Greensill Capital (UK) Limited: business, collapse and aftermath

analysisGCUK was the operating centre of the Greensill group from 2012 until its administration in March 2021: it originated supply chain finance and receivables, sold them to Credit Suisse funds, Greensill Bank AG and other investors, and relied on trade credit insurance underwritten through BCC Trade Credit for Insurance Australia Limited. The record traces how SoftBank, Credit Suisse and GFG Alliance were connected to it, how the loss of insurance and a called guarantee ended its business, how its administration and the insolvencies of the other group companies have proceeded to 2026, and what courts, regulators and Parliament found. Allegations by insurers, claimants and the Secretary of State are kept with their status and with the responses and outcomes found. ^{1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43}

analysisGreensill Capital (UK) Limited is a private limited company registered at Companies House under number 08126173. It was incorporated on 2 July 2012 under the name Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited and has carried its present name since 18 July 2012; Companies House records its business as financial intermediation not elsewhere classified (SIC 64999) and its status as in administration. GCUK is a wholly owned subsidiary of Greensill Capital Pty Limited, a company incorporated in Queensland and the parent of the Greensill group, and its 2019 accounts describe it as the group's main trading entity. The High Court recorded in 2025 that GCUK was the group's main operating and trading company in the UK, provided financial support and management for the wider group and performed a central treasury function for it. ^{1 2 3 4 5}

analysisThe records place control with Lex Greensill. In GCUK's accounts for 2017, 2018 and 2019 the directors named Greensill Capital Pty Limited as the immediate and ultimate parent and said that they considered Alexander (Lex) Greensill to be the ultimate controlling party, and since 6 April 2016 the register of persons with significant control has listed Lex Greensill alone, through significant influence or control over the trustees of a trust. The National Audit Office reported in July 2021 that the Australian parent was 64.55% owned by its founder, staff and directors, including 28.06% held by a trust associated with Lex Greensill, 25.11% by the SoftBank Vision Fund and 10.34% by General Atlantic; it gave these percentages without a date or a source, and the parent's share register is not in the record. GCUK's 2019 annual report states that SoftBank invested an aggregate $1.46 billion in the parent during 2019 and became a significant shareholder of the group. ^{6 7 2 8 9}

analysisThe courts have described GCUK's business as two kinds of credit: accounts receivable financing, in which it advanced money at a discount against the assignment of receivables owed to its customers, and supply chain financing, advances that let a customer pay its own suppliers' invoices. According to the administrators, GCUK bought the receivables through bespoke IT platforms and generally sold them, or notes backed by them, within 24 hours to financial institutions, specialist funds and Greensill Bank AG, either outright or through insolvency-remote vehicles that issued notes secured on them. The High Court in 2026 described GCUK as funded partly by advances from Greensill Bank AG, a German sister company, and partly by securitisation through a Luxembourg note issuer whose notes many investors bought through Credit Suisse Virtuoso SICAV-SIF and its sub-fund managed by Credit Suisse Asset Management. GCUK's 2019 strategic report said that credit insurance mitigated default risk on some of the assets but that GCUK took a first loss under it, leaving it indirectly exposed to assets it mostly did not hold on its balance sheet. ^{4 10 3 2}

analysisGCUK's last filed accounts, for 2019, report revenue of $419.6 million (2018: $233.6 million), an operating profit of $37.5 million after impairment expenses of $47.3 million and a profit after tax of $31.8 million, with total assets of $682.3 million and net assets of $155.3 million at 31 December 2019. For the group as a whole, Greensill reported to the National Audit Office $143 billion of financing in 2019 to more than eight million customers and suppliers, revenues of over $475 million and total assets of more than $5.3 billion; these are Greensill's own figures, which the National Audit Office did not audit, and the parent's consolidated accounts are not in the record. ^{2 9}

analysisCredit Suisse Asset Management's records identify four Credit Suisse supply chain finance funds, which had net assets of USD 10,016 mn on 26 February 2021, USD 7,253 mn of it in the Credit Suisse (Lux) Supply Chain Finance Fund, a sub-fund of Credit Suisse Virtuoso SICAV-SIF. On 1 March 2021 the funds' boards suspended redemptions and subscriptions and approved their liquidation, citing uncertainty about the valuation of some assets and the reduced availability of insurance cover; by 30 November 2022 about USD 6.78 bn had been returned to investors and the funds' cash position equalled about USD 7.4 bn, or 74% of their assets under management at suspension, while recovery efforts concentrated on programmes related to GFG Alliance, Katerra and Bluestone. Lex Greensill told the Treasury Committee that Greensill failed because its principal insurer decided not to renew its cover and, roughly a week before the administration, Credit Suisse decided that it would no longer fund Greensill's business. On 28 February 2023 FINMA concluded enforcement proceedings finding that Credit Suisse had seriously breached its supervisory obligations in its business relationship with Lex Greensill and the Greensill companies; that is a regulator's finding about the bank, not about GCUK, and FINMA recorded that Credit Suisse had already adopted wide-ranging organisational measures. ^{1 2 3}

