Shigenobu Nagamori, founder and former chairman of NIDEC

analysisAccording to the report of the outside committee on quality misconduct that NIDEC published in September 2026, Shigenobu Nagamori and three other founding members established NIDEC on 23 July 1973 as Nihon Densan Kabushiki Kaisha, with share capital of ¥20 million; NIDEC's annual securities report dates the founding to July 1973 in Nishikyo-ku, Kyoto. NIDEC's annual securities report for the year ended 31 March 2025 records Nagamori's offices: representative director, president and chief executive officer from the founding; representative director, chairman and president from October 2014; representative director and chairman, chairing the board of directors, from June 2018; chief executive officer from April 2022; and representative director and Global Group Representative from April 2024, its June 2024 entry showing him as Global Group Representative chairing the board. The report distinguishes the title of chairman from the function of chairing the board; its April 2024 entry does not mention chairing the board, and it does not say who chaired the board between April and June 2024. ^{1 2 3}

analysisFrom 2018 the presidency was held by others. The Third-Party Committee's report states that in June 2018 Hiroyuki Yoshimoto, formerly of Nissan Motor, was appointed representative director, president and chief operating officer, the first person other than Nagamori to serve as NIDEC's president, while Nagamori, as representative director and chairman, retained the chief executive officer position. Jun Seki, also formerly of Nissan Motor, joined in January 2020, became president and chief operating officer in April 2020 and chief executive officer in June 2021, NIDEC's annual securities reports record. The annual securities report for the year ended 31 March 2022 explains that, in view of economic and political risks, Nagamori would take management responsibility as chief executive officer while Seki, as representative director and president (chief operating officer), concentrated on the automotive business, a structure it described as short-term and premised on developing successors. Seki resigned as a director on 2 September 2022, and Hiroshi Kobe became representative director, president and chief operating officer that month. ^{4 5 6 3}

analysisThe committee's report states that Nagamori had substantial influence over personnel matters and that a voluntary Nomination Committee was set up in November 2022 on his own initiative, mainly to select his successor. Chaired by an outside director, it basically nominated candidates from lists presented by executives including Nagamori; in 2024 it selected Mitsuya Kishida from five executive vice presidents, and an outside director member said Nagamori appeared to deliberately avoid having a say. The Remuneration Committee, set up in February 2021, was chaired in succession by Nagamori, Jun Seki, Nagamori again and Hiroshi Kobe before an outside director took over. According to the committee's report Nagamori sat on both committees until May 2025; NIDEC's annual securities report for the year ended 31 March 2026 records that he left the compensation committee on 20 June 2025. ^{4 7}

analysisNIDEC's notice of 13 March 2023 named five executive vice presidents from 1 April 2023, Kishida among them, and said that the president from April 2024 would be chosen from the five, with the founder to become director and group representative and Kobe representative director, chairman and CEO. The arrangement adopted differed. Under NIDEC's notice of 14 February 2024, from 1 April 2024 Nagamori moved from representative director, chairman and chief executive officer to representative director and Global Group Representative, Kobe from representative director, president and chief operating officer to director and chairman, a title distinct from chairing the board, and Kishida from executive vice president and head of the automotive business unit to president and chief executive officer. The Third-Party Committee's report, whose English renders the new posts as founder and executive chairman and chairman, states that from fiscal 2024 (year ended 31 March 2025) Kishida formulated the performance targets as the person with ultimate responsibility, and that measures were taken so that Nagamori did not issue instructions to raise them. ^{8 9 4}

analysisNagamori also held posts outside the parent company. NIDEC's annual securities report for the year ended 31 March 2022 lists him as chairman of Nidec Shimpo since June 2013, of Nidec Mobility since November 2019 and of Nidec Techno Motor since October 2021, and as chair of the Kyoto Gakuen school corporation, now Nagamori Gakuen, since March 2018. Nidec Shimpo was renamed Nidec Drive Technology on 1 April 2023, according to a NIDEC notice of 13 March 2023. ^{5 9}

