that for the year to 31 December 2019 the group had global revenues of over $475 million, an operating profit of more than $52 million, total assets of more than $5.3 billion and net assets of $440 million. [src-077] - Qualification: These are Greensill's own figures as relayed by the NAO, which did not audit them; the consolidated accounts of Greensill Capital Pty Limited are not in the record. ## Lawsuits involving Greensill Capital (UK) Limited and its directors - Documented: On 16 March 2021, after the administration had begun, forms TM01 were filed for Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) terminating the directorships of William Crothers with effect from 4 February 2021 and of Sean Denis Robson-Hanafin, Bartholomeus Gerardus Joannes Ras, Neil Albert Garrod, Divya Sara Eapen and Alastair Kenneth Eadie with effect from 12 February 2021. A second-filed TM01 for Sean Denis Robson-Hanafin was registered on 26 March 2024, and the officer list now gives 20 December 2020 as the end of that directorship. [src-017] [src-006] [src-003] [src-035] - Documented: The 2019 annual report of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited names Alexander Greensill, William Crothers, Alastair Eadie, Bartholomeus Ras, Neil Garrod and Sean Robson-Hanafin as its directors and Jonathan Lane as company secretary. [src-018] - Documented: A Part 7 claim, BL-2025-000562, Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (in administration) v Greensill and others, was filed in the Business List of the High Court on 29 April 2025 and is listed as a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against seven defendants: Alexander (Lex) Greensill, Sean Hanafin, Divya Eapen, Alastair Eadie, Neil Garrod, Jonathan Lane and Bartholomeus Ras. A court docket summary and a press report (April 2025) describe it as a claim brought by the company's administrators against former directors. [src-072] [src-044] [src-015] - Qualification: The claim is the company's allegation against the defendants; its particulars, the sums claimed and any defences are not in the record, and no hearing or judgment was found. No response by the defendants was found in the record. - Outcome: The joint administrators' progress report for 8 March to 7 September 2026 says that their investigations in respect of former directors are ongoing and lists claims against GCUK's former directors among continuing work, giving no further details so as not to prejudice their position. - Documented: On 15–16 March 2021 Bluestone Resources Inc., Bluestone Coal Sales Corporation, Blackstone Energy, Ltd., James C. Justice II, Cathy L. Justice and James C. Justice III sued Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, Lex Greensill and Roland Hartley-Urquhart in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (1:21-cv-02253, Judge Jesse M. Furman), seeking direct, consequential and punitive damages for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, breach of fiduciary duties, aiding and abetting those breaches and civil conspiracy in connection with the financing Greensill Capital (UK) Limited had provided to the Bluestone coal businesses. [src-105] [src-106] - Qualification: The complaint's allegations were not answered or adjudicated. - Response: Lex Greensill and Greensill Capital (UK) Limited appeared through counsel; Lex Greensill applied in August 2021 to stay the action, and on 2 September 2021 the court granted a temporary stay with the plaintiffs' consent, later ordering that the individual defendants' deadlines, including their time to answer the complaint, be stayed for 90 days if a Chapter 15 stay was granted. - Outcome: The case was automatically stayed as to Greensill Capital (UK) Limited after U.S. recognition of its administration in September 2021; on 1 July 2022 the court dismissed it following a settlement, with leave to reopen within sixty days if the settlement was not consummated, and on 1–2 August 2022 the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed all claims against all three defendants with prejudice, no defendant having filed an answer. The settlement terms are not in the record. - Attributed: The Bluestone plaintiffs alleged that Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, as buyer, financed Bluestone under a Customer Agreement of 14 June 2018 (a supply chain finance programme, with about $70 million advanced) and a Receivables Purchase Agreement of 26 September 2018 (about $780 million advanced), the latter contemplating purchases of 'prospective receivables' not yet generated by Bluestone from a list of 'prospective buyers' that included entities that were not and might never become Bluestone customers; the maximum outstanding purchase price under the receivables agreement rose from $140 million to $785 million under a letter agreement of 29 January 2021. [src-106] [src-080] [src-105] - Qualification: Allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint of March 2021 in S.D.N.Y. 1:21-cv-02253; the defendants filed no answer and the case was dismissed with prejudice in August 2022 after a settlement whose terms are not in the record. - Response: In written evidence to the Treasury Committee in 2021, answering a question about a letter by Sanjeev Gupta, Lex Greensill said that the term 'prospective receivables' was unknown to Greensill Capital and did not appear in its client or investor documentation, and that it offered 'future receivables' programmes whose nature was disclosed to investors. - Attributed: The complaint alleged that Greensill Capital (UK) Limited advanced $850 million to Bluestone, of which $108 million was paid back as fees and $19 million kept as initial discounts, so that Bluestone received $723 million in cash; that the fees, under no fewer than 16 fee letters dated between 14 June 2018 and 30 November 2020, included $25 million paid on 10 June 2019 for cancelling a December 2018 warrant over 2.5% of Bluestone Resources, replaced by a warrant over 10% at negligible cost said to be worth at least $100 million; that it also received about $89 million of interest; and that all these payments were funded with money lent by Greensill Capital (UK) Limited itself. [src-106] [src-105] - Qualification: Allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint; not answered or adjudicated before the voluntary dismissal with prejudice in August 2022. - Attributed: The complaint alleged that Bluestone had no choice but to enter a Guarantee and Security Agreement on 3 November 2020 pledging collateral to Greensill Capital (UK) Limited and to pay it a $15 million fee, both without new consideration; that Roland Hartley-Urquhart demanded payment of $300 million on 20 February 2021 and repayment of $850 million on 26 February 2021, each by the end of the third quarter of 2021; and that on 1 March 2021 Roland Hartley-Urquhart told Bluestone that Greensill Capital had collapsed and would not provide a $5 million advance due by the end of February 2021 under the programme documents. [src-106] [src-105] - Qualification: Allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint; not answered or adjudicated before the voluntary dismissal with prejudice in August 2022. - Attributed: The complaint alleged that around 9 February 2021 the plaintiffs learned for the first time of obligations of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited to funds managed by Credit Suisse relating to Bluestone's financing, when Roland Hartley-Urquhart urgently demanded that Bluestone make an additional payment to those funds, explaining that Greensill Capital had itself failed to make its own required payment to them, in what the plaintiffs described as an attempt to pressure Bluestone into covering the unpaid obligation. [src-106] [src-105] - Qualification: Allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint; not answered or adjudicated before the voluntary dismissal with prejudice in August 2022. - Attributed: The complaint described Lex Greensill as co-founder and former chief executive of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, who visited the plaintiffs in West Virginia in April 2019 and supported and approved the 2018 financing discussions, and Roland Hartley-Urquhart as its former Vice Chairman and the plaintiffs' main contact from May 2018; it claimed against both individuals for aiding and abetting the company's alleged breaches of its duty of care under West Virginia law and of fiduciary duty under Delaware law, and against all three defendants for civil conspiracy. [src-106] [src-105] - Qualification: Allegations and claims in the plaintiffs' complaint, with amounts left to be determined at trial; they were not answered or adjudicated, and all claims were voluntarily dismissed with prejudice in August 2022. - Documented: A docket summary for Greensill Capital (UK) Limited v. Tempus Intermediate Holdings, LLC (U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, 4:17-cv-00127, Judge Lawrence Richard Leonard) records a breach-of-contract action under diversity jurisdiction filed on 13 October 2017 and terminated on 17 September 2018. Federal Judicial Center case data attached to the docket code the case as disposed of by a judgment on a motion before trial in favour of the plaintiff, Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, with the defendants unrepresented (pro se). [src-084] - Qualification: The source is a statistical docket summary: the contract in dispute, the judgment and any amount awarded are not in the record (the amount fields carry the database's top code), and the data provider notes that its matching of this data to dockets cannot be guaranteed. - Outcome: The docket summary gives 30 September 2020, about two years after the termination, as the date of the last known filing in the case; the record does not show what was filed or whether any amount was recovered. - Documented: Greensill Capital (UK) Limited and Alexander Greensill issued a libel claim (QB-2019-002773) against Reuters News & Media Limited on 2 August 2019 over an article Reuters published on 7 July 2019 under the headline 'Exclusive: Greensill issued false statement on bonds sold by metals tycoon Gupta'. The claimants pleaded that it meant they had knowingly given bond market investors and brokers false information in a May 2018 update that the Scottish Government had granted a guarantee, committing a criminal offence of market abuse; Reuters denied that meaning, and the natural and ordinary meaning was ordered to be decided as a preliminary issue before any defence was filed. [src-098] [src-077] - Outcome: The meaning was decided on 14 May 2020 ([2020] EWHC 1325 (QB)); according to the National Audit Office's chronology, Greensill dropped the libel suit against Reuters on 27 May 2020. - Documented: On 14 May 2020 Nicklin J ([2020] EWHC 1325 (QB)) rejected the claimants' principal submission that the Reuters article alleged that Greensill Capital (UK) Limited had knowingly issued a false statement and was guilty of market abuse, and held that its natural and ordinary meaning was that the company, in its May 2018 update, had given bond market investors and brokers false information that the Scottish Government had approved a guarantee related to a hydro plant in Kinlochleven when no such approval had been given, so that there were grounds to investigate how the statement came to be made, whether the company knew it was false and whether it had committed any market abuse offence. [src-098] [src-077] - Qualification: The ruling decided only what the article meant, not whether it was true; Reuters had not filed a defence and the claim was dropped later that month, so the article's account was never adjudicated. - Response: The article itself reported Greensill's statements that the May 2018 update was based upon information provided by GFG and that Greensill never knowingly issues false statements, and that after publication Greensill said the update was neither false nor misleading. - Documented: The court in [2020] EWHC 1325 (QB) also held that the ordinary reasonable reader would not understand the article to convey any defamatory allegation against Alexander Greensill personally, because the word 'Greensill' in it would be understood as referring to Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, except in one paragraph that referred to Alexander Greensill personally; the judgment describes Alexander Greensill as the founder of the company in 2011 and its chief executive. [src-098] - Documented: On 10 June 2021 the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia (Davies, Moshinsky and Colvin JJ, [2021] FCAFC 99) dismissed, with costs, the appeal by Peter Greensill Family Co Pty Ltd as trustee for the Peter Greensill Family Trust against Thawley J's decision in [2020] FCA 559 in its dispute with the Commissioner of Taxation. The trustee had sold property that was not taxable Australian property and distributed the capital gain to a beneficiary of the trust; the courts rejected the trustee's contention that s 855-10 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 required that gain to be disregarded in assessing the trustee. [src-122] ## How GCUK collapsed in March 2021 and what its administration has done - Documented: During its administration Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) filed a statement of affairs (form AM02) on 11 June 2021, notice of the establishment of a creditors' committee (form COM1) on 3 August 2021 and the result of a meeting of creditors (form AM07) on 28 August 2021. [src-006] - Documented: The administrations of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) and Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited (GCMC) were extended repeatedly after their first year: according to the administrators' progress report filed on 10 October 2026, the period was extended by creditors' consent to 7 March 2023, then by the court for 24 months to 7 March 2025 and, by order of 18 March 2025, for 18 months to 7 September 2026; GCUK filed the corresponding notices of extension (form AM19) on 17 February 2022, 17 March 2023 and 19 March 2025. [src-006] [src-015] - Outcome: The administrations did not end on 7 September 2026: according to the same progress report, the High Court extended them on 4 September 2026 for a further 24 months to 7 September 2028, and GCUK filed a further notice of extension (form AM19) on 16 September 2026. - Documented: In their progress report for the six months to 7 September 2026, the joint administrators of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) reported that about $587.2 million (at March 2021 exchange rates) remained outstanding from GFG, across 33 separate balance sheet items, with no recoveries in the period; they said that significant time had passed in numerous unsuccessful negotiations and non-binding term sheets on GFG settlement offers, and that they continued to explore recovery under the security and guarantees granted by GFG in connection with the GFG programmes. [src-015] - Attributed: In their statutory proposals of April 2021, the joint administrators of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited stated that the restructuring and refinancing plan the Greensill group pursued from the end of 2020 could not be implemented and that a number of factors, most particularly the withdrawal of insurance coverage from GCUK, forced GCUK to stop originating new business and left it insolvent. [src-029] - Qualification: This is the administrators' account in proposals prepared under paragraph 49 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986; it is not a court finding. The insurers' own position on the non-renewal of the policies is a separate matter. - Attributed: The administrators of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited stated that on 4 March 2021 one of Greensill Capital Pty Limited's financial creditors accelerated a $140 million loan and demanded immediate payment from GCUK as guarantor, which left GCUK unable to pay its debts as they fell due; the House of Commons Treasury Committee's report published on 20 July 2021 identifies the lender as Credit Suisse. [src-029] [src-031] [src-052] - Qualification: The sequence is given in the administrators' proposals and repeated by the Treasury Committee. The High Court found on 8 March 2021 that US$140 million was immediately due and payable by GCUK as guarantor on a Credit Suisse AG facility to its holding company and that GCUK was cash-flow insolvent. - Attributed: The administrators of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited also stated that during 2020 the exposure of Greensill Bank AG to the GFG Alliance drew increased attention from the Auditing Association of German Banks and BaFin, that BaFin opened an investigation into the bank focused on the concentration of its lending to GFG and set conditions ultimately requiring that exposure to be reduced, and that GFG could not find alternative funding while the group's restructuring, intended to refinance the GFG liabilities, failed. [src-029] [src-035] [src-108] - Qualification: This is the administrators' account in their April 2021 proposals; BaFin's own decisions and the terms of its conditions are not in the record. - Outcome: According to [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch), BaFin required the group on 8 December 2020 to accelerate the reduction of its exposure to GFG and on 5 January 2021 blocked withdrawals by the group from Greensill Bank AG; in March 2021 BaFin filed an insolvency application for the bank, and the district court in Bremen appointed Dr Michael Frege as insolvency administrator. - Documented: On 8 March 2021 the High Court (Mr Justice Michael Green, [2021] EWHC 700 (Ch)) made administration orders for Greensill Capital (UK) Limited and Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited on the application of their directors: the application for GCUK was made by its sole director, Alexander David Greensill, and that for Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited by Alexander David Greensill and Alastair Kenneth Eadie. GCUK's administration is registered as High Court case 000435 of 2021. [src-052] [src-029] [src-015] - Qualification: The judgment was issued under the case number of Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited, CR-2021-000436; GCUK's own administration proceedings carry number 000435 of 2021. - Response: The court recorded that Credit Suisse and the Peter Greensill Family Trust, notified as lenders, consented to the orders, that the Bank of England did not intend to exercise its powers, and that Credit Suisse Asset Management, appearing for the noteholders, did not oppose them. - Outcome: On 4 September 2026 the High Court extended both administrations to 7 September 2028; the administrators intend to end the administrations of GCUK and Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited by conversion to creditors' voluntary liquidations. - Documented: In [2021] EWHC 700 (Ch) the High Court described Greensill Capital (UK) Limited as an arranger of trade finance involving the sale and purchase of receivables and found that GCUK had ceased trading on 2 March 2021, that US$140 million was immediately due from it as guarantor of a Credit Suisse AG facility to its holding company, and that it was cash-flow insolvent; Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited, a service company providing employees to GCUK, depended on GCUK to fund its payroll for over 500 employees and was therefore also cash-flow insolvent. [src-052] - Documented: When making the orders, the High Court recorded that the proposed administrators from Grant Thornton, who had advised Greensill Capital (UK) Limited since December 2020, intended a pre-packaged sale agreed with Apollo Holdings Plc, which had offered to buy GCUK's intellectual property and IT systems and take on most of the employees of Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited; the court accepted that the purpose of the administrations was a better result for creditors than a winding up, not a rescue of the companies. [src-052] [src-029] - Outcome: The administrators' proposals (April 2021) state that contract negotiations with the proposed purchaser ended on 11 March 2021 because of a substantial reduction in the value of its offer, so the sale did not proceed. - Documented: The court noted that Credit Suisse and PGFT (the Peter Greensill Family Trust, acting through its trustee), lenders to the Greensill group, had been notified of the application for administration of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited and consented to the orders, that the Bank of England had confirmed it did not intend to exercise its powers although the group included Greensill Bank AG, and that Credit Suisse Asset Management, appearing for the noteholders, did not oppose the orders. [src-052] [src-029] - Documented: Christine Laverty, Trevor O'Sullivan and William Stagg of Grant Thornton UK LLP were appointed joint administrators of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited and Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited on 8 March 2021; in a letter of 9 July 2021 to the House of Commons Treasury Committee they stated that they were not administrators or liquidators of the Australian parent, Greensill Capital Pty Limited, which is under the control of different insolvency practitioners. [src-004] - Documented: Russell Simpson later replaced Trevor O'Sullivan as a joint administrator of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited: Companies House received on 18 July 2022 notice of a court order removing an administrator from office and notice of the appointment of a replacement administrator, and both the High Court's judgment of 19 September 2023 and the administrators' progress report for March to September 2026 name Christine Laverty, Russell Simpson and William Stagg, the latter report as members of Grant Thornton UK Advisory and Tax LLP. [src-051] [src-015] [src-006] - Documented: The statement of affairs of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited as at 8 March 2021, made by Alexander David Greensill on 28 April 2021 in the High Court administration case 000435 of 2021, gives total assets of $1,472,148,187 at book value and $475,446,600 estimated to realise; the directors noted that a significant portion of the trade assets and accrued income to which they attributed a low recoverable value benefited from third-party security guarantees which, if invoked, could yield additional recoveries of c.$250m of trade assets and c.$175m of accrued income. [src-007] [src-029] - Qualification: The figures are the directors' estimates at the date of administration and do not account for the costs of the administration. - Documented: On the liabilities side, the statement of affairs of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited shows $200,000,000 of debts secured by floating charges and unsecured non-preferential claims of $1,654,699,147 at book value and $1,456,984,613 estimated, giving an estimated deficiency as regards members of $1,181,551,493 after issued share capital of $13,480; the administrators' proposals summarise it as 210 unsecured creditors totalling $1.46 billion, against $14.5 million of unsecured claims in the statement of affairs of Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited. [src-007] [src-029] - Documented: The creditor schedule filed at Companies House with the statement of affairs of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, whose amount column and total are marked in pounds sterling, lists Credit Suisse AG, London Branch with 318,560,000.00 and gives total claims of £1,278,780,154.75. [src-007] [src-029] - Qualification: The statement of affairs form itself gives creditor amounts in US dollars, while the attached schedule is marked in pounds sterling; the schedule is an image-based filing, so individual amounts carry that currency caveat. The administrators' figure for unsecured claims ($1.46 billion) is in US dollars. - Documented: Group companies listed as creditors in the same schedule of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited include Greensill Capital Pty Ltd (245,497,076.30), Greensill Bank AG (32,705,156.43), Greensill Capital Management Company Limited (9,806,850.67) and Greensill GmbH (1,043,418.83), together with Greensill Limited (UK), Greensill Capital Trading 2 Limited, Greensill Capital Trading 3 Limited, Greensill Trading Limited (UK), Greensill Capital Investments (UK), GC Trading Ltd and Greensill Switzerland SARL. [src-007] - Qualification: Amounts are as printed in the schedule, whose amount column is marked in pounds sterling; the names of the UK special-purpose companies are given as they appear in the schedule. - Documented: Among other creditors, the schedule of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited lists Marsh Limited with 27,950,020.00 and Marsh Limited (UK) with 2,103,121.57, GFG (with a Singapore address) with 12,105,337.92, Tradeshift Holdings Inc. with 5,160,050.19, and SIMEC International UK Limited and Aar Tee Commodities (UK) Limited with 2,017,556.32 each. [src-007] - Qualification: Amounts are as printed in the schedule, whose amount column is marked in pounds sterling. - Documented: The schedule of creditors of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited also names Peter Greensill Family Co Pty. Ltd. as trustee for and on behalf of the Peter Greensill Family Trust, in a closing block with further entries for Greensill Bank AG and Credit Suisse AG, London Branch; in the filed image the amount on the trust's line cannot be matched to it with certainty. [src-007] [src-029] - Qualification: The administrators' proposals report separately that the trust's floating charge secured a balance of $60 million at the date of administration. - Documented: William Crothers, a former director of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, filed a statement of concurrence with the statement of affairs subject to qualifications; the statement ends by saying that, given those qualifications, the signatory has no reason to believe that the statement of affairs is not accurate. [src-007] - Response: The qualifications William Crothers gave were: ceasing to be a director of GCUK on 4 February 2021; reliance on the CFO and finance function for the figures, both while a director and for the statement of affairs; judgements and assumptions on recoveries in the statement of which, since resigning, William Crothers has had no up-to-date or detailed knowledge; and no access to historical Greensill Capital records, so that the numbers cannot be verified. - Documented: According to the administrators' proposals, assets under management by Greensill Capital (UK) Limited totalled $17,738 million at 8 March 2021, of which GCUK was beneficially entitled to only $490 million, the economic benefit lying predominantly with third-party investors; $3,738 million had been collected by 16 April 2021, of which $32 million was for GCUK. Before the administrations GCUK facilitated about $140 billion of such transactions a year. [src-029] - Documented: The administrators' proposals describe Greensill Capital (UK) Limited as the main trading entity of the group and the recipient of most of its income, which provided funding to most other group entities; in the administration GCUK was to keep collecting sums due from obligors, pursue recoveries and submit insurance claims on notes protected by insurance policies, while the administrators negotiated with the investors who held the main beneficial interest in those assets to cover the costs. [src-029] - Documented: After the sale process was terminated on 11 March 2021, the administrators made 435 employees of Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited redundant and retained 135 to help realise assets and wind down the business; to keep pursuing insurance claims on defaulted assets for investors, Greensill Capital (UK) Limited retained its insurance professionals, contracted with its broker and engaged the insurance lawyers already acting on its claims. [src-029] - Documented: By 16 April 2021 anchor investors had paid retainer fees of $5 million into the administration estate of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited to cover costs while funding arrangements were finalised; the administrators' US dollar receipts and payments account for 8 March to 16 April 2021 shows $5,000,000.00 of third-party funding received and $573,346.27 paid for trade insurance. [src-029] - Documented: The administrators' proposals state that the accrued income of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited consisted mainly of about $194 million of structuring and advisory fees and about $24 million of data-driven revenue from securitised contracts, principally in the telecoms sector; the largest fee, $175 million, was due in equal instalments on 31 March and 30 June 2021, and after the first instalment was not received the administrators were pursuing the obligor. [src-029] - Qualification: The proposals do not name the obligor of the $175 million fee. - Documented: Among other assets of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, the administrators' proposals list an equity warrant in a US-based mining business held at a book value of $50 million and $4 million owed by a former shareholder after GCUK brokered the sale of its shares to another party, which the statement of affairs treats as fully recoverable. [src-029] - Qualification: The proposals name neither the mining business nor the former shareholder. - Documented: Other group entities owed Greensill Capital (UK) Limited $107.4 million at the date of administration, chiefly Greensill Inc ($46.3 million), Omni ($19.3 million), Earnd UK ($10.9 million), Finacity ($9.4 million), Omni Technologies SAS ($7.4 million) and Greensill Capital Asia PTE ($5.9 million), of which the directors estimated $13 million as recoverable; GCUK's loan notes of about $37 million in the Omni entities, owned by Greensill Capital Pty Limited, were dealt with in a sale completed on 22 April 2021 that realised about $9 million for GCUK. [src-029] - Documented: At the date of administration Greensill Capital (UK) Limited held about $59 million in 36 bank accounts in 18 currencies, plus about $50 million in a segregated account relating to Credit Suisse's security; long-term cash deposits of about $6 million were collateral for letters of credit provided to insurers, and about $1.8 million held in escrow in Citibank reserve accounts for trustee and issuer fees did not form part of the estate. [src-029] - Documented: The administrators of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited reported that part of the collections from GCUK's trade assets might be subject to a claim by Greensill Bank AG arising from an agreement of 14 July 2020 under which the bank advanced €90 million to GCUK, and that they were taking legal advice on the validity of that claim. [src-029] [src-015] - Qualification: This is a potential claim reported in the administrators' proposals of April 2021; its validity was under review and its resolution is not stated in the retained progress report. - Documented: Greensill Capital (UK) Limited held a foreign exchange hedging account at Citibank, through which it also hedged foreign exchange positions of Greensill Bank AG, backed by a cash deposit of about €70 million; after the administrators' appointment Citibank closed the account because GCUK could not meet further margin calls and set the closure costs off against the deposit, leaving about €40 million, which was subject to a potential claim by Greensill Bank on the basis that the deposit funds originated from the bank. [src-029] - Documented: On 8 December 2021 the administrators of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited applied to the High Court for directions on whether GCUK or Greensill Bank AG was the beneficial owner of funds that had come to GCUK through foreign exchange transactions; Greensill Bank's insolvency administrator, Dr Michael Frege, was later joined as a respondent, and the court described the dispute as hostile litigation between the two companies. [src-051] - Outcome: On 19 September 2023 the High Court held that Greensill Bank AG's Part 36 offer of 14 September 2022 had been accepted by the administrators and bound the bank, leaving the bank's further points on mistake and the rule in Ex parte James to be decided on a later occasion ([2023] EWHC 2429 (Ch)). - Documented: In [2023] EWHC 2429 (Ch), given on 19 September 2023, Sir Anthony Mann held that CPR Part 36 can apply to administrators' directions proceedings and that a Part 36 offer made by Greensill Bank AG on 14 September 2022 to settle its claim to the disputed funds had been accepted by the administrators of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) and bound the bank; the bank's further arguments on mistake and the rule in Ex parte James were left for a later hearing. [src-051] - Qualification: The judge made a reporting restrictions order preventing any reporting of the contents of without-prejudice offers, including Part 36 offers, in the matter; the terms of the offer are therefore not stated here. - Response: Greensill Bank argued that Part 36 did not apply, that the administrators' rejection of the offer in December 2022 ended it, that the offer was conditional on a court ruling and had been withdrawn in August 2023, and that offer and acceptance did not correspond; the judge rejected these arguments. - Documented: The Companies House register lists four charges over Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, three outstanding and one satisfied; the oldest, created on 24 June 2016 in favour of Citibank Europe PLC and still outstanding, is described by the administrators as a fixed charge over a designated bank account under a corporate deposit deed securing amounts due in connection with standby letters of credit issued by Citibank, under which nothing was outstanding at the date of administration. [src-039] [src-015] [src-029] - Documented: Two charges over Greensill Capital (UK) Limited were registered in favour of Peter Greensill Family Co Pty. Ltd. as trustee of the Peter Greensill Family Trust: one created on 19 May 2020 and satisfied on 23 October 2020, and one created on 22 October 2020, in which the trustee acts as security agent and security trustee. The administrators describe the latter as a floating charge over GCUK's receivables, subordinate to the Credit Suisse security, securing GCUK's guarantee of a $60 million loan by the trust to Greensill Capital Pty Limited made on 22 October 2020; by April 2021 nothing had been paid to the trust under that security. [src-039] [src-015] [src-029] - Documented: Charge 0812 6173 0004 over Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, created on 22 October 2020 and delivered to Companies House on 9 November 2020, is registered in favour of Credit Suisse AG, London Branch and contains a floating charge; according to the administrators it covers a specified account and GCUK's receivables and secures GCUK's guarantee of a $140 million loan made by Credit Suisse to Greensill Capital Pty Limited on 22 October 2020, the full $140 million being due at the date of administration. [src-017] [src-029] [src-015] [src-039] - Qualification: The administrators stated in April 2021 that they were obtaining legal advice on the validity of the security, and that none of the secured creditors was a qualifying floating charge holder under the Insolvency Act 1986. - Documented: On 5 March 2021 Credit Suisse appointed Geoffrey Paul Rowley and Anthony John Wright of FRP Advisory Trading Limited as receivers of the secured account, receivables and related rights