the questionWhich records support the articles?
1Carillion's group structure, predecessors and shareholders
documentedCompanies House records Carillion plc under company number 03782379 as a public limited company incorporated on 28 May 1999. Its only previous name on the register, Cameron 1999 plc, applied from 28 May 1999 to 11 June 1999. 1
documentedCompanies House shows Carillion plc with company status 'Liquidation' and a registered office at Central Square, 8th Floor, 29 Wellington Street, Leeds. The last accounts filed were made up to 31 December 2016; the accounts made up to 31 December 2017 (due by 30 June 2018) and the confirmation statement due by 11 June 2018 are shown as overdue, the last confirmation statement being dated 28 May 2017. According to an Insolvency Service notice, winding-up orders were made against Carillion plc and associated companies on 15 January 2018 and the court appointed the Official Receiver as liquidator. 1 2
documentedCompanies House lists Carillion plc's nature of business under SIC codes 41201 (construction of commercial buildings), 42110 (construction of roads and motorways), 43390 (other building completion and finishing) and 43999 (other specialised construction activities not elsewhere classified). 1
attributedIn a table compiled from investors' letters and oral evidence, the House of Commons committees' report gives Kiltearn Partners LLP's holding on 1 March 2017 as 5.01%, the figure from Carillion's 2016 annual report, and notes that according to Kiltearn the figure should be 10%. The table records that Kiltearn continued to buy Carillion shares on behalf of clients until early July 2017, voted all its shares against the remuneration report in May 2017, began selling on 3 August 2017 and had sold all its shares by 4 January 2018. 5
- qualification
- Kiltearn's 10% figure is its own account to the committees; Carillion's 2016 annual report published a notified holding of 5.01% as at 1 March 2017 and cautioned that holdings may change without notification until the next threshold is crossed. The retained records do not reconcile the two figures.
attributedThe same table gives the Standard Life Aberdeen holding on 1 March 2017 as 4.96%, the figure Carillion's 2016 annual report shows for Standard Life Investments (Holdings) Limited, and notes that according to Standard Life Aberdeen it should be 0.56% at that date. It records that Standard Life began to divest gradually in December 2015 owing to concerns about financial management, strategy and corporate governance, that its holding was minimal by the time of a meeting with the chief executive on 17 July, and that all shares were sold by the end of 2017. 5
- qualification
- The 0.56% figure is Standard Life Aberdeen's own account to the committees and differs from the 4.96% notified holding published by Carillion; the retained records do not reconcile the two figures.
attributedThe committees' table also summarises other notified holders' accounts: BlackRock (8.81%) said the majority of its shares were held in passive funds and sold in line with index changes arising from the profit warnings; Brewin Dolphin (5.00%) reduced its holding during 2017, accelerating after the July profit warning; Deutsche Bank AG (5.82%) said its shares were not proprietary investments but were held on behalf of clients and for hedging purposes; and Letko, Brosseau & Associates (4.97%) sold all its shares rapidly after the November profit warning, having taken the view that recovery was 'unlikely'. 5
- qualification
- These are the shareholders' own accounts as summarised by the committees from letters and oral evidence; the percentages are the notified holdings as at 1 March 2017 from Carillion's 2016 annual report.
attributedAccording to the House of Commons committees' report, Kiltearn Partners, which owned over 10% of Carillion's shares when the £845 million provision was announced in the profit warning of 10 July 2017, was very critical of the timing of the profit warning and argued that there were 'clear grounds for an investigation into whether Carillion's management knew, or should have known, about the need for a £845 million provision'. The committees also report Kiltearn's chief executive as saying that after the July 2017 profit warning the published financial information 'could no longer be considered reliable', and that Kiltearn, unhappy with the level and timeliness of financial disclosures, was considering legal action over what it considered could be 'dishonest concealment' of information in the 2016 annual report. 6 3 7 8 5 9
- qualification
- This is an investor's argument for an investigation as reported by the committees, not a finding. Kiltearn's holding figure is its own account; the notified holding published in Carillion's 2016 annual report as at 1 March 2017 was 5.01%.
- outcome
- In a Decision Notice published on 28 July 2022, which Carillion did not refer to the Upper Tribunal, the FCA imposed a public censure on Carillion, rather than a financial penalty given its liquidation, finding that it had recklessly published misleading announcements on 7 December 2016, 1 March 2017 and 3 May 2017; Carillion neither admitted nor denied the matters. In January and February 2026 the FCA fined former finance directors Richard Adam and Zafar Khan and former chief executive Richard Howson after finding that each had been aware of serious financial troubles in Carillion's UK construction business but had failed to reflect this in company announcements; the fines were imposed after they withdrew their challenges to the FCA's decisions.