analysisSoftBank was both an investor and a source of credit support. Under a Credit Enhancement Programme, SoftBank Group Corp. provided credit default swaps for some of GCUK's financings of Vision Fund portfolio companies, with the Greensill group absorbing any shortfall up to $100 million a year. On 10 November 2020 a SoftBank Vision Fund 2 vehicle subscribed for $440 million of convertible notes of the Australian parent, in a package that included an Omnibus Deed to which GCUK was a party (an amended share-sale deed of 8 December 2020 later gave SoftBank Group Corp. longer to absorb an additional $50 million first loss and moved the crystallisation date to 15 May 2021); the money was credited to GCUK's general account and was not used to redeem the Katerra-backed Fairymead notes held by the Credit Suisse fund. On 30 December 2020 Greensill Limited, a GCUK subsidiary, gave up its Katerra receivables and security for Katerra shares. In [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch) the High Court found that Greensill Limited, through Lex Greensill, entered those agreements with the purpose of prejudicing the noteholders, rejecting the argument that the purpose was to redeem the notes, which Lex Greensill gave as the purpose of the $440 million, because the purpose had to be judged when the agreements were made on 30 December 2020. It found that the SoftBank defendants neither knew of nor shared that purpose and believed in good faith that the $440 million would pay the noteholders, and it dismissed the fund's claim against them. ⁴

analysisThe House of Commons Treasury Committee identified GFG Alliance, the businesses owned by Sanjeev Gupta and the Gupta family that include Liberty Steel, as one particular concentration of risk for Greensill. In their report to 7 September 2026 GCUK's administrators put the amount still outstanding from GFG at about $587.2 million (at March 2021 exchange rates), across 33 balance sheet items, with no recoveries in the period, and said they were exploring recovery under the security and guarantees GFG had granted. The Serious Fraud Office opened an investigation in May 2021 into suspected fraud, fraudulent trading and money laundering in the financing of GFG companies, including their arrangements with GCUK; an investigation is not a finding, no charge or outcome is in the record, and a press report (February 2024) said that GFG has consistently denied any wrongdoing. ^{5 2 6 7}

analysisThe notes were credit-enhanced by trade credit insurance underwritten by Insurance Australia Limited through its authorised representative BCC Trade Credit Pty Ltd, under a Master Policy with GCUK and the Australian parent and a Parallel Policy with Greensill Bank AG, both first agreed in 2017 and renewed in 2019. On 1 September 2020 each Greensill company was told that BCC did not wish to renew the policies, which would expire on 1 March 2021; Greensill disputed the notice, and on 1 March 2021 the Supreme Court of New South Wales refused its urgent application for an injunction compelling cover, so the policies expired that night. The administrators state that GCUK lost about $4.6 billion of cover and ceased originating new assets from 2 March 2021 once key investors said they would stop buying insured receivables. That is the administrators' explanation: BCC told the Treasury Committee that by July 2020 it and Tokio Marine & Nichido had developed particular concerns about Greensill that made them very reluctant to give any cover, Lex Greensill's account also differs, and the validity of the policies was contested in later litigation. In 2026 Greensill Bank AG and Credit Suisse settled their claims under the policies on confidential terms, while White Oak's claim went to trial in October 2026. ^{1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8}

analysisOn 4 March 2021, according to the administrators, a $140 million loan by Credit Suisse to the Australian parent was accelerated and payment was demanded from GCUK as guarantor. On 8 March 2021 the High Court, finding that GCUK had ceased trading on 2 March and was cash-flow insolvent, made administration orders for GCUK, on the application of its sole director Lex Greensill, and for Greensill Capital Management Company (UK) Limited, the service company that employed the UK staff and depended on GCUK to fund its payroll; GCUK's administration is High Court case 000435 of 2021, although the judgment was issued under the service company's number, CR-2021-000436. Credit Suisse and the Peter Greensill Family Trust, as lenders, consented to the orders, the Bank of England did not intend to use its powers, and Credit Suisse Asset Management, appearing for the noteholders, did not oppose them. Christine Laverty, Trevor O'Sullivan and William Stagg of Grant Thornton UK LLP became joint administrators of both companies; they are not office-holders of the Australian parent, which has its own insolvency practitioners. Both administrations have since been extended to 7 September 2028, and the administrators intend to end them by conversion to creditors' voluntary liquidations. ^{6 9 10 11 12}

analysisThe directors' statement of affairs showed unsecured non-preferential claims estimated at $1,456,984,613 and an estimated deficiency as regards members of $1,181,551,493. By September 2026 a confidential settlement of 5 June 2026 had concluded all secured creditor claims (the administrators had recorded floating charges securing $140 million for Credit Suisse and $60 million for the Peter Greensill Family Trust), but unsecured claims, estimated by the directors at about $1.6 billion, had not yet been called for or adjudicated, and some creditors had lodged claims above the directors' estimates; the Insolvency Service described GCUK's liabilities as more than £1.6 billion, the figure it also gives for the combined liabilities of three group companies, while the directors' and administrators' figures are in US dollars. On 4 September 2026 the High Court extended the administration to 7 September 2028 and allowed interim distributions to unsecured creditors, whose timing and amount were still uncertain; the administrators intend to end with a creditors' voluntary liquidation. ^{13 6 11 14 15}