of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited; the receivers had Citibank, as account bank, pay Credit Suisse about $50 million from the secured account, leaving about $90 million outstanding, which Credit Suisse also claimed against the receivables held by GCUK. Companies House received two notices of appointment of a receiver or manager on 23 March 2021 and, on 28 April 2021, two notices of ceasing to act and a receiver's abstract of receipts and payments to 14 April 2021. [src-029] [src-017] [src-015] - Response: The administrators stated in their April 2021 proposals that they were obtaining legal advice on the validity of the security held by Credit Suisse and the Peter Greensill Family Trust, and that none of the secured creditors was a qualifying floating charge holder under the Insolvency Act 1986. - Outcome: On 5 June 2026 the administrators executed a confidential settlement, involving a payment from the estate, after which all secured creditor claims were concluded. - Documented: On 5 June 2026 the administrators of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited executed a confidential settlement involving a payment from the estate, which concluded all secured creditor claims; their progress report records that payments in that period included one in full and final settlement of the Peter Greensill Family Trust's purported secured creditor claim. The administrators had recorded the trust's floating charge as securing $60 million and Credit Suisse's as securing $140 million at the date of administration. [src-015] - Documented: The administrators' US dollar receipts and payments account for Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, covering 8 March 2021 to 7 September 2026, records cumulative payments to floating charge creditors of 100,028,425.28 to Credit Suisse AG and 17,750,051.00 to the Peter Greensill Family Trust, the trust's payment falling in the six months to 7 September 2026. [src-015] - Qualification: The figures are read from an image of the filed account and are given as the administrators' account; the trust's period and cumulative columns print slightly different amounts (17,760,081.90 and 17,750,051.00), so the exact figure is uncertain. - Documented: By 7 September 2026 the administration of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited had cumulative receipts of £380.6 million and payments of £265.6 million, converted to pounds at the exchange rates of that date; the administrators' cumulative time costs and expenses stood at £51.8 million and £41.0 million. [src-015] - Qualification: The amounts are the administrators' own totals in their progress report. - Documented: The administrators of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited reported in September 2026 that the directors had estimated unsecured claims at about $1.6 billion for GCUK and about $14.5 million for Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited, that certain creditors had lodged claims of significant value above the directors' estimates, that claims had not yet been called for or formally adjudicated, and that further contingent claims could arise from trade credit insurance policies or litigation by obligors, insurers or others. [src-015] [src-008] - Qualification: The Insolvency Service's press release of 4 June 2026 describes GCUK as having collapsed into administration with liabilities of more than £1.6 billion, and in the same release gives more than £1.6 billion as the combined liabilities of the three Greensill companies of which Lex Greensill was a director; the directors' and administrators' figures are in US dollars. - Documented: On 4 September 2026 the High Court extended the administrations of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited and Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited by 24 months to 7 September 2028 and gave the administrators permission to make interim distributions to GCUK's unsecured creditors during the administration; the administrators intend to convert GCUK's administration into a creditors' voluntary liquidation for a final distribution. [src-015] [src-006] - Qualification: The timing and amount of any interim dividend were uncertain at the September 2026 report. - Documented: In their progress report for March to September 2026 the administrators of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited stated that their investigations concerning former directors were continuing and that they were advancing actions in that regard without giving details, so as not to prejudice their position; their remaining work includes negotiations with third parties, including pre-appointment GCUK directors, to recover contributions to the estate's losses, and settlements following their statutory investigations reached in the period had a total consideration of £1.8 million, of which £1.19 million was received in the period and £570,000 remained due on deferred terms, with a final payment scheduled for March 2028. [src-015] - Qualification: The report names no director and states no claim amount; the settlement counterparties are not identified. - Documented: In September 2026 the administrators reported that Greensill Capital (UK) Limited remained an inactive party to Australian insurance proceedings, providing discovery with costs covered by the active parties; that it remained joined to two English insurance proceedings between investors and insurers, stayed against GCUK except for discovery under court orders dated 22 November 2024; and that it had been joined as a defendant, as accredited lender, to proceedings by Greensill Bank AG against the Secretary of State for Business and Trade over its CBILS and CLBILS investments and guarantees. [src-015] - Documented: In the six months to 7 September 2026 Greensill Capital (UK) Limited received $446,854 as a final dividend from Greensill Capital Inc., and its administrators continued to monitor the liquidations of Greensill Asia and Greensill India for possible recoveries for the estate of Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited. [src-015] - Documented: On 18 August 2021 the joint administrators Christine Mary Laverty, Trevor Patrick O'Sullivan and William George Edward Stagg, as foreign representatives of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, filed a Chapter 15 petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (case 21-11473 (MEW)) seeking recognition of GCUK's English administration as a foreign main proceeding. [src-064] [src-105] - Outcome: An order of 13 September 2021 in Bluestone Resources Inc. v Greensill Capital (UK) Limited in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York refers to the bankruptcy court's order granting recognition of a foreign main proceeding involving GCUK and stays that case against GCUK. - Documented: Grant Thornton UK LLP was introduced to the Greensill companies by their lawyers, Allen & Overy LLP, shortly before 31 December 2020 and was engaged on that date by Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, Greensill Bank AG and Greensill Capital Pty Limited to assist with a Better Outcome Review for the Australian parent and with contingency planning for a possible insolvency appointment; GCUK paid Grant Thornton £1,437,784 for that engagement and its addendum. [src-029] - Qualification: These are the administrators' own disclosures in their proposals; they state that they gave no contingency planning or other advice to Greensill Bank AG. - Response: The administrators stated that before accepting the appointments they considered the firm's prior professional relationships, having regard to their licensing bodies' ethical guidelines, and concluded that those engagements did not give rise to risks compromising the fundamental principles of the Insolvency Practitioners Association Ethics Code or any of its five threats. - Documented: The administrators disclosed that Grant Thornton was the appointed auditor of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited in 2013, resigned as auditor in July 2015 without undertaking the 2014 audit, and in 2014 provided VAT and other tax advice to GCUK for fees of about £90,000. [src-029] - Documented: Chris Laverty, Trevor O'Sullivan and Helen Dale of Grant Thornton were appointed joint administrators of Caversham Finance Limited in March 2020, when it owed Greensill Capital (UK) Limited £30.8 million; the debt was repaid in full in July and August 2020 from asset realisations. [src-029] - Outcome: The administrators recorded that there were no further connections between Caversham and GCUK. - Documented: Under the revised assignment of intellectual property filed as Exhibit C to the second plan supplement in the Chapter 11 case of Greensill Capital Inc. (21-10561 (MEW)), Greensill Capital Inc. agreed, as part of a global settlement of disputes between the estates, to assign to Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, acting by its administrators, its rights in software and related intellectual property developed for GCUK; the parties were also bound by a Services Agreement effective 25 March 2021. [src-062] ## Who owned Greensill Capital (UK) and which companies it owned - Documented: Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) is a wholly owned subsidiary of Greensill Capital Pty Limited (GCPty), a proprietary company incorporated in Queensland, Australia, and the parent company of the Greensill group; GCUK's 2019 accounts describe GCUK as the main trading entity among the subsidiaries that make up the group. [src-018] [src-029] [src-005] [src-035] - Documented: In Credit Suisse Virtuoso SICAV-SIF v SoftBank Group Corp ([2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch)), the High Court described Greensill Capital Pty Limited (GCPty) as a non-trading holding company that raised debt and equity, including from the SoftBank Group. [src-035] - Documented: The statement of affairs of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) lists Greensill Capital Pty Limited, care of accountants in Bundaberg, Queensland, as GCUK's only shareholder, holding 1,347,865 ordinary shares of $0.01 each (called up $13,479) and one ordinary share of £1; the 2018 accounts give the same issued share capital. [src-007] [src-097] - Documented: Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) did not prepare consolidated accounts, relying on the exemption in section 401 of the Companies Act 2006: its results were included in the consolidated financial statements of its parent, Greensill Capital Pty Limited, which the accounts said were available from an address in Bundaberg, Queensland. [src-018] - Documented: In its accounts for 2017, 2018 and 2019, Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) named Greensill Capital Pty Limited as its immediate and ultimate parent company, and its directors stated that they considered Alexander Greensill to be the ultimate controlling party. [src-082] [src-097] [src-018] - Documented: Since 6 April 2016 the register of persons with significant control of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) has listed one person, Alexander David Greensill (Lex Greensill), whose nature of control is recorded as significant influence or control over the trustees of a trust. [src-002] - Attributed: The National Audit Office's report of 7 July 2021 states that Greensill's Australian parent company, Greensill Capital Pty Limited, was 64.55% owned by its founder, staff and directors, including 28.06% held by a trust associated with Lex Greensill; 25.11% by the SoftBank Vision Fund; and 10.34% by General Atlantic, a US private equity investor. [src-077] - Qualification: The NAO report gives these percentages without a date or a source; the share register of Greensill Capital Pty Limited is not in the record, so the figures have not been checked against it. - Attributed: In a letter of 9 July 2021 to the chair of the Treasury Committee, the joint administrators of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) and Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited (GCMC) wrote that the strategic decisions affecting the wider Greensill group appeared to have been taken largely at the level of the Australian parent, Greensill Capital Pty Limited. [src-004] - Qualification: This is the administrators' own assessment ("it appears"); they were not appointed over Greensill Capital Pty Limited, which is in liquidation under the control of other insolvency practitioners, and the letter does not set out the evidence for it. - Documented: The High Court's judgment in [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch) records that the Greensill group was founded by Mr Greensill and focused on supply chain financing; that Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) was the main operating and trading company of the group in the UK and provided financial support and management for the wider group; and that GCUK performed a central treasury function for the group. [src-035] - Documented: Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited (GCMC, Companies House 08037769) is a separate company from Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK), although GCUK used that name from 2 to 18 July 2012. GCMC was incorporated in England and Wales on 19 April 2012, is wholly owned by Greensill Capital Pty Limited, which holds its single ordinary share, and has been in administration since 8 March 2021 (High Court case 000436 of 2021). The administrators' progress report for the six months to 7 September 2026, which covers both GCUK and GCMC, names Chris Laverty, Will Stagg and Russell Simpson as joint administrators of the two companies. [src-015] [src-029] [src-001] [src-013] - Documented: The register of persons with significant control of Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited (GCMC) has, since 6 April 2016, listed Alexander David Greensill (Lex Greensill), with the same nature of control as at Greensill Capital (UK) Limited: significant influence or control over the trustees of a trust. [src-013] [src-002] - Documented: Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) had no staff of its own apart from its directors; the group's UK employees were employed by Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited (GCMC), which provided staff and management services to GCUK under an intercompany support services agreement, recharged the costs to GCUK and relied on GCUK for its funding. According to the administrators, GCMC employed about 580 people for GCUK before the administration, and it had 569 employees at the date of their appointment, when GCUK had none. [src-018] [src-015] [src-029] - Documented: According to the administrators' proposals, Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited (GCMC) was the group's principal intermediate holding company, owning the entire share capital of 12 subsidiaries in the UK and abroad, most of them special purpose vehicles set up to originate transactions for Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK); its subsidiaries included Greensill Capital Inc., a Delaware corporation and parent of Finacity Corporation, and Earnd (UK) Limited. [src-029] - Documented: Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited (GCMC) was the 100% shareholder of a United Arab Emirates subsidiary that was being set up to originate business in the Middle East; according to the administrators' proposals, that entity's main asset was about $400,000 of cash and it had entered a local winding-up. [src-029] - Documented: According to the administrators' proposals, Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited (GCMC) was owed $28.4 million by other group companies, including about $13.6 million by Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK), of which the directors estimated in the statement of affairs that about $2.7 million would be recovered, and about $14.5 million by Earnd (UK) Limited. [src-029] - Documented: The 2019 accounts of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) list Greensill Bank AG, Finacity Corporation, a US receivables securitisation business, and Earnd (UK) Limited among the group's other trading companies, the last two acquired in 2019; Earnd (UK) Limited (formerly Freeup Finance Limited), a developer of technology that lets workers be paid earned but unpaid wages early, joined the group in October 2019. [src-018] - Documented: Earnd (UK) Limited (Companies House 11391391) was incorporated on 31 May 2018 as Freeup Finance Ltd, took its present name on 28 April 2020 and was dissolved on 8 August 2025. [src-101] - Documented: At 31 December 2017 Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) held 100% of the shares and voting power of Greensill Bank AG, a German bank; the carrying value of GCUK's investments in subsidiaries was $58,986 thousand at the end of 2017 and $54,256 thousand at the end of 2016. [src-082] - Documented: During 2018 Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) subscribed for a further 497,512 shares in Greensill Bank AG at €40.20 per share, and on 14 December 2018 it transferred its investment in the bank to Greensill Capital Pty Limited for €40.20 per share. GCUK kept contingent convertible loan notes issued by the bank, which its 2018 accounts describe as a former subsidiary sold to Greensill Capital Pty Limited during the year; the High Court's judgment of 18 March 2026 ([2026] EWHC 639 (Ch)) describes Greensill Bank AG as another subsidiary of Greensill Capital Pty Limited. [src-097] [src-005] - Documented: At 31 December 2017 the subsidiaries of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) were Greensill Bank AG (Germany, banking) and Greensill Capital Securities Limited, each 100% owned, and three Luxembourg partnerships in which GCUK held 100% of the voting power but only a small ownership interest: GAM Greensill Supply Chain Finance Fund SCSp (0.01%), GAM Greensill Supply Chain Finance Plus Fund SCSp (0.003%) and GAM Greensill Absolute Return SCF Fund SCSp (0.002%). [src-082] - Documented: At 31 December 2018 the subsidiaries of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) were Greensill Capital Securities Limited (financing), Greensill Capital Investments Limited and Greensill Limited (both dormant), each 100% owned, and GAM Greensill Supply Chain Finance Fund SCSp, in which GCUK held 100% of the voting power and a 0.004% ownership interest; Greensill Bank AG and the two other GAM Greensill funds were no longer listed. [src-097] [src-082] - Documented: At 31 December 2019 Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) owned 100% of Greensill Capital Securities Limited (09595415, arrangement of securities), Greensill Capital Investments Limited (10489840), Greensill Limited (11344883), Greensill Trading Limited (12329861), Greensill Trading 2 Limited (12354521), Greensill Trading 3 Limited (12365031) and Greensill Trading 4 Limited (12373206), all financing companies, as well as Greensill GmbH (Frankfurt am Main, HRB 114964, management services) and Greensill Capital Securities (Malta) Limited (C91376, arrangement of securities). It also listed GAM Greensill Supply Chain Finance Fund SCSp (Luxembourg, B207546) as a subsidiary, with 100% of the voting power but a 0.172% ownership interest. [src-018] - Documented: Greensill Limited (Companies House 11344883), an English special purpose vehicle, has had Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) registered as its person with significant control since 3 May 2018, holding 75% or more of the shares and voting rights and the right to appoint and remove directors. In [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch) the High Court described it as wholly owned by GCUK, without employees of its own, and as delegating its management and administration entirely to GCUK under a Participation Agreement. [src-012] [src-005] [src-035] - Documented: According to the High Court in [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch), the directors of Greensill Limited at all material times were Alexander (Lex) Greensill and Alastair Eadie, both also directors of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK), and Greensill Limited's annual report for 2019 named Mr Greensill as its ultimate controlling party in the directors' opinion. [src-035] - Documented: Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) is the registered person with significant control, holding 75% or more of the shares, of four financing subsidiaries: Greensill Trading Limited (12329861) since 22 November 2019, Greensill Trading 2 Limited (12354521) since 9 December 2019, Greensill Trading 3 Limited (12365031) since 16 December 2019 and Greensill Trading 4 Limited (12373206) since 20 December 2019; for the last two the register also records 75% or more of the voting rights and the right to appoint and remove directors. [src-050] [src-065] [src-066] [src-067] [src-018] - Documented: Greensill Trading Limited (Companies House 12329861), incorporated on 22 November 2019, was dissolved on 23 November 2024. [src-049] - Documented: Greensill Capital Investments Limited (Companies House 10489840), incorporated on 21 November 2016, filed its last accounts for the year to 31 December 2021 and was dissolved on 31 October 2024. [src-038] - Documented: Greensill Global Trading Limited (Companies House 12680973), a private limited company incorporated on 18 June 2020, was dissolved on 21 November 2024. [src-102] - Documented: Greensill Capital Trading Limited (Companies House 09268343) was incorporated on 17 October 2014 as Greensill Capital Management Company (Ireland) Limited, changed its name on 19 April 2016 and was dissolved on 23 November 2024. [src-090] - Documented: Greensill GmbH, a wholly owned subsidiary of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) registered at the Frankfurt am Main district court under HRB 114964, was registered on 28 March 2019 with share capital of €25,000, according to a company-data aggregator summarising the commercial register; its purpose was to provide services, in particular management services, to companies of the Greensill group. [src-018] [src-024] - Documented: Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) was the sole shareholder of Shenzhen Greensill Commercial Factoring Limited, which was set up in 2020 to originate business in China; according to the administrators' proposals, it employed eight people but had not begun trading, and its main assets were about $6 million of cash and a local banking licence. [src-029] - Documented: Greensill Capital Securities (Malta) Limited (registration C 91376), registered at 171 Old Bakery Street, Valletta, is listed in the 2019 accounts of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) as a wholly owned subsidiary arranging securities. A company-data aggregator summarising the Malta register in September 2020 gives 4 April 2019 as its date of establishment and lists GCUK as the shareholder of its 1,300 issued shares (EUR 1,300). [src-018] [src-068] - Documented: A company-data aggregator summarising the Malta register in September 2020 lists the directors of Greensill Capital Securities (Malta) Limited as Adam De Domenico, Steven Michael Hollands, Wasif Islam Raza and Ludwig Clemens Sels. [src-068] - Documented: Greensill Asia Pte. Limited (Singapore registration 201825907W) was created on 30 July 2018 according to its GLEIF record (a company-data aggregator gives 29 July 2018); its legal entity identifier 9845000ACC9C90VH8A22 was first registered on 11 December 2020 and has lapsed, with renewal due since 11 December 2022. [src-116] [src-056] - Documented: Company-data aggregators summarising Indian Ministry of Corporate Affairs records list Alexander David Greensill as a director of Greensill India Finance Private Limited from 2 August 2020, and Divya Sara Eapen as a former director whose appointment ended on 26 April 2021. [src-055] - Qualification: The board composition comes from two aggregators, not from the primary MCA record, and the two disagree about a third director, so the list is not complete or verified. - Documented: The GLEIF record of GAM Greensill Supply Chain Finance Plus Fund SCSp (Luxembourg RCS B210763, care of GAM (Luxembourg) S.A.) gives a creation date of 15 November 2016; its legal entity identifier 5493009TYYUD7Y2CEC23 has lapsed, with renewal due since 28 June 2023, and the record still shows the entity as active, with no liquidation event recorded. [src-119] - Documented: The GLEIF record of GAM Greensill Absolute Return SCF Fund SCSp (Luxembourg RCS B218565, care of GAM (Luxembourg) S.A.) gives a creation date of 17 October 2017 and records a liquidation that started with effect from 10 February 2022 and was completed with effect from 30 June 2024; the entity is shown as inactive and its legal entity identifier 54930068MF2HD5ZCWW60 as retired. [src-117] - Documented: According to a company-data aggregator summarising Luxembourg register publications, GAM Trade Finance S.à r.l. was registered as general partner of GAM Greensill Supply Chain Finance Fund SCSp on 15 July 2016, of GAM Greensill Supply Chain Finance Plus Fund SCSp on 6 December 2016 and of GAM Greensill Absolute Return SCF Fund SCSp on 17 October 2017, and in March 2022 as liquidator of the Plus Fund (16 March) and of the Absolute Return Fund (17 March); its own registration was terminated on 16 December 2024. [src-099] - Documented: Steve Kieffer, a manager of GAM (Luxembourg) SA, was a managing director of GAM Trade Finance S.à r.l., the general partner of the GAM Greensill funds, from 20 June 2018 to 16 December 2024, alongside other managing directors, according to a company-data aggregator summarising the Luxembourg register. [src-099] [src-107] ## What happened to the other Greensill group companies after March 2021 - Documented: According to the papers in its Chapter 11 case (21-10561 (MEW), Southern District of New York), Greensill Capital Inc. was a direct wholly owned subsidiary of Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited (GCMC), itself directly wholly owned by Greensill Capital Pty Limited, and Greensill Capital Inc. owned 100% of Finacity Corporation, which had wholly owned subsidiaries of its own. [src-057] [src-042] - Documented: According to the administrators' proposals, at the date of their appointment in March 2021 the book value of the investments of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) was about $8.5 million, relating mainly to subsidiaries in China and Germany and an investment in GAM Investments, and the book value of its investments in group undertakings was about $14.4 million, on which the directors estimated a full recovery; the German subsidiary, Greensill GmbH, had seven employees, provided services to GCUK and had no realisable assets. [src-029] - Documented: According to the National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai Bench, when the liquidation of Greensill India Finance Private Limited (corporate identity number U65999MH2020FTC343142) began on 30 March 2022, its shareholders were Greensill Asia Pte Ltd, with 19,999,999 shares (99.99%), and Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited (GCMC), with one share (0.01%); the administrators of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited described Greensill Asia as its immediate parent. [src-112] [src-029] - Outcome: On 11 June 2024 the tribunal dismissed the liquidator's petition for the company's dissolution through voluntary liquidation and suspended the liquidation process, while leaving the company free to explore other routes to liquidation, dissolution or winding up. - Documented: GAM Greensill Supply Chain Finance Fund SCSp is a Luxembourg special limited partnership (société en commandite spéciale, RCS B207546) registered at 25 Grand-Rue, Luxembourg; a company-data aggregator summarising the Luxembourg register gives 15 July 2016 as its date of formation and records it as dissolved on 15 December 2022. [src-088] [src-018] - Documented: GAM Trade Finance S.à r.l. (Luxembourg RCS B204853) was registered on 14 March 2016 with capital of €12,500, with GAM (Luxembourg) SA as its shareholder at registration, according to a company-data aggregator summarising the Luxembourg register. Its stated purpose was to acquire, hold and manage interests in GAM Greensill Supply Chain Finance Fund SCSp and GAM Greensill Supply Chain Finance Plus Fund SCSp, and it could act as their general partner and manager. [src-099] - Attributed: Commercial-register publications for Greensill GmbH, as summarised by company-data aggregators, show Alexander Greensill and Danyon Mayall Lloyd as managing directors from the company's registration on 28 March 2019; a publication of 16 March 2021 records that Danyon Mayall Lloyd was no longer a managing director, and one of 26 May 2023 records the liquidation of the company, Simon Slobbe as liquidator and that Alexander Greensill was no longer a managing director. [src-036] [src-037] - Qualification: The register publications are known from aggregator summaries; the commercial register entries are not themselves in the record, and the dates given are publication dates. - Documented: The administrators of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited reported in April 2021 that, following the appointment of administrators to Greensill Capital Pty Limited, GCUK and Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited, most of the group's subsidiaries were being sold or wound down through solvent or insolvent processes in their own jurisdictions; most overseas subsidiaries had provided origination services to GCUK and held no material assets. [src-029] [src-015] - Documented: Greensill Capital Pty Limited, the Australian parent of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, went into voluntary administration in March 2021 when its directors appointed Matthew Byrnes, Philip Campbell-Wilson and Michael McCann of Grant Thornton Australia Limited as administrators under section 436A of the Corporations Act; the disclosure statement in the Chapter 11 case of Greensill Capital Inc. dates the appointment 8 March 2021, the GCUK administrators' progress report of 2026 dates it 9 March 2021. [src-034] [src-042] [src-015] - Qualification: The two sources differ by one day on the date of the appointment; neither explains the difference. - Outcome: Its creditors resolved on 22 April 2021 to place it in liquidation, with Grant Thornton Australia Limited appointed as liquidator, according to ASIC. - Documented: Greensill Capital Pty Limited (ACN 154 088 132) went into liquidation by resolution of its creditors on 22 April 2021, according to ASIC, with Grant Thornton Australia Limited appointed: ASIC's published notices name Matthew James Byrnes as liquidator and Philip Campbell-Wilson and Michael Gerald McCann as joint appointees, and the Insolvency Service also states that the company went into liquidation in April 2021. ASIC described the company as a major creditor of its UK subsidiary, Greensill Capital (UK) Limited. [src-011] [src-008] [src-034] [src-015] - Qualification: The GCUK administrators' progress report of 2026 gives the date of the liquidators' appointment as 22 April 2022, which conflicts with ASIC and the Insolvency Service. - Outcome: ASIC reported to the Australian Parliament's joint committee that the liquidator was conducting further investigations and that ASIC was continuing to work closely with it. - Documented: Greensill Limited, a UK company of the Greensill group, went into liquidation on 30 July 2021, when Andrew Charters of Grant Thornton UK LLP and Sarah O'Toole were appointed joint liquidators; Paul Allen and Geoffrey Rowley were appointed liquidators on 4 January 2022, and Andrew Charters and Sarah O'Toole resigned on 12 May 2022. [src-015] [src-008] [src-026] - Outcome: Companies House records retained in the archive list Greensill Limited (11344883) with company status Liquidation. - Documented: Greensill Bank AG, the Bremen bank of the Greensill group, is subject to insolvency proceedings in the courts of Bremen, with Dr Michael Frege as its insolvency administrator; according to an announcement by Michael Frege's law firm dated 17 March 2021, the proceedings followed an insolvency application by the German financial regulator BaFin, after which the district court in Bremen appointed Michael Frege. In May 2021 the Federal Court of Australia recognised the bank's administrators, enabling them to recover the bank's assets located in Australia. [src-108] [src-051] [src-034] - Attributed: In a written answer to the Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, ASIC stated that in March 2021 BaFin filed a criminal complaint with prosecutors against the management of Greensill Bank AG, a German subsidiary of Greensill Capital Pty Limited; ASIC understood that the complaint was filed with prosecutors in Bremen and related to balance sheet manipulation. [src-034] - Qualification: This is ASIC's account of a complaint made by BaFin; a criminal complaint is not a charge or a finding. ASIC does not name the managers concerned or state what became of the complaint. - Attributed: A press report (May 2025) states that Michael Frege, insolvency administrator of Greensill Bank AG, filed a claim for damages against former senior managers of the bank in the Bremen Regional Court (Landgericht Bremen), as confirmed to the publication by a court spokesperson. [src-109] - Qualification: The freely available part of the report names neither the defendants nor the amount claimed; the claim's content and status are not established in the record. - Attributed: The National Audit Office's report of July 2021 on the British Business Bank's accreditation of Greensill Capital notes that it was reported in June 2021 that Ebner Stolz, the auditor of Greensill Capital's German bank, had withdrawn its certifications of the bank's 2019 annual accounts in April 2021. [src-077] - Qualification: The NAO repeats press reports and does not itself establish the withdrawal or its reasons. - Documented: Greensill Capital Inc., the group's Delaware company, filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York on 25 March 2021 (case 21-10561 (MEW), Judge Michael E. Wiles); its plan of liquidation came before the court at a combined hearing on 26 October 2021 and a court docket summary records the plan as confirmed on that date. [src-057] [src-071] [src-062] [src-029] - Qualification: The GCUK administrators' proposals of April 2021 give the date the case was commenced as 26 March 2021; the court filings give 25 March 2021. - Outcome: A court docket summary records joint status reports of mediation parties filed by the Greensill U.S. Liquidation Trust on 9 May 2023 and 8 March 2024 and the closing of adversary proceeding 1:23-ap-1027 on 30 August 2023, without naming the parties. - Documented: At the Chapter 11 petition date the board of Greensill Capital Inc. had two members, Alexander (Lex) D. Greensill and an independent director, Jill Frizzley, appointed by resolution dated 20 March 2021 to review actions related to the company's wind-up and the Chapter 11 case; the case's service list gives Jill Frizzley's firm as Wildrose Partners LLC. [src-042] - Documented: According to its Chapter 11 disclosure statement, Greensill Capital Inc. was the base of the group's sales force in the United States and the Americas, employing more than 70 people across 13 states at 1 January 2021, and all revenue from those sales went directly to Greensill Capital (UK) Limited; GCUK performed many of its administrative functions, such as payroll, taxes and finance, and lent to it under a Call Account Loan Agreement dated 1 January 2019. [src-042] [src-057] - Attributed: The disclosure statement of Greensill Capital Inc. attributes the group's severe financial distress in early 2021 to a combination