documentedCarillion was formed in the 1999 demerger from Tarmac. Carillion's 2016 annual report states that its merger reserve 'initially arose on the demerger from Tarmac plc on 29 July 1999', and the House of Commons committees' report states that 'Carillion demerged from Tarmac in 1999'. Carillion's group business plan of January 2018 describes the 1999 'Tarmac Group demerger into Tarmac (building materials) and Carillion (support services and construction services)' and the group's roots in companies that became part of Tarmac Group (Tarmac Construction, Wimpey Construction, Cubitts and Mitchell Construction). 3 6 10
attributedA governance case study published on an academic blog states, citing contemporary press reports, that the 1999 spin-off of Carillion from Tarmac was approved 'with the supporting vote of only 53% of outstanding shares', amid protests over the transfer of some Tarmac employees' and retirees' pension rights from the well-funded Tarmac pension plan to an allegedly comparable Carillion plan without consultation with, or disclosure to, them. It states that Carillion began with no debt (Tarmac retained all of the combined predecessor's corporate debt), 14,000 employees, turnover of £1.8 billion and an estimated market capitalisation of £200 million, and without a chief executive or finance director. 11
- qualification
- Secondary, non-official account relying on 1999 press reports. No retained official record (shareholder-meeting result, demerger circular or pension documents) confirms the 53% figure, the opening figures or the pension-transfer complaints.
attributedThe same case study states that a number of Tarmac's institutional shareholders protested at the inclusion of the approval of the demerger and of increases in executive compensation in one resolution rather than two, and that the proposed packages included £1.37 million in cash and pension adjustments for Sir Neville Simms, chairman of Tarmac, who became chairman of Carillion. Companies House records Sir Neville Ian Simms as a director of Carillion plc from 28 May 1999 to 11 May 2005. 11 12
- qualification
- The pay package, the shareholder protests and the chairmanship are reported only in this secondary non-official account; the retained registry record shows the directorship but not the office of chairman.
documentedNote 33 of Carillion's 2016 annual report refers to a list of investments in subsidiaries and joint ventures, giving name, country of incorporation, registered office and proportion of ownership interest, on pages 144 to 147, and states that the voting rights held by the Group equal its percentage shareholding in each entity. In that list, undertakings marked with an asterisk are those whose shares are directly owned by Carillion plc; entries without the asterisk are not shown as directly owned by it. 3
documentedThe subsidiary list in Carillion's 2016 annual report marks as directly owned by Carillion plc, each at 100%, the following companies in its England section: Carillion Construction Limited (594581), Carillion Services Limited (3011791), Carillion JM Limited (77628), Carillion Holdings Limited (3783019), Carillion Energy Services Limited (3858865), Carillion (AM) Limited (1367044), Carillion Private Finance Limited (2997859), Carillion Professional Services Limited (2916489), Carillion Regeneration Limited (2630590), Carillion Regional Construction Limited (303453), Carillion Swindon Limited (2294384), Clinicenta Limited (5325813), G T Railway Maintenance Holdings Limited (3126198), Carillion Fleet Management Limited (537677), Carillion Insurance Advisers Limited (349002), Carillion LGS Limited (3198709), Carillion Nominees Limited (3787277), Planned Maintenance Engineering Limited (737307), Postworth Limited (2508579), Schal International Management Limited (2646690) and Wakeremote Limited (2112970). 3
documentedOutside England, the same list marks as directly owned by Carillion plc Carillion France SA (B384804571, France, 100%), Carillion Canada Finance Corp (2022794, Canada, 100%), Carillion Investments BV (1502877, Netherlands, 100%), Carillion Finance (Jersey) Ltd (117045, Channel Islands, 100%) and a 33.333% interest in Emrill Services LLC (59850, Middle East and North Africa section, registered office in Dubai). The report describes Carillion Finance (Jersey) Limited as a wholly-owned subsidiary incorporated in Jersey which on 12 December 2014 issued £170 million of convertible bonds guaranteed by Carillion plc. 3
documentedEntries in the England section of the 2016 list shown at 100% but not marked as directly owned by Carillion plc include Carillion Services 2006 Limited (2684154), Carillion Integrated Services Limited (3679838), Carillion MENA Limited (398443), Carillion Utility Services Limited (00728599), Carillion Utility Services Group Limited (01521006), Carillion Support Services & Investments Limited (881324), Carillion Construction Overseas Limited (1270381), Carillion GB Limited (3105686), Carillion Managed Services Limited (03130297), Carillion Capital Projects Limited (247624), Carillion Specialist Services Limited (2574792), Carillion Asset Management Limited (1122808), Carillion AM Government Limited (885404) and Carillion (Singapore) Limited (551186). 3
documentedThe 2016 list shows a 100% holding, not marked as directly owned by Carillion plc, in Carillion Private Finance (Education) 2012 Limited (8113991). Companies House officer records list company 08113991 under the name Amber LEP Investments Limited, with status active. 3 13
documentedOther England-section entries of the 2016 list not marked as directly owned by Carillion plc include John Mowlem Construction Plc (1947809, 100%), Eaga Services Limited (02969358, 100%), Eaga Energy Solutions Limited (4448876, 100%), Eaga Heating Limited (05754891, 100%), Alfred McAlpine International Limited (1449086, 100%), Alfred McAlpine Pension Trustees Limited (1528870, 100%), Dudley Bower Group Plc (566465, 100%), G T Railway Maintenance Limited (2995513, 100%), Centrac Limited (2995364, 100%), Sovereign Hospital Services Limited (3232308, 100%) and Churchward Plc (2489314, 99.5%). 3
documentedIn its Scotland section the 2016 list shows 100% holdings, not marked as directly owned by Carillion plc, in Carillion (AMBS) Holdings Limited (SC203910) and Carillion (AMBS) Limited (SC20258). The Companies House officers page of Carillion (AMBS) Limited (SC020258) lists 60 officers, all of whom have resigned. 3 14