analysisNIDEC's annual securities report for the year ended 31 March 2026 records that Nagamori resigned as a director on 19 December 2025. Press reports state that in December 2025 he resigned as Global Group Representative, representative director and chair of the board, and that in February 2026 he also stepped down as honorary chairman, which the Third-Party Committee calls chairman emeritus; NIDEC's investor-news list shows a notice dated 26 February 2026 on the resignation of the honorary chairman but gives only its title and date. A press report quoted Nagamori as saying that, with NIDEC's revival the most important issue, he had decided to withdraw from its management. ^{10 7 4 11 12}

analysisUntil August 2025, although the details varied over time, Nagamori was the decision-maker for significant matters requiring approval in the NIDEC group, the committee's report states: appointments and transfers of headquarters officers, executive appointments, pay and bonuses at domestic group companies, and disposals of fixed assets, including impairment write-downs above set thresholds (at domestic group companies, ¥1 million or more). The approval authority of presidents Hiroyuki Yoshimoto, Jun Seki and Mitsuya Kishida was limited. Nagamori's authority was transferred to Kishida in August 2025, although a headquarters circular of 20 August 2025 kept certain domestic group-company pay and personnel matters with Nagamori until he indicated in September 2025 that he would delegate them. The report also states that Nagamori chaired the board of directors, a majority of whom are outside directors, until 19 December 2025, after which Kishida chaired it. ¹

analysisWhen Kishida became president and chief executive officer in April 2024, a 'Three-Party Meeting' of Nagamori, Hiroshi Kobe and Kishida, the top three executives on the business side, called the 'NKK Meeting' after their surnames, was set up as a deliberative body on business progress, management issues and risk responses; it met weekly on Mondays. According to the committee's report, it stopped meeting after Nagamori became non-full-time chairman emeritus on 19 December 2025, and he resigned as chairman emeritus effective 26 February 2026. ¹

analysisUntil fiscal 2023 (year ended 31 March 2024), the committee found, performance targets were ultimately decided top-down by Nagamori, who frequently rejected draft business plans as 'too conservative' and had them raised. In late March 2016 he rejected a draft with consolidated operating profit of ¥130 billion ('I am enraged!') and set minimum internal targets of net sales of ¥1.25 trillion, operating profit of ¥150 billion and a 12% margin, with lower figures for external announcement. For fiscal 2023 he instructed operating profit of ¥330 billion against ¥227.2 billion submitted by the business units; the consolidated plan was finalised at ¥307.5 billion. Nagamori told the committee that 'a company can achieve growth only when it sets ambitious targets and works desperately to achieve them' and that even when targets are missed, those who tried will grow. The committee said it did not dispute setting high targets as such, and found no facts indicating that he instructed or directed the improper accounting. ¹

analysisThe committee concluded that every instance of improper accounting it identified occurred against the backdrop of excessive pressure to meet performance targets, particularly operating-profit targets: for many years Nagamori set the group's targets top-down from the perspective of the growth investors expected, beyond the actual capabilities of business units and subsidiaries, and his considerable pressure on headquarters executive officers and CFOs passed down to unit and subsidiary executives. The committee, whose investigation was voluntary and did not seek to establish individual legal liability, said it did not dispute his philosophy of setting high targets as such but found that it failed in actual management practice. Nagamori said he repeatedly told officers and employees, 'It's perfectly acceptable to fail to meet targets if they cannot be met without resorting to improper conduct.' On 1 October 2026 NIDEC's new president, asked about Nagamori's influence, said that no business is without pressure, that 'excessive' is a qualitative word and that many group units had acted correctly under the same pressure, adding that NIDEC must ensure this does not happen in future. Since June 2026, according to NIDEC's annual securities report, each business unit and domestic group company formulates its own mid-term plan and is responsible for executing it after formal approval, a process intended to prevent plans being set or changed arbitrarily by some members of management. ^{2 1 3 4}