of factors, among them the expiry of a key insurance policy of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, which removed significant insurance cover for newly originated assets, the withdrawal of substantial financial support by certain key creditors, and pressure on and from key investors to reduce the group's exposure to the GFG Alliance. [src-042] - Qualification: This is the debtor's description in a disclosure statement filed in its Chapter 11 case, not a finding of the Bankruptcy Court; it broadly matches the account in the GCUK administrators' proposals. - Documented: The Services Agreement between Greensill Capital Inc. and Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, amended and restated on 11 June 2021, did not provide for GCUK to pay vacation time accrued before 17 March 2021 or pay in lieu of notice in certain cases; to limit uncovered costs, Greensill Capital Inc. told nearly all its remaining employees on 31 July 2021 that 31 October 2021 would be their last day of employment. [src-042] - Documented: The Chapter 11 schedules of Greensill Capital Inc. list an employee contract with William R Hartley-Urquhart, also known as Roland Hartley-Urquhart, among the company's executory contracts. [src-057] [src-062] - Documented: Greensill Capital Inc. acquired all the equity of Finacity Corporation in 2019 under a stock purchase agreement dated 10 June 2019, modified by a letter agreement of 20 December 2019; its Chapter 11 schedules list Adrian Katz and related Katz parties as unsecured creditors for $5,304,000.00 of earn-out payments under that 2019 agreement. [src-042] [src-057] - Documented: The same schedules list Greensill Capital (IOM) Limited, an Isle of Man company listed for service care of Harborview Directors Limited in Douglas, as an unsecured creditor of Greensill Capital Inc. for $88,844.00 of invoices under an intercompany jet agreement. [src-057] [src-070] - Documented: On 29 March 2021 Greensill Capital Inc. asked the Bankruptcy Court for authority to sell its 100% interest in Finacity Corporation by auction, with a group including Finacity's chief executive Adrian Katz as stalking-horse bidder at $3 million; after objections by the creditors' committee and negotiations involving Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, the court approved a sale to White Oak Global Advisors, LLC on 18 August 2021, and the sale closed on 21 September 2021 for $7 million in cash. [src-042] - Documented: Under the Global Settlement at the core of Greensill Capital Inc.'s Chapter 11 plan, Greensill Capital (UK) Limited's claim under the intercompany loan, which GCUK put at about $53 million at the petition date, was allowed at $52,840,506.80 but subordinated to general unsecured claims: GCUK receives 20% of the liquidation trust's net recoveries until those claims are paid in full and 100% thereafter, any residue goes to Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited as sole shareholder, and a separate GCUK letter-of-credit claim was allowed at $526,000 as a general unsecured claim. [src-042] - Qualification: The settlement resulted from negotiations among the debtor, the creditors' committee, GCUK, the Katz parties and other interested parties. - Documented: As part of the Global Settlement, Greensill Capital (UK) Limited contributed to Greensill Capital Inc. all its rights to causes of action arising from the 2019 acquisition of Finacity, and the plan releases GCUK, Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited and the UK administrators from the estate's claims; the plan as filed did not provide for a release of the debtor's directors and officers. [src-042] - Documented: After the Finacity sale, the disclosure statement describes the remaining assets of Greensill Capital Inc. as consisting almost entirely of potential causes of action, besides about $260,000 in cash at 31 July 2021, an intercompany receivable of about $1.4 million face value owed by Greensill Capital Pty Limited, art pieces previously displayed at its former corporate headquarters in New York and claims relating to a $5 million directors' and officers' insurance policy with Axis Insurance Company; the plan funds a liquidation trust to pursue over $65 million of retained causes of action. [src-042] - Attributed: A revised schedule of retained causes of action, filed by Greensill Capital Inc. on 22 October 2021 as Exhibit A to its second plan supplement, lists as potential defendants of claims retained by the liquidation trust, among others, Alexander D. Greensill, Greensill Capital Pty Limited, Greensill Capital (IOM) Limited and fourteen other individuals who had been directors or officers of Greensill companies, as well as Bain & Company, Euler Hermes North America Holding and Bank of America Corporation. [src-062] - Qualification: The schedule states that the list is for representative purposes only, is not exhaustive, is subject to further diligence and investigation, and is not to be construed to mean that any listed person will be a defendant; it records potential claims, not claims made or established against anyone. - Documented: Greensill Asia Pte. Limited (Singapore registration no. 201825907W), which according to the administrators of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited served as the group's Asian hub employing local staff for GCUK, entered liquidation in March 2021: under a notice given under section 161(4) of Singapore's Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018, Aw Eng Hai of Foo Kon Tan LLP was appointed provisional liquidator with effect from 23 March 2021 by a directors' resolution of 22 March 2021, after a director's statutory declaration that the company could not by reason of its liabilities continue its business. [src-092] [src-029] [src-112] [src-015] - Outcome: The National Company Law Tribunal in Mumbai later described Greensill Asia as being in creditors' voluntary liquidation, and in September 2026 the GCUK administrators were still monitoring its liquidation. - Documented: Greensill India Finance Private Limited, incorporated on 2 August 2020 as a subsidiary of Greensill Asia Pte Ltd to carry on business as a non-banking finance company, went into voluntary liquidation in 2022: its board decided on 2 March 2022 to wind it up voluntarily, an extraordinary general meeting on 30 March 2022 appointed Subrata Monindranath Maity as liquidator, and Purnima Shetty replaced Subrata Monindranath Maity on 6 July 2022. [src-112] - Documented: On 11 June 2024 the National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai Bench, dismissed the liquidator's petition under section 59(7) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code for the dissolution of Greensill India Finance Private Limited (CP (IB)/930/MB/2022) and suspended the liquidation, because the subscribers had paid in only Rs. 8,70,00,000 of the Rs. 20,00,00,000 subscribed capital after the parent Greensill Asia became insolvent, and the balance of Rs. 11,30,00,000, which Greensill Asia's liquidator had declared on 26 October 2021 it could not pay, was valued at nil; the tribunal left the company free to pursue other routes to liquidation or dissolution. [src-112] [src-015] - Outcome: In September 2026 the GCUK administrators were continuing to monitor the liquidations of Greensill Asia and Greensill India for potential recoveries for the estate of Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited. - Documented: According to a company-data aggregator summarising the Malta Business Registry, filings made on 4 August 2022 for Greensill Capital Securities (Malta) Limited comprise a resolution for its dissolution and consequential voluntary winding up, a declaration of solvency and a notice of appointment of a liquidator, whose name is not shown in the summary. [src-118] - Qualification: The filings themselves are not in the record; this is a secondary listing of register entries, and a declaration of solvency indicates a solvent winding-up. - Documented: The shareholders of GAM Greensill Supply Chain Finance Fund SCSp, a Luxembourg special limited partnership, decided unanimously on 2 March 2021 to put the fund into voluntary liquidation and on 7 June 2021 appointed GAM Trade Finance S.à r.l. as liquidator, whose managers appointed Steve (Stéphane) Kieffer as its permanent representative on 14 March 2022, according to notices published in Luxembourg's electronic register of companies and associations (RESA) on 21 March 2022. [src-093] ## Who directed Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, 2012–2026 - Documented: Companies House records Alexander David Greensill as a director of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited from 2 July 2012 to 17 June 2026. [src-003] - Documented: Companies House records Peter Edward Greensill as a director of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited from 2 July 2012 to 22 January 2018; that officer record lists three appointments, all in Greensill group companies. [src-003] [src-014] - Documented: Companies House records Jason Richard Alexander Austin as a director of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited from 2 July 2012 to 21 June 2019 and as its company secretary from 2 July 2012 to 16 September 2015. [src-003] - Documented: Companies House records Maurice Nicholas Beech Thompson as a director of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited from 25 September 2014 to 22 January 2018. [src-003] - Documented: Companies House records David Campbell Brierwood as a director of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited from 1 January 2015 to 22 January 2018. [src-003] - Documented: Companies House records William Roland Hartley-Urquhart as a director of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited from 20 May 2015 to 22 January 2018; the officer record shows no other appointment. [src-003] [src-027] - Documented: Companies House records Patrick Joseph Allin as a director of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited from 8 February 2016 to 22 January 2018. [src-003] - Documented: Companies House records William Crothers as a director of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited from 1 August 2016 to 4 February 2021. [src-003] - Documented: Companies House records Jonathan Edward Myott Lane as company secretary of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited from 16 September 2015 to 30 June 2020 and as one of its directors from 14 December 2018 to 24 July 2019. [src-003] - Documented: Companies House records Christopher William Bates as a director of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited from 14 December 2018 to 9 January 2019. [src-003] - Documented: Companies House records Rachel Justine Donnelly as company secretary of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited from 19 February 2019 to 11 December 2019; the officer record shows no other appointment. [src-003] [src-073] - Documented: Companies House records Alastair Kenneth Eadie as a director of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited from 19 February 2019 to 12 February 2021. [src-003] - Documented: Companies House records Bartholomeus Gerardus Joannes Ras as a director of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited from 19 February 2019 to 12 February 2021; the officer record shows no other appointment. [src-003] [src-023] - Documented: Companies House records Neil Albert Garrod as a director of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited from 24 July 2019 to 12 February 2021. [src-003] - Documented: Companies House records Sean Denis Robson-Hanafin as a director of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited from 24 July 2019 to 20 December 2020. [src-003] - Documented: Companies House records Hayley Louise James as company secretary of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited from 30 June 2020 to 21 October 2021. [src-003] [src-074] - Documented: Companies House records Divya Sara Eapen as a director of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited from 13 July 2020 to 12 February 2021. [src-003] - Documented: Companies House records Bradley Jay Gans as a director of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited from 15 December 2020 to 28 December 2020; the officer record shows no other appointment. [src-003] [src-028] - Documented: The directors' report in the 2017 annual report of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited lists Alexander Greensill, Peter Greensill, Jason Austin, Maurice Thompson, Roland Hartley-Urquhart, David Brierwood, Patrick Allin and William Crothers as directors during the year and up to signature, and records that Peter Greensill, Maurice Thompson, Roland Hartley-Urquhart, David Brierwood and Patrick Allin resigned on 22 January 2018. [src-082] - Documented: The 2019 annual report of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited describes Lex (Alexander) Greensill as co-founder and CEO of the Greensill Group, who before starting Greensill was Managing Director and Head of Supply Chain Finance for Europe, Middle East and Africa at Citibank and established Morgan Stanley's global supply chain finance business. The report also states that Lex Greensill is a solicitor of the Supreme Court of England and Wales and of the Supreme Court of Queensland and was awarded the CBE for services to the UK economy in 2017. [src-018] - Documented: The 2019 annual report of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited describes William (Bill) Crothers as Vice Chairman Public Sector and a member of the Group Audit Committee; according to the report, William Crothers was a senior civil servant for eight years, most recently the UK Government's Chief Commercial Officer, founded and chaired the Crown Commercial Service as its first executive chairman, and earlier spent 21 years at Accenture. [src-018] - Documented: The 2019 annual report of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited describes Neil Garrod as the Greensill Group's Chief Financial Officer, who previously spent 18 years at Vodafone, 10 of them as Global Group Treasurer. [src-018] - Documented: The 2019 annual report of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited describes Sean Robson-Hanafin as President of the Greensill Group, previously Head of Corporate Banking for UK and Europe at Standard Chartered, with 14 years at Citigroup as a Managing Director and service as a Senior Advisor to the UK Government's Cabinet Office on capital markets and corporate finance. [src-018] - Documented: The 2019 annual report of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited describes Alastair (Al) Eadie as Group Finance Director, with over 30 years' experience in roles at MSCI, Aviva, UBS, EY and Accenture, and as a fellow chartered accountant and qualified treasurer. [src-018] - Documented: The 2019 annual report of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited describes Bartholomeus (Bart) Ras as UK Managing Director of the Greensill Group and Global Head of its Innovation and Incubator team, who earlier was CFO of Philips Supply Management and Purchasing, EMEA Head of Supply Chain Finance at Citi and Global Head of Business Development for HSBC Global Trade and Receivable Finance. [src-018] - Documented: In a letter of 4 May 2021 to Mel Stride MP, the Financial Conduct Authority referred to Lex Greensill as CEO of Greensill and reported two formal meetings between FCA staff and Lex Greensill: on 12 September 2019, a discussion of Greensill's activities in the UK held at Greensill's request, and on 9 December 2020, as part of the evidence gathering for the Woolard Review into the future of unsecured credit. [src-016] - Documented: The Financial Conduct Authority's letter of 4 May 2021 described Maurice Thompson as Chair of Greensill and reported an unplanned meeting with Maurice Thompson in February 2020 at which Greensill's employer salary advance scheme was briefly discussed. [src-016] [src-003] - Qualification: The letter does not say which Greensill company Maurice Thompson chaired; Companies House records the directorship of Maurice Thompson at Greensill Capital (UK) Limited as having ended on 22 January 2018. - Documented: The High Court in [2026] EWHC 639 (Ch) and the Insolvency Service in its announcement of 4 June 2026 both state that Lex Greensill was a director of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, Greensill Limited and the Australian parent company Greensill Capital Pty Limited. [src-005] [src-008] - Documented: In [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch) the High Court describes Divya Eapen as the Chief Risk Officer of the Greensill Group at the time of a video meeting on 27 January 2021 with the Chief Risk Officer of SBIA, the manager of the SoftBank Vision Funds. [src-035] - Documented: In [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch) the High Court describes Jonathan Lane as the Greensill group's senior internal lawyer and records that on 14 October 2020 Lex Greensill forwarded internally to Jonathan Lane, among others, the proposal under which SoftBank Group would buy the outstanding Katerra notes. [src-035] - Attributed: An internal SoftBank email of 4 February 2021, quoted in the High Court judgment [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch), stated that SBIA, the manager of the SoftBank Vision Funds, had just been informed that "the chairman, head of BoD risk committee and head of BoD audit committee have resigned", that this was not public, and that, given SoftBank Group's stance and this development, SBIA had paused the proposed transaction concerning Greensill. [src-035] - Qualification: This is a contemporaneous email by an SBIA managing partner quoted in the judgment's account of events; it does not name the people or the Greensill company whose board is meant, and the court made no finding about the resignations. - Documented: The Companies House appointments record of Alexander David Greensill lists 15 appointments; apart from a directorship of Shotwick Park Estate Limited, all are in Greensill group companies, including two separate directorships of Greensill Capital Securities Limited. [src-010] - Documented: Companies House lists as directors of Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited Alexander David Greensill (19 April 2012 to 17 June 2026), Peter Edward Greensill (19 April 2012 to 24 January 2021), Jason Richard Alexander Austin (19 April 2012 to 21 June 2019) and Alastair Kenneth Eadie (21 June 2019 to 21 April 2021). [src-010] [src-014] [src-026] [src-019] - Documented: The joint administrators' proposals list Alexander David Greensill, Jonathan Edward Myott Lane and Alastair Kenneth Eadie as the directors and officers of Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited, none of them holding shares, in the administration that began on 8 March 2021 (High Court, 000436 of 2021). [src-029] - Documented: Companies House lists the officers of Greensill Limited as directors Alexander David Greensill (3 May 2018 to 17 June 2026), Jason Richard Alexander Austin (3 May 2018 to 24 June 2019) and Alastair Kenneth Eadie (24 June 2019 to 2 March 2021), and as company secretaries Jonathan Edward Myott Lane (3 May 2018 to 23 June 2021) and Hayley Louise James (from 23 June 2021, listed as active). [src-010] [src-040] - Documented: Companies House lists Alexander David Greensill as a director of Greensill Capital Trading Limited from 17 October 2014, with no resignation recorded before the company was dissolved, Jason Richard Alexander Austin as a director from 17 October 2014 to 24 June 2019 and Peter Edward Greensill as a director from 27 November 2014 to 24 January 2021. [src-010] [src-026] [src-014] - Documented: Companies House lists Alexander David Greensill as a director of Greensill Capital Investments Limited from 21 November 2016, with no resignation recorded before the company was dissolved, Jason Richard Alexander Austin as a director from 21 November 2016 to 24 June 2019 and Alastair Kenneth Eadie as a director from 24 June 2019 to 2 March 2021. [src-010] [src-026] [src-019] - Documented: Companies House lists Alexander David Greensill as a director of Laufer Limited from 17 October 2016, with no resignation recorded before the company was dissolved, Jason Richard Alexander Austin as a director from 17 October 2016 to 24 June 2019 and Alastair Kenneth Eadie as a director from 24 June 2019 to 2 March 2021. [src-010] [src-026] [src-019] - Documented: Companies House lists Alexander David Greensill and Alastair Kenneth Eadie as directors of Greensill Trading Limited from 22 November 2019, Greensill Trading 2 Limited from 9 December 2019, Greensill Trading 3 Limited from 16 December 2019 and Greensill Trading 4 Limited from 20 December 2019. Alastair Kenneth Eadie resigned from all four on 2 March 2021, while no resignation is recorded for Alexander David Greensill before the companies were dissolved; Jonathan Edward Myott Lane was company secretary of Greensill Trading Limited from 22 November 2019 to 23 September 2021. [src-059] [src-010] [src-019] - Documented: Companies House lists as directors of Earnd (UK) Limited Neil Albert Garrod (30 October 2019 to 4 March 2021), William Crothers (17 April 2020 to 4 February 2021), Sean Denis Robson-Hanafin (17 April 2020 to 20 December 2020), Alastair Kenneth Eadie (17 April 2020 to 4 March 2021) and Alexander David Greensill (from 4 March 2021, with no resignation recorded before the company was dissolved). [src-010] [src-022] [src-021] [src-020] [src-019] - Documented: Companies House lists as directors of Greensill Global Trading Limited Alastair Kenneth Eadie (18 June 2020 to 26 April 2021), Sean Denis Robson-Hanafin (18 June 2020 to 20 December 2020) and Alexander David Greensill (from 26 April 2021, with no resignation recorded before the company was dissolved). [src-010] [src-022] [src-019] - Documented: Companies House records Alexander David Greensill as a director of Greensill Capital Securities Limited from 18 May 2015 to 9 April 2018 and again from 2 December 2019, Wasif Islam Raza as a director from 9 April 2018 to 8 October 2020, Neil Albert Garrod as a director from 2 December 2019 to 1 April 2022, and Hayley Louise James as company secretary from 25 September 2020 to 29 September 2021. [src-010] [src-085] [src-021] [src-063] - Attributed: A company-data aggregator's summary of Companies House filings records Ludwig Clemens Herbert Sels as appointed a director of Greensill Capital Securities Limited together with Wasif Islam Raza on 9 April 2018, when Alexander Greensill ceased to be a director, and as no longer a director from 29 January 2021. [src-086] [src-010] [src-085] - Qualification: No Companies House officer page for Ludwig Clemens Herbert Sels is in the record, and the aggregator's dates may be filing dates rather than effective dates. Companies House itself confirms that Wasif Islam Raza was appointed and Alexander David Greensill resigned on 9 April 2018. - Attributed: According to a company-data aggregator's copy of a commercial-register announcement of 5 August 2020 for Greensill Bank AG (Amtsgericht Bremen, HRB 4088), Danyon Mayall Lloyd and one other member left the bank's management board (Vorstand), and Ann-Christin Rebekka Rathjen and Ingo Schwartz were entered as management board members, each also holding Prokura (a registered commercial power of attorney). [src-120] [src-036] - Qualification: The announcement is known only from aggregator copies, which show the Bremen entry under the name ARIMA Beteiligungs GmbH, a name the record does not explain; a second aggregator dates the corresponding publication 6 August 2020. The register extract itself is not in the record. - Attributed: A company-data aggregator's copy of a register announcement of 26 April 2021 for the same Bremen entry records that Markus Antonius Nünnerich and Ann-Christin Rebekka Rathjen left the management board of Greensill Bank AG. The same aggregator's profile lists Ann-Christin Rebekka Rathjen as holder of Prokura at the bank from 14 May 2018 to 4 August 2020 and again from 27 April 2021, and as a management board member from 5 August 2020 to 26 April 2021. [src-123] - Qualification: Aggregator data only: the profile lists the periods without labelling each one, and the pairing of periods with roles follows the announcements of 5 August 2020 and 26 April 2021. The register itself is not in the record. - Documented: Companies House records Alexander David Greensill as a director of Shotwick Park Estate Limited (14009366) from 29 March 2022 to 5 June 2026. [src-010] - Documented: The register of persons with significant control of Shotwick Park Estate Limited shows Alexander David Greensill from 29 March 2022 to 5 June 2026 with 75% or more of the shares and voting rights and the right to appoint or remove directors. On 5 June 2026 Peter Edward Greensill was entered with the same controls and removed the same day, and Alexander David Greensill was entered again with 75% or more of the shares, more than 25% but not more than 50% of the voting rights and the right to appoint or remove directors. [src-100] - Documented: A second Companies House officer record for Peter Edward Greensill, with identifying details matching the former director of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, lists one appointment: director of Cultivar International UK Limited (13901285) since 8 February 2022. [src-060] - Documented: Companies House records Alastair Kenneth Eadie as a director of Fractus CFO Ltd (16828244) since 3 November 2025 and, from the same date, as its person with significant control with 75% or more of the shares and voting rights and the right to appoint or remove directors. [src-111] [src-019] - Documented: Companies House records Sean Denis Robson-Hanafin as a director of Silver Birch Finance Limited (13362558) since 28 April 2021 and of other Silver Birch companies, including Silver Birch Finance Holdings Limited (15 to 29 April 2021 and again since 31 July 2024), Silver Birch Trading Holdings Limited (since 20 July 2022) and Silver Birch Technology Limited (since 25 April 2025). [src-022] - Documented: Companies House records Sean Denis Robson-Hanafin as a director of Tradeteq Ltd (10234056) and of Tradeteq (Advisors) Ltd (09837868) since 8 May 2025. [src-022] - Attributed: A press report (May 2021) said that Silver Birch Finance, a new trade finance venture co-founded by Sean Hanafin and joined by other former Greensill colleagues, was about to launch, with its infrastructure funded by seed capital from partners at TDR Capital; it described Sean Hanafin as having worked for 18 months at Greensill, most recently as president and global head of origination for multinational corporates. [src-047] [src-022] - Qualification: This is a press account based on unnamed sources before the launch; the founders, the role of each founder and the funding are not shown in the retained registry records, which record only Sean Robson-Hanafin's directorship of Silver Birch Finance Limited from 28 April 2021. - Response: The same report said that a spokesman for Silver Birch Finance confirmed it would announce its launch that week, and that people close to the firm said it would not provide supply chain finance of the kind offered by Greensill Capital, its model being based on receivables and inventory finance rather than payables. - Attributed: A trade-press report (May 2025) said that Silver Birch, a working capital structuring and advisory firm led by chief executive Sean Hanafin and backed by partners at TDR Capital, had acquired the trade finance technology company Tradeteq, and that Silver Birch said the deal raised its outstanding working capital volumes by 50% to US$1.5bn. [src-048] [src-022] - Qualification: The acquisition terms and the volume figure are the company's statements as reported by the press; no transaction document is in the record. Companies House records Sean Robson-Hanafin as a director of Tradeteq Ltd from 8 May 2025. - Attributed: A company-data aggregator's executive profile lists Bartholomeus Gerardus Joannes Ras as a former Managing Director, Working Capital Finance, EMEA, of Pemberton Capital Advisors LLP. [src-078] [src-003] - Qualification: The profile gives no dates and is not confirmed by a register record or company statement in the retained sources; when the role was held relative to the directorship of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited is not stated. - Documented: Companies House records Maurice Nicholas Beech Thompson as a director of Caversham Finance Limited (00785922) from 1 November 2014 to 2 June 2018. [src-025] - Attributed: A company-data aggregator's executive profile, citing the team page of the Greensill website as captured in 2019, describes John Gorman as a co-founder and "Chairman Emeritus" of Greensill and an entrepreneur in real estate, financial services, manufacturing and agriculture, and attaches the title to Greensill Capital (UK) Limited. [src-087] [src-078] [src-003] - Qualification: The description rests only on an aggregator's copy of the former Greensill website. John Gorman does not appear among the 20 officers of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited in the Companies House register, so the title was not a registered office of that company, and the record does not show which Greensill entity, if any, John Gorman held a position in. - Documented: Christine Mary Laverty, appointed on 8 March 2021 as one of the joint administrators of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited and Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited, is recorded at Companies House as a member of Grant Thornton UK LLP from 1 February 2019 to 15 April 2025 and as a member of Grant Thornton UK Advisory & Tax LLP since 14 April 2025. [src-004] [src-075] - Documented: Geoffrey Paul Rowley, whom Credit Suisse appointed with Anthony John Wright of FRP Advisory Trading Limited as receivers of a charged account and receivables of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited on 5 March 2021, is recorded at Companies House as a director of FRP Advisory Group plc and FRP Advisory Trading Limited since 14 November 2019 and as a designated member of FRP Advisory Services LLP since 9 December 2019. [src-029] [src-058] - Documented: From 2014 Marsh Ltd provided insurance broking and other services to Greensill Capital (UK) Limited and Greensill Bank AG under a series of Letters of Engagement addressed to GCUK and signed by a GCUK officer, and most of Marsh's communications and instructions on both the master and the parallel policies were with GCUK ([2024] EWHC 3068 (Comm)). The incorporated Terms of Engagement capped Marsh's liability for broking services at £7.5 million, later raised to £10 million, and gave the English courts exclusive jurisdiction over disputes. [src-041] ## How Greensill Capital (UK) financed supply chains and receivables - Documented: In [2026] EWHC 639 (Ch), a judgment of 18 March 2026, the High Court described the business of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited as extending credit at a discount to customers in return for the assignment of receivables owed by the customers' debtors (accounts receivable financing), and extending discounted credit under supply chain financing, that is, advances that let a customer pay unpaid invoices from its own suppliers. The Commercial Court in [2024] EWHC 3068 (Comm) likewise described GCUK's business as including supply chain financing of a customer's payables and accounts receivable financing in which GCUK purchased receivables. [src-005] [src-041] - Documented: The High Court in [2026] EWHC 639 (Ch) described Greensill Capital (UK) Limited as funded partly by advances from Greensill Bank AG, a German company that was another subsidiary of Greensill Capital Pty Limited, and partly by securitisation: the receivables and their related rights were assigned to a Luxembourg note-issuing securitisation vehicle, and the notes were bought by third-party investors, many of whom invested through Credit Suisse Virtuoso SICAV-SIF and its sub-fund managed by Credit Suisse Asset Management (Switzerland) AG. [src-005] - Documented: According to the joint administrators' statement of proposals, Greensill Capital (UK) Limited was the group's main trading entity: it arranged supply chain finance and other working capital financing, used bespoke IT platforms to buy working capital and supply chain receivables, and sold the receivables, or notes backed by them, generally within 24 hours to financial institutions, specialist funds and Greensill Bank AG. In direct assignments the receivables were sold outright; for note issues they were transferred to insolvency-remote special purpose vehicles that issued notes secured on them. GCUK also offered accounts receivable financing, instalment payment agreements and purchases of portfolios of supplier irrevocable payment undertakings. [src-029] - Documented: The administrators' proposals, whose diagram the Treasury Committee reproduced in its report of 20 July 2021, set out the cycle of a transaction: a supplier invoiced its customer (the obligor); Greensill Capital (UK) Limited agreed to pay the invoice to the supplier at a discount to its face value; receivables of buyers below investment grade were sold with the benefit of insurance; the assets were sold to investors by direct assignment or as notes backed by the receivables, and GCUK paid the supplier out of the sale proceeds. At maturity the obligor paid GCUK the face value and GCUK repaid the investors, the difference between the discounted price and the face value being profit shared between GCUK and the investor. [src-029] [src-031] - Attributed: The Treasury Committee's report 'Lessons from Greensill Capital', published on 20 July 2021, records that the Bank of England described Greensill's funding model as 'complex' and as having 'non-standard features'. According to the report, Greensill, unlike most other UK providers, funded its operations mainly from outside investors: it issued secured commercial paper through a special purpose vehicle registered in Luxembourg, packaging invoices into notes bought by its investors, for example a fund managed by Credit Suisse, while others were bought by Greensill Bank; its reliance on investor funding made it vulnerable to a contraction in that funding. [src-031] - Qualification: The description of the model as complex and non-standard and the assessment of its vulnerability are the Bank of England's characterisations in written evidence, as reported by the Committee; they are not findings of a court, and the report speaks of 'Greensill' as a group rather than of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited alone. - Response: The report also quotes a paper Greensill shared with the Bank of England, in which Greensill described itself as the first to take a traditionally bank-only product and open it up to the capital markets. - Documented: To issue securitised notes, Greensill Capital (UK) Limited entered into agreements with Hoffman S.à r.l., a Luxembourg private limited company, and Citibank N.A., London Branch as note trustee. On 21 December 2017 GCUK, Hoffman and Citibank signed a Master Assignment Agreement, an umbrella agreement setting the terms on which GCUK could sell and assign to Hoffman its rights in Payment Obligations and related Additional Rights, while Hoffman, as issuer, was party with Citibank to a Master Trust Deed originally dated 13 October 2017 and supplemented on 21 December 2017, which governed the issue of notes under the Hoffman Note Programme ([2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch)). [src-035] - Documented: GLAS Trust Corporation Limited, a professional trustee company, was appointed note trustee for the Fairymead Notes issued by Hoffman S.