documentedIn its Canada section the 2016 list shows 100% holdings, not marked as directly owned by Carillion plc, in Carillion Canada Holdings Inc. (2177453), Carillion Canada Inc. (1556261), Carillion Construction Inc. (1780791), Carillion Services Inc. (2529541), Carillion Investments (Canada) Inc. (2423833) and EAGA Canada Inc. (6130381), and a 60% holding in Rokstad Power GP Inc. (101270283). 3
documentedElsewhere the 2016 list shows 100% holdings, not marked as directly owned by Carillion plc, in Carillion Australia Pty Limited (ACN119335787, Australia); Carillion (Jersey) Ltd (1771), Carillion Insurance Company Ltd (24845) and John Mowlem (Guernsey) Ltd (39351) in the Channel Islands section; Carillion Irishenco Ltd (290713, Ireland); TCon Bauten GmbH (B/37133, Germany); Mowlem Holdings BV (24296427) and Mowlem Aqumen BV (24296440) (Netherlands); Carillion (Caribbean) Limited (C3241(c), Trinidad and Tobago); and Carillion (Saudi Arabia) LLC (101031785, registered office in Riyadh). 3
documentedThe 2016 list shows partial interests, not marked as directly owned by Carillion plc, in Aspire Defence Services Limited (4556471, 50%), The Hospital Company (Liverpool) Limited (8747138, 50%), The Hospital Company (Sandwell) Limited (9822818, 50%), Carillion Powerlines Limited (8884783, 50%), PSBP Midlands Limited (09598377, 42.5%), Road Management Services (A13) plc (3917644, 25%) and, in Scotland, Aberdeen Roads Holdings Limited (SC489526, 33.3%). The report's related-party note lists Aberdeen Roads Holdings Limited, PSBP Midlands Limited (spelled 'PBSP Midlands Limited') and the two Hospital Companies among PPP joint ventures, and Aspire Defence Services Limited among other joint ventures. 3
documentedIn its Middle East and North Africa section the 2016 list shows 49% holdings, not marked as directly owned by Carillion plc, in Al Futtaim Carillion LLC (62491, registered office in Dubai) and Carillion (Qatar) LLC (43790, registered office in Doha). Elsewhere the report describes Al Futtaim Carillion as 'our joint venture business in the United Arab Emirates' and as a '50:50 joint venture business in the UAE', and its related-party note lists Al Futtaim Carillion LLC (UAE) among other joint ventures. 3
documentedCarillion's 2014 annual report states that the Group held an 80 per cent equity shareholding in Inspiredspaces Wolverhampton (Holdings 2) Limited and a 50.1 per cent equity shareholding in CarillionAmey Limited, both equity accounted as joint ventures because contractual arrangements specify that key operating decisions are made jointly, with no shareholder having overall control. The 2016 annual report repeats this for CarillionAmey Limited (50.1 per cent), while its subsidiary list shows CarillionAmey Limited (5428762) at 50%. 4 3
documentedCarillion's 2014 and 2016 annual reports state that the Group had a 49 per cent equity shareholding in the Bouchier Group, which operates in Canada, consolidated as a subsidiary on the basis of contractual arrangements giving the Group powers as a shareholder to exert control over the board, together with options to acquire the remaining 51 per cent of the equity by 2022. The 2016 subsidiary list shows Bouchier Contracting Ltd. (207776550) at 49%; the 2014 report gives the Bouchier Group's revenue as £79.9m (2013: £70.4m) and its profit for the year as £8.6m (2013: £10.6m). 3 4
documentedCarillion's 2014 and 2016 annual reports state that the Group had a 49 per cent equity shareholding in Carillion Alawi LLC, which operates in Oman, fully consolidated as a subsidiary without any allocation to non-controlling interests on the basis of contractual arrangements that do not entitle the other investors to any interest in its profit or net assets. The 2016 subsidiary list shows Carillion Alawi LLC (1083481) at 49%. 3 4
documentedAccording to the House of Commons committees' report, when Carillion collapsed in January 2018 'the total group structure consisted of 326 companies, 199 based in the UK, of which 27 are now in compulsory liquidation'. The Insolvency Service's chief executive told the committees that the company's 'incredibly poor standards' made it difficult to identify information that should have been 'absolutely, straightforwardly available', such as a list of directors. 6
documentedCarillion's 2014 annual report states that the Group acquired JLIS (John Laing Integrated Services), a UK-based provider of facilities management services with around 1,100 employees, during the fourth quarter of 2013; the 2016 annual report refers to intangible assets arising from the acquisition of John Laing Integrated Services Limited in 2013. 4 3
documentedCompanies House records Carillion Construction Limited (00594581) as a private limited company incorporated on 29 November 1957 and named Tarmac Construction Limited until 30 July 1999, with company status 'Liquidation' and a registered office at PwC, Central Square, 29 Wellington Street, Leeds; its last accounts were made up to 31 December 2016 and its accounts for 2017 are shown as overdue. The Insolvency Service lists it among the companies against which winding-up orders were made on 15 January 2018, and Carillion's 2016 annual report lists it as 100% owned directly by Carillion plc. 15 3 2
documentedCompanies House records Carillion Services Limited (03011791) as a private limited company incorporated on 19 January 1995 with company status 'Liquidation', previously named Mackwest Limited (19 to 27 January 1995), Tarmac Servicemaster Limited (1995 to 1997), Tarmac Facilities Services Limited (1997 to 1999) and Tarmac Services Limited (11 February 1999 to 30 July 1999). Carillion's 2016 annual report lists Carillion Services Limited (3011791) as 100% owned directly by Carillion plc. 16 3
documentedCompanies House records Carillion Services 2006 Limited (02684154) as a private limited company incorporated on 4 February 1992 with company status 'Liquidation', previously named Noreast Building Management Limited (1992 to 1993), Mowlem Facilities Management Limited (1993 to 1997), Aqumen Services Limited (1997 to 2003), Mowlem Aqumen Managed Services Limited (2003 to 2005) and Mowlem Services Limited (21 November 2005 to 24 May 2006). Carillion's 2016 annual report lists Carillion Services 2006 Limited (2684154) at 100%, not marked as directly owned by Carillion plc. 17 3