analysisThe committee found that the pressure originated with Nagamori. He regularly and severely reprimanded executives who missed targets at monthly meetings, harshly reprimanded presidents and CFOs of underperforming domestic group companies and e-mailed them that their roles would end unless they produced results, and frequently pressed executives, including presidents Jun Seki and Mitsuya Kishida and founding member Hiroshi Kobe, while dangling his authority over executive appointments; in practice executives were repeatedly demoted or forced to leave for failing to meet targets. The committee described this as management practice and found no facts that Nagamori instructed or directed the improper accounting. Nagamori wrote that he 'consistently developed people by reprimanding them', and in a May 2023 e-mail to executives acknowledged that his management style had created an atmosphere in which unfavourable reports were difficult to present. ¹

analysisFrom around 2011 to around June 2020, the committee found, an employee Nagamori had transferred into the Internal Audit Department in February 2011 as 'General Manager in charge of Special Audits' ('Mr. A' in the report) conducted 'special audits' of suspected improper accounting and embezzlement on Nagamori's orders, reporting only to him and a limited number of executives and not to the Internal Audit Department or the auditor PwC Kyoto. Where large amounts were involved, Mr. A sometimes had improper accounting handled 'in a planned manner' over several fiscal years instead of corrected immediately; Nagamori knew this from the reports and accepted it. The committee could not interview Mr. A, who had left NIDEC and did not respond, and recovered only a very small portion of his reports. Nagamori said he used Mr. A rather than the Internal Audit Department because otherwise 'the information would have been shared with PwC Kyoto, and it would have escalated into a major issue', that it was better 'to correct the improper conduct without making it public, and to give employees who are remorseful a second chance', and that he 'accepted this sometimes' for struggling group companies although problem assets should be dealt with immediately. NIDEC's annual securities report for the year ended 31 March 2026 says that at least quarterly reporting by the Internal Audit Department to the Audit and Supervisory Committee is part of a structure built so that such special audits are never repeated. ^{1 2}

analysis'Legacy liabilities' was NIDEC's internal term, as the committee's report explains, for assets of questionable value arising from avoided impairments and similar measures taken to meet targets. The committee found from internal project materials that an 'Asset Revitalization Project' launched in November 2016 under the Internal Audit Department collected reports of such items and required their write-downs to be 'self-funded' from each unit's or group company's own profits while still meeting aggressive targets. Progress was reported quarterly to management beginning with Nagamori, including reports of a general downward trend, for example on 23 June 2022, although new legacy liabilities kept arising; the Internal Audit Department ended the project during fiscal 2022 (year ended 31 March 2023) because disposition did not proceed as anticipated. ¹

analysisIn October 2019, the committee found, Mr. A reported to Nagamori that a group company had about ¥2.1 billion of legacy liabilities as of the second quarter of fiscal 2019 (July–September 2019), including items clearly requiring immediate resolution such as 'recording of fictitious die sales', and submitted a plan to reduce them to about ¥1.5 billion by the end of fiscal 2019 so as to keep 'eliminating the risk of external leaks'. Nagamori commented that 'achieving healthy finances is an urgent task' but approved the plan. Although aware that some Nidec Precision (formerly Nidec Copal) facilities required impairment, he also approved addressing them 'in a planned manner' instead of recognising the impairment immediately. The committee, which could not interview Mr. A, found no facts that Nagamori instructed or directed the improper accounting. Nagamori said his position was that problem assets should be dealt with immediately, but that he 'accepted this sometimes' when Mr. A asked for planned handling out of compassion for struggling group companies. ¹