à r.l. on 28 February 2023, replacing Citibank N.A., London Branch, which had acted as note trustee since the first issue of those notes in December 2019; GLAS was the second claimant in [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch). [src-035] - Documented: In the Fairymead multi-obligor programme that financed the Katerra group, Greensill Capital (UK) Limited originated the notes to fund the obligations under the Participation Agreement and the Receivables Purchase Agreement; Greensill Limited granted GCUK security for its obligations by a Security Agreement dated 19 December 2019, and on the same day GCUK notified Hoffman S.à r.l. of a 'PBB Product Schedule' made under the Master Assignment Agreement of 21 December 2017, whose product code PBB was used in Offer Files from at least 14 September 2020 and in each relevant Offer File for the Fairymead Notes ([2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch)). [src-035] - Documented: In a letter of 4 May 2021 to the Treasury Committee, the FCA stated that Credit Suisse Asset Management operated four supply chain finance sub-funds through fund vehicles in Luxembourg and Liechtenstein, which were qualified-investor alternative investment funds not open to retail investors and were supervised, with their management companies, by the Luxembourg CSSF and the Liechtenstein FMA. Portfolio management for all of them was performed by Credit Suisse Asset Management (Switzerland) AG under FINMA supervision, and the FCA-regulated CSAM Limited and Credit Suisse UK Limited marketed and distributed them to UK investors. [src-016] - Documented: The FCA's letter of 4 May 2021 also stated that, until mid-2018, the Swiss GAM AG Group operated sub-funds of its Absolute Return Bond Fund range, Luxembourg alternative investment funds supervised by the CSSF with portfolio management by the FCA-authorised GAM Investment Management Limited, which invested among other things in Greensill supply chain finance assets and included sub-funds named 'GAM Greensill Supply Chain Finance Funds'; on 2 March 2021 GAM announced the liquidation of the last remaining GAM Greensill Supply Chain Finance Fund, which then held $842m in assets. [src-016] - Documented: According to the FCA's letter of 4 May 2021, Greensill Capital Securities Limited (GCSL), part of the Greensill Capital (UK) Limited group, was an appointed representative of the FCA-authorised Mirabella Advisers LLP from 10 August 2017 until Mirabella terminated that status on 5 March 2021. GCSL arranged and distributed Greensill's loan notes to institutional investors, while the structuring of the notes and the provision of supply chain finance were carried out by GCUK; the FCA noted that originating a supply chain finance instrument is not a regulated activity. [src-016] [src-046] - Outcome: On 15 December 2025 the FCA announced that it had closed the investigation, opened on 4 May 2021, into Mirabella's oversight of Greensill Capital Securities Limited as its appointed representative, having identified no breaches by Mirabella requiring further action. - Documented: The FCA told the Treasury Committee that Greensill Capital Securities Limited was not among the firms it supervised under the Money Laundering Regulations, but that its parent Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, as an Annex 1 firm under those regulations, was required to ensure that the subsidiary applied the relevant anti-money-laundering policies, controls and procedures to the extent that it did business subject to the regulations. [src-016] - Documented: The FCA's letter of 4 May 2021 stated that certain Greensill securities, whose structuring was carried out by Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, were classed as 'officially listed' because they were listed on multilateral trading facilities in the European Economic Area, which allowed them to be distributed to UK investors without being subject to the UK listing regime and its FCA scrutiny; the FCA added that such venues might not have sought recognition as Recognised Overseas Investment Exchanges and cited the case as an example of regulatory arbitrage. [src-016] - Documented: In the strategic report for 2019, Greensill Capital (UK) Limited stated that it originated assets mainly for distribution to third parties or other group companies, that default risk on certain of them was mitigated by credit insurance on which the company took a first loss, and that it was therefore indirectly exposed to default risk on the originated assets although they were mostly not held on its balance sheet; among its key risks it also listed concentration on certain customers, key employees and suppliers after significant revenue growth over the previous two years. [src-018] - Documented: Note 28 to the 2019 accounts of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited states that the company used bankruptcy-remote structured entities, which it sponsored but did not consolidate, to distribute assets to investors: financial assets with a carrying amount of $38.4bn (2018: $28.0bn) were transferred to them during 2019 at a total discount of $495m (2018: $290m), and GCUK covered their administrative expenses of $4,084,000 (2018: $4,965,000). GCUK derecognised the transferred assets but sometimes kept a small interest through first losses under insurance policies, credit default swaps or loss-absorption mechanisms required by the end investors, and kept similar first losses on assets transferred directly to Greensill Bank AG; the note put the maximum exposure to loss from the first losses under the insurance policies at $1,036m (2018: $428m) and the expected credit losses on that exposure at $59.3m (2018: $16.6m). [src-018] - Documented: Credit Suisse Asset Management's investor Q&A of 15 December 2022 states that insurance for the notes held by its supply chain finance funds was generally bought as described in the fund documents, with the fund named as loss payee on policies under which Greensill entities such as Greensill Bank AG were the insured, and that it was meant to cover both purchases of existing receivables and suppliers' undertakings relating to future services or deliveries; claims had to be submitted by the policyholder, Greensill Bank. At 26 February 2021 insurance had been bought for all obligors and note programmes of the Credit Suisse (Lux) Supply Chain Finance Fund, for more than one-third of the notes of the Credit Suisse Nova (Lux) Supply Chain Finance High Income Fund and, in the two investment grade funds, for obligors rated A- or lower. [src-033] - Documented: In [2024] EWHC 3068 (Comm), a judgment of 3 December 2024, the Commercial Court described Greensill's trade credit insurance as a parallel policy structure: for each insured risk a 'master' policy named Greensill Capital (UK) Limited as insured and a 'parallel' policy named Greensill Bank AG. GCUK acted as servicer for the bank, originating the financings, arranging and paying for the cover and making disclosures and representations to insurers; it paid the substantive premium, the bank's policy requiring only a nominal $1, and was responsible for paying back to the insurer a sum equal to any deductible on a claim, the bank's policy having no deductible. [src-041] - Documented: The service level agreements between Greensill Capital (UK) Limited and Greensill Bank AG, quoted in [2024] EWHC 3068 (Comm), described their working relationship as a long-term business partnership concerned mainly with the bank's refinancing of the supply chain finance business that GCUK acquired with commercial customers, with GCUK providing 'trust holdings' to the bank, and stated an 'at-arms-length principle' under which the two could operate as separate businesses that 'are not a group of companies'. [src-041] - Documented: An 'insurance disclosure pack' that Greensill Capital (UK) Limited gave Marsh in September 2020, quoted in [2024] EWHC 3068 (Comm), described GCUK as predominantly the originator of the assets to be insured and the party holding the relationship with Marsh and the insurers, and described Greensill Bank AG, together with other parties taking the benefit of the bank's insurances as loss payees, as an investor provided with the insurance that GCUK arranged through Marsh. [src-041] - Documented: The revised intellectual property assignment agreement for Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, filed on 22 October 2021 in the Chapter 11 case of Greensill Capital Inc. (21-10561 (MEW), Southern District of New York), lists ten software items developed for or on behalf of GCUK that Greensill Capital Inc. was to assign to it, among them the Accounts Receivable Module, the Greensill Payments Engine, the New Core System that packaged assets into investor offers and placed them, the Greensill Trading Module for offer and acceptance, a Client File Converter, an Allocation Tool, a Decision Engine, Shared Services, Verdi and Greensill Finance SAP. The Decision Engine, a Python script, recommended which obligors' assets could be sold to which investor, for example Airbus assets to Greensill Bank or Credit Suisse, using current exposure and headroom under insurance, investor and concentration limits. [src-062] - Documented: By a Fourth Omnibus Amendment dated 2 January 2018, filed as Exhibit 10.31 with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, Greensill Capital Inc. assigned to its affiliate Greensill Capital (UK) Limited its role as Purchaser Agent under the Amended and Restated Receivables Purchase Agreement of 22 November 2016, a receivables programme in which Wise Alloys Funding II LLC sold receivables, serviced by Wise Alloys LLC, to Hitachi Capital America Corp. and Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A., New York Branch, with Constellium Holdco II B.V. as parent. The amendment raised the Facility Amount under the related Receivables Sale Agreement from USD 325,000,000 to USD 375,000,000 and Intesa's commitment from $125,000,000 to $175,000,000, extended the purchase termination date from 24 January 2018 to 24 January 2020, and was signed for both Greensill companies by Jonathan Lane as General Counsel. [src-043] - Attributed: Figures that Lex Greensill gave the Treasury Committee, reproduced in its report of 20 July 2021, put Greensill's total asset flow at $27,263m in 2018, $143,039m in 2019 and $142,937m in 2020, of which future receivables were $470m (2%), $10,615m (7%) and $15,401m (11%); Greensill Bank bought 6%, 7% and 11% of the total flow but 0% of the future receivables in 2018 and 73% in both 2019 and 2020. The Committee noted that as future receivables grew, Greensill switched from selling them mainly to other investors to selling them mainly to Greensill Bank. [src-031] [src-080] - Qualification: The figures were supplied by Lex Greensill and cover Greensill as a whole rather than Greensill Capital (UK) Limited alone; the record contains no independent check of them. The copy of Lex Greensill's written evidence in the record shows 87% instead of 89% for the 2020 share of total flow sold to other investors, while the report's table shows 89%, consistent with the 11% sold to Greensill Bank. - Attributed: In written evidence to the Treasury Committee dated 22 June 2021, Lex Greensill said that the term 'prospective receivables', which Sanjeev Gupta had used in a letter of 7 April 2021 for Greensill's arrangements with its clients, including some GFG Alliance companies, was unknown to Greensill Capital and appeared in no client or investor documentation, and that Greensill Capital offered 'future receivables' programmes whose nature was fully disclosed to investors. [src-080] [src-031] - Qualification: This is Lex Greensill's own account to a parliamentary committee; it was not tested in any proceedings in the record. - Outcome: The Committee reported that Mr Greensill declined to explain precisely what 'future receivables' were or how they differed from Mr Gupta's description, said it was 'left in some doubt' about how they operated, and considered that prospective receivables as Mr Gupta described them would appear to be a significantly riskier form of lending than traditional supply chain finance. ## Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, the Covid loan schemes and lobbying - Documented: The Treasury Committee's report of 20 July 2021 states that Greensill provided the financing for the Pharmacy Early Payment Scheme, which let pharmacies receive funding earlier than under the standard government payment schedule. The Chancellor's evidence quoted in the report says the scheme was introduced by the Department of Health and Social Care in 2013 and delivered by Citibank, and that in 2018 Taulia replaced Citibank as provider under a contract with the NHS Business Services Authority made through a Crown Commercial Service framework and contracted Greensill to provide the financing, HM Treasury having no record of involvement in that process. [src-031] - Documented: The Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CLBILS), launched by the British Business Bank on 20 April 2020, let accredited commercial lenders lend to businesses with turnover above £45 million, normally up to £50 million per borrower group (up to £200 million for lenders accredited to its Larger Scheme Facility); the government guaranteed 80% of each loan, repaying the lender that share if the borrower did not repay, provided the lender had complied with the scheme rules. [src-077] - Documented: Lex Greensill first contacted the British Business Bank's Chief Commercial Officer about CLBILS accreditation on 17 April 2020; Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) then submitted an Expression of Interest on 19 April 2020 and, on 23 April 2020, a Formal Proposal asking for a lending allocation of £1 billion, based on a pipeline of 40 to 50 borrowers with facilities averaging £35 million and three products: supply chain finance, accounts receivable and accounts receivable portfolio. [src-077] - Attributed: The CLBILS application of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) stated that the Greensill business had provided more than £120 billion of financing in 2019, 30% of it relating to UK buyers or sellers, that it had no external debt, that it had received an investment of $1.7 billion in the previous 18 months valuing it at around $4 billion, and that its default rate was 0.03% for 2019, with defaulted assets at 0.43% of total assets in March 2020. [src-077] [src-031] - Qualification: These were the applicant's own statements. The National Audit Office reported that the British Business Bank performed limited due diligence and accepted key information at face value, that the £120 billion figure could not be verified from publicly available information, and that a more sceptical process might have led the Bank to question statements on default rates, borrower exposure and the business model. - Response: The British Business Bank told the National Audit Office that the purpose of its due diligence was not to assess Greensill's financial position in detail but, given the policy direction to accredit lenders quickly and a greater reliance on post-accreditation audits, to confirm that lenders could reliably deliver money to borrowers. - Outcome: In July 2021 the Treasury Committee noted the National Audit Office's finding that a more sceptical process might have prevented the acceptance of Greensill as an accredited lender. - Documented: A British Business Bank paper submitted to its Investment Committee on 4 May 2020 recommended accrediting Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) with a lending allocation of up to £1 billion, stated that limited due diligence had been carried out, and named three key risks: scrutiny of supply chain finance (including its link to the 2018 collapse of Carillion), GCUK's relationship with Sanjeev Gupta's firms through Liberty Steel Group, and its connection to former Prime Minister David Cameron. [src-077] - Documented: On 12 May 2020 the British Business Bank's Investment Committee ruled the supply chain finance product of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) ineligible for CLBILS and approved accreditation with a £1 billion allocation for the other two products; on 3 June 2020 the Bank's Chief Commercial Officer set the lending allocation at £400 million, and GCUK, the first non-bank lender accredited under CLBILS, was formally accredited on 4 June 2020 with a maximum of £50 million per borrower group. [src-077] - Documented: Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) applied on 12 June 2020 for the CLBILS term loan and revolving credit facility variants and for the Larger Scheme Facility, which would have allowed loans of up to £200 million; the British Business Bank's Managing Director Forum agreed on 3 July 2020 to refuse the Larger Scheme Facility because GCUK was not permitted to use the Internal Ratings Based approach, and GCUK was accredited for the two variants on 8 July 2020 within its existing £400 million allocation. [src-077] - Documented: In mid-June 2020 David Cameron sent messages to Nadhim Zahawi MP, then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business and Industry, and to Richard Sharp about whether the £50 million CLBILS limit could be raised for Greensill; HM Treasury told the Treasury Committee that the British Business Bank never approached it with a proposal for enhanced accreditation, and the individual loan limit of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited remained £50 million. [src-031] - Documented: The National Audit Office found that the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, aware that Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) financed Liberty Steel and that Liberty Steel had sought around £160 million to £180 million of government support early in the pandemic, made eight email enquiries of the British Business Bank over 19 weeks between April and September 2020 about GCUK's accreditation and whether it could lend more than £50 million per borrower; the Bank did not prioritise the application, and its legal review concluded that external parties had not influenced the accreditation. [src-077] - Qualification: The Department described these as informal approaches; the British Business Bank called the level of departmental interest unusual. - Documented: Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) applied on 16 July 2020 to lend under the Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CBILS), which covered businesses with turnover up to £45 million, and was accredited on 21 September 2020 with a £50 million allocation; it lent £18.5 million through four revolving credit facilities of £5 million each, one later reduced to £3.5 million after the borrower was found to have an existing CBILS facility with another lender. [src-077] - Documented: Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) lent £400 million under CLBILS, the maximum it was permitted, in eight loans of £50 million each, all revolving credit facilities, which made it the fifth-largest CLBILS lender by value, and £18.5 million under CBILS; with the 80% government guarantee, the National Audit Office put the government's maximum exposure under both schemes at £335 million (£334.8 million in its detailed figure). [src-077] [src-031] - Documented: The first CLBILS loan of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK), £50 million to SIMEC International (UK) Limited, a GFG Alliance company, had an initial draw date of 31 July 2020. [src-077] - Documented: The second CLBILS loan of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK), £50 million to Aar Tee Commodities (UK) Limited, had an initial draw date of 27 August 2020; the British Business Bank noted that the owner of Aar Tee Commodities had previously been a board member of GFG's charitable foundation and of GFG's strategic board, and the National Audit Office counted the company among seven CLBILS borrowers with connections to the GFG Alliance. [src-077] - Documented: On 30 September 2020 Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) made six CLBILS loans of £50 million each, totalling £300 million, to Speciality Steel UK Limited, Liberty Commodities Limited, Liberty Industries UK Limited, Liberty Steel Newport Limited, Liberty Pipes (Hartlepool) Limited and Liberty Merchant Bar Plc, companies that appeared to the British Business Bank to be associated with the GFG Alliance. [src-077] - Documented: On 2 October 2020 the British Business Bank became concerned that the seven CLBILS loans of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) to Gupta Family Group (GFG) Alliance borrowers, totalling £350 million, breached the rule that lending to one borrower group could not exceed £50 million without Larger Scheme Facility accreditation, which GCUK lacked; treated as one group, the lending was £300 million above GCUK's limit. The Bank had restated the group rule to GCUK in May 2020 and escalated its concerns to HM Treasury on 7 October and to the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy on 9 October 2020. [src-077] [src-031] - Qualification: This records the Bank's concern and provisional view as described by the National Audit Office in July 2021; it is not a court finding of breach. - Response: GCUK told the Bank on 2 October 2020 that it considered the loans to be compliant. - Attributed: A press report of April 2021, cited by the Treasury Committee, stated that the GFG Alliance had split companies so that Greensill could lend it more under CLBILS while keeping each transaction within the £50 million cap. [src-031] - Qualification: This is a press account reported by the Committee, not a finding. The Department for Business and Trade later relied on related grounds when it terminated the guarantees, which Greensill Bank AG disputes in pending litigation. - Response: Lex Greensill, declining to discuss individual customers, told the Committee on 11 May 2021 that each facility had been reviewed by a top-tier London law firm and that in Lex Greensill's opinion every facility complied with the British Business Bank rules. - Documented: The British Business Bank's Investment Committee agreed on 12 October 2020 to investigate the compliance of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) with the CLBILS rules; on 13 October 2020 the Bank told GCUK that it could make no more loans until the issues were resolved, reducing its allocation to zero under both CLBILS and CBILS, and from October 2020 it engaged Ernst & Young to review the CLBILS loans. According to the Bank, GCUK said at that meeting that it had received “political steers” that its support for the steel industry was welcome. [src-077] - Documented: On 2 March 2021 the British Business Bank sent Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) a Letter of Concern setting out provisional findings that it had breached the CLBILS guarantee agreement and giving notice that the Secretary of State's guarantee obligations were suspended; a second Letter of Concern, dated 26 March 2021 in the National Audit Office timeline, concerned the loan to Aar Tee Commodities (UK) Ltd, these being the only such letters issued under CLBILS, and a Supplemental Letter of Concern followed on 27 May 2021. As of 30 June 2021 the investigation was ongoing and the guarantees remained suspended, with GCUK's deadline for representations extended to 20 August 2021. [src-077] [src-094] [src-015] - Response: On 9 April 2021 the joint administrators replied that GCUK denied the allegations in the Letter of Concern, considered its loans compliant with the scheme rules, including those on lending to groups, and reserved the right to seek damages if the guarantees were cancelled on those grounds. - Outcome: According to the Department for Business and Trade's written case as described in a press report (January 2026), the government terminated the CLBILS guarantees in April 2022 and the CBILS guarantees in September 2023; Greensill Bank AG denies that the Department was entitled to do so in High Court proceedings that were pending as of October 2026. - Attributed: On 9 April 2021 the joint administrators of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK), Chris Laverty, Trevor O'Sullivan and Will Stagg of Grant Thornton UK LLP, replied to the British Business Bank that GCUK denied the allegations in the Letter of Concern, considered its loans compliant with the scheme rules including those on group lending, and regarded any cancellation of the guarantees on those grounds as a breach for which GCUK reserved the right to seek damages. [src-077] [src-094] - Qualification: This is GCUK's position as reported by the National Audit Office. The administrators also said the time given to respond was procedurally unfair; on 16 April 2021 the Bank replied that the process was set out in the Letter of Concern. - Outcome: According to the Department for Business and Trade's written case reported in January 2026, the government terminated the CLBILS guarantees in April 2022 and the CBILS guarantees in September 2023. - Attributed: According to the Department for Business and Trade's written case for a High Court hearing, as described in a press report (January 2026), the government terminated the CLBILS guarantees of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) in April 2022 because six of the eight borrowers were “ultimately owned” by Sanjeev Gupta, so that GCUK had lent £300 million to them when the sum “ought not to have exceeded £50m”, and it terminated the CBILS guarantees in September 2023, saying GCUK “did not exercise a level of care, control and diligence consistent with the standard required”. [src-094] [src-033] - Qualification: These are the Department's stated grounds as reported in a press account; they are contested in pending litigation and have not been decided by a court. Credit Suisse Asset Management's December 2022 investor Q&A also referred to the UK government's decision to remove the CLBILS guarantees on Greensill loans to GFG, and said its supply chain finance funds were not beneficiaries of those guarantees. - Response: Counsel for Greensill Bank AG stated that the six companies were not “partner or linked enterprises”, that GCUK “did not act in bad faith”, and that Greensill Bank AG denies the Department was entitled to terminate the guarantees. - Documented: Greensill Bank AG has issued legal proceedings against the Secretary of State for Business and Trade concerning its CBILS and CLBILS investments and the underlying guarantees; Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK), as the accredited lender, has been joined as a defendant and is providing disclosure, according to the joint administrators' 2026 progress report. [src-015] - Outcome: Pending as of October 2026. - Attributed: A press report (January 2026) said that Greensill Bank AG seeks more than £331 million in damages from the Department for Business and Trade, alleging that it wrongly terminated the guarantees agreed with Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) on pandemic loans and that there was “considerable political pressure” from the Department to accredit GCUK to lend to Sanjeev Gupta's companies; the hearing before Mr Justice Robin Knowles dealt with procedural issues, and the trial is expected to begin in late 2027 and could last up to eight weeks. [src-094] - Qualification: These are a party's claims as reported in the press. The Department is defending the claim and its counsel called the bank's pleaded case “highly inadequate”; no decision on the merits appears in the record. - Response: According to the same report, the Department is defending the claim: its counsel said it had lawfully determined that GCUK failed to act in good faith by treating six Gupta-owned borrowers separately to avoid the restrictions on lending to groups, and called the bank's pleaded case “highly inadequate”. - Outcome: Pending; trial expected to begin in late 2027. - Documented: In February 2020 Standard Chartered, as one of the lenders of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK), asked UK Export Finance for an Export Development Guarantee covering 80% (£400 million) of a £500 million five-year loan to GCUK; UK Export Finance rejected the application in June 2020 as not aligned with the product's policy intent and rejected a revised £100 million to £200 million one-year proposal in September 2020, its due diligence having identified concerns about GCUK's governance and exposure to some of its customers. [src-077] [src-031] - Outcome: The Treasury Committee's July 2021 report cited UK Export Finance's refusals of June and September 2020 as an example of other agencies of the government paying attention to the reputational issues around Greensill. - Documented: Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited received between £20,002 and £50,000 from HM Revenue & Customs under the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme, according to the National Audit Office, which found published HMRC data showing a Greensill company claiming between £10,001 and £25,000 in each of January and February 2021. [src-077] - Documented: The Covid Corporate Financing Facility (CCFF), which the Bank of England operated for HM Treasury to buy short-term commercial paper, was not open to financial institutions; Greensill applied after the market notice of 18 March 2020 and proposed changes to the criteria, such as accepting assets from securitisation vehicles in the European Economic Area and insurers' credit ratings in place of borrowers' ratings, and on 30 March 2020 HM Treasury told the Bank that the Chancellor did not intend to change the criteria and the Bank told Greensill that its application did not meet them. The National Audit Office records this as HM Treasury's rejection of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited. [src-031] [src-077] - Documented: After further proposals and a confidential HM Treasury call for evidence in May 2020, HM Treasury told Greensill for the final time on 26 June 2020 that it would not be eligible for the CCFF, in a call by Second Permanent Secretary Charles Roxburgh with Lex Greensill, then chief executive of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK), and Bill Crothers, a GCUK director; Economic Secretary John Glen MP confirmed it by letter to Lex Greensill and by text to David Cameron, and Greensill never gained access to the facility. [src-031] - Documented: The Treasury Committee found that most of the lobbying on behalf of Greensill in 2020 was carried out by Lex Greensill, then chief executive of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK), Bill Crothers, a GCUK director, and former Prime Minister David Cameron, an adviser to Greensill Capital, and that David Cameron or the office of David Cameron made 56 contacts with the government on Greensill's behalf in the period it examined. [src-031] [src-094] - Qualification: The Committee accepted that David Cameron did not break the rules governing lobbying by former ministers, while saying those rules were not strong enough. - Response: David Cameron told the Committee that lobbying the UK Government “was never intended to be part of my role”. - Outcome: The Committee concluded that the Treasury took the right decision in preventing Greensill from accessing the CCFF; a press report (January 2026) stated that an inquiry later found David Cameron's actions to have been within the rules and that David Cameron had not been required to register as a lobbyist. - Attributed: David Cameron told the Treasury Committee that Greensill paid “a generous annual amount—far more than what I earned as Prime Minister” and that the adviser held shares, not share options, in the business, vesting over the term of the contract; the Committee also recorded the use of Greensill's private jets, which David Cameron said were short-haul flights on which tax was paid for any benefit. [src-031] - Qualification: This is David Cameron's own account; the exact remuneration was described as a private matter, and no amount or shareholding is stated in the record. - Attributed: David Cameron told the Treasury Committee that the adviser role involved invitations to most routine Greensill Board meetings but no directorship, board-committee seat, voting rights or executive responsibility, and that the last Board meeting David Cameron attended was on 10 November 2020. [src-031] [src-004] - Qualification: This is David Cameron's own account in a letter to the Committee; it does not name the Greensill company whose board is meant. - Response: The joint administrators of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited told the Committee on 9 July 2021 that, from an initial review of the 2020 minutes, David Cameron did not appear to be recorded as an attendee at any of GCUK's board meetings. - Attributed: The joint administrators of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) told the Treasury Committee on 9 July 2021 that, from an initial review of the minutes of GCUK's 2020 board meetings, David Cameron did not appear to be recorded as an attendee at any of them; they declined to provide the minutes, citing commercially sensitive and legally privileged content. [src-004] - Qualification: This was an initial review by the administrators. David Cameron told the Committee of attending routine “Greensill Board” meetings as an adviser without naming the company, so the record does not show which group board those meetings belonged to. - Documented: The Treasury Committee reported that the Prudential Regulation Authority received limited information from BaFin in March 2020 suggesting a “possible weakness in controls” at Greensill, which the Bank of England did not then pass to HM Treasury; the potentially serious nature of Greensill's financial difficulties became apparent to PRA supervisors in October 2020, with a much stronger concern from BaFin about Greensill Bank AG, and the information reached HM Treasury on 3 November 2020. [src-031] - Response: Sam Woods, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, told the Committee that BaFin's concerns in March 2020 were about systems and controls rather than the solvency of the bank, that BaFin later gave reassurance on which it put some weight, and that the Bank did not pass the information to HM Treasury at that time because it conveyed less serious concerns than the October information and did not add materially to concerns about Wyelands and its relationship with the GFG Alliance that the Bank was already sharing with HM Treasury. - Attributed: Lex Greensill told the Treasury Committee that the first concerns about Greensill as a company arose in December 2020, following interactions with the German regulator; David Cameron also dated first concern about the company's financial position to December 2020, after a call from Lex Greensill reporting that a planned capital raising was not going as well as hoped. [src-031] - Qualification: These are the witnesses' own accounts; the Committee separately recorded that the Bank of England had received information from BaFin about possible control weaknesses in March and October 2020. - Attributed: Charles Roxburgh, Second Permanent Secretary at HM Treasury, told the Treasury Committee that, on the administrator's figures, Greensill owed $8 million to HMRC, about $168,000 to two local authorities and $10,000 to one foundation trust, a direct public exposure of £5 million to £6 million before recoveries, while the indirect exposure lay in the 80% CLBILS guarantees, which were suspended during the British Business Bank's investigation. [src-031] - Qualification: This is HM Treasury's evidence in 2021, based on provisional administration figures that do not name