analysisThe Insolvency Service notice on the winding-up orders lists 'Carillion Services Ltd, company number 02684154' and 'Carillion Services 2006 Ltd, company number 03011791'. Companies House assigns 03011791 to Carillion Services Limited and 02684154 to Carillion Services 2006 Limited, and Carillion's 2016 annual report uses the same pairing; the notice therefore transposes the two company numbers. 16 17 2 3
documentedCompanies House records Carillion JM Limited (00077628) as a private limited company incorporated on 8 June 1903 and named John Mowlem & Company plc until 31 December 2002, Mowlem plc until 25 April 2006 and Mowlem Limited until 24 May 2006; its company status is 'Liquidation', its last accounts were made up to 31 December 2016 and its accounts for 2017 are shown as overdue. Carillion's 2016 annual report dates the acquisition of Mowlem to 23 February 2006, with consideration including Carillion plc shares, and lists Carillion JM Limited (77628) as 100% owned directly by Carillion plc. 18 3
documentedCompanies House records Carillion (AM) Limited (01367044) as a private limited company incorporated on 8 May 1978 and named Marchwiel plc until 4 February 1985, Alfred McAlpine plc until 12 February 2008 and Alfred McAlpine Limited until 18 March 2008; its company status is 'Liquidation' and its last accounts were made up to 31 December 2016. Carillion's 2016 annual report dates the acquisition of Alfred McAlpine to 12 February 2008, with consideration including Carillion plc shares, and lists Carillion (AM) Limited (1367044) as 100% owned directly by Carillion plc. 19 3
documentedCompanies House records Carillion Energy Services Limited (03858865) as a private limited company incorporated on 14 October 1999 and named Eaglepower Limited until 18 November 1999, Eaga Partnership Limited until 27 February 2007, Eaga plc until 20 April 2011 and Eaga Limited until 13 June 2011; its company status is 'Liquidation'. The House of Commons committees' report states that in 2011 Carillion purchased Eaga, a supplier of heating and renewable energy services, and that Eaga was renamed Carillion Energy Services. Carillion's 2016 annual report dates the acquisition of Carillion Energy Services to 21 April 2011, with consideration including Carillion plc shares, and lists Carillion Energy Services Limited (3858865) as 100% owned directly by Carillion plc. 20 6 3
documentedCompanies House records Carillion Group Limited (04030312) as a private limited company incorporated on 10 July 2000 as Sovereign Harbour Trust Limited (renamed on 8 December 2000), a non-trading company (SIC 7499) whose last accounts were made up to 31 December 2008; it was dissolved on 7 December 2010. Richard Francis Tapp's Companies House appointments record shows him appointed as its secretary and as a director on 1 December 2001. 21 22
documentedCompanies House records Carillion Nominees Limited (03787277) as a private limited company incorporated on 10 June 1999 as Hackremco (No.1513) Limited (renamed on 16 July 1999), a dormant company (SIC 99999) whose last accounts were made up to 31 December 2017; it was dissolved on 26 February 2019. Carillion's 2016 annual report lists it as 100% owned directly by Carillion plc. 23 3
documentedA Cyprus company-data aggregator reproducing the Cyprus Registrar of Companies lists Carillion Construction Limited as an overseas company (country of incorporation United Kingdom) registered in Cyprus on 12 April 2017 under registration number ΑΕ 3100, with status dissolved. It lists eight officers, among them directors Richard John Howson and Zafar Iqbal Khan and secretary Richard Francis Tapp, without appointment dates. 24
documentedThe Official Gazette of the Republic of Cyprus (No. 4420 of 13 May 2022, Fifth Annex, Part I) lists Carillion Construction Limited (Α.Ε. 3100) among overseas companies struck off the register under the Companies Law, Cap. 113, by notice of removal, against the date 15 January 2018. That is the date on which, according to the Insolvency Service, winding-up orders were made against Carillion Construction Limited and other group companies in England. 25 2
documentedCompanies House records KPMG Audit Limited (03110745) as an active private limited company incorporated on 2 October 1995 and named KPMG Audit Plc from 2 October 1995 to 24 September 2024. Under its former name, KPMG Audit Plc resigned as auditor of Carillion plc on 13 March 2014, according to Carillion's 2014 annual report. 26 4
documentedCompanies House records PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (OC303525) as an active limited liability partnership incorporated on 9 December 2002, with its registered office at 1 Embankment Place, London. According to the Insolvency Service's notice on Carillion's insolvency, partners at PwC were appointed as special managers to assist the Official Receiver as liquidator of Carillion plc. 27 2
documentedCompanies House records Tesco plc (00445790) as an active public limited company incorporated on 27 November 1947, with its registered office at Tesco House, Shire Park, Welwyn Garden City. The House of Commons committees' report states that Carillion non-executive director Alison Horner, who joined the board in December 2013 and chaired the remuneration committee from May 2014, was also Chief People Officer at Tesco plc. 28 6
documentedCompanies House records Grainger plc (00125575) as an active public limited company incorporated on 27 November 1912 and named Grainger Trust plc until 5 March 2007. It records Justin Richard Read as a director of Grainger plc from 13 February 2017 to 18 June 2026. 29 30
documentedPSA Peugeot Citroën's 2009 registration document (document de référence), filed with the French Autorité des marchés financiers on 22 April 2010, lists Jean-Paul Parayre as a member of the Supervisory Board of Peugeot S.A. since 11 December 1984 (current term ending in 2011), chairman of its finance and audit committee and a member of its strategy committee. It states that at 31 December 2009 he was also chairman of the supervisory boards of Stena Maritime and of Vallourec (the latter since 2000), a director of Bolloré S.A. and of Société Financière du Planier and 'Gérant B' of Stena International Sarl, and lists among mandates that expired in the previous five years his directorships of SDV Cameroun, Stena Line and Carillion plc. 31
documentedCompanies House records Jean Paul Parayre as a director of Carillion plc from 28 May 1999 to 7 December 2004. 12