analysisMost of the group's other companies were sold or wound down in their own jurisdictions. The Australian parent went into voluntary administration in March 2021 (on 8 or 9 March, depending on the source) and into liquidation by creditors' resolution on 22 April 2021, according to ASIC, although the GCUK administrators' 2026 report gives 22 April 2022, and ASIC later told the Australian Parliament that the liquidator was conducting further investigations. Greensill Bank AG became subject to insolvency proceedings in Bremen after an application by the German regulator BaFin, and Greensill Capital Inc. filed for Chapter 11 in New York on 25 March 2021 (26 March in the GCUK administrators' proposals); a court docket summary records its plan of liquidation as confirmed on 26 October 2021 and later mediation status reports filed by the Greensill U.S. Liquidation Trust in 2023 and 2024. ^{6 11 16 17 18 14 19 20 21 22 23}

analysisGCUK was also a lender under the UK's Covid-19 loan schemes. On 4 June 2020 the British Business Bank accredited it as the first non-bank lender under the Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CLBILS), with a £400 million allocation and a limit of £50 million per borrower group, and GCUK lent the full £400 million in eight loans, as well as £18.5 million under the smaller CBILS scheme. In October 2020 the Bank stopped further lending while it investigated compliance with the scheme rules, and on 2 March 2021 a Letter of Concern set out provisional findings of breach and suspended the government guarantees; on 9 April 2021 the administrators replied that GCUK denied the allegations and considered its loans compliant. According to the Department for Business and Trade's written case as a press report described it in January 2026, the government terminated the CLBILS guarantees in April 2022 and the CBILS guarantees in September 2023. Greensill Bank AG, which denies that the Department was entitled to do so, has sued the Secretary of State for Business and Trade over the guarantees, with GCUK joined as a defendant; the claim was pending as of October 2026. ^{1 2 3 4}

analysisThe Treasury Committee found that most of the lobbying on Greensill's behalf in 2020 was done by Lex Greensill, by Bill Crothers, a GCUK director, and by former Prime Minister David Cameron, an adviser to Greensill Capital, and that David Cameron or David Cameron's office made 56 contacts with the government on Greensill's behalf in the period it examined. The Committee accepted that David Cameron had not broken the rules on lobbying by former ministers, while finding those rules not strong enough; David Cameron said lobbying the UK Government was never intended to be part of the role. The Committee concluded that the Treasury was right to keep Greensill out of the Covid Corporate Financing Facility, and a press report (January 2026) said that a later inquiry found David Cameron's actions within the rules and no registration as a lobbyist required. ^{2 3}

analysisIn disqualification proceedings the Secretary of State for Business and Trade alleged three areas of misconduct by Lex Greensill: the Katerra transactions and the use of the $440 million, statements to trade credit insurers about finance to the Catfoss companies, and what the boards were told about the insurance. Lex Greensill disputed the allegations, regarding the case as unbalanced and unfounded, as the court recorded in [2024] EWHC 2039 (Ch), and they were never tried: the proceedings ended when the Secretary of State accepted, on 2 June 2026, a nine-year undertaking concerning Lex Greensill's conduct as a director of GCUK, Greensill Limited and the Australian parent, recorded on the Companies House register as running from 23 June 2026 to 22 June 2035. In an undertaking the director does not dispute certain facts for the purposes of the proceedings only; it is not a court finding. The Financial Conduct Authority said in May 2021 that it was investigating matters relating to GCUK and Greensill Capital Securities Limited and the oversight of that company by its principal, Mirabella Advisers LLP; its remark that some press allegations were potentially criminal was not a finding, it closed the Mirabella part on 15 December 2025 without identifying breaches requiring action, and no outcome concerning GCUK or Greensill Capital Securities is in the record. ^{5 6 7 8 9 10}

analysisGCUK, in administration, filed a High Court claim for breach of fiduciary duty on 29 April 2025 against Lex Greensill, Sean Hanafin, Divya Eapen, Alastair Eadie, Neil Garrod, Jonathan Lane and Bartholomeus Ras; it is the company's allegation, its particulars and any defences are not in the record, no hearing or judgment was found, and the administrators said in 2026 that their investigations in respect of former directors were continuing. An earlier claim by the Bluestone coal companies and members of the Justice family against GCUK, Lex Greensill and Roland Hartley-Urquhart in New York, filed in March 2021, was stayed in September 2021 after the defendants had appeared through counsel and the U.S. court had recognised GCUK's administration, and was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice in August 2022 after a settlement whose terms are not in the record, without any answer or ruling on its allegations. ^{11 12 4 13 14}