the debtor company; the Committee noted that Greensill contested the rationale for suspending the guarantees. - Documented: A review by Nigel Boardman, conducted at the request of the Prime Minister, examined decisions on the development and use of supply chain finance and associated schemes in government, especially the role of Lex Greensill and Greensill Capital; the Treasury Committee, reporting in July 2021, said it had been due to report to the Prime Minister by 30 June 2021. [src-031] - Attributed: In written evidence to the Treasury Committee in 2021, Lex Greensill corrected earlier oral evidence and stated that Greensill Capital had provided a facility to a subsidiary of General Atlantic, which the Committee said had bought a minority stake in Greensill in 2019, that the facility was repaid in full in 2021, and that Greensill Capital had a special approval process for lending to any shareholder or affiliate. [src-080] - Qualification: This is Lex Greensill's own statement; the Committee had cited reports that General Atlantic borrowed €300m from Greensill, and the amount of the facility is not confirmed in the record. - Outcome: According to Lex Greensill's written evidence, the facility was repaid in full in 2021; the evidence gives no amount. - Attributed: In a June 2021 letter annexed to Lex Greensill's written evidence to the Treasury Committee, Bill Crothers stated that in summer 2015, after discussions with Cabinet Secretary Sir Jeremy Heywood, Civil Service head John Manzoni and the Head of Propriety and Ethics, a three-month transitional arrangement allowed Bill Crothers to work part time for the Civil Service while advising Greensill Capital for about one day a month; the Civil Service work covered only commercial capability, and responsibility for the Crown Commercial Service passed to John Manzoni for that period. [src-080] [src-018] - Qualification: This is Bill Crothers' own account; the record has no separate official confirmation. The 2019 accounts of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited describe Bill Crothers as a former senior civil servant whose last government role was UK Government Chief Commercial Officer. ## Credit Suisse's Greensill funds: limits, closure and recoveries - Documented: Credit Suisse Asset Management's investor Q&A of 15 December 2022 identifies four Credit Suisse supply chain finance funds and gives their net asset values at 26 February 2021: the Credit Suisse (Lux) Supply Chain Finance Fund, a sub-fund of Credit Suisse Virtuoso SICAV-SIF, USD 7,253 mn; the Credit Suisse Nova (Lux) Supply Chain Finance High Income Fund USD 1,834 mn; the Credit Suisse Nova (Lux) Supply Chain Finance Investment Grade Fund USD 260 mn; and the Liechtenstein-domiciled Credit Suisse Supply Chain Finance Investment Grade Fund USD 669 mn, a total of USD 10,016 mn. [src-033] - Documented: On 1 March 2021 the boards of the four Credit Suisse supply chain finance funds suspended redemptions and subscriptions and then approved the start of their liquidation. Credit Suisse Asset Management's December 2022 Q&A gives as reasons the considerable uncertainty about the valuation of some of the funds' assets and the reduced availability of insurance cover for new investments, which made it unachievable for the funds to stay invested in line with their investment policies; management fees were waived. [src-033] [src-031] - Response: Lex Greensill told the Treasury Committee that Greensill failed because its principal insurance provider decided not to renew its cover and, ultimately, Credit Suisse determined that it would no longer fund Greensill's business, roughly a week before the administration; Lex Greensill attributed the failure to that withdrawal of insurance capacity. - Outcome: Credit Suisse Asset Management reported that by 30 November 2022 about USD 6.78 bn had been returned to the funds' investors in seven instalments and that, with the cash still held, the funds' cash position equalled about USD 7.4 bn, or 74% of their assets under management at suspension. - Documented: Credit Suisse Virtuoso SICAV-SIF is a Luxembourg investment company with an umbrella structure of sub-funds holding segregated assets and liabilities; its Credit Suisse (Lux) Supply Chain Finance Fund held the beneficial interests in the Fairymead Notes, which had a principal face value of $439,999,710. Its alternative investment fund manager for that sub-fund was originally Credit Suisse Fund Management, which delegated portfolio management to Credit Suisse Asset Management (Schweiz) AG ([2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch)). [src-035] - Documented: According to the uncontentious facts recorded in [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch), Eric Varvel was Credit Suisse's Global Head of Asset Management between late 2019 and mid-2021, and Michel Degen, head of the Swiss and EMEA asset management divisions, reported to Varvel; Degen's team included Luc Mathys, head of fixed income asset management, and Lukas Haas, a portfolio manager at Credit Suisse Asset Management. [src-035] - Attributed: A press report (March 2017) of a Credit Suisse announcement said that Credit Suisse AG was transferring its Swiss asset management business to a new legal entity, Credit Suisse Asset Management (Schweiz) AG, which, subject to FINMA approval, would start operating at the end of March 2017 under its own licence as a manager of collective investment schemes, as part of a new holding structure jointly owned by Credit Suisse (Schweiz) AG and Credit Suisse AG; Michel Degen was named its chief executive, remaining under Eric Varvel as global head of asset management. The GLEIF record of the company gives February 2017 as its creation date. [src-121] [src-113] [src-035] - Qualification: The account of the transfer and appointments comes from a press report of the bank's announcement; the Swiss commercial register entry itself is not in the record. - Outcome: Credit Suisse Asset Management (Schweiz) AG was deregistered from the commercial register of the Canton of Zurich on 30 August 2024, UBS Asset Management Switzerland AG having succeeded to its rights and obligations ([2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch)). - Documented: On 24 March 2020, after the Covid-19 market decline had affected Greensill's liquidity, SoftBank Group Corp. invested $1.5 billion in the Credit Suisse (Lux) Supply Chain Finance Fund; an internal SoftBank presentation gave the purpose as supporting the operations of Greensill Capital, whose supply chain deals the fund financed, and a side letter required the fund to acquire only notes from the Greensill group's supply chain finance programme while the investment lasted. The investment, agreed to run until 18 May 2020 and extended at the request of Greensill Capital Pty Limited, was fully redeemed and the side letter terminated by 16 July 2020 ([2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch)). [src-035] - Documented: Credit Suisse Asset Management agreed new concentration limits with the Greensill group in 2020: on 3 July 2020 Lex Greensill, Adam Milenkovic, Chief Risk Officer of Credit Suisse's asset management division, and Luc Mathys signed an agreement limiting the Credit Suisse (Lux) Supply Chain Finance Fund's exposure to multi-obligor programmes to 5% by 31 December 2020 and its exposure to SoftBank Vision Fund-related companies to 7% in total and 3% per programme; on 22 July 2020 two Credit Suisse executives recorded that Lex Greensill was 'okay by year end' with bringing Vision Fund-backed companies down to 5% ([2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch)). [src-035] - Documented: Credit Suisse's investment bank also worked on the Greensill group's capital raising: a Credit Suisse presentation of September 2020 addressed a potential initial public offering, the group engaged Credit Suisse's investment banking department for its fundraising, Credit Suisse attended the board meeting of Greensill Capital Pty Limited on 10 November 2020 to report on the debt and equity private placements, and documents showed the department hoped to earn $40-50 million in fees over the next 12-18 months. By December 2020 TDR Capital was the main prospective equity investor, with a $350M order subject to Lex Greensill personally investing $25M ([2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch)). [src-035] - Documented: Exchanges in December 2020 concerned compliance with the limits: on 11 December a Greensill group employee told Lex Greensill that meeting the 3% per-programme and 5% overall SoftBank-sponsor limits required Katerra to be zeroed out, and Lex Greensill replied that Katerra should be excluded from the calculation because Credit Suisse had not reported it to the regulator as part of the exposure, it being a multi-obligor programme; on 21 December 2020 Lukas Haas of Credit Suisse Asset Management wrote that the 5% limit for single and multi-obligor programmes 'agreed between Lex and CS senior management earlier this year' had to be kept, with 'absolutly [sic] no room to deviate' ([2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch)). [src-035] - Documented: On 31 December 2020 the Greensill group arranged a trade with Credit Suisse Virtuoso SICAV-SIF, the 'Secondary Trade', under which Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, via Greensill Bank AG, was to buy all the outstanding Fairymead Notes, with a total notional value of $439,999,710, for settlement on 14 January 2021; the notes held by the Credit Suisse (Lux) Supply Chain Finance Fund were due mainly on 15 March 2021, with the balance on 17 May 2021 ([2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch)). [src-035] - Outcome: It was common ground in the proceedings that the trade was cancelled on 7 January 2021, with internal Greensill and Credit Suisse confirmations of the cancellation on 11 and 12 January 2021; the court found that the Greensill group lacked the resources to perform the trade at any point up to the settlement date, and the Fairymead Notes all defaulted on maturity in March and May 2021. - Attributed: On 4 January 2021 Lex Greensill wrote to Eric Varvel of Credit Suisse that the supply chain finance funds' concentrations at 31 December 2020 exceeded the year-end targets for SoftBank Vision Fund companies and for GFG, and made proposals that Lex Greensill acknowledged were 'counter to the agreement struck in the summer of 2020': no further purchases from Vision Fund companies until the target was met, early repurchase of all Katerra notes when the Greensill equity raise closed, and GFG reductions matching a plan being agreed with BaFin for Greensill Bank AG, of $200mm in January 2021, $100mm by 31 March 2021 and $150mm by 30 June 2021. The email described all GFG assets as 100% insured and cited more than EUR700mm of government-guaranteed COVID loans for which GFG was eligible and an IPO of GFG's Australian subsidiary LibertyOneSteel. [src-035] - Qualification: These are Lex Greensill's proposals and descriptions of the exposures and refinancing options, as quoted in [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch) as part of the documentary record; the record does not establish that the stated insurance cover or refinancing sources existed as described. - Response: Eric Varvel replied the same day that the right approach was to complete the trades that had been confirmed, keeping both sides on-side with the Credit Suisse board and FINMA, and that breaking confirmed trades was not the right direction. - Outcome: In [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch) it was common ground that the Secondary Trade was cancelled on 7 January 2021; instead it was agreed that the remaining Fairymead Notes would be redeemed over a longer period, on terms that Michel Degen sent on 7 January 2021 and Lex Greensill accepted the same evening. - Attributed: On 5 January 2021 Eric Varvel recorded that Lex Greensill maintained that the trades bringing Credit Suisse's exposure down from 15% to 5% had been put in the market by Credit Suisse and then accepted by the Greensill team, said that Lex Greensill claimed to have confirmed this with legal counsel, and noted that Lex Greensill continued to push for three more months. [src-035] - Qualification: This is Lex Greensill's position as reported by a Credit Suisse executive in an internal email quoted in [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch). - Response: Michel Degen of Credit Suisse annotated the email 'THIS IS NOT TRUE', writing that the trades had been agreed and that Greensill's middle office had simply not instructed them, and told Lex Greensill directly that the trades had been agreed. - Outcome: In [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch) it was common ground that the Secondary Trade was entered into on 31 December 2020, and the court found on the evidence that it had been orally agreed by Lex Greensill and Michel Degen on 30 December 2020. - Documented: On 7 January 2021 Michel Degen sent Lex Greensill terms 'discussed and agreed with our CEO and EXB', to be confirmed before Credit Suisse informed FINMA of an extension of its new guidelines to 31 March 2021: the notes of the Katerra multi-obligor programme (438mn) were to mature on 15 or 31 March 2021 or be bought back by Greensill by 31 March 2021, with no roll-over of maturities before that date, and Vision Fund-related notes were to be at or below 5% of each supply chain finance fund by 31 March 2021; Lex Greensill replied 'We accept those terms' ([2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch)). [src-035] - Attributed: Minutes of the board of Greensill Capital Pty Limited on 7 January 2021 record Lex Greensill reporting that the implementation of Credit Suisse's concentration limits meant its supply chain finance fund was no longer buying GFG and SoftBank portfolio company assets, with a potential impact on the liquidity of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, and that Credit Suisse had agreed to suspend its new rules until the end of March and resume buying GFG assets on conditions: a $100m reduction in GFG assets by the end of January (an aggregate $200m reduction for January), a GFG seller concentration limit of 9% by the end of March and 5% by 30 June 2021, a $150m buy-back of SoftBank portfolio company assets when the equity raise closed, and a 12-month option for Credit Suisse to buy $150m of shares at the equity-raise valuation. [src-035] - Qualification: The conditions are as Lex Greensill reported them to the board and as its minutes record them, quoted in [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch); Credit Suisse's own email of the same day, also quoted there, sets out only the Vision Fund and Katerra terms. - Attributed: A Credit Suisse note of a call with FINMA on 8 January 2021, quoted in [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch), records that Credit Suisse's head of risk Lara Warner and Eric Varvel informed FINMA that the concentration risk to SoftBank Vision Fund-sponsored papers had been reduced to 16% by year-end, missing the internal 5% target set by the Group CEO because Greensill had flagged very late that it needed more time; that no regulatory breach was associated with this internal guideline breach; and that Greensill had been told Credit Suisse would not renew its programmes and would run down the funds, targeting a run-off exposure of 7 per cent by mid-March. [src-035] [src-032] - Qualification: This is Credit Suisse's own record of what it told FINMA. In its February 2023 conclusions FINMA found that the bank had made partly false and overly positive statements to it about the claims selection process and the funds' exposure to certain debtors. - Attributed: On 29 January 2021 Lex Greensill told SoftBank executives that Credit Suisse had agreed to drop its 31 January reduction requirements for Vision Fund and GFG exposures and to raise the available GFG limit, freeing about $125mm of operating cash for Greensill, on the sole condition that View Glass notes of $270mm notional, covered by the SoftBank-Greensill credit default swap, were repurchased and settled by 5 February 2021, and asked SoftBank to buy them back. [src-035] - Qualification: This is Lex Greensill's account of Credit Suisse's position in an email to SoftBank quoted in [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch). - Outcome: On 4 February 2021 a SoftBank Group email recorded that Masayoshi Son and Rajeev Misra had concluded that SoftBank Group and SoftBank Vision Fund 2 should not act, and SoftBank Investment Advisers paused the transaction the same day. - Attributed: On 24 February 2021 Lex Greensill told SoftBank Investment Advisers that Credit Suisse had sketched out a plan, to go to its board for in-principle support, for 'a committed underwrite of the entire GFG book'; on 26 February 2021 Lex Greensill wrote that the SoftBank Vision Fund 2 investment committee had declined a proposed co-purchase of $300mm of insured GFG paper, of which Credit Suisse was to take $150mm and SoftBank Vision Fund 2 $150mm. [src-035] [src-033] - Qualification: This is Lex Greensill's description of Credit Suisse's plan in emails quoted in [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch); no Credit Suisse statement about the plan was found in the record. - Outcome: On 1 March 2021 the boards of the four Credit Suisse supply chain finance funds suspended redemptions and subscriptions and then approved the start of the funds' liquidation, according to Credit Suisse Asset Management's investor Q&A of 15 December 2022. - Documented: In [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch) the court found that Lex Greensill thought, at the time of Katerra's financial difficulties around October 2020, that a default on the Fairymead Notes would have been existential for Greensill; in evidence Lex Greensill described the Credit Suisse supply chain finance funds as the principal source of the group's liquidity, saying they had provided over $10 billion of funding. [src-035] - Qualification: The description of the funds as the principal source of liquidity and the figure of over $10 billion are Lex Greensill's evidence, not findings of the court. - Documented: A slide deck for the board meeting of Greensill Capital Pty Limited on 26 January 2021, quoted in [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch), listed among the 'Must Haves Q1 2021' the key outflows of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited: USD 140m to repay the Credit Suisse bridge loan and USD 125m of insurance collateral at the end of February, USD 400m for the Katerra repurchase in mid-March and a USD 40m Katerra balance at the end of March. [src-035] [src-031] [src-052] - Outcome: The Treasury Committee's report of 20 July 2021 states that on 4 March 2021 Credit Suisse accelerated a $140 million loan to Greensill's holding company and demanded immediate payment from Greensill Capital (UK) Limited as guarantor, which it was unable to make; on 8 March 2021 the High Court ([2021] EWHC 700 (Ch)) found that US$140 million was immediately due and payable by GCUK as guarantor on a facility from Credit Suisse AG to its holding company. - Attributed: Notes taken by a SoftBank Investment Advisers observer at the board meeting of Greensill Capital Pty Limited on 26 January 2021, quoted in [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch), recorded that the Katerra notes were all held by Credit Suisse Virtuoso, with $400M maturing in March and $40M in May, and that if Greensill ceased to be a going concern Credit Suisse could still claim under the Greensill Bank insurance policy, Greensill would need to pay $100M under the deductible, and 'TBCC' would effectively become another creditor of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited. [src-035] - Qualification: These are an observer's notes of a board discussion, not a statement of agreed terms; the judgment quotes them as part of the record and makes no finding on the deductible arrangement. - Documented: FINMA's press release of 28 February 2023 states that Greensill told Credit Suisse it was planning an initial public offering with the bank and first needed a bridging loan; the Credit Suisse risk manager responsible for the loan identified a number of risks in Greensill's business model and recommended internally that it not be granted, but a senior manager overruled the recommendation. [src-032] - Qualification: This is FINMA's account in its proceedings against Credit Suisse; the release does not name the borrowing company, the amount or the date of the loan. - Attributed: In its answer QoN026-01 to the Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, ASIC stated that elements of Credit Suisse's relationship with the Greensill group were managed by Credit Suisse in Australia and that there had been reports that this included the booking of 50% of a USD140mil bridging loan and involvement in a potential private placement or initial public offering that never took place; ASIC said it was engaging with Credit Suisse on these matters. [src-034] - Qualification: ASIC relayed reports and did not state the booking as established; no response from Credit Suisse on the point was found in the record. - Documented: In its answer QoN026-01 to the Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, ASIC stated that Greensill Capital Pty Limited, the Australian parent of the group, which went into liquidation by resolution of its creditors on 22 April 2021 with Grant Thornton Australia as liquidator, was a major creditor of its UK subsidiary Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, and that ASIC was considering whether the parent's financial reports for 2018 and 2019 complied with the Australian Accounting Standards and whether the audits of those accounts complied with the Australian Auditing Standards. [src-034] - Qualification: ASIC described a review in progress; no outcome of it was found in the record. - Documented: In its press release of 28 February 2023 concluding enforcement proceedings, FINMA stated that Credit Suisse launched the first of four supply chain finance funds with Greensill in 2017, Greensill acting as financing company, securitising the claims and transferring the securities to the funds, with specific insurance meant to secure most claims against buyer default. FINMA found that Credit Suisse's asset management company had little knowledge and control over the specific claims, which Greensill rather than Credit Suisse selected and reviewed, and that Credit Suisse left Greensill to arrange the insurance in its own name; the funds were distributed to qualified investors with their risk shown as low, and around ten billion US dollars was invested when Credit Suisse closed them at short notice in March 2021. [src-032] - Qualification: These are FINMA's findings about Credit Suisse in supervisory proceedings against the bank; no Greensill company was a party, and they are not determinations about Greensill Capital (UK) Limited. - Documented: FINMA also found that the funds' risk character changed decisively over time: in some instances Greensill transferred to them future claims that had not yet arisen and so financed some companies whose creditworthiness was doubtful, while Credit Suisse did not at first realise the consequences, had no knowledge or control over how many claims were actually contractually owed, and relied on the insurance cover organised by Greensill (FINMA press release, 28 February 2023). [src-032] - Qualification: A regulator's finding about Credit Suisse's conduct as asset manager; it describes Greensill's transfers only as seen in FINMA's proceedings against the bank and is not a finding against a Greensill company. - Documented: On 28 February 2023 FINMA concluded its enforcement proceedings against Credit Suisse over its business relationship with Lex Greensill and the Greensill companies, finding that over a period of years the bank had seriously breached its supervisory obligations on risk management and appropriate organisational structures and had not sufficiently fulfilled its supervisory duties as an asset manager, and that it had made partly false and overly positive statements to FINMA about the claims selection process and the funds' exposure to certain debtors. FINMA ordered remedial measures, including periodic executive-board review of about 500 key business relationships, a responsibility document for about 600 senior managers and an audit mandatary to check compliance, and opened four enforcement proceedings against former Credit Suisse managers. [src-032] - Qualification: A regulator's finding about Credit Suisse, not about Greensill Capital (UK) Limited; FINMA said it would not comment on the proceedings against individuals or their identities. - Response: FINMA recorded that Credit Suisse had adopted a wide range of organisational measures based on its own investigation, revising governance structures and strengthening control processes, which FINMA supported. - Attributed: A press report (June 2025) on the full FINMA report, compiled in December 2022 and released during the trial of Credit Suisse Virtuoso's claim against SoftBank under a London court order, quoted the report as stating that the investments of large Greensill investors such as General Atlantic and SoftBank 'were primarily used to pay out private investors and to provide Greensill Bank, which was increasingly coming under regulatory scrutiny, with additional capital', and that under Lex Greensill's management the company had its own fleet of business jets. [src-045] - Qualification: Only the press report's quotations of the FINMA report are in the record; the report itself was not reviewed. It was produced in FINMA's supervisory proceedings against Credit Suisse, to which no Greensill company was a party, it is not a court finding, and the quoted passage does not say which Greensill company received or used the funds. - Response: The press report said that a representative of Lex Greensill declined to comment, and that UBS called it a legacy Credit Suisse matter whose conduct pre-dated UBS's acquisition of Credit Suisse. - Attributed: A press report (June 2025) said the full FINMA report showed that senior Credit Suisse managers received anonymous messages from 2018 questioning their 'character judgment' in choosing Greensill Capital as a partner and in giving it discretion over clients' money, and raising concern that a 'large proportion' of the loans went to companies in Sanjeev Gupta's steel businesses; according to the report, warnings continued until at least June 2019, and one senior manager forwarded the 2018 tip-off to Lex Greensill. [src-045] [src-032] - Qualification: This is a press account of the FINMA report, which is not itself in the record. FINMA's own February 2023 release states that the closure of another provider's Greensill-related fund led to enquiries at Credit Suisse in 2018 and that media and FINMA repeatedly put critical questions to the bank, but does not quote the messages. - Response: UBS told the press report that this was a legacy Credit Suisse matter that pre-dated its acquisition of Credit Suisse. - Documented: At the hearing on 8 March 2021 at which the High Court made administration orders for Greensill Capital (UK) Limited and Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited ([2021] EWHC 700 (Ch)), counsel appeared for Credit Suisse Asset Management as noteholder, described by the judge as the beneficial owner of receivables whose funds had invested some $6.2 billion in them; Credit Suisse Asset Management did not oppose the orders, and Credit Suisse, as one of the lenders to the group, consented to them, as did the Peter Greensill Family Trust. [src-052] - Documented: Credit Suisse Asset Management reported that by 30 November 2022 about USD 6.78 bn had been returned to investors in the four supply chain finance funds in seven instalments and that, with the cash still held, the funds' cash position equalled about USD 7.4 bn, or 74% of their assets under management at suspension; recovery efforts focused on programmes totalling USD 2.3 bn at 26 February 2021, essentially related to GFG Alliance, Katerra and Bluestone. [src-033] - Documented: By the sixth payout on 15 December 2021 the four funds had distributed 68% of their combined net asset value of 26 February 2021: 64.8% for the Credit Suisse (Lux) Supply Chain Finance Fund, 63.4% for the Nova High Income fund, 95.4% for the Nova Investment Grade fund and 99.7% for the Liechtenstein investment grade fund, whose final payment of about USD 31.3 mn on 11 November 2022 brought its total returned to about USD 667 mn, 99.7% of its NAV at suspension. At 30 November 2022 the GFG, Katerra and Bluestone notes made up 76.8% of the remaining notional note exposure of the Credit Suisse (Lux) Supply Chain Finance Fund (CSAM Q&A, 15 December 2022). [src-033] - Qualification: The Q&A gives 99.7% for the Liechtenstein fund both as its cumulative distribution at 15 December 2021 and as the total returned after its final payment of November 2022, without explaining the identical figures. - Documented: In October 2021 Credit Suisse Asset Management agreed with GFG Alliance the full repayment, without a haircut, of the funds' exposure to GFG's Australian operations: an initial AUD 129 mn (about USD 96 mn), received in October 2021, and the remaining principal of AUD 240 mn (about USD 178 mn) with interest by mid-2023; by November 2022 about AUD 319 mn had come back from the Australian entities, AUD 152 mn to the Credit Suisse (Lux) Supply Chain Finance Fund and AUD 168 mn to the Nova High Income fund. The remaining GFG exposure outside Australia was allocated in June 2022 as USD 651 mn to the Lux fund and USD 236 mn to the Nova High Income fund, and in November 2022 CSAM signed a non-binding term sheet with GFG and other creditors on a debt restructuring. [src-033] - Documented: In June 2022 Credit Suisse Asset Management agreed with Bluestone and its shareholders a two-year standstill with recurring payments of up to USD 320 mn to all noteholders, calculated on Bluestone's operating performance, and a sharing of the proceeds of any sale of the Bluestone entities; about USD 11.5 mn had been received by 30 November 2022. Of the original Bluestone exposure of USD 850 mn, USD 690 mn related to the Credit Suisse supply chain finance funds and was allocated in June 2022 as USD 595 mn to the Credit Suisse (Lux) Supply Chain Finance Fund and USD 95 mn to the Nova High Income fund. [src-033] - Documented: Credit Suisse Asset Management reported in December 2022 that it had claimed for all insurable losses within the relevant limitation period: 17 insurance claims for the Credit Suisse (Lux) Supply Chain Finance Fund covering USD 1,723 mn of exposure, of which 9 claims for USD 1,405 mn concerned GFG- and Bluestone-related entities, and 4 claims for the Nova High Income fund covering USD 469 mn, making 18 claims across the two funds for about USD 2.2 bn because one claim can cover both funds; all were claims under notes that included future receivables. [src-033] - Attributed: On 22 February 2022 Credit Suisse Asset Management began proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia in New South Wales over the funds' Catfoss Renewables exposure, in order to be joined to insurance cases already before the court under the same policy; CSAM said it expected the insurer to challenge the validity of the relevant policies across most, perhaps all, of its insurance claims, while its own firm position was that the policies were valid and the insurers' claims unfounded. [src-033] [src-030] [src-054] [src-005] - Qualification: The commencement and the positions are as stated by CSAM in its December 2022 investor Q&A; the insurer's defence is described only as CSAM anticipated it. - Response: According to the High Court in [2025] EWHC 1380 (Ch), the insurers' defences in the Australian proceedings included a general defence that the Parallel Policy was invalid, alleging that the Greensill group made misrepresentations and non-disclosures when it procured cover for counterparties including the Catfoss group; in [2026] EWHC 639 (Ch) the court described the contention that misrepresentations relating to Catfoss resulted in policies providing cover of about US$4.6 billion being void as a defence raised by insurers in the Australian litigation. - Outcome: On 25 September 2026 Insurance Australia Group announced that Insurance Australia Limited had agreed to settle the proceedings brought by Credit Suisse entities against it and other parties in the Federal Court of Australia, on confidential terms; the claimed amounts had an aggregate face value of about A$2.8 billion plus interest. - Documented: The four funds had provisioned about USD 308 mn, adjusted for the closure of the liquidated Liechtenstein fund, for estimated external recovery costs from 2021 to 2026, covering among other things the operating expenses of the supply chain finance infrastructure, such as Greensill Capital (UK) Limited and Citi/TMF, for administration, recovery, insurance and trustee services, with Credit Suisse absorbing internal costs; USD 249 mn was provisioned in the Credit Suisse (Lux) Supply Chain Finance Fund, USD 58 mn in the Nova High Income fund and USD 1 mn in the Nova Investment Grade fund, and the main cost categories were legal advice excluding insurance (47%), insurance advisers (21%) and Greensill servicing costs (21%) (CSAM Q&A, 15 December 2022). [src-033] - Documented: For the Katerra exposure, disclosed by Credit Suisse as 'Fairymead' in the Credit Suisse (Lux) Supply Chain Finance Fund, Credit Suisse Asset Management chose litigation as its route to recovery, while pursuing insurance claims for GFG and Bluestone: on 23 December 2021 Credit Suisse filed two applications for document discovery in federal courts in California and Arizona, and on 3 August 2022 a preliminary application in the English courts for proposed proceedings against entities affiliated with SoftBank Group Corp. [src-033] [src-035] - Response: In the English proceedings the SoftBank defendants denied that the claimants had any entitlement to relief against them under section 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986, contending that the transactions were part of a linked set intended to put the Greensill group in funds ([2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch)). - Outcome: CSAM reported that at a hearing on 7 December 2022 the English court gave permission to bring the claim against SoftBank; the claim, decided as [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch), was dismissed on 15 October 2025. - Documented: Credit Suisse Asset Management (Schweiz) AG of Zurich (CHE-427.360.640) was deregistered from the commercial register of the Canton of Zurich on 30 August 2024, UBS Asset Management Switzerland AG having succeeded to its rights and obligations, and Credit Suisse Fund Management was deregistered on 1 October 2024, UBS Asset Management (Europe) SA having succeeded to it ([2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch)). The GLEIF record of the asset manager's LEI 529900QDWOQDW46HBC70 shows the entity as inactive following a merger and acquisition event recorded with effect from 29 August 2024 22:00 UTC, with successor LEI 254900SFTV4L52IHCW98. [src-113] [src-035] - Documented: Credit Suisse AG of Zurich (CHE-106.831.974) was deleted from the Swiss commercial register on 31 May 2024, its assets and liabilities passing by merger to UBS AG of Zurich and Basel (CHE-101.329.561), as published in the Swiss Official Gazette of Commerce; the GLEIF record of Credit Suisse AG (LEI ANGGYXNX0JLX3X63JN86) shows it as inactive after a merger effective 31 May 2024, with successor LEI BFM8T61CT2L1QCEMIK50. [src-061] [src-114] - Documented: The GLEIF record of the Credit Suisse (Lux) Supply Chain Finance Fund (LEI 549300TIGSPHR48XV551), in the golden copy of 21 October 2026, lists it as an active Luxembourg sub-fund, first registered on 21 April 2017, with its address care of UBS Asset Management (Europe) S.A. at 33A avenue J.F. Kennedy, Luxembourg, and with relationship links to an umbrella fund and a fund manager. [src-104] ## SoftBank, the Katerra notes and the $440 million: what happened? - Documented: In May 2019 SoftBank Vision Fund L.P. (SVF1) invested about $800 million in Greensill Capital Pty Limited (GCPL), the Greensill group parent: about $527 million as convertible loan notes and the rest as common equity, which took SVF1's equity ownership of GCPL to 9.9%, below the 10% level that would have triggered regulatory consequences for equity control of Greensill Bank AG, as recorded by the High Court in [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch). [src-035] - Documented: SoftBank Vision Fund L.P. (SVF1) made further investments in Greensill Capital Pty Limited (GCPL) in September and October 2019 through SVF Wyatt (Singapore) Pte Ltd: a convertible loan note of about $180 million issued on or around 23 September 2019, and conditional share purchase agreements of 18 October 2019 (about $444 million for 186,136 G Class shares and about $16 million for 7,152 G Class shares) and 6 November 2019 (about $30 million for 12,675 G Class shares), each share transfer being subject to BaFin approval. [src-035] - Documented: The annual report of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) for the year ended 31 December 2019 states that during 2019 SoftBank invested an aggregate $1.46 billion in the group parent company, Greensill Capital Pty Limited, and became a significant shareholder of the group. [src-018] - Attributed: A press report (May 2019) stated that the SoftBank Vision Fund's $800 million investment would double Greensill's valuation to about $3.5 billion and give the fund a stake of between 15 and 20 per cent, and that General Atlantic had invested $250 million less than a year earlier at a valuation of $1.64 billion. [src-091] [src-035] [src-098] - Qualification: The report attributed the valuation and stake figures to unnamed people close to the deal; they are not established by the official record. The High Court recorded in [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch) that the May 2019 investment took the equity ownership of SoftBank Vision Fund L.P. in the group parent to 9.9%, with about $527 million of the $800 million invested as convertible loan notes. - Documented: Under a Credit Enhancement Programme, SoftBank Group Corp. (SBG) provided credit support for certain financings by Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) of Vision Fund portfolio companies through credit default swaps underwriting their bankruptcy risk, with the Greensill group absorbing any shortfall up to $100 million in any year (the 'Greensill First Loss'); by October 2019 GCUK had agreed such swaps with Cayman Project 2 Limited, an SBG subsidiary, for its facilities to View, Inc., Fair Financial Corp, Guazi Limited and OYO Hospitality UK Limited, in each of which SoftBank Vision Fund L.P. had invested. [src-035] - Documented: A draft application to the credit committee of Greensill Capital Pty Limited (GCPL) dated 29 September 2019 described a revised Credit Enhancement Programme as a joint venture between a special purpose vehicle of SoftBank Group Corp. (SBG) and Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK); on 2 October 2020 SBG informed Greensill that it was terminating the process for establishing that joint venture. [src-035] - Documented: SoftBank Group Corp. (SBG) gave the Greensill group no written guarantee or credit default swap for the funding provided to the Katerra group under the December 2019 receivables purchase agreement; the High Court found that the Greensill group and SBG differed over whether SBG had committed to credit support for the Katerra facility, Lex Greensill contending, including in emails of 19 December 2019 and 11 October 2020, that Masayoshi Son had given a personal commitment and SBG contending that there was no binding agreement, and Lex Greensill accepted in evidence that there was no written agreement. [src-035] - Response: Lex Greensill explained in evidence that the Greensill group was naturally advancing the strongest position it could in the continuing negotiations over the Credit Enhancement Programme. - Outcome: The court found that the parties compromised this dispute in the November 2020 agreements, which were primarily driven by the need to rescue Katerra and salvage the Greensill fundraising. - Attributed: When Greensill Capital Pty Limited (GCPL) sought extensions in 2020 of the redemption timetable for the investment of SoftBank Group Corp. (SBG) in the Credit Suisse supply chain finance subfund, SBG asked in exchange for shares in GCPL and for GCPL to sell its corporate jets and be audited by a Big 4 firm; in an internal email of June 2020 quoted in the judgment, Rajeev Misra of SoftBank questioned Lex Greensill's reliability and proposed a high penalty of 3% extra GCPL equity unless the auditor was upgraded by November, all aircraft were sold within four months and the December quarter-end audit was done by a Big 4 firm, and on 6 August 2020 Masayoshi Son emailed Lex Greensill urging cost cuts because the group's funding was still fragile. [src-035] - Qualification: The requests made in exchange for the delayed redemption are recorded by the court as uncontentious facts; Mr Misra's email and Mr Son's email are internal and bilateral communications quoted in [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch), and the court treated Mr Misra's email as written in frustration rather than as a settled SoftBank view. - Response: In terms Lex Greensill proposed on 14 October 2020, Greensill would sell the private jets before its IPO rather than by December 2020; at the trial, Lex Greensill's evidence that the SoftBank defendants had imposed very tough terms concerned the personal obligations relating to private jets and a personal guarantee that Lex Greensill had had to concede. - Outcome: By 16 July 2020 the investment of SoftBank Group Corp. in the Credit Suisse sub-fund had been fully redeemed and its side letter terminated. Among the agreements of 10 November 2020, an amendment deed cut to $1,974.75 from $2,385.10 the strike price of GCPL shares due under GCPL's September 2019 convertible loan note to a SoftBank Vision Fund vehicle, in consideration for SoftBank Group Corp. agreeing to submit its redemption requests on a delayed timetable, and GCPL and Lex Greensill gave a letter of undertaking that GCPL would sell its corporate jets, failing which a SoftBank fund would receive shares in GCPL. In [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch) the court found that Mr Misra wrote the June 2020 email in frustration at the repeated extension requests and did not consider that there was a consistent or settled view within the SoftBank group that Lex Greensill was not to be trusted. - Documented: On 13 and 14 October 2020 Tom Cheung of SoftBank Investment Advisers and Lex Greensill exchanged proposed terms under which SoftBank Group Corp. would repurchase the Fairymead (Katerra) notes at par, $440 million, in return for warrants over shares in Greensill Capital Pty Limited (GCPL); the proposal evolved into a $440 million injection into GCPL, and the High Court found that it was Lex Greensill who sought to persuade the SoftBank defendants to inject the $440 million to prevent a default under the Katerra receivables purchase agreement and to salvage the Greensill fundraising, rejecting the case that SoftBank had imposed the terms ('There was no take-it-or-leave-it moment'). [src-035] - Documented: The High Court found that, in the negotiations leading to the November 2020 agreements, SoftBank Group Corp. and the Greensill group compromised their continuing dispute over the Credit Enhancement Programme, but that the negotiations were primarily driven by the pressing need to rescue Katerra from collapse and to salvage the Greensill fundraising, which required Katerra's indebtedness under the receivables purchase agreement to be addressed. [src-035] - Documented: In a draft email of 3 November 2020 prepared for Masayoshi Son and quoted in the judgment, Lex Greensill wrote that SoftBank Group Corp. and SoftBank Vision Fund 2 should ensure the agreements were executed and the funds transferred to Greensill by Friday 6 November 2020, so that the group would not have 'a disclosure issue' with its incoming equity and debt investors and, 'more importantly', with its insurers covering the Katerra, Fair, View and OYO transactions. [src-035] - Documented: A letter titled 'Katerra Inc. – Summary of Terms' dated 2 November 2020, signed on behalf of Commonwealth Real Estate LP, Katerra Inc. (Cayman Islands) and a SoftBank Vision Fund investment vehicle, made it a pre-closing condition of a proposed investment in Katerra that the indebtedness of Katerra and certain subsidiaries to Greensill Limited, about $440,000,000, be fully discharged for no more than $176,000,000, with releases of claims by Katerra and Greensill. [src-035] - Documented: On 5 November 2020 the investment committee of SoftBank Vision Fund 2 approved a $440 million investment in convertible loan notes of Greensill Capital Pty Limited (GCPL) on the terms of a SoftBank Investment Advisers memo, which stated that Greensill anticipated using the proceeds to buy from external investors the notes that had funded the Katerra facility and to manage that risk internally, and that Greensill had hired Credit Suisse and Citibank to arrange a pre-IPO round targeting about $1 billion (about $600 million of equity and $400 million of debt); the same day SoftBank Vision Fund L.P.'s committee approved a further $200 million investment in Katerra. [src-035] - Documented: On 10 November 2020 SVF II Wyatt Subco (Singapore) Pte. Ltd., an investment vehicle of SoftBank Vision Fund 2, subscribed for $440 million of convertible loan notes issued by Greensill Capital Pty Limited (GCPL); the same day an Omnibus Deed was concluded between GCPL, Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK), SoftBank Group Corp. (SBG), Lex Greensill and SVF II Holdings (Singapore) Pte. Ltd., and under a sale and purchase deed (the 'LG Fair Loss SPA') GCPL, as trustee for the Lex Greensill family trust, sold shares in GCPL to SBG. [src-035] - Outcome: An amended and restated LG Fair Loss SPA of 8 December 2020 gave SBG a longer timeframe for absorbing an additional $50 million first loss and extended the crystallisation date to 15 May 2021. - Documented: The $440 million notes of Greensill Capital Pty Limited (GCPL) were unsecured and convertible into 86,713 new F shares of GCPL, subject to a German regulatory condition, and the Omnibus Deed recited that, as part of the consideration for them, GCPL would assume any and all losses in respect of the Katerra notes and the Katerra programme. [src-035] - Outcome: By an amendment deed of 23 December 2020 between SVF II Wyatt Subco (Singapore) Pte. Ltd., SVF Wyatt (Singapore) Pte Ltd and GCPL, the conversion entitlement was increased to 141,218 new F Class shares. - Documented: Under clause 2.1 of the Omnibus Deed, Lex Greensill, Greensill Capital Pty Limited (GCPL) and Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) released SoftBank Group Corp. (SBG), Vision Fund II and related parties from claims relating to the Katerra programme, the Katerra notes, any credit default swap, guarantee or other credit enhancement for Katerra (or the failure to provide one), and the joint venture, occasionally referred to as Credition Global Limited, that SBG and GCUK had discussed forming to guarantee financings by GCUK and its affiliates of SoftBank portfolio companies. [src-035] - Documented: By clause 4.2 of the Omnibus Deed, SoftBank Group Corp. waived the 'CDS Greensill First Loss 2020-2021', defined as the annual first loss of US$100,000,000 payable by Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) under the Credit Enhancement Programme on or before 8 October 2021; the deed defined the 'Katerra Notes' as the notes issued by Hoffman S.à r.l., compartment MZ, backed by payment obligations originated under the Katerra programme. [src-035] - Documented: Clause 3 of the Omnibus Deed obliged Greensill Capital Pty Limited (GCPL) and Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) to account to Vision Fund II for any amounts recovered on the Katerra notes or the Katerra programme, to use best endeavours to recover such amounts, and to recover and remit to Vision Fund II at least US$176,000,000 by 31 December 2020; clause 11.1 required the parties to keep the deed, its existence and the transactions it contemplated confidential. [src-035] - Outcome: On 4 December 2020 the GCPL board approved a variation removing the obligation to recover and remit $176 million, and the Amended Omnibus Deed entered into on 23 December 2020 by GCPL, GCUK, SoftBank Group Corp., Lex Greensill and SVF II Holdings replaced clause 3 with an obligation to remit to Vision Fund II any Katerra recoveries from parties other than the SoftBank entities and any Katerra equity received. - Documented: The $440 million paid under the convertible loan notes was credited to the general account of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) on or around 10 November 2020, and Greensill Capital Pty Limited (GCPL) did not use it to repurchase or redeem the Fairymead notes; internal Greensill emails quoted in the judgment recorded on 18 November 2020 that the cash was 'being used for other stuff', including paying off a Credit Suisse loan, and on 27 November 2020 that the group seemed 'to have gone through all the $440m intended for Katerra having only paid $70m toward it'. [src-035] - Attributed: According to an April 2021 email from Allen & Overy, counsel to the Greensill group, quoted in the judgment, $250 million of the $440 million was paid to Greensill Bank AG to be held as collateral in respect of GFG positions, and the balance was used as transient asset-purchase liquidity, for example $70 million used on 25 November 2020 to buy assets onto the balance sheet of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) until 16 December 2020, and as operating liquidity for GCUK, whose monthly operating costs were about $35 million, until the administration. [src-035] - Qualification: This is a later summary by the Greensill group's own lawyers, quoted by the court among the documents; the court did not itself determine how each part of the $440 million was used, beyond finding that it was not used to repurchase or redeem the Fairymead notes. - Attributed: Notes by SoftBank Investment Advisers' chief risk officer of a meeting on 27 January 2021 with Divya Eapen, chief risk officer of the Greensill group, quoted in the judgment, recorded that part of the $440 million had been placed as cash collateral at Greensill Bank AG and part used by Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) to buy Liberty notes that could not be sold, itemised as $30 million of insured notes (receivables from Liberty Commodities), $110 million of other Liberty receivables (Rehbein and Seaview), $250 million of cash collateral at Greensill Bank and $80 million of unrestricted cash at GCUK. [src-035] - Qualification: These are a counterparty's notes of what the Greensill group's risk officer said at a meeting; the four amounts listed together exceed the $440 million, and the court made no finding on the breakdown. - Response: The same notes recorded that legal counsel and Lex Greensill believed GCUK could use the cash until the maturity of the notes held by Credit Suisse Virtuoso. - Documented: On 5 January 2021 BaFin, the German financial regulator, blocked withdrawals by the Greensill group from Greensill Bank AG, which affected the $250 million deposited with the bank in November 2020 out of the $440 million provided under the convertible loan notes on about 10 November 2020. [src-035] - Documented: SoftBank Vision Fund L.P. (SVF1) was a major shareholder of Katerra: by September 2019 its vehicle SVF Abode (Cayman) Limited had invested about $1.75 billion in the Katerra group, and when SVF1's investment committee approved a further investment on 5 November 2020, SVF1 owned 47.4% of the equity of Katerra Inc. (Cayman Islands), the group parent. [src-035] - Documented: On 28 November 2020 SoftBank Investment Advisers told the Greensill group's counsel that its principals had confirmed that Greensill would release its security interest over Katerra's CLT facility, pledged under the Greensill–Katerra facility, so that a SoftBank Vision Fund vehicle could fund Katerra on a secured basis; on 1 December 2020 Katerra Inc. (Cayman Islands) issued a $25,000,000 bridge note to SVF Abode (Cayman) Limited, and Greensill Limited agreed with the Katerra sellers to release all liens on their assets under the receivables purchase agreement other than liens on the purchased receivables. [src-035] - Documented: On 29 November 2020 SoftBank Investment Advisers proposed revised steps to the Greensill group: amending the $440 million convertible loan note to increase the number of F class shares into which it converts, cancelling Greensill's obligation to pay over $176 million of Katerra recoveries, Greensill forgiving and terminating its $440 million facility to Katerra, and Katerra issuing to Greensill warrants for 5% of its fully diluted equity, to be transferred to SoftBank Vision Fund 2; Jonathan Lane, the group's counsel, replied that this fitted the group's understanding save for the warrant pass-through, to which there was no objection in principle, but that external counsel was needed on fraudulent conveyance risk. [src-035] - Documented: On 11 December 2020 the Greensill group delivered the signature pages of Lex Greensill, Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) and Greensill Capital Pty Limited (GCPL) to the Amended Omnibus Deed into escrow with Allen & Overy, pending SoftBank Investment Advisers' consent to release the Vision Funds' pages; US antitrust (HSR) approval for the investment by SoftBank Vision Fund L.P. in Katerra was given on 22 December 2020, and on 23 December 2020 SoftBank Investment Advisers consented to release its signature pages on the Amended Omnibus Deed and the amended convertible loan note. [src-035] - Documented: On 12 December 2020 Katerra, SVF Abode (Cayman) Limited and Wolff Principal Holdings LP signed indicative terms for settling claims under Katerra's construction contracts, conditional on SVF Abode investing $175 million in cash and extinguishing $25 million owed to it under a 1 December 2020 promissory note, and on the extinguishment of $440 million principal of indebtedness of Katerra and certain subsidiaries to Greensill Limited in exchange for preferred shares equal to 5% of the fully diluted equity. [src-035] - Documented: On 30 December 2020 Greensill Limited (GL), Katerra Inc. (Cayman Islands), its Delaware intermediate holding company and the other Katerra sellers entered into a Contribution and Exchange Agreement (CEA) under which GL contributed its claims under the receivables purchase agreement in exchange for 762,144 Series A preferred shares of Katerra Inc. (Cayman Islands); all obligations under the Greensill finance documents were deemed paid and discharged in full, the documents were terminated, and all security held by GL was released. [src-035] - Documented: On 30 December 2020, by a Share Transfer Agreement (TA), Greensill Limited (GL) transferred the 762,144 Series A preferred shares of Katerra Inc. (Cayman Islands) that it had received under the Contribution and Exchange Agreement (CEA) that day to SVF II Abode (Cayman) Limited, an investment vehicle of SoftBank Vision Fund 2; by 6 July 2021 the Vision Funds' vehicles held 99.6% of Katerra's equity, SVF II Abode's block amounting to 6.25%. [src-035] - Documented: Also on 30 December 2020 SVF Abode (Cayman) Limited, for SoftBank Vision Fund L.P. (SVF1), subscribed for 11,416,921 Series A preferred shares of Katerra Inc. (Cayman Islands) for $174,922,250 in cash and the contribution of the $25,000,000 owed under the December 2020 bridge note; the High Court found that these shares were worth the $200 million price. [src-035] - Documented: After TDR Capital, the lead investor in Greensill's pre-IPO equity raise, indicated by 23 December 2020 that it would not proceed with its planned investment, Lex Greensill asked SoftBank on 23 December 2020 for a $1.5 billion bridge facility; minutes of the board of Greensill Capital Pty Limited (GCPL) of 31 December 2020 record that SoftBank declined to provide a bridge facility but would consider an equity investment of up to $250 million alongside other investors, noting that crossing a 50% equity threshold would require it to consolidate Greensill Bank AG, 'a red line'. [src-035] - Documented: The Credit Suisse (Lux) Supply Chain Finance Fund, a sub-fund of Credit Suisse Virtuoso SICAV-SIF, invested in notes originated and administered in England by Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) and issued by Hoffman S.à r.l. through its Compartment MZ under the Fairymead Multi-Obligor Programme; their intended security was participations granted to GCUK by its subsidiary Greensill Limited under a Participation Agreement of 19 December 2019, assigned by GCUK to Hoffman and then to Citibank N.A., London Branch as note trustee, over receivables sold or purportedly sold to Greensill Limited by Katerra group companies under a receivables purchase agreement of 9 December 2019, and the sub-fund's notes, with a face value of about $440 million, all defaulted when they matured or fell due in March 2021. [src-035] - Qualification: The High Court judgment [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch) also states, in another passage, that the Fairymead Notes all defaulted on maturity in March and May 2021. - Documented: Credit Suisse Virtuoso SICAV-SIF, for its Credit Suisse (Lux) Supply Chain Finance Fund, and GLAS Trust Corporation Limited, as note trustee, sued SoftBank Group Corp., SVF II Abode (Cayman) Limited, SVF Abode (Cayman) Limited, SVF Habitat (Cayman) Limited, SoftBank Vision Fund L.P., SoftBank Vision Fund II-2 L.P. and Greensill Limited (in liquidation) in the High Court, Financial List (case FL-2022-000014), under section 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986, under which a court may make orders restoring the position after a transaction at an undervalue entered into for the purpose of putting assets beyond the reach of creditors or otherwise prejudicing their interests, in respect of the Contribution and Exchange Agreement (CEA) and Share Transfer Agreement (TA) of 30 December 2020, by which Greensill Limited released its Katerra receivables rights and security and passed the Katerra shares it received to a SoftBank Vision Fund 2 vehicle; Lord Justice Miles heard the case in June and July 2025 and gave judgment on 15 October 2025 in [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch). [src-035] - Qualification: Greensill Limited, acting by its liquidators, took a mostly neutral position, and the claimants sought no substantive relief against it. - Response: The SoftBank defendants denied that the claimants had any entitlement to relief against them under section 423. - Outcome: The court dismissed the claim: it held that the Contribution and Exchange Agreement was a transaction at an undervalue and that Greensill Limited entered into the transactions for the purpose of prejudicing the noteholders, but that the SoftBank defendants did not know or suspect that purpose, and it made no order against them. No appeal against the judgment was found in the sources reviewed. - Attributed: The claimants contended that the Contribution and Exchange Agreement (CEA) and Share Transfer Agreement (TA) of 30 December 2020 left Greensill Limited with effectively no assets, rendered the intended security for the Fairymead notes valueless and benefited the SoftBank defendants, who they said were culpably involved; the SoftBank defendants contended that the transactions were part of a linked set intended to put the Greensill group in funds to repurchase or repay the notes, that the $440 million was provided in November 2020 on that understanding, that they only discovered after 30 December 2020 that it had not been so used, and that their only benefit, shares in Katerra, became valueless when the Katerra group entered bankruptcy in June 2021. [src-035] - Qualification: These were the parties' cases at trial. The court found that Greensill Limited had the purpose required by section 423 and that the transaction was at an undervalue, but that the SoftBank defendants did not know of or share that purpose, and it dismissed the claim. - Documented: The High Court found that Greensill Limited (GL) was a link in the securitisation chain: Katerra was a secured borrower from GL, GL had to pay participation amounts equal to Katerra's payments to its parent Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK), and those obligations were assigned to Hoffman S.à r.l. so that they would fall outside GL's insolvency estate in any insolvency of the Greensill group; GL had no assets other than its claims against Katerra and no employees, and Lex Greensill, a trained solicitor, appreciated these facts. [src-035] - Documented: The court found that Lex Greensill understood that the Contribution and Exchange Agreement (CEA) of 30 December 2020 would break the securitisation chain: Lex Greensill accepted in evidence that Jonathan Lane, the group's senior internal lawyer, had said at the time that by writing off the debt Greensill Limited was effectively killing off the assets underpinning the notes, an asset effectively held by Credit Suisse Virtuoso, and that this could not be done without speaking to the beneficial owner; Lex Greensill said that conversation took place after the $440 million had been received. [src-035] - Documented: The court held that the Contribution and Exchange Agreement (CEA) of 30 December 2020 was a transaction at an undervalue: by releasing its rights under the receivables purchase agreement, Greensill Limited (GL) gave up valuable assets, its rights over the purchased receivables and related security, whose value would otherwise have passed to the noteholders, and obtained no consideration in money or money's worth, any notional relief from paying participation amounts being offset by GL's liability for breaching its undertaking in the Participation Agreement not to agree amendments or waivers without the participation holders' prior written consent, which it was common ground had not been given. [src-035] - Response: The SoftBank defendants argued that the release left Greensill Limited in no worse position because it also relieved Greensill Limited of its obligation to pay participation amounts, and that the arrangement for the $440 million to be used to buy or redeem the Fairymead notes was itself consideration to Greensill Limited; the court rejected both arguments. Greensill Limited, acting by its liquidators, took a mostly neutral position in the claim. - Documented: The court valued the rights of Greensill Limited under the receivables purchase agreement at 30 December 2020 at $86.2 million: actual receivables with a face value of $250 million and type 1 future receivables with a face value of $10 million at a 22% recovery rate ($57.2 million), plus $29 million of secured collections. [src-035] - Documented: In [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch) (15 October 2025) the High Court found that Greensill Limited, through Lex Greensill, entered the Contribution and Exchange Agreement (CEA) and Share Transfer Agreement (TA) on 30 December 2020 with the purpose of prejudicing the noteholders' interests, releasing its only asset in order to keep SoftBank on side while Lex Greensill sought a $1.5 billion loan to meet BaFin's demands concerning Greensill Bank, although Lex Greensill would have preferred to pay the noteholders in full. The court nevertheless made no order against the SoftBank defendants and dismissed the claim: relief could at most have been capped at the $11.3 million value of the Katerra shares received by SoftBank Vision Fund 2, and Katerra's bankruptcy in June 2021, when the shares were cancelled, amounted to 'the extreme case of the value of an asset falling to nil'; there was no independent basis for relief against SoftBank Group Corp. [src-035] - Response: Lex Greensill consistently explained in evidence that the purpose of the $440 million injection was the purchase or redemption of the Fairymead notes, and the SoftBank defendants contended that when Lex Greensill decided on 4 December 2020 to cause the transactions, the intention was that the sub-fund would be made whole; the court did not accept this analysis, holding among other things that the purpose had to be ascertained when the transaction was entered into and that Lex Greensill had authorised Greensill Limited to enter into the agreements on 30 December 2020. - Documented: The court also found that Lex Greensill knew Credit Suisse would not consent to the release of the receivables purchase agreement, did not ask for its consent and concealed the position from it, giving the misleading impression that the release would take effect only after a buy-back of the Fairymead notes, and it rejected Lex Greensill's evidence that the SoftBank defendants had prevented disclosure by insisting on the Omnibus Deed's confidentiality provisions. [src-035] - Documented: The court found that the SoftBank defendants did not know or suspect that the Contribution and Exchange Agreement (CEA) and Share Transfer Agreement (TA) of 30 December 2020 were entered into for the purpose of prejudicing the claimants, believed in good faith that the $440 million would be used to pay the Fairymead noteholders, did not share in or know of the purpose of Greensill Limited, and did not orchestrate the transactions, which were commercially negotiated agreements. [src-035] - Documented: On 6 June 2021 Katerra Inc. (Cayman Islands), its Delaware intermediate holding company and 31 affiliates, including the Katerra sellers, filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas. [src-035] - Outcome: The High Court recorded in [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch) that the Katerra shares received by the SoftBank defendants in the December 2020 transactions were cancelled in the bankruptcy; at the 2025 trial the claimants submitted that the bankruptcy was ongoing and had not been completed, so that its overall recovery was not known. - Attributed: In disqualification proceedings issued in March 2024, the Secretary of State for Business and Trade alleged (the 'Katerra Allegations') that in November and December 2020 Lex Greensill caused Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) and Greensill Limited to enter into transactions with SoftBank group companies to the detriment of investors in the Katerra notes programme, and caused or allowed GCUK to apply $440 million received in November 2020 otherwise than to redeem the Katerra notes, causing the noteholders losses exceeding that amount. [src-005] [src-008] - Qualification: These were allegations in the Secretary of State's evidence, an affirmation by a chief investigator of the Insolvency Service, in proceedings under the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986; they were not tried. - Outcome: Lex Greensill's application to strike out the proceedings was dismissed on 18 March 2026 ([2026] EWHC 639 (Ch)); the proceedings ended when the Secretary of State accepted a disqualification undertaking on 2 June 2026, before the six-week trial due to begin on 8 June 2026. - Attributed: The Insolvency Service's announcement of 4 June 2026 states that in late 2020 Lex Greensill caused Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK), Greensill Limited and Greensill Capital Pty Limited to enter into transactions that removed the legal protections underpinning the investment of the Credit Suisse (Lux) Supply Chain Finance Fund in Katerra-backed notes, so that the receivables no longer required payment, the security was released and the payment obligations supporting the fund's trade credit insurance were cancelled, without the required written consents, and caused or allowed GCUK to use $440 million received in November 2020 for purposes other than redeeming the notes, which all defaulted with a loss of $440 million to the fund. [src-008] [src-035] - Qualification: This is the account published with Lex Greensill's disqualification undertaking, under which a director does not dispute certain facts for the purposes of the disqualification proceedings only; it is not a court finding. Separately, the High Court recorded in [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch) that it was common ground that the prior written consent required under the Participation Agreement had not been given. - Attributed: In an application to strike out the disqualification proceedings, Lex Greensill contended that the Secretary of State should have obtained documents and witness evidence from Credit Suisse, that documents referred to in the Credit Suisse v SoftBank proceedings tended to support Lex Greensill's case that Credit Suisse was aware of the implications of the Katerra restructuring, and that emails with Credit Suisse employees, not available to the court, tended to suggest that Lex Greensill had not lied to Credit Suisse as the Secretary of State alleged. [src-005] [src-035] [src-008] - Qualification: These were contentions in a strike-out application, not findings. In the separate Credit Suisse v SoftBank proceedings, to which the Secretary of State was not a party, the High Court found that Lex Greensill's communications concealed the true position from the Credit Suisse claimants. - Outcome: Mr Justice Trower dismissed the strike-out application on 18 March 2026 ([2026] EWHC 639 (Ch)), holding that questions about potentially exculpatory material were a matter for trial; the proceedings ended with a disqualification undertaking accepted on 2 June 2026, without a trial. ## How exposed was Greensill to GFG Alliance, and what is still owed? - Documented: GFG Alliance (the Gupta Family Group Alliance) is, as the House of Commons Treasury Committee described it in July 2021, a collection of global businesses and investments owned by Sanjeev Gupta and the Gupta family that includes the LIBERTY Steel Group; the joint administrators of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) define the 'GFG Group' as the entities of the Gupta Family Group under the control of Sanjeev Gupta, and the Committee identified the relationship with GFG Alliance as one particular concentration of risk for Greensill. [src-015] [src-031] - Documented: On 4 May 2022 the Insolvency Service told Lex Greensill's solicitors that its investigation of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK), Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited and Greensill Limited, then in a scoping phase, was likely to cover, among other matters, the controls in place to limit the risk of funding receivables based on invoices which may not have been accurate, particularly in relation to the Gupta Family Group of companies (GFG). [src-005] - Qualification: This was a list of matters likely to be investigated, recorded in [2026] EWHC 639 (Ch); it is not a finding. The allegations eventually made in the disqualification proceedings fell into three areas, concerning Katerra, Catfoss and insurance non-disclosure. - Attributed: In evidence for the Secretary of State in the disqualification proceedings, the Insolvency Service's chief investigator alleged that the inability of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) to manage the 'GFG $7.5 billion exposure risk' was 'ultimately key to the failure and cessation of GCUK's business', and asserted that Lex Greensill kept the GFG relationship closely in Lex Greensill's own hands, with limited involvement at senior level by other directors and management of GCUK. [src-005] [src-031] [src-008] - Qualification: This is the investigator's affirmation evidence (Wilson1) as summarised in [2026] EWHC 639 (Ch); the $7.5 billion figure is the Insolvency Service's and is not explained or tested in the judgment. The court recorded that it was no part of the Secretary of State's case that Lex Greensill's alleged misconduct caused the insolvencies, the financial position being only context, and the allegations were not tried because the proceedings ended with a disqualification undertaking accepted on 2 June 2026. - Response: In the strike-out application it was argued for Lex Greensill that this evidence invited adverse inferences about a cause of the insolvencies although no misconduct by Lex Greensill in relation to GFG was alleged; the court noted an instance in the evidence where Lex Greensill expressed agreement with the investigator's view that the inability to manage the GFG exposure risk was a cause of GCUK's failure. Lex Greensill told the Treasury Committee in 2021 that the group's concentrations on insurance and clients were too high and were the principal contributing factor to the failure. - Outcome: Mr Justice Trower dismissed the strike-out application on 18 March 2026. - Documented: On about 8 December 2020 BaFin, the German financial regulator, required the Greensill group to accelerate the reduction of its exposure to GFG Alliance: minutes of the board of Greensill Capital Pty Limited (GCPL) of 31 December 2020, quoted in [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch), record that BaFin required that only $25 of every $100 of GFG receivables due to be rolled over be rolled over (a 75% reduction), a requirement the group considered not sustainable, and internal SoftBank Investment Advisers documents recorded that Greensill Bank AG had to reduce its GFG exposure from about $2 billion (stated in a 27 December 2020 update as $2.05 billion) to $600 million by 31 December 2020. [src-035] [src-031] - Response: Minutes of the board of Greensill Capital Pty Limited of 7 January 2021, quoted in [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch), record that a seller concentration reduction plan, with a further reduction of the exposure to nil by 31 December 2021, had then been agreed with BaFin, and the House of Commons Treasury Committee recorded that BaFin later agreed to an alternative proposal from Greensill to its December 2020 plan. - Outcome: On 5 January 2021 BaFin also blocked withdrawals by the Greensill group from Greensill Bank AG, which affected $250 million deposited with the bank in November 2020. - Documented: Minutes of a meeting of the board of Greensill Capital Pty Limited (GCPL) on 7 January 2021, quoted in [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch), record Lex Greensill reporting that a seller concentration reduction plan had been agreed with BaFin, including a further reduction of the exposure to nil by 31 December 2021; the House of Commons Treasury Committee reported in July 2021 Lex Greensill's evidence that BaFin's December 2020 plan 'was going to be impossible for Greensill to comply with' and that BaFin later agreed to an alternative proposal from Greensill. [src-035] [src-031] - Documented: In the statement of affairs of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) as at 8 March 2021, with a creditor schedule dated 28 April 2021, 'GFG', with a Singapore address, is listed among the creditors of GCUK for 12,105,337.92; the statement of affairs form gives creditor amounts in US dollars, while the amount column of the attached schedule is marked in pounds sterling. [src-007] - Qualification: The schedule does not say which GFG entity is meant or what the debt is for; at the same time GFG companies owed GCUK much larger amounts (see the administrators' figures). - Documented: The joint administrators of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) reported in their proposals, covering 8 March to 16 April 2021, that from the end of 2020 GCUK and Greensill Capital Pty Limited sought further debt or equity to reduce the group's exposure to GFG and meet insurance collateral requirements, by mandating investment banks for an equity raise, seeking bridge financing from existing shareholders and engaging an investment bank to arrange a structured finance facility through a special purpose securitisation vehicle issuing notes backed by insured receivables from the GFG supply chain finance programmes, but that none of these solutions could be implemented. [src-029] - Unresolved: The administrators' proposals give two different figures for the GFG exposure on the balance sheet of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) at the start of the administration: in the section on trade assets, about $355 million owed by GFG company obligors out of trade assets of about $490 million (the rest, about $135 million, owed by other obligors); and in the section on the administrators' independence, about $230 million of GFG-related receivables held on GCUK's own balance sheet, besides notes secured on GFG companies' obligations that GCUK had sold to investors, principally five. [src-029] [src-015] - Qualification: Both figures appear in the same report without reconciliation, and the report does not say whether they are measured on different bases. The administrators' later progress report to 7 September 2026 gives a third, higher figure: about $587.2 million outstanding from GFG across 33 balance sheet items at March 2021 exchange rates. - Documented: In September 2025 the administrators of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) began proceedings in Australia (the 'IB Proceedings') to determine the validity of GCUK's security over Liberty Holdings Australia Ltd, later extended to its security over Liberty OneSteel (MDR) UK Limited and, between March and September 2026, to security that Liberty Holdings Australia had granted to Liberty Capital (UK) Limited and that was then transferred to Liberty Capital Investment Limited; the substantive hearing, due in early September 2026, was deferred on the application of Liberty Holdings Australia and Liberty OneSteel (MDR) and is to take place in November 2026. [src-015] - Qualification: The validity of GCUK's security is the subject of these pending proceedings. The administrators state that the security granted to Liberty Capital (UK) Limited was granted in breach of GCUK's security; that is their position, not a court finding. - Documented: On 22 September 2025 GFG commenced a Part 7 claim in the Commercial Court in England against Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK), Greensill Bank AG and UBS, immediately before the administrators of GCUK began proceedings in Australia over the validity of GCUK's security (the 'IB Proceedings'); after an interlocutory hearing on jurisdiction, judgment was given in favour of GCUK on 4 February 2026 that the dispute should be decided by the Australian courts, and the English proceedings are stayed until the outcome of the IB Proceedings. [src-015] - Qualification: The administrators state that the English claim was brought in breach of GCUK's statutory moratorium, which was not permitted to be lifted; the judgment of 4 February 2026 is known from the administrators' report and was not found among the sources reviewed. - Outcome: The administrators' progress report for the period to 7 September 2026 states that the English claim remains stayed until the outcome of the IB Proceedings, whose substantive hearing was deferred and is to take place in November 2026, and that the administrators continue to engage with GFG to see whether a suitable settlement can be reached. - Documented: In the section of their report on GFG, the administrators of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) stated that legal and diligence work on previously proposed consensual settlements was supported by a funding indemnity, of which GCUK's proportional share came to about $7.2 million, with no further funding expected; the receipts and payments accounts annexed to their report for the period to 7 September 2026 carry, in the US dollar, Australian dollar and euro accounts, a line headed 'Costs being covered by GFG funding'. [src-015] - Qualification: The narrative passage does not name the provider of the funding indemnity, and the link to GFG rests on the account headings. The amounts on the GFG funding lines of the scanned accounts cannot be read reliably, so no total of the GFG funding is available. - Documented: The administrators of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) reported that GFG entities continue to enter insolvency processes in various jurisdictions, that GCUK holds direct or indirect security interests over these entities, and that between March and September 2026 six more entered local insolvency processes, including Liberty Pipes (Hartlepool) Limited and Liberty Capital (UK) Limited in England and Whyalla Ports Pty Ltd in Australia. [src-015] - Documented: The Serious Fraud Office opened an investigation in May 2021 into suspected fraud, fraudulent trading and money laundering in relation to the financing and conduct of the business of companies within GFG Alliance, including its financing arrangements with Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK); the House of Commons Treasury Committee reported the investigation in July 2021 and said that it awaited its outcome. [src-031] [src-034] [src-110] - Qualification: An investigation is not a finding of wrongdoing; no charge or outcome of the investigation was found in the sources reviewed. - Response: A press report (February 2024) stated that GFG has consistently denied any wrongdoing. - Attributed: David Cameron, an adviser to Greensill, told the House of Commons Treasury Committee that throughout David Cameron's time at Greensill the concentration of loans to GFG was an issue for the business, regularly discussed at board meetings from before 2020, and that it was understood to be actively managed with plans to reduce it over time; the Committee also recorded that David Cameron described the relationship between Greensill and GFG Alliance as 'symbiotic'. [src-031] - Qualification: This is David Cameron's written response to the Committee dated 18 June 2021 and oral evidence, as quoted in the Committee's report of July 2021; the Committee did not make a finding on how the concentration was managed. - Attributed: The House of Commons Treasury Committee recorded, among reputational issues raised in press reporting before the period of Greensill's lobbying covered by its report, a press report (March 2019) on concerns about links between Lex Greensill, Sanjeev Gupta and Tim Haywood of GAM, one of whose funds provided finance to Greensill, and a parliamentary question tabled by Lord Myners in June 2019 asking whether the Government was investigating the management, investment valuations and manager–investee relationships of the GAM Greensill Supply Chain Finance Fund. [src-031] - Qualification: The Committee reported these as press concerns and a parliamentary question; they are not findings, and no answer to the question was found in the sources reviewed. - Attributed: An article published on 7 July 2019 by Reuters News & Media Limited, the defendant in a later libel claim, and reproduced in the High Court judgment [2020] EWHC 1325 (QB), reported that a May 2018 update by Greensill to bond investors and brokers stated that the Scottish Government had approved a guarantee relating to the Kinlochleven hydro plant owned by GFG Alliance, against which bonds issued in 2017 on behalf of Sanjeev Gupta were secured, whereas the Scottish Government said no approval had been given; the meaning Reuters contended for in the libel claim added that an April 2017 pre-sale document produced by Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) for GAM Holding AG, which bought £220 million of the bonds, stated that such a guarantee would allow GFG to repurchase the bonds early. The article also said that Greensill had helped GFG raise billions of dollars through bond sales, including the 2017 Kinlochleven sale. [src-098] [src-077] - Qualification: This is the account of a news article and of the meaning Reuters contended for in a libel claim brought by GCUK and Lex Greensill over that article; the judgment of 14 May 2020 decided only what the article meant, not whether its allegations were true. - Response: In the article Greensill said the May 2018 update 'was based upon information provided by GFG' and that it never knowingly issues false statements; GFG said it 'did not mislead anyone' and had never told any party that such guarantees had been put in place; GAM said it did not feel misled by Greensill. - Outcome: The article reported that the Kinlochleven bonds were sold in early 2019 and that GFG said it had purchased and refinanced them early that year; the libel claim over the article was decided on meaning only on 14 May 2020 and, according to the National Audit Office's chronology, dropped by Greensill on 27 May 2020. - Documented: The Federal Court of Australia's judgment of 28 April 2026 in White Oak Commercial Finance Europe (Non-Levered) Limited v Insurance Australia Limited (No 3) [2026] FCA 530 refers to proceedings in the United Kingdom brought by White Oak against Marsh Ltd over White Oak's investment in the Greensill Liberty Commodities Limited Receivable Purchase Agreement programme; Liberty Commodities Limited is listed by the National Audit Office among companies with connections to GFG Alliance. [src-095] [src-077] [src-053] [src-005] - Outcome: Marsh & McLennan Companies' quarterly report to the SEC for the period ended 30 September 2026 states that White Oak filed the claim against Marsh Ltd. in the High Court in London in June 2023 and that Marsh Ltd. reached a settlement with White Oak in May 2025 to resolve the matter in the United Kingdom; [2026] EWHC 639 (Ch) describes the White Oak trial as having settled after the trial had concluded. - Attributed: In a complaint filed in March 2021 in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York against Lex Greensill, Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) and Roland Hartley-Urquhart, Bluestone Resources Inc. and related plaintiffs alleged that in January 2020 the defendants introduced them to GFG Alliance, which they understood from Greensill to be an important Greensill client, and strongly encouraged them to supply metallurgical coal to GFG; the complaint says that the first delivery, in June 2020, was given an extended payment period to December 2020, that GFG paid late, and that Roland Hartley-Urquhart at first vouched for GFG. [src-106] [src-105] - Qualification: These are allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint; they were not adjudicated. - Outcome: On 1 July 2022 the court dismissed the action by an order referring to a settlement agreement, and on 2 August 2022 the plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal of all claims against all defendants with prejudice was so ordered; no defendant had filed an answer, and the settlement terms were not found in the sources reviewed. ## Why Greensill lost its trade credit insurance and what the courts did - Attributed: A press report (February 2024) of court filings stated that Zurich Insurance Company, sued in the High Court by the administrators of Greensill Bank AG in a dispute over trade credit insurance, alleged in a defence and counterclaim dated 26 January 2024 that the claims against it arose out of a 'fraudulent scheme' involving Lex Greensill, Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK), Sanjeev Gupta and three Liberty businesses of GFG Alliance, including that receivables purportedly sold by Liberty to GCUK were not genuine, that a receivables purchase agreement was a 'sham' and that Zurich had not been told of a German investigation of Greensill Bank or of the true nature of the Greensill–Liberty business; the report put the dispute at $405 million. [src-110] - Qualification: These are allegations in an insurer's statement of case as reported by the press; no court ruling on them and no outcome of the proceedings was found in the sources reviewed. - Response: A spokesperson for Lex Greensill said that Lex Greensill 'wholly rejects' the allegations as without foundation and would address them in a defence and any counterclaims; a GFG Alliance spokesperson said GFG 'was not involved in any insurance arrangements which Greensill had in place'. - Documented: According to the High Court's account in [2025] EWHC 1380 (Ch), the notes bought by Credit Suisse Virtuoso SICAV-SIF in the securitisation of receivables originated by Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) were credit-enhanced by insurance underwritten by Insurance Australia Limited (IAL) through its authorised representative BCC Trade Credit Pty Ltd under two policies: a Master Policy between BCC and GCUK with Greensill Capital Pty Limited, and a Parallel Policy between BCC and Greensill Capital Pty Limited with Greensill Bank AG. Both were first agreed in 2017 and renewed in 2019, are governed by New South Wales law and give the New South Wales courts exclusive jurisdiction; Credit Suisse Virtuoso SICAV-SIF was a loss payee under the Parallel Policy, with an indemnity claim against GCUK if that policy failed to respond because Greensill Capital Pty Limited or Greensill Bank AG had breached it. [src-054] [src-005] - Attributed: In Lex Greensill's 2025 application to stay part of the disqualification proceedings, Lex Greensill contended that the Parallel Policy, to which Greensill Capital Pty Limited and Greensill Bank AG were party, carried more limited disclosure obligations than the Master Policy, to which Greensill Capital Pty Limited and Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) were party, so that it might respond where the Master Policy would not, and that any losses Insurance Australia Limited or BCC Trade Credit Pty Ltd suffered on a Parallel Policy claim could then be recouped from Greensill Capital Pty Limited and GCUK for breach of the more onerous Master Policy obligations. [src-054] - Qualification: This was Lex Greensill's submission as recorded by the High Court in [2025] EWHC 1380 (Ch); the court made no finding on the terms or effect of the policies. - Outcome: The court dismissed the stay application. - Attributed: In the same 2025 stay application, counsel for Lex Greensill submitted that there was evidence that, if the insurers succeeded in their defences in Australia, the resulting increase in the applicants' claims would cut the dividend to unsecured creditors of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited from 16 cents to 6 cents in the dollar; counsel for the Secretary of State did not dispute in general terms that failure of the Australian applicants would reduce that dividend. [src-054] [src-030] - Qualification: These were submissions recorded in [2025] EWHC 1380 (Ch), not findings of the court, which described the argument for a stay on this ground as having very little merit. - Response: Counsel for the Secretary of State submitted that the evidence did not explain how creditors' interests would be better served by deciding the disqualification proceedings after the Australian proceedings, or why those interests should be preferred. - Outcome: The Greensill Bank AG and Credit Suisse claims against Insurance Australia Limited were later settled on confidential terms (announced in 2026); the record does not state the effect on the unsecured dividend. - Attributed: BCC Trade Credit Pty Ltd told the House of Commons Treasury Committee in a letter of 18 June 2021 that the Greensill policies whose non-renewal Lex Greensill had cited were issued, or purportedly issued, on or around 22 February 2019 by BCC as corporate authorised representative of Insurance Australia Limited (IAL), and were extended, or purportedly extended, to expire on 1 March 2021. It stated that BCC ceased to be IAL's corporate authorised representative on 30 June 2019, wrote policies from 1 July 2019 as corporate authorised representative of Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance Co., Ltd., and was therefore not authorised to issue renewal terms on behalf of IAL on 1 March 2021. [src-076] - Qualification: This is BCC's account to Parliament, given while it said the validity of the policies was under investigation under a full reservation of rights; questions of BCC's authority were later pleaded in the Australian proceedings and were not adjudicated in the record. - Attributed: BCC Trade Credit Pty Ltd stated in its June 2021 letter to the Treasury Committee that, as a matter of public record, Insurance Australia Limited's interest in BCC was bought by Tokio Marine Management (Australasia) Pty Ltd with effect from 9 April 2019; the Committee's July 2021 report described BCC as the insurance broker owned by Tokio Marine. [src-076] [src-031] [src-054] [src-083] - Qualification: Stated by BCC; the transaction documents are not in the record. The High Court in [2025] EWHC 1380 (Ch) describes the 2019 event as an acquisition of IAL by Tokio Marine, which differs from BCC's account of a purchase of IAL's interest in BCC, and the Supreme Court of New South Wales called BCC the relevant underwriting agency rather than a broker. - Documented: The Supreme Court of New South Wales recorded in [2021] NSWSC 167 that Tokio Marine Management (Australasia) Pty Ltd, evidently the agent that wrote the policies, wrote to Greensill's brokers Marsh Limited on 2 July 2020 asserting that a named person had no authority to bind risk on Insurance Australia Limited and that no extensions or new limits would be granted, and on 29 July 2020 that no Greensill policy would be extended or renewed; it reserved the underwriters' rights on 4 August 2020 and on 1 September 2020 gave each Greensill company notice that BCC Trade Credit Pty Ltd did not wish to renew the policies, which would expire on 1 March 2021. BCC's June 2021 letter to the Treasury Committee likewise says it confirmed in writing in July 2020 that renewal terms would not be offered, reiterated by the non-renewal notice of 1 September 2020. [src-083] [src-076] - Response: Greensill's letter of 27 February 2021 stated that the 1 September 2020 notice was not accepted, arguing that it had not been given 180 days before the end of the policy period, and requested renewal terms ([2021] NSWSC 167). - Outcome: On 1 March 2021 the Supreme Court of New South Wales refused the Greensill companies' urgent application for an injunction compelling Insurance Australia Limited to provide cover, and the policies expired at midnight ([2021] NSWSC 167). - Documented: On 1 March 2021 Stevenson J of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Equity, Commercial List, file 2021/58429) refused an urgent after-hours application by Greensill Capital Pty Ltd, Greensill Capital (UK) Limited and Greensill Bank AG for an interlocutory mandatory injunction compelling Insurance Australia Limited to provide cover under two trade credit insurance policies that expired at midnight; the defendants were BCC Trade Credit Pty Ltd, Tokio Marine Management (Australasia) Pty Ltd and Insurance Australia Limited ([2021] NSWSC 167). [src-083] [src-076] [src-053] - Documented: In its reasons in [2021] NSWSC 167 the court recorded that Insurance Australia Limited's two policies covered the Greensill plaintiffs and their funding partners against non-payment by account debtors and by Greensill's clients, that the cover was in the order of US$4.6 billion for some 40 clients, and that it was not disputed that the policies did not renew automatically. Greensill's case, raised apparently for the first time in its letter of 27 February 2021, was that the 1 September 2020 notice fell a day or two short of the 180 days' notice required by clause 4.2; the court assumed the point arguable for the application but did not see it as strong. [src-083] - Documented: On the balance of convenience, the court in [2021] NSWSC 167 weighed Greensill's evidence of very serious consequences if the policies were not renewed, including its estimate that over 50,000 jobs, more than 7,000 of them in Australia, might be at risk, the risk that Greensill Bank AG would fall below its regulatory capital requirements, and the failure of its broker Marsh to find alternative cover, against the exposure of Insurance Australia Limited, which had not reinsured beyond midnight. It treated Greensill's delay as weighing against relief: the underwriters' position had been clear for about eight months, and by 1 September 2020 at the latest, yet Greensill instructed lawyers in London and Sydney only on 25 and 26 February 2021 and sought relief within hours of the cover expiring. [src-083] - Attributed: BCC Trade Credit Pty Ltd told the Treasury Committee that by 1 March 2021 Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance Co., Ltd. had taken a commercial decision not to let BCC issue new contracts on its behalf to replace the expiring policies, that BCC and Tokio Marine & Nichido had by July 2020 begun to develop particular concerns about Greensill which made them very reluctant to provide any cover and had reserved all rights under the policies since then, and that general market conditions and UK insurance or regulatory requirements were not significant factors in its decision. [src-031] [src-076] - Qualification: This is BCC's account in its letter of 18 June 2021, quoted in the Committee's July 2021 report; the letter does not specify the concerns and says BCC would not divulge the without-prejudice discussions with Greensill. - Unresolved: Accounts given to the Treasury Committee differ on why cover was withdrawn: Lex Greensill told the Committee that the loss of insurance cover was the ultimate cause of Greensill's failure and described Covid as a time when many credit insurers needed more capital or had to cut cover; BCC Trade Credit Pty Ltd said general market conditions were not a significant factor; and Sam Woods, Deputy Governor for Prudential Regulation at the Bank of England and chief executive of the Prudential Regulation Authority, said on 23 June 2021 that, as Sam Woods understood it, Tokio Marine looked at what was going on in the Bond and Credit Company in Australia, did not like it and 'pulled the plug'. [src-031] - Qualification: Sam Woods added that it had been reported that one of the underwriters exceeded its limits and that Sam Woods had no way of verifying that. The Committee's July 2021 report sets out these accounts and concludes only that the failure of Greensill does not provide particularly strong evidence about procyclicality in the regulation of insurance markets. - Attributed: The joint administrators' statutory proposals for Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) state that trade credit insurance was critical to GCUK's ability to finance sub-investment-grade clients and that from 1 March 2021, after renewal negotiations broke down partly because GCUK could not meet the insurers' collateral requirements, GCUK lost the benefit of about $4.6 billion of cover (of which $4.1 billion was in use on 8 March 2021) under a policy for newly originated assets, with about $9 billion more due to expire later in 2021. According to the proposals, key investors then said they would stop investing in insured receivables and, with press speculation eroding other investors' confidence, GCUK ceased originating new assets from 2 March 2021. [src-029] [src-076] [src-030] [src-096] - Qualification: This is the administrators' explanation of the causes of failure in their April 2021 proposals; BCC's and Lex Greensill's accounts of the non-renewal differ, and the insurers' and the companies' positions on the policies were contested in later litigation. - Response: BCC Trade Credit Pty Ltd told the Treasury Committee in June 2021 that by July 2020 it and Tokio Marine & Nichido had begun to develop particular concerns about Greensill that made them very reluctant to provide any cover, and that general market conditions and UK insurance or regulatory requirements were not significant factors in its decision. - Outcome: Greensill Bank AG and Credit Suisse settled their claims under the policies against Insurance Australia Limited and other parties on confidential terms in 2026 and abandoned their indemnity claims; White Oak, the sole remaining applicant, took its claim to trial in October 2026. - Documented: The statement of affairs of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) lists BCC Trade Credit Pty Ltd, Chubb European Group SE, Zurich Insurance plc (UK Branch), Swiss Re International SE (including its German branch) and QBE (UK) Ltd together among its unsecured creditors, annotated in the copy attached to the administrators' proposals as 'potential 1st loss claims, dependant on whether assets default and insurance claims are lodged'; Marsh Limited appears separately in the creditor list. [src-029] [src-007] [src-041] - Qualification: The annotation describes contingent claims; [2024] EWHC 3068 (Comm) records that GCUK was responsible for paying a sum equivalent to any deductible back to the insurer on a claim. The amounts on the scanned copies cannot be reliably attributed to individual insurers. - Documented: In a letter of 9 July 2021 to the chair of the Treasury Committee, the joint administrators of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited said that the terms of the current credit insurance policies were commercially sensitive and confidential, so that it would not be appropriate to disclose the insurers' identities or the cover provided without the insurers' express consent; they offered to seek that consent if the Committee sent a separate letter of request. [src-004] - Attributed: In written evidence to the Treasury Committee's 2021 inquiry, Lex Greensill declined to name Greensill Capital's credit insurers or the cover each provided, saying the information was subject to confidentiality agreements with over 20 insurers and that consent would have to be sought from each insurer by Grant Thornton as administrators. BCC Trade Credit Pty Ltd's letter to the Committee cites Lex Greensill's oral evidence that Greensill companies had business dealings with 27 other insurers and says that from July 2020 to February 2021 Greensill and its brokers at Marsh were exploring cover with other insurers. [src-080] [src-076] [src-004] - Qualification: These are statements of Lex Greensill and of BCC to the Committee; the insurers and agreements are not identified in the record, and the two figures refer to different things (insurers under confidentiality agreements; other insurers with business dealings). - Response: The joint administrators told the Committee in a letter of 9 July 2021 that it would not be appropriate to disclose the insurers' identities or the cover provided without the insurers' express consent, which they offered to seek if the Committee sent a separate letter of request. - Documented: In the Federal Court of Australia, claims under the Greensill trade credit insurance policies issued between October 2021 and June 2023 were case-managed together: six by Greensill Bank AG and its insolvency administrator Michael Frege against Insurance Australia Limited, BCC Trade Credit Pty Ltd, Greg Brereton and others, three by Credit Suisse Virtuoso SICAV-SIF for its sub-fund Credit Suisse (Lux) Supply Chain Finance Fund (one jointly with a Credit Suisse Nova (Lux) sub-fund), and one by White Oak Commercial Finance Europe (Non-Levered) Limited (NSD 1039 of 2021). By April 2026 an eleventh proceeding, Greensill Bank AG v Marsh Ltd (NSD 344 of 2025), was case-managed with them, under orders dated 30 March 2023, 26 July 2023 and 27 May 2025. [src-095] [src-115] [src-054] [src-041] [src-096] [src-079] [src-030] - Response: Insurance Australia Limited, BCC Trade Credit Pty Ltd and the Tokio Marine companies defended the claims, BCC and the Tokio companies contending in part that the policies were not validly entered into because of fraudulent non-disclosure or misrepresentation by Greensill Capital (UK) Limited and Lex Greensill, among others ([2024] EWHC 2039 (Ch)); in September 2026 Insurance Australia Limited said it continued to defend White Oak's proceedings. - Outcome: A three-month joint trial was first scheduled for March 2026 and then listed for 3 August 2026 before Thawley J; after the Greensill Bank AG and Credit Suisse claims settled in 2026, White Oak remained the sole applicant and its trial began in October 2026. - Unresolved: Sources give different totals for the Australian insurance claims, each in its own terms: the High Court in [2025] EWHC 1380 (Ch) put the ten claims at in excess of US$4 billion, [2024] EWHC 2039 (Ch) described them as seeking recovery in the region of A$7 billion, the Federal Court of Australia in [2026] FCA 1496 referred to 11 proceedings with claims totalling over $7 billion, and Marsh & McLennan's quarterly report for the period to 30 September 2026 states that the applicants collectively claimed losses of approximately $5 billion plus interest and costs. [src-096] [src-053] [src-054] [src-079] - Qualification: The figures differ in currency, date and scope (for example whether interest or the later Marsh proceeding is included), and none is a finding of loss; the claims were settled or untried as of October 2026. - Documented: In each of the jointly managed Australian proceedings BCC Trade Credit Pty Ltd brought a cross-claim in which Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) is the first cross-respondent, with Greensill Bank AG and Greensill Capital Pty Limited (in liquidation) as further cross-respondents ([2025] FCA 95; [2026] FCA 530; [2026] FCA 1496). The English High Court recorded in [2024] EWHC 2039 (Ch) that GCUK's administration had been recognised in Australia and that its administrators consented to proceedings against GCUK on the basis that it would be released from filing pleadings or giving disclosure, while not opposing limited disclosure by category. [src-115] [src-095] [src-096] [src-079] - Attributed: BCC Trade Credit Pty Ltd and the Tokio Marine companies defended the Australian proceedings in part on the contention that the policies were not validly entered into because of fraudulent non-disclosure and/or misrepresentation by Greensill Capital (UK) Limited and by Lex Greensill, among others, particularised in a 53-page Annexure A common to each claim. As summarised in [2025] EWHC 1380 (Ch), the insurers' general invalidity defence alleges misrepresentations and non-disclosures in procuring cover for the Catfoss group (Catfoss Renewables Ltd, Catfoss DBT Ltd, Noviniti Poole Ltd and Noviniti Colchester Ltd), Bluestone Resources and Liberty France Aluminium, made deliberately and dishonestly with Lex Greensill personally responsible, and that these also tainted the 2019 renewal of the Parallel Policy. [src-079] [src-054] [src-033] [src-005] [src-030] [src-096] - Qualification: These are defences pleaded by the insurers in civil proceedings, as described by the English courts in [2024] EWHC 2039 (Ch) and [2025] EWHC 1380 (Ch); they were not adjudicated in the record. Greensill Bank AG and Credit Suisse settled their claims in 2026 on confidential terms and abandoned their indemnity