documentedCompanies House records Justin Richard Read as a director of Carillion plc appointed on 1 December 2017; the officer list shows the appointment as active, with no termination recorded. 12 29
sources in this section
- Companies House company record: Carillion plc (03782379) Companies House
- Carillion declares insolvency: information for employees, creditors and suppliers Insolvency Service (GOV.UK) · 15 Jan 2018
- Company statement source · src-003 identified by category only · Company statement
- Company statement source · src-094 identified by category only · Company statement
- Carillion: Second Joint Report of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (HC 769), chapter on external checks and balances House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees · May 2018
- Carillion: Second Joint Report of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (HC 769), chapters on the company and its board House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees · May 2018
- FCA fines former finance directors of Carillion plc (in liquidation) Financial Conduct Authority · 7 Jan 2026
- FCA fines former chief executive of Carillion plc (in liquidation) Financial Conduct Authority · 16 Feb 2026
- FCA publishes Decision Notices against Carillion plc (in liquidation) and three of its former executive directors Financial Conduct Authority · 28 Jul 2022
- Carillion Group Business Plan, January 2018 (published by the committees) House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · Jan 2018
- Research source · src-105 identified by category only · Research
- Companies House officers list: Carillion plc (03782379) Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Richard John Howson Companies House
- Companies House officers list: Carillion (AMBS) Limited (SC020258), page 1 Companies House
- Companies House company record: Carillion Construction Limited (00594581) Companies House
- Companies House company record: Carillion Services Limited (03011791) Companies House
- Companies House company record: Carillion Services 2006 Limited (02684154) Companies House
- Companies House company record: Carillion JM Limited (00077628) Companies House
- Companies House company record: Carillion (AM) Limited (01367044) Companies House
- Companies House company record: Carillion Energy Services Limited (03858865) Companies House
- Companies House company record: Carillion Group Limited (04030312) Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Richard Francis Tapp Companies House
- Companies House company record: Carillion Nominees Limited (03787277) Companies House
- Corporate registry source · src-048 identified by category only · Corporate registry
- Official Gazette of the Republic of Cyprus No. 4420, Fifth Appendix, Part I (13 May 2022) Government Printing Office, Republic of Cyprus · 13 May 2022
- Companies House company record: KPMG Audit Limited (03110745) Companies House
- Companies House LLP record: PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (OC303525) Companies House
- Companies House company record: Tesco PLC (00445790) Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Justin Richard Read Companies House
- Companies House company record: Grainger plc (00125575) Companies House
- Company statement source · src-083 identified by category only · Company statement
2Carillion's board, executives and pay, 1999–2018
documentedCarillion's 2014 annual report lists the board as five non-executive directors - Philip Green (Chairman), Steve Mogford (Senior Independent Non-Executive Director), Andrew Dougal, Alison Horner and Ceri Powell - and two executive directors, Richard Howson (Group Chief Executive) and Richard Adam (Group Finance Director); the report states that at 31 December 2014 the board comprised two executive and five non-executive directors. 1
documentedCarillion's 2016 annual report, whose chairman's statement is dated 1 March 2017, lists the board as five non-executive directors - Philip Green (Chairman), Keith Cochrane (Senior Independent Non-Executive Director), Andrew Dougal, Alison Horner and Ceri Powell - and two executive directors, Richard Howson (Group Chief Executive) and Zafar Khan (Group Finance Director), with Richard Tapp as Secretary and the registered office at Carillion House, 84 Salop Street, Wolverhampton. The House of Commons committees' May 2018 report names the same five as the non-executive directors in place at the end of 2016. 2 3 4
documentedAccording to the House of Commons committees' May 2018 report, Carillion was governed by a seven-member board; immediately before the July 2017 profit warning its members were Richard Howson (Chief Executive), Zafar Khan (Finance Director), Philip Green (non-executive Chairman) and the non-executive directors Keith Cochrane, Andrew Dougal, Alison Horner and Baroness Morgan of Huyton. By the collapse Howson and Khan were no longer in post, replaced respectively by Keith Cochrane and Emma Mercer; the report notes that Mercer did not join Carillion plc's board. 3 4
documentedCarillion's January 2018 group business plan presents the board as Philip Green (Chairman), Sally Morgan (Senior Independent Director), Keith Cochrane (Interim Chief Executive), Andrew Dougal (Audit Committee chair), Alan Lovell and Alison Horner (non-executive directors) and Justin Read (Audit Committee chair designate). It describes the board as refreshed with four appointments since July - Andrew Davies as Chief Executive, Sally Morgan, Alan Lovell and Justin Read - with Davies to join on 22 January, and states that Keith Cochrane and Andrew Dougal would step down during 2018. 5 3
documentedThe Companies House officer list for Carillion plc records 32 officer appointments, 25 of them with resignations. The seven shown as active are the directorships of Keith Cochrane (appointed 2 July 2015), Andrew Dougal (3 October 2011), Philip Green (1 June 2011), Alison Horner (1 December 2013), Alan Lovell (1 November 2017), Baroness Sally Morgan (1 July 2017) and Justin Read (1 December 2017). 6 3
- qualification
- All 32 entries are present in the retained copy of the list. Philip Green appears twice: an active directorship from 1 June 2011 and a second director entry with appointment and resignation both dated 1 June 2011. None of the entries is for Emma Mercer or Andrew Davies, consistent with the committees' statement that Mercer did not join the board.