analysisThe committee's interim report of 27 February 2026 sets out the case of Nidec Precision Corporation (NPCJ, formerly Nidec Copal). After 'Company α' told NPCJ on 21 October 2016 that it would not be selected as supplier for 'Projects X and Y', Nagamori e-mailed the next day, to recipients the report lists as 'Mr. Kobe, the Executive Officer Responsible for Group Companies, and NPCJ officers', that 'a massive impairment awaits us' unless ways of avoiding it could be found; the list does not make clear whether that executive officer is Kobe or a separate recipient, and elsewhere the report treats the two as different persons. Only about ¥300 million of the equipment was repurposed, and on 1 December 2018 about ¥5.5 billion of the idle assets was reclassified as fixed assets and depreciated over eight years without impairment. The committee was appointed by the company, worked without compulsory powers and did not aim to establish individual liability; its findings are not a court or regulatory decision. ¹

analysisOn 12 February 2017 NPCJ told Nagamori and the executive officer responsible for group companies that only about ¥1.3 billion of its legacy liabilities would be expensed in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2016 (January–March 2017), and that the small-motor manufacturing equipment for 'Company α' and the Projects X and Y equipment, which the report says accounted for the bulk of NPCJ's legacy liabilities (at least ¥8.0 billion), would be repurposed or sold to avoid impairment. As no such repurposing or sale followed beyond about ¥300 million, the committee concluded that 'Mr. Nagamori and the Executive Officer Responsible for Group Companies approved the deferral of losses by leaving those assets idle without performing impairments', describing such planned handling as equivalent to delaying the rectification of improper accounting. In the fourth quarter of fiscal 2022 (January–March 2023) the remaining ¥2.45 billion exceeded NPCJ's ¥1.29 billion structural-reform budget and was left to 'self-funding', so the losses were still being deferred through depreciation when the committee began its work. The conclusion is the committee's inference from the absence of any record of repurposing or sale, not a court decision. ¹

analysisWhen the newly appointed headquarters CFO led a disposal of legacy liabilities as 'structural reforms' in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2022 (January–March 2023), business units and subsidiaries reported more than ¥160 billion. The committee found that the CFO obtained Nagamori's approval on condition that full-year operating profit not fall below ¥100 billion, that Nagamori instructed a V-shaped recovery in fiscal 2023, and that about ¥56.6 billion was disposed of while the rest was left for 'disposition in a planned manner' through self-funding in fiscal 2023 and later, which did not proceed as planned. The committee did not find that the CFO, who is not named, knew that items needing immediate disposal had been classified for planned disposition; it held him partly responsible, but said he deserved a certain degree of recognition for persuading Nagamori, who insisted on self-funding, to allow the reforms. ¹

analysisIn fiscal 2024 (year ended 31 March 2025), with Kishida as president, Nagamori did not approve such reforms. In March 2025 Kishida, the headquarters CFO, the chief performance officer and others decided to dispose of legacy liabilities by recognising about ¥49.2 billion of group-wide structural reform expenses, including about ¥25.8 billion of one-time loss risks in the AMEC Organic Business. When Kishida proposed this at the NKK meeting on 24 March 2025, Nagamori argued that they should be handled through 'self-funding' and did not approve; the minutes record: 'FDR Nagamori: The operating profit must not fall below 240 billion yen even by 1 yen this fiscal year. Raising the stock price is the top priority.' On the basis of the minutes and interviews, the committee concluded that, although Kishida repeatedly explained the need, Nagamori's rejection meant that liabilities which should have been disposed of in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2024 (January–March 2025) were not, without Kishida being aware of it; this is the committee's finding, not a court decision. ¹

analysisThe report also attributes a revenue idea to him. When NIDEC expected a ¥10 billion shortfall against its fiscal 2021 (year ended 31 March 2022) operating-profit target of ¥190 billion, it proposed recognising about ¥1 billion of government grants linked to a subsidiary's planned EV-products factory in 'Country X' as revenue, 'an idea that came from Mr. Nagamori'. Grants of about ¥1,250 million, negotiated by the executive officer responsible for group companies, were recognised in full as revenue in March 2022, although the committee concluded, as the local audit firm had said, that they were grants related to assets that should not have been recognised as revenue. The committee's overall conclusion remained that no facts showed Nagamori instructed or directed the improper accounting, and its finding is not a court decision. ¹