claims, and White Oak's claim went to trial in October 2026. - Response: Credit Suisse Asset Management stated in its investor Q&A of 15 December 2022 that it was its firm position that all relevant insurance policies are valid and the insurers' claims unfounded. In the English disqualification proceedings Lex Greensill denied withholding relevant information from BCC's head of trade credit, Greg Brereton, or making misrepresentations to Mr Brereton or BCC ([2026] EWHC 639 (Ch)). - Outcome: In 2026 Greensill Bank AG and Credit Suisse settled their claims against Insurance Australia Limited and other parties on confidential terms and abandoned their indemnity claims; White Oak, the sole remaining applicant, continued to press its claim, including its non-disclosure and misrepresentation issues, at a trial that began in October 2026 ([2026] FCA 1496). - Attributed: According to the High Court's summary in [2025] EWHC 1380 (Ch), when claims were first asserted Insurance Australia Limited refused to pay on the basis that BCC Trade Credit Pty Ltd and its head of trade credit, Greg Brereton, had acted in excess of their authority, a defence arising from an investigation into the business written through Mr Brereton that followed the 2019 Tokio Marine acquisition. Insurance Australia Group's September 2026 announcement refers to the policies as purportedly issued by BCC on IAL's behalf. [src-054] [src-030] [src-096] - Qualification: IAL's authority defence was a position in litigation and was not adjudicated in the record; the issues for White Oak's trial from October 2026 still included Mr Brereton's authority ([2026] FCA 1496). The judgment dates the first assertion of claims to about July 2020 and describes the acquisition as one of IAL, whereas BCC's letter to Parliament describes a purchase of IAL's interest in BCC. No response by BCC or Mr Brereton to this defence was found in the record. - Attributed: In Lex Greensill's 2026 application to strike out the disqualification proceedings, Lex Greensill relied on allegations made by Credit Suisse in the Australian proceedings that BCC's head of trade credit, Greg Brereton, had committed a serious fraud to mislead or misrepresent the status of the insurance policies Mr Brereton had written, arguing that if those allegations were right the decision not to extend the companies' policies in March 2021 and the insurers' refusal of cover resulted from Mr Brereton's conduct rather than Lex Greensill's own; the application also relied on material from Marsh Ltd that emerged in the English White Oak trial. [src-005] [src-008] - Qualification: This is Lex Greensill's account, recorded in [2026] EWHC 639 (Ch), of allegations made by Credit Suisse in litigation; Credit Suisse's pleading is not in the record and the allegations were not adjudicated before the Credit Suisse claims settled in 2026. No response by Mr Brereton was found in the record. - Outcome: The court dismissed the strike-out application on 18 March 2026; the disqualification proceedings then ended with Lex Greensill's undertaking accepted by the Secretary of State on 2 June 2026, so the matter was not tried. - Attributed: The Secretary of State for Business and Trade alleged in the disqualification proceedings against Lex Greensill (the 'Catfoss Allegations') that from September 2018 Lex Greensill made, or caused Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) to make, a series of dishonest misrepresentations and non-disclosures to trade credit insurers covering GCUK's finance to Catfoss Renewables Ltd and Catfoss DBT Ltd, exposing GCUK and its investors to the risk that the policies would be avoided and further cover refused; the statement of matters said this risk had eventuated, with insurers declining claims for approximately US$4.6 billion of investor losses. [src-005] [src-008] [src-009] - Qualification: These were allegations of the Secretary of State in disqualification proceedings (High Court CR-2024-001426) and were not tried. The Insolvency Service's pre-action letter of 15 November 2023 had alleged that the misrepresentations invalidated all cover and led the insurer to decline claims totalling $4.8 billion. - Response: Lex Greensill denied withholding relevant information from BCC's head of trade credit, Greg Brereton, or making misrepresentations to Mr Brereton or BCC, and contended that the allegations rested on the insurers' defence in Australia rather than an independent investigation. - Outcome: Lex Greensill's strike-out application was dismissed on 18 March 2026 ([2026] EWHC 639 (Ch)). The proceedings ended when the Secretary of State accepted a nine-year disqualification undertaking on 2 June 2026, running from 23 June 2026, in which directors do not dispute certain facts for the purposes of the proceedings only; the Insolvency Service's announcement describes the conduct by reference to the Katerra transactions and does not mention the Catfoss allegations. - Attributed: The Secretary of State also alleged (the 'Insurance non-disclosure Allegations') that from August 2020 Lex Greensill made misrepresentations and non-disclosures to the boards of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited and Greensill Capital Pty Limited about the status of the trade credit insurance, including that the insurers were investigating policies and endorsements worth over US$11.5 billion, had refused to acknowledge that they were on risk and had served notice of non-renewal. The Insolvency Service's pre-action letter of 15 November 2023 had alleged that this failure to tell the boards of the likely non-renewal, with insurers declining claims of $2.19 billion relating to investor losses, prevented the directors from making informed decisions. [src-005] [src-008] - Qualification: These were allegations in disqualification proceedings (High Court CR-2024-001426) and were not tried. - Response: Lex Greensill said that memos from July to September 2020 showed that, on learning of Mr Brereton's dismissal by BCC, Lex Greensill informed the companies' executive team, which with the approval of the Chairman and the head of the Risk Committee resolved not to circulate the information more widely; Lex Greensill also said the allegation was advanced without investigating the records of the directors said not to have been informed ([2026] EWHC 639 (Ch)). - Outcome: Lex Greensill's strike-out application was dismissed on 18 March 2026. The proceedings ended with the nine-year disqualification undertaking accepted on 2 June 2026; the Insolvency Service's announcement describes the conduct by reference to the Katerra transactions and does not mention the insurance non-disclosure allegations. - Documented: On 18 July 2024 ICC Judge Mullen ([2024] EWHC 2039 (Ch), case CR-2024-001426) allowed an application of 12 April 2024 by BCC Trade Credit Pty Ltd, Tokio Marine Management Australasia Pty Limited and Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance Company Limited to obtain the affirmation made on 6 March 2024 by Ian Wilson of the Insolvency Service in support of the Secretary of State's disqualification claim against Lex Greensill, for use only on the scope of discovery in the Federal Court of Australia and subject to conditions, including redaction of the names of individuals other than Mr Greensill and Mr Wilson. [src-079] - Response: Lex Greensill opposed the application; the Secretary of State was neutral. - Outcome: The court also directed that Lex Greensill be told within 14 days which parts of the affirmations the applicants proposed to rely on in the Australian proceedings, so that Lex Greensill could apply there for a non-disclosure order. - Attributed: A report by Edward Cowpe, the referee appointed by the Federal Court of Australia on discovery, quoted in [2024] EWHC 2039 (Ch), stated that Greensill Capital (UK) Limited holds some 168 million Microsoft files, 300TB of operational system data, data on several back-up applications, about 77 boxes of hard-copy documents and 836 laptops and 99 mobile phones, and that the administrators had passed data to regulators without carrying out their own privilege review. [src-079] - Qualification: Figures from the referee's report as quoted by the English court; the report itself is not in the record. - Response: According to the same quoted report, the administrators said that no documents had been withheld from the regulators on the basis of privilege; the English court noted that the administrators were concerned to limit their spending on disclosure and the applicants' access to the whole of the records. - Documented: The Commercial Court recorded in [2024] EWHC 3068 (Comm) that in August 2023 Insurance Australia Limited pleaded, as one of its defences in the Greensill Bank AG proceedings, that Marsh was a concurrent wrongdoer whose responsibility should reduce IAL's liability; that Greensill Bank AG and Marsh entered into a confidential standstill deed on 5 September 2023 to toll limitation periods; and that Marsh was joined as a respondent in the Credit Suisse proceedings on 7 November 2023. [src-041] - Documented: On 3 December 2024 the Commercial Court (Simon Colton KC sitting as a deputy High Court judge, CL-2024-000433, [2024] EWHC 3068 (Comm)) decided to continue, on a narrower basis, the interim anti-suit injunction granted to Marsh Limited by Cockerill J on 30 July 2024, restraining Greensill Bank AG and its insolvency administrator Michael Frege from bringing any claim against Marsh in Australia in relation to the engagement in the 2018 letter of engagement between Greensill Bank AG and Marsh, which ran for 12 months from 1 March 2018 and contained an English exclusive jurisdiction clause. Marsh had sought the injunction fearing that an Australian claim for misleading conduct, with a headline value in the billions of Australian dollars, might escape the liability cap of £7.5 million (later £10 million) in its terms of engagement. [src-041] [src-053] - Response: Greensill Bank AG and Michael Frege sought to have the interim injunction set aside for non-disclosure, Marsh not having told the court that it relied on documents disclosed in the Australian proceedings in breach of the Harman obligation, and in any event opposed its continuation; they offered no undertaking not to bring a misleading-conduct claim in Australia. - Outcome: Marsh Ltd, Marsh Pty Ltd and other parties settled with Greensill Bank AG and its insolvency administrator in June 2026, according to Marsh & McLennan's quarterly report for the period to 30 September 2026. - Documented: In [2024] EWHC 3068 (Comm) the Commercial Court held that Marsh had not shown to a high degree of probability that Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) had actual or ostensible authority to bind Greensill Bank AG to the letters of engagement GCUK signed with Marsh, or that the bank ratified them, and considered, without making a finding of fact at that interim stage, that GCUK more likely than not lacked such authority. It found the involvement of the bank's 2014 chief executive Danyon Lloyd, of Group General Counsel Jonathan Lane, who was not an officer of the bank, and of Jason Austin, described as a co-founder of the Greensill business, a GCUK director and a member of the bank's supervisory board without executive powers, insufficient to infer that authority. [src-041] - Documented: In the Australian proceedings Moshinsky J of the Federal Court of Australia held on 12 November 2024, after a hearing on 11 November, that it was proved beyond reasonable doubt that Marsh Ltd and Marsh Pty Ltd had breached their obligation not to use documents discovered in those proceedings for other purposes, a contempt of that court, by relying on them in the without-notice anti-suit application in England; the court released Marsh from the obligation from the date of its order without making the release retrospective ([2024] FCA 1308, as described in [2024] EWHC 3068 (Comm)). [src-041] [src-053] [src-115] - Response: Marsh argued in the Australian court that obtaining the anti-suit injunction was for the purposes of the Australian proceedings and not a collateral purpose, or alternatively that the obligation yielded to its duty of full and frank disclosure on the without-notice application; according to [2024] EWHC 3068 (Comm), Marsh and its lawyers later apologised for the admitted breach while Marsh wished to challenge the correctness of the Australian decision. - Outcome: In [2024] EWHC 3068 (Comm) the English Commercial Court found Marsh's failure to disclose the breach at the without-notice hearing a serious and substantial breach of its duties to that court, but declined to set aside the anti-suit injunction and said the breach should be reflected in costs. Marsh's involvement in the Australian proceedings ended with its settlements with Greensill Bank AG (June 2026) and Credit Suisse (September 2026). - Documented: On 20 February 2025 Moore J of the Federal Court of Australia ([2025] FCA 95) allowed the application of Greensill Bank AG and its insolvency administrator Michael Frege, dated 31 January 2025, seeking the judge's disqualification for apprehended bias from the ten jointly managed Greensill proceedings, because before appointment to the court on 18 December 2024 Moore J had appeared as senior counsel for Marsh Limited and Marsh Pty Limited on the Harman application and some of the submissions made there suggested a particular outcome on issues for the trial; the proceedings were referred for reallocation to another judge, with no order as to costs. The court identified as a key issue whether the Greensill Bank AG parties were bound by Marsh's terms of engagement, including exclusive jurisdiction and liability-limitation clauses, in letters of engagement executed by Greensill Bank AG for 2018–2019 and by Greensill Capital (UK) Limited for other periods. [src-115] - Documented: Marsh & McLennan's quarterly report for the period to 30 September 2026 states that a claim filed in the High Court in London in June 2023 by White Oak, a loss payee, against Marsh Ltd, the broker that placed a number of Greensill's trade credit insurance policies, over White Oak's purchase of receivables from Greensill was settled in May 2025, the settlement being recovered through Marsh's errors-and-omissions insurance. [2026] EWHC 639 (Ch) likewise refers to the White Oak trial against Marsh Ltd as having settled after the trial had concluded. [src-053] [src-005] - Documented: According to the same quarterly report, two Credit Suisse funds claiming as loss payees added Marsh Ltd to the Australian proceedings in November 2023, and Greensill Bank AG, an insured under the policies, added Marsh Pty Ltd and Marsh Ltd in November 2024 and March 2025; Marsh Ltd, Marsh Pty Ltd and other parties settled with Greensill Bank AG and its insolvency administrator in June 2026 and with Credit Suisse in September 2026, which together with the White Oak settlement concluded Marsh's involvement in the Australian proceedings. [src-053] - Documented: Marsh & McLennan recorded charges, net of insurance proceeds, of $144 million for the three months and $569 million for the nine months to 30 September 2026 in connection with the Australian Greensill proceedings, reflecting the settlements with Greensill Bank AG and Credit Suisse and related costs, and stated that it did not expect further charges in connection with these matters. [src-053] - Documented: Insurance Australia Group Limited announced on 25 September 2026 that Insurance Australia Limited (IAL) had agreed to settle, on confidential terms, the proceedings brought by Credit Suisse entities against it and other parties in the Federal Court of Australia over policies purportedly issued by BCC Trade Credit Pty Ltd on IAL's behalf to Greensill entities, whose claims had an aggregate face value of approximately A$2.8 billion plus interest; the announcement refers to the earlier announced settlement of the proceedings brought by Greensill Bank AG and its insolvency administrator on 29 May 2026. It said the settlement would not have a material impact on its financial position or FY27 results given anticipated recoveries from insurance, reinsurance and other indemnities, and that White Oak's proceedings, with claims of approximately A$170 million plus interest, remained on foot and were being defended. [src-030] [src-096] - Qualification: The announcement gives White Oak's claims as approximately A$170 million plus interest; [2026] FCA 1496 describes the same claim as US$120 million plus about six years of interest. - Documented: On 28 April 2026 Moshinsky J ([2026] FCA 530, White Oak Commercial Finance Europe (Non-Levered) Limited v Insurance Australia Limited (No 3), NSD 1039 of 2021) largely rejected the without-prejudice privilege claims of BCC Trade Credit Pty Ltd, Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance Co Ltd and Tokio Marine Management (Australasia) Pty Ltd over documents about negotiations in the 'Main Dispute' between those parties and Insurance Australia Limited on one side and Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK), Greensill Capital Pty Ltd and Greensill Bank AG on the other over the validity of the policies, finding the supporting evidence general and not tied to specific documents. The court upheld privilege over a fourth category concerning a dispute partly resolved with Credit Suisse, ordered the producing parties, including GCUK, to reproduce the documents free of redactions for without-prejudice privilege, and ordered further discovery of the BCC and Tokio Marine parties' communications with the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority on the subject of Tokio Marine & Nichido's notification of breach of 30 July 2020. [src-095] - Response: The BCC/Tokio Marine parties submitted that their evidence was sufficient to substantiate the privilege, which required only that the communications formed part of genuine negotiations to settle a dispute, and that, as a joint privilege of the negotiating parties, it could not be waived by one of them alone. - Attributed: Evidence filed for the BCC and Tokio Marine parties in the White Oak proceeding, given on information from Chris Williams of Tokio Marine Holdings, stated that from about August 2020 Mr Williams was tasked with trying to resolve the dispute over the policies, that Mr Williams met Lex Greensill, described as the principal of the entire Greensill group, together with other representatives of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited and of Marsh, by teleconference on 27 August 2020 on a without-prejudice basis, and that Mr Williams met and corresponded regularly with Mr Greensill and Marsh until 1 March 2021. [src-095] - Qualification: This is the BCC/Tokio Marine parties' affidavit evidence as recorded in [2026] FCA 530; the court held it too general to establish privilege over most of the documents and made no finding on the content of the negotiations. - Outcome: On 28 April 2026 the court ordered the BCC/Tokio Marine parties and other producing parties to reproduce the documents concerned without redactions for without prejudice privilege, except for the category over which privilege was upheld. - Documented: On 9 October 2026 Thawley J ([2026] FCA 1496, NSD 1039 of 2021) ordered White Oak Commercial Finance Europe (Non-Levered) Limited to provide further security for costs of $2,500,000 for Insurance Australia Limited and $5,500,000 for BCC Trade Credit Pty Ltd and the two Tokio Marine respondents, explaining that the total security should be $8 million for BCC/Tokio Marine and $5 million for IAL. The applications were heard on 6 October 2026, the day before the trial began; White Oak was the sole remaining applicant after Greensill Bank AG and Credit Suisse settled and abandoned their indemnity claims, its claim was for US$120 million plus about six years of pre-judgment interest, and the trial was expected to run until the end of the year. [src-096] - Attributed: In the security-for-costs hearing White Oak submitted that its claim concerned only 29 receivables, one finance programme and one policy, whereas the Credit Suisse proceedings had involved more than 400 notes, about 4,700 receivables, 17 programmes and three policies, and that BCC/Tokio Marine and Insurance Australia Limited had spent more than $62 million in the 12 months to July 2026; the court said that spending reflected an intensive period when 11 sets of proceedings with claims totalling over $7 billion were being run together. [src-096] - Qualification: White Oak's figures as recorded in [2026] FCA 1496; the court accepted that the trial would be shorter than the combined hearing but said the remaining claims were still legally and factually complex. - Attributed: A press report (February 2024), citing court filings, states that Zurich Insurance Company was sued in the High Court in London in 2023 by the administrators of Greensill Bank AG in a dispute over trade credit insurance; the Commercial Court in [2024] EWHC 3068 (Comm) likewise records proceedings by Greensill Bank AG against Zurich Insurance issued in 2023. [src-110] [src-041] - Qualification: The particulars of the claim, Zurich's defence and the outcome of the London proceedings are not in the record. - Response: According to the same press report, Zurich's defence and counterclaim dated 26 January 2024 alleged that the claims arose out of a 'fraudulent scheme' and that deliberate or reckless misrepresentation and non-disclosure entitled it to avoid the policies; a spokesperson for Lex Greensill rejected the allegations as without foundation, and GFG Alliance said it was not involved in Greensill's insurance arrangements. ## Investigations of GCUK and Lex Greensill's 2026 disqualification - Documented: On 28 June 2021 the Financial Reporting Council announced an investigation into the auditor of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) in relation to its audit of GCUK's 2019 financial statements; the Treasury Committee identified the auditor under investigation as Saffery Champness. [src-031] [src-077] - Documented: The Secretary of State for Business and Trade brought disqualification proceedings against Alexander David Greensill (Lex Greensill) in the High Court, Insolvency and Companies List, case CR-2024-001426, under section 6 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, in the matter of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) and Greensill Limited; the claim concerned Lex Greensill's conduct as a director of GCUK, Greensill Limited and their Australian parent, Greensill Capital Pty Limited. [src-005] - Documented: The Insolvency Service investigation began in spring 2022: on 29 April 2022 Ian Wilson, a Chief Investigator at the Insolvency Service, told Lex Greensill that the Secretary of State had instructed it to investigate Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK), Greensill Limited and Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited and the conduct of their directors, and on 4 May 2022 it listed the likely areas, including controls on funding receivables, particularly for the Gupta Family Group (GFG), the Katerra participation agreements and GCUK's accreditation for and loans under CLBILS. [src-005] [src-008] - Qualification: The court later observed that these were areas for investigation, not allegations. - Documented: On 15 November 2023 the Insolvency Service gave Lex Greensill advance notice, by then concerning Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) and Greensill Limited only, that it intended to recommend disqualification proceedings, and on 23 February 2024 the Secretary of State served the formal notice of intention to start proceedings under section 16 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986; Lex Greensill was given the usual opportunity to offer a disqualification undertaking and did not do so. [src-079] [src-005] - Documented: The Secretary of State commenced Part 8 proceedings against Lex Greensill on 7 March 2024 and served them on 8 March 2024, supported by an affirmation of Insolvency Service investigator Ian Wilson dated 6 March 2024 running to 322 pages and 1,053 paragraphs with about 8,500 pages of exhibits (re-affirmed on 19 December 2024); Lex Greensill disputed the allegations, and a six-week trial was fixed to begin in a window from 8 June 2026. [src-054] [src-079] [src-005] - Attributed: In the statement of matters in Ian Wilson's affirmation, the Secretary of State alleged three broad areas of misconduct by Lex Greensill: the Katerra Allegations (transactions with SoftBank Group companies in November and December 2020 and the use of $440m received by Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK)), the Catfoss Allegations (misrepresentations and non-disclosures from September 2018 to trade credit insurers covering finance to Catfoss Renewables Ltd and Catfoss DBT Ltd) and the Insurance non-disclosure Allegations (from August 2020, concerning what the boards of GCUK and Greensill Capital Pty Limited were told about the trade credit insurance). [src-005] [src-008] [src-079] - Qualification: These were allegations in disqualification proceedings, disputed by Lex Greensill; the Secretary of State stated that the claim was not based on the alleged misconduct having caused the companies' insolvencies. The proceedings ended with an undertaking in June 2026 and the allegations were not tried. - Response: Lex Greensill disputed the allegations: in July 2024 ICC Judge Mullen recorded in [2024] EWHC 2039 (Ch) that Lex Greensill regarded the Secretary of State's case as unbalanced and unfounded, and was concerned that untested and disputed allegations of a serious nature might be reported in the press without an effective opportunity to rebut them. - Attributed: In the strike-out application, Lex Greensill contended that the section 16 notice of 23 February 2024 fundamentally changed the allegations made in the November 2023 advance notice, including by dropping the allegation that misrepresentations relating to Catfoss invalidated all the trade credit insurance policies and caused insurers to decline claims totalling $4.8 billion, and by adding allegations of breaches of sections 172 and 174 of the Companies Act 2006. [src-005] - Qualification: This was Lex Greensill's contention; the Secretary of State did not accept that the section 16 notice fundamentally altered the allegations. - Outcome: In [2026] EWHC 639 (Ch) Mr Justice Trower found that both notices made essentially the same allegations in the same three areas and called the description of a fundamental alteration “a substantial exaggeration”. - Attributed: Lex Greensill contended in the strike-out application that the GFG and CLBILS areas, identified for investigation in 2022, were dropped from the case in November 2023 for political reasons rather than because the Secretary of State had concluded there was no legal need to prove a link between Lex Greensill's conduct and the insolvencies; the solicitor's evidence for Lex Greensill said that the Insolvency Service had then included other allegations that it had not investigated properly. [src-005] - Qualification: This is Lex Greensill's contention as reported by the court; the judgment makes no finding on why the GFG and CLBILS areas were not pursued. The court held that the claim did not need to prove that the alleged conduct caused the insolvencies. - Outcome: The strike-out application was dismissed on 18 March 2026 ([2026] EWHC 639 (Ch)). - Attributed: Lex Greensill also argued that Ian Wilson's affirmation implied, without alleging it, that Lex Greensill had caused the insolvencies, citing its references to BaFin having “gated” part of the US$440 million that Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) obtained from SoftBank and to GCUK's liquidity and solvency being “in question”. [src-005] - Qualification: This was Lex Greensill's complaint about the Secretary of State's evidence in the strike-out application. - Response: In a witness statement of 14 January 2026, the Secretary of State's solicitor stated that the claim was not mounted on the basis that the alleged misconduct was responsible for the insolvencies of the companies, 'not least because it does not need to be', and that the alleged misconduct, if made out, merited an upper-bracket disqualification. - Outcome: In [2026] EWHC 639 (Ch) Mr Justice Trower did not accept the complaint, holding that the allegations focused on detriment to noteholders and that the companies' financial position was relevant context even though the Secretary of State did not allege that the misconduct caused the insolvencies. - Documented: In [2025] EWHC 1380 (Ch), after a hearing on 13 May 2025, Mr Justice Trower dismissed Lex Greensill's application, issued on 30 January 2025, to stay the Catfoss issue in the disqualification proceedings pending final judgment in related insurance proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia, finding that a stay would cause significant delay and complication without sufficient countervailing case-management benefit. [src-054] - Response: Counsel for the Secretary of State opposed the stay, submitting that a significant number of issues arose in only one of the two sets of proceedings and that the overlap did not mean that the interests of justice required a stay. - Documented: On 18 March 2026, in [2026] EWHC 639 (Ch), Mr Justice Trower dismissed Lex Greensill's application of 18 November 2025 to strike out the disqualification claim or for reverse summary judgment, holding that section 6 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 does not require proof that the director's conduct caused the company's insolvency, the extent of responsibility being one factor to weigh, and that unfairness in the Insolvency Service's investigation had not been established and was a matter for trial. [src-005] [src-008] - Outcome: The Insolvency Service stated that the Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal against that decision. - Documented: Lex Greensill gave a nine-year disqualification undertaking concerning conduct as a director of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, Greensill Limited and Greensill Capital Pty Limited, which the Secretary of State for Business and Trade accepted on 2 June 2026; it ended the court proceedings, in which a six-week trial had been due to begin on 8 June 2026, and the ban took effect on 23 June 2026. [src-008] [src-009] - Qualification: A disqualification undertaking is an agreement in which the director does not dispute certain facts for the purposes of the disqualification proceedings only; it is not a court finding. - Documented: The Companies House register of disqualified officers records for Alexander David Greensill a disqualification undertaking dated 2 June 2026, running from 23 June 2026 to 22 June 2035, for conduct while acting for Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, Greensill Limited and Greensill Capital Pty Limited, under section 7 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986; while disqualified, Lex Greensill may not act as a director or be involved in the promotion, formation or management of a company without the court's permission. [src-009] [src-008] - Attributed: Announcing the undertaking on 4 June 2026, the Insolvency Service described the conduct as Lex Greensill causing the Katerra transactions of late 2020 and causing or allowing Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) to use $440 million received in November 2020 for purposes other than redeeming notes held by the Credit Suisse (Lux) Supply Chain Finance Fund, and stated that this breached the duty under the Companies Act 2006 to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence; its chief executive, Duncan Beach, called the nine-year ban above the average for director disqualifications. [src-008] - Qualification: The undertaking records facts that Lex Greensill does not dispute for the purposes of the disqualification proceedings only; it is not a court finding. The announcement describes only the Katerra-related conduct; the record does not contain the undertaking's statement of facts, so it does not show whether the Catfoss or insurance non-disclosure allegations were covered. - Documented: On 4 May 2021 the Financial Conduct Authority told the Treasury Committee that it was formally investigating matters relating to Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (GCUK) and Greensill Capital Securities Limited (GCSL) and the oversight of GCSL by its principal, Mirabella Advisers LLP, and was cooperating with other UK enforcement and regulatory agencies and overseas authorities; it noted that some press allegations about the circumstances of Greensill's failure were “potentially criminal in nature”. [src-016] [src-046] - Qualification: The FCA's remark about press allegations is not a finding. No outcome of the FCA investigation into GCUK and GCSL appears in the record; the part concerning Mirabella was closed in December 2025. - Outcome: On 15 December 2025 the FCA announced that it had closed its investigation into Mirabella's oversight of GCSL, having identified no breaches by Mirabella requiring further action. - Documented: On 15 December 2025 the Financial Conduct Authority announced that it had closed its investigation, opened on 4 May 2021, into the oversight of Greensill Capital Securities Limited, an appointed representative, by its principal Mirabella Advisers LLP, having identified no breaches by Mirabella requiring further action; Mirabella had applied to cancel its authorisation and, as of 12 September 2025, no longer provided financial services, and the FCA said it would continue to work with UK and overseas counterparts on their own enquiries connected to Greensill. [src-046] [src-089] - Qualification: The FCA reserved the right to review its decision and act if new information comes to light. The FCA statement spells the firm's name “Mirabella Advisors LLP”; the Companies House register gives Mirabella Advisers LLP. - Documented: The Companies House register of persons with significant control for Mirabella Advisers LLP (OC384100) lists Mirabella Group Holdings Limited (company number 12204258), notified on 11 November 2019, as holding 75% or more of the voting rights and rights to surplus assets and the right to appoint or remove members; Cordium Consulting Group Limited (05963788) held the same interests from 6 April 2016 until 11 November 2019. [src-089] ## Sources - [src-001] Companies House company record of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (08126173), Companies House - [src-017] Companies House filing history of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, page 2, Companies House - [src-006] Companies House filing history of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited (accounts and insolvency filings), Companies House - [src-081] Companies House filing history of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, page 3, Companies House - [src-035] Judgment: Credit Suisse Virtuoso SICAV-SIF and GLAS Trust Corporation Limited v SoftBank Group Corp. and others [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch), The National Archives (Find Case Law), 2025-10-15 - [src-003] Companies House list of officers of Greensill Capital (UK) Limited, Companies House - [src-103] GLEIF LEI record 2138004D9J9DZUANAI93 (Greensill Capital (UK) Limited), Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation, 2026-10-21 - [src-069] Regulatory record source · src-069 - [src-016] Letter from the Financial Conduct Authority to the Chair of the Treasury Committee on the regulation of Greensill Capital, 4 May 2021, House of Commons Treasury Committee (published correspondence from the FCA), 2021-05-04 - 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