documentedA published governance case study states that Philip Rogerson replaced Sir Neville Simms as Chairman of Carillion in May 2005, and that John McDonough was Chief Executive and Chris Girling Finance Director at the time of the Mowlem acquisition. Companies House records Sir Neville Simms as a director of Carillion plc from 28 May 1999 to 11 May 2005. 7 6
- qualification
- The case study (a non-official secondary source) spells the names 'Sims' and 'Molem'; Simms's chairmanship is not stated in the retained official records, which show only his directorship.
documentedCarillion's 2014 annual report states that Philip Rogerson, Chairman since May 2005, stood down following the 2014 annual general meeting; its table of board changes gives 7 May as the date of his resignation as Non-Executive Chairman, matching the Companies House record of his directorship (1 October 2004 to 7 May 2014). His 2014 fees were £68 thousand. 1 6
documentedPhilip Green joined Carillion's board on 1 June 2011 (2014 and 2016 annual reports; Companies House). According to the House of Commons committees' May 2018 report he joined as Senior Independent Non-Executive Director in June 2011; Carillion's 2014 annual report states that he had been Senior Independent Non-Executive Director and Chairman designate before becoming Chairman in 2014. 3 1 2 6 4
documentedPhilip Green was non-executive Chairman of Carillion plc from May 2014 until the company was placed into compulsory liquidation on 15 January 2018. Carillion's 2014 remuneration report states that on appointment as Chairman he received a fee of £193,000 pro rata from 7 May 2014, the date given for Philip Rogerson's resignation; he is named Chairman in the 2016 annual report and in the January 2018 group business plan, and the House of Commons committees' report states that he was Chairman from 2014 until the liquidation. 1 3 2 5 8
documentedThe House of Commons committees' May 2018 report states that Philip Green, Carillion's Chairman, is not to be confused with Sir Philip Green of Arcadia and, previously, BHS. Carillion's annual reports name him as Philip Green CBE, and Companies House records him as Philip Nevill Green. 3 2 6 4
attributedAccording to the House of Commons committees' May 2018 report, Philip Green was Managing Director of Coloroll before it went into receivership in June 1990, and in 1994 the Pensions Ombudsman made a finding of breach of trust and maladministration against him. 3 9 10 4
- qualification
- Stated by the committees, which cite a January 2018 press report; the 1994 Pensions Ombudsman determination itself is not among the retained documents. An online encyclopedia entry states that Green became Coloroll's group development director in 1985 and was its managing director from 1989 to 1990, and that the 1994 finding concerned him as a trustee of the Coloroll group's pension fund. Asked by the committees, the chair of Carillion's pension Trustee wrote on 26 January 2018 that the Trustee had not been aware of the Pensions Ombudsman ruling against Green. No response by Green on this point was found in the retained documents.