analysisNagamori also gave a written instruction concerning the auditor. After a forensic investigation by an outside expert, carried out at PwC Kyoto's request in the 2022 investigation of improper accounting at Nidec Global Appliance Brasil, he wrote on the 8 June 2022 approval request 'Negotiate to have Kyoto Audit Corporation cover half' of the approximately ¥51.4 million cost. PwC Kyoto reduced its audit fees for fiscal 2021 (year ended 31 March 2022) and fiscal 2022 by ¥12.85 million each, ¥25.7 million in total, and Nagamori commented that this would be 'a good warning' to PwC Kyoto 'to prevent poorly considered instructions in the future'. Staff told the committee they felt uncomfortable making the audit firm bear the costs but followed his instructions. PwC Japan told the committee that PwC Kyoto regarded the forensic costs as part of the audit-fee negotiations and agreed to cover them taking into account the remuneration for the group audit as a whole. ¹

analysisThe Third-Party Committee found no facts indicating that Nagamori instructed or directed the improper accounting it uncovered. Because he knew from the special-audit reports that improper accounting needing immediate correction was being handled in a planned manner, and accepted this, it held that 'the conclusion that Mr. Nagamori condoned some improper accounting cannot be avoided'; because all of it was caused by excessive performance pressure originating with him, of which he was well aware, it said he 'should bear the greatest responsibility'. It stated that its investigation was not performed to pursue the liability of specific officers and does not guarantee any decision by courts or other authorities. Nagamori answered that problem assets should be dealt with immediately but he 'accepted this sometimes' out of compassion for struggling group companies, and that he told staff that missing targets was acceptable if they could not be met without improper conduct. Leaving the post the committee calls founder and executive chairman of the board on 19 December 2025, during the investigation, he said, as reported, that he was withdrawing from management for NIDEC's revival, and press headlines said he had apologised over the suspected improper accounting; he gave up the chairman-emeritus post effective 26 February 2026. Asked on 4 September 2026 whether Nagamori had failed to give an account, NIDEC's then president said, as reported, that he himself, as chief executive, should be accountable for everything in the company. A press report places Nagamori among those under investigation by the Executive Responsibility Investigation Committee set up on 13 March 2026, and he is a defendant in the derivative action of 9 September 2026. ^{1 2 3 4 5 6}

analysisNIDEC's own analysis, prepared after the committee's reports of 27 February and 17 April 2026 and set out in its revised improvement plan and status report of 27 April 2026 to the Tokyo Stock Exchange, attributes the accounting irregularities to six overlapping structural factors, among them excessive share-price primacy to keep showing growth, a culture that put short-term profit first and did not tolerate missed targets, and concentration of authority in Nagamori with a culture of prioritising his wishes. It is the company's own assessment, not a finding of a court or regulator. At the press conference of 3 March 2026 on the committee's report, the company's president said, according to a press report, that NIDEC took the serious accounting misconduct extremely solemnly, had disclosed inaccurate information and betrayed the trust of shareholders, investors and market participants, and apologised to all concerned. To review the influence of Nagamori's management philosophy, NIDEC abolished morning group readings of 'The Path to Challenge' and removed internal posters strongly reflecting his values at its sites in Japan and abroad. ^{7 8}

analysisA separate company-appointed committee of outside experts on quality misconduct, whose report NIDEC received on 2 September 2026 and published on 4 September 2026, found no fact that NIDEC's management, including Nagamori, instructed or was involved in quality misconduct aimed at meeting performance targets, and said that the strict performance management it described was not the direct cause of all of it. It nevertheless described how, in at least some business units and sites, high targets and short-cycle performance management constrained the time, staff and equipment needed for change procedures, inspection and correcting quality problems, contributing to an 'unhealthy state'. Its findings concern quality, not accounting, and are not a court decision. In its notice of 4 September 2026 NIDEC said it took the findings very seriously and regarded the issues of management stance and culture shared with the accounting misconduct, such as excessive performance pressure and a culture in which people could not speak up, as fundamental issues to be addressed as a whole in its revival through continued and strengthened culture reform. ⁹

analysisThe same committee described Nagamori's 'federal management' approach: he generally kept acquired companies' organisation and officers without sufficiently strengthening governance as the group grew, and until August 2025 the group's major approval matters, including personnel, were reserved to him. Quoting the Third-Party Committee's accounting report, it said that NIDEC was 'Mr. Nagamori's company' with all authority concentrated in him and that it seemed undeniable that the strain of his 'micromanagement' led to expanding 'legacy liabilities', delayed disposal and new accounting misconduct; this is the quality committee's assessment, not a court decision. Nagamori told the quality committee that staffing of quality and other control functions had not kept pace with the company's growth, that the CFO and legal functions in particular had been weak, and that he had got the order of reinforcing staff wrong. ⁹

analysisNIDEC's annual securities report for the year ended 31 March 2026 lists Nagamori as the largest shareholder of record at 31 March 2026, with 98,948 thousand shares, or 8.61% of issued shares excluding treasury shares. The Bank of Kyoto followed with 4.32% and a custody account of a US bank with 3.93%, and SN Kosan GK came fourth with 40,491 thousand shares (3.52%); foreign corporations other than individuals held 50.91% of the shares. The list follows the shareholder register, with share counts rounded down to thousands, and NIDEC states that it could not confirm, as of the record date, holdings reported in large-shareholding reports such as Oasis Management's. ¹

analysisThe Third-Party Committee's report of 27 February 2026 put Nagamori's holding, directly and through his asset-management company, which it does not name, at about 12%, and assessed that he therefore still had strong influence and that the possibility of his trying to influence NIDEC's operations could not be ruled out. This was an assessment, not a finding of wrongdoing, and the committee added that disposing of his shares or restricting his shareholder rights would be for Nagamori to decide and beyond NIDEC's control. It recommended, in terms that are not binding, that NIDEC 'break away from being Mr. Nagamori's company' by putting in place a structure that prevents any stakeholder, including Nagamori, from distorting business operations, strengthen the functions of, information to and support for outside directors, and ensure integrity toward investors and the market. After becoming chairman emeritus Nagamori repeatedly told the committee, 'I do not intend to rule from behind the scenes', a statement the committee said it believes it can trust. The 8.61% in NIDEC's register at 31 March 2026 is the stake held in his own name. ^{2 1}

analysisAccording to a Japanese weekly magazine report of 7 November 2025, SN Kosan GK is an asset-management company in which Nagamori serves as representative partner and one of the Nagamori family companies; the report said he was preparing to pass the family companies to a 'successor' and that whoever took over as SN Kosan's representative partner would gain considerable influence over NIDEC's management, and a later report by the same magazine called SN Kosan the family's asset-management company. The magazine's account of SN Kosan's representative was not checked against the commercial register, which was not retrieved, and business-data aggregator records name a different person as SN Kosan's representative. ^{3 4}

analysisA Japanese weekly magazine reported in October 2026 that Nagamori had set up Minoreas Co., Ltd., incorporated on 31 July 2026 with its head office in the same building as SN Kosan and with registered purposes including management of subsidiaries and affiliates and work relating to mergers, acquisitions, business succession and corporate rehabilitation. Citing an unnamed person at a financial institution dealing with the family, it described Minoreas as a corporate-rehabilitation fund business that buys Kyoto small and medium-sized companies lacking successors, improves their profitability and aims to sell them; it said the family group had been renamed from 'SN Group' to 'Minoreas Group', that Nagamori's second son Tomohiro, who had also become a director, was involved in its launch, and that a former NIDEC executive had become Minoreas's president. The report does not state that Minoreas has any business dealings with NIDEC. Asked in writing about the background of its establishment, SN Kosan's office replied by telephone through an employee that it had been told to decline. ^{4 5}

analysisAccording to a Japanese business magazine report of 31 July 2026, an Osaka-based shareholders' rights lawyers group, moving to pursue Nagamori's liability, formally decided on 30 July 2026 to ask NIDEC to bring a damages suit against nine former directors, including past presidents and a vice chairman. The group put NIDEC's loss at no less than ¥5 billion, said shareholders on its side would file a derivative suit if NIDEC refused, and planned to send its written demand in early August. These are the group's plans and allegations as reported by the magazine; a demand is a pre-suit step, not a finding of liability, and the record does not show which, if any, of the demands NIDEC disclosed in August 2026 came from this group. The magazine describes all nine as former directors although Kishida was then still NIDEC's president. ¹

analysisThe magazine reported that the group contends Nagamori had long been aware of the problems and tolerated accounting treatment that led to misconduct. As grounds it cites a Nidec Instruments company-housing property, for which Nagamori is said to have instructed in 2022 that efforts be made to sell it at a price that would avoid a loss, an impairment loss of about ¥414 million being recorded only in fiscal 2024 (year ended 31 March 2025) although the Third-Party Committee found it should have been recorded in fiscal 2020; and Kishida's repeated proposals in fiscal 2024 for a structural reform dealing separately with 'negative legacies', which Nagamori reportedly rejected. The instruction and the rejection are reported as alleged, the references to the committee are the magazine's summary, and none of this is a court finding; the committee itself found no facts indicating that Nagamori instructed or directed the improper accounting, while concluding that he condoned the planned handling of some of it. Nagamori's own account, given to the committee before the group's announcement and not in answer to it, was that his position had been that assets requiring resolution should be dealt with immediately, but that he sometimes accepted planned handling when an employee asked out of compassion for struggling domestic group companies. ^{2 3 4}

analysisAccording to an online news report of 5 August 2026, a shareholder sent NIDEC a written demand asking it to sue nine current and former officers, including Nagamori, for damages totalling ¥5 billion, the losses claimed including damage to the company's reputation and the cost of the Third-Party Committee; under the Companies Act the shareholder may bring a derivative suit if the company does not sue within 60 days of receiving the demand. The demand letter itself is not in the record, and NIDEC's own notices of shareholder demands name no directors and state no amounts. A press report of 21 August 2026 said that those under investigation by NIDEC's Executive Responsibility Investigation Committee, which covers directors, auditors and executive officers who served between fiscal 2020 and the end of June 2025, include Nagamori. Being within its scope is not a finding of liability or of participation in the irregularities, and the committee had not reported as of the record. ^{5 6 7}

analysisNIDEC announced on 10 September 2026 that an individual shareholder had filed a derivative action in the Kyoto District Court on 9 September 2026 (No. 1749, 2026 (wa)) against two former directors, Nagamori and Hiroshi Kobe. According to NIDEC's summary, the plaintiff claims that NIDEC's acquisitions of treasury shares in September 2022 and in February–March 2023 and its interim dividend of December 2022 were illegal because they exceeded the distributable amounts under the Companies Act and the Corporate Accounting Rules, and demands under Article 462(1) of the Companies Act that the defendants and others pay NIDEC ¥28,730,558,300 (about ¥28.7 billion) plus delinquency charges. These are the plaintiff's allegations; no ruling is in the record, and NIDEC's notice does not say whether the plaintiff made any of the earlier written demands. NIDEC said the suit, which seeks payment from former directors as individuals, would not affect its business performance, and that it would examine its measures concerning the litigation on the basis of the Executive Responsibility Investigation Committee's reports and recommendations. ⁸