--- title: "Nidec: what 844 quality cases do—and do not—show" language: en canonical: https://dossiertwist.com/dossiers/nidec/product-quality/ as_of: 2026-10-06 keywords: ["Nidec","accounting","corporate governance","audit","quality","subsidiaries"] --- # Nidec: what 844 quality cases do—and do not—show **Question.** Were the quality problems isolated, and did investigators establish product danger? **Answer.** The report describes widespread process and approval failures, including falsified test records. It also places explicit limits on safety conclusions and on how completely the investigation could check the group. ## A defined case count, not a safety verdict - Analysis: The quality committee’s September 2026 report identified 844 quality cases across 12 business units: 60 classified as important and 784 as general. It separately identified six origin-labelling or customs-related cases. These are investigated cases under the report’s definitions, not a count of defective products, injured customers or legal convictions. Earlier totals of suspected cases used different screening, duplication and inclusion rules. [s-d187] - Analysis: Of the 844 quality cases, 805 involved changes to people, machines, materials or methods without required approval; 22 involved fabricated or altered test results, 11 altered test conditions, four unauthorised products and two improper records. Nidec Instruments, Mobility and Techno Motor accounted for 767 cases, or 90.9%. Case counts do not rank safety consequences. “Important” includes specified involvement, legal, certification and technical-risk criteria; “general” does not mean harmless or fully resolved. The committee did not independently validate site assessments of safety or recall risk. [s-d187] - Analysis: The committee used interviews, document work and supplementary surveys, including 89,973 responses from 97,663 targeted personnel. It did not independently repeat every company-led investigation, verify every exclusion or capture all potential quality problems. This was a voluntary, time-limited investigation. Some people did not respond or supplied only written replies; unresolved fact-finding was left for further work. The committee’s conclusions do not bind a court or regulator. [s-d187] ## Five examples and their qualifications - Analysis: An unnamed SPMS factory relaxed acceptance criteria without customer approval and rewrote measured inspection values to fit customer specifications. The report dates the practice from around July 2018 until around May 2026; a 2020 internal rule allowed approved changes to customer-facing data. The company had sought looser specifications, but the customer did not approve them. Managers then pursued process improvements without informing the customer; the committee found that this did not eliminate the unresolved items. The factory conducted performance checks before shipment. That does not establish compliance with the customer’s agreed specifications. The public report anonymises the company, factory, customer and individual actors. [s-d187] - Documented: An unnamed SPMS factory relaxed acceptance criteria without customer approval and rewrote measured inspection values to fit customer specifications. The report dates the practice from around July 2018 until around May 2026; a 2020 internal rule allowed approved changes to customer-facing data. [s-d187] - Qualification: The factory conducted performance checks before shipment. That does not establish compliance with the customer’s agreed specifications. The public report anonymises the company, factory, customer and individual actors. - Response: The company had sought looser specifications, but the customer did not approve them. Managers then pursued process improvements without informing the customer; the committee found that this did not eliminate the unresolved items. - Outcome: The report says the practice stopped around May 2026 after the quality inspection identified it. - Analysis: An unnamed AMEC Organic factory repeatedly reworked automotive motor parts without required customer approval to reduce scrap and costs. Some practices dated to at least around 2012 and all had stopped by 19 February 2026. The report found inadequate risk assessment, records and traceability, but no identified market failure attributable to the practice by its reporting date. Available records did not identify the decision-maker, approver or highest manager aware before discovery. [s-d187] - Analysis: An overseas Nidec Mobility plant used 15% recycled resin in one part number for which the customer prohibited it, from around August 2020 to September 2025. It stopped after internal discovery but did not notify the customer until May 2026. The plant judged the risk low because its tests found no problem and no warranty problem had been reported over six years. The report treats this as the plant’s reason for delayed disclosure, not independent proof that the contractual breach was immaterial. The investigators could not identify the actual operator or approver, and found no evidence that the plant head knew or approved it. This was one confirmed part number, not every component made there. [s-d187] - Analysis: After a production transfer, Nidec Techno Motor told a customer in May 2026 that chemical-content requirements were met without obtaining the necessary supplier information. The gap was reported around mid-June, and collection of missing information continued during the investigation. The investigation did not establish that the products actually contained a chemical prohibited by the customer. Many older information gaps concerned updates to previously obtained data. [s-d187] - Analysis: Nidec Instruments operations recorded standard passing values as though measured when required per-lot torque or pull-strength tests had not been performed. The report traces torque practices to at least January 2022 and pull-strength practices to at least May 2024, continuing until around July 2026. The practices were inherited or continued through a business transfer. Staff believed stable production and past satisfactory checks made repeated testing unnecessary, but no customer approval for changing the testing frequency or substituting other tests was confirmed. [s-d187] ## Responsibility and the work still promised - Analysis: Keyword-based forensic review covering 31 current or former leaders did not reveal new quality episodes or emails clearly showing instructions or acquiescence in specific misconduct. The committee nevertheless identified structural problems in demanding targets, resources, reporting and control of acquired or transferred operations. The report did not find that Nagamori or other top management directed the identified quality misconduct to meet targets. This is distinct from its criticism of the organisation and from the separate accounting committee’s individual findings. [s-d187] - Analysis: Nidec’s September disclosure promised stronger independent quality authority, reporting and escalation, including power to stop shipments, continuing quality reporting and customer discussions. The committee recommended realistic resources and targets and testing whether changes work in practice. These were announced measures and recommendations, not proof of completed remediation. The September 4 statement that no material prior-period financial effect had been identified was a dated company assessment. The later annual report recorded warranty provisions it described as limited and said customer discussions continued, with possible additional compensation or related costs not then reasonably estimable. [s-d10] [s-d187] ## Sources - [s-d187] Research source · s-d187 - [s-d10] Company statement source · s-d10