documentedAccording to the House of Commons committees' May 2018 report, Philip Green was appointed in 2011 as a corporate responsibility adviser to the then Prime Minister, a role he left in 2016; Carillion's 2016 annual report lists 'Advisor to the Prime Minister on Corporate Responsibility' among his external appointments. 3 2 4
documentedCarillion's 2014 annual report lists Philip Green's external appointments as Non-Executive Chairman of BakerCorp, Senior Independent Director of Saga plc, Chairman Designate of Williams & Glyn Bank Limited and Chairman of Sentebale, a charity focused on Lesotho, and records that in 2014 he stood down as Chairman and a director of Clarkson plc on 9 May and was appointed a director of Saga plc on 29 May. The House of Commons committees' May 2018 report states that when he was appointed Carillion's Chairman he was also Chairman of BakerCorp and Chairman Designate of Williams and Glyn Bank Limited and had previously been Chairman of Clarkson plc. 1 3 4
documentedCarillion's 2016 annual report lists Philip Green's external appointments as Non-Executive Chairman of BakerCorp Inc (USA), Non-Executive Chairman of Corsair Infrastructure Management (USA), Chairman of Sentebale, founder of the charity Hope Through Action and Advisor to the Prime Minister on Corporate Responsibility. An online encyclopedia entry states that he was chairman of BakerCorp from June 2011 until December 2017. 2 9
documentedCarillion's 2014 and 2016 annual reports list Philip Green's past roles as Chief Executive of United Utilities Group PLC, Chief Executive of Royal P&O Nedlloyd, Director and Chief Operating Officer of Reuters Group PLC and Chief Operating Officer of DHL Europe and Africa, the 2014 report adding Chairman of Clarkson plc. An online encyclopedia entry states that he was chief executive of United Utilities from 2006 to 2011, succeeded by Steve Mogford, and chairman of Clarkson; Carillion's 2014 annual report states that Mogford joined United Utilities Group PLC as Chief Executive in March 2011. 9 1 2
attributedThe House of Commons committees' May 2018 report concluded that Philip Green 'appears to have interpreted his role as Chairman as that of cheerleader-in-chief' and that 'as leader of the board he was both responsible and culpable'. In evidence Green accepted, as Chairman, 'full and complete' responsibility for the collapse, but said he did 'not necessarily' accept culpability. 4 9 11 3
- qualification
- Conclusions of a parliamentary inquiry report, not findings of a court or regulator.
- response
- In his written response to the report, Green said he had a significant number of comments on it and disagreed with many of its conclusions, but that it would not be appropriate to comment while the investigations by the Insolvency Service (assisted by PwC as Special Manager), the Financial Conduct Authority and the Financial Reporting Council were ongoing, with which he said he would continue to cooperate fully.
- outcome
- An online encyclopedia article states that in January 2021 the Insolvency Service said it would seek to ban eight former Carillion directors, including Green, and that the trial due to start on 16 October 2023 was cancelled after the Insolvency Service decided it was not in the public interest to pursue him and other directors. A written parliamentary answer of 24 October 2023 confirms that disqualification proceedings begun on 12 January 2021 against five non-executive directors of Carillion plc were dropped in October 2023, without naming them.
attributedThe House of Commons committees' May 2018 report concluded that Carillion's non-executive directors 'were, however, unable to provide any remotely convincing evidence of their effective impact'. In evidence Alison Horner said 'we were there to provide oversight and challenge, and we were able to do that effectively', and Philip Green said 'we challenged; we probed; we asked'. 4 3 12 11 13
- qualification
- Conclusion of a parliamentary inquiry report, not a finding of a court or regulator.
- response
- In written responses, Philip Green and Andrew Dougal each said they disagreed with many of the report's conclusions, and Alison Horner said it misquoted or misrepresented her evidence in a number of instances; each said it would not be appropriate or right to comment further at that time while the investigations into Carillion's insolvency were ongoing. In his 5 April 2018 letter to the committees Dougal described the board's culture as 'engaged, honest and collaborative'.
- outcome
- Disqualification proceedings that the Insolvency Service began on 12 January 2021 against five non-executive directors of Carillion plc, alongside three executive directors, were dropped in October 2023 (written parliamentary answer of 24 October 2023). A legal briefing of 20 October 2023 by the non-executive directors' lawyers states that the proceedings were discontinued on the eve of a trial due to start on 16 October 2023 and that neither the FCA nor the FRC brought action against any of the non-executive directors. The official records do not name the five directors.
documentedSteve Mogford was a non-executive director of Carillion plc from September 2006: the 2014 annual report gives his board appointment date as 5 September 2006, while Companies House records 6 September 2006 and a resignation on 31 December 2015. After Philip Green became Chairman in 2014, Mogford was appointed Senior Independent Non-Executive Director; he sat on all five board committees, and the 2014 report stated that, having served nine years in September 2015, he would retire from the board in 2015 to keep within the Code's independence requirements for non-executive directors. He held no Carillion shares at 31 December 2014; his fees were £57 thousand for 2014 and £60 thousand for 2015. 1 6 2
- qualification
- The board appointment date differs by one day between the 2014 annual report (5 September 2006) and Companies House (6 September 2006).
documentedCarillion's 2014 annual report lists Steve Mogford's external appointment as Chief Executive of United Utilities Group PLC, which he joined in March 2011, and his past roles as Chief Executive of Selex Galileo (part of Finmeccanica, Italy) and Chief Operating Officer and Director of BAE Systems plc. 1
documentedKeith Cochrane joined Carillion's board as Senior Independent Non-Executive Director. The 2016 annual report gives his board appointment date as 2 July 2015 and its Audit and Remuneration Committee tables list him from 02.07.15; Companies House also records his appointment as a director on 2 July 2015. The House of Commons committees' May 2018 report gives the date as 2 July 2016. 2 6 3 4
- qualification
- Conflicting dates: the annual report and the Companies House register give 2 July 2015, and the 2016 annual report shows a part-year fee of £28 thousand for Cochrane in 2015, consistent with a mid-2015 appointment; the committees' report, which cites the 2016 annual report, gives 2 July 2016. The register and annual-report date is used here.
documentedCarillion's 2016 annual report shows the Nominations and Business Integrity Committees chaired by Philip Green, the Sustainability Committee by Ceri Powell, the Audit Committee by Andrew Dougal and the Remuneration Committee by Alison Horner. Its Audit Committee table lists Dougal (chairman, member since 03.10.11), Keith Cochrane (02.07.15), Horner (01.12.13) and Powell (02.04.14), and the Remuneration Committee consisted of the independent non-executive directors Horner, Powell, Dougal and Cochrane. 2
documentedCarillion's 2016 annual report lists Keith Cochrane's external appointment as UK Government Lead Non-Executive Director for the Scotland Office and the Office of the Advocate General, and his past roles as Chief Executive of The Weir Group PLC, Chief Executive and Finance Director of Stagecoach Group PLC and Director of Group Finance of ScottishPower PLC. 2
documentedWhen Richard Howson was removed as Chief Executive in July 2017, the board asked Keith Cochrane, already a board member, to take the role on an interim basis (House of Commons committees' May 2018 report). FTI Consulting's January 2018 'Project Ray' review for the lenders and the January 2018 group business plan describe Cochrane as Interim Chief Executive, the plan stating that Cochrane and Andrew Dougal would step down during 2018; the National Audit Office interviewed Cochrane as the Chief Executive in post at the time of the insolvency. 3 14 5 15 4
attributedThe House of Commons committees' May 2018 report concluded that Keith Cochrane, who came with extensive board-level experience, 'quickly succumbed to the dysfunctionality prevalent on the board', and that as interim Chief Executive he was 'an inside appointment', having served as a non-executive on a board that 'exhibited little challenge or insight', and was unable to convince investors of his ability to lead and rebuild the company. 3 4
- qualification
- Conclusions of a parliamentary inquiry report, not findings of a court or regulator. Cochrane told the committees he sought to challenge executives 'in an appropriate manner'.
- response
- In his written response, Cochrane said the committee appeared in a number of instances to have taken his evidence out of context and that he did not accept many of the report's conclusions, but that in view of the ongoing investigations into Carillion's insolvency it would not be right to comment in detail at that time.
documentedJohn McDonough was Carillion's Chief Executive before Richard Howson: Carillion's 2014 remuneration report records his base salary as £632,000 and his single total figure of remuneration as £1,666 thousand for 2009, £1,512 thousand for 2010 and £1,719 thousand for 2011, Howson taking over on 1 January 2012. Companies House records McDonough as a director of Carillion plc from 1 January 2001 to 31 December 2011, and a published governance case study states that he was Chief Executive at the time of the Mowlem acquisition. 1 6 7
documentedRichard Howson joined Carillion's board on 10 December 2009 and was Group Chief Executive from 1 January 2012, having previously been Chief Operating Officer, until 10 July 2017, when he was removed as the company issued its profit warning (House of Commons committees' May 2018 report; the FCA gives the same tenure, and Companies House records his directorship as ending on 10 July 2017). According to the committees, he stayed on in a lesser role, with responsibilities for collecting cash on key contracts and boosting morale in the UK construction business, before leaving in September 2017, and continued to receive his full contractual salary until the company entered liquidation. 3 2 16 6 1 4
documentedCarillion's annual reports describe Richard Howson as a Fellow of the Institution of Civil Engineers with 19 years' service with Carillion in various roles (2014 report) and 22 years (2016 report); his past roles were Chief Operating Officer, Executive Director responsible for UK Construction and Middle East and North Africa, and Managing Director, Middle East and North Africa, all at Carillion plc. The House of Commons committees' report states that he had been at the company since its formation in 1999. 1 2 3
documentedCarillion's 2014 annual report states that Richard Howson held no external appointments. The 2016 annual report lists them as Chairman of BITC's Community Leadership Team, Chairman of the CBI's Construction Council and Non-Executive Director of John Wood Group PLC, and states that he retained the fee of £35,374 paid in 2016 for the Wood Group role. 2 1
attributedThe House of Commons committees' May 2018 report concluded that Richard Howson, Chief Executive from 2012 until July 2017, 'was the figurehead for a business model that was doomed to fail' and should accept that, as the longstanding leader who took Carillion to the brink, he 'was part of the problem rather than part of the solution'. 4 3 16 17 13
- qualification
- Conclusions of a parliamentary inquiry report, not findings of a court or regulator.
- response
- In his written response, Howson said the report had not considered all the issues key to understanding why Carillion went into liquidation and had omitted or ignored some of the more significant evidence; he accepted that debt was too high but said he had been committed to working through the challenging contracts and reducing it, and argued that the final months before the liquidation, when 4 out of the 5 experienced divisional managing directors were removed from their roles, had not been examined. In oral evidence, as the committees record, he had said that 'but for a few very challenging contracts, predominantly in the Oman and one in Qatar, I believe Carillion would have survived', and that the business was in a sustainable position when he was removed.
- outcome
- The FCA fined Howson £237,700 (press release first published 16 February 2026) after he withdrew his challenge to its decision, following an initial Decision Notice dated 24 June 2022; it found that in the period 1 July 2016 to 10 July 2017 he acted recklessly and was knowingly concerned in breaches by Carillion of the Market Abuse Regulation and the Listing Rules. On 4 October 2023 the Insolvency Service announced that it had accepted an 8-year disqualification undertaking from Howson for his conduct as a director of Carillion plc. A legal briefing by the non-executive directors' lawyers states that none of the three executives' undertakings involved any admission as to the alleged fraud or any direct knowledge of or involvement in preparing incorrect accounts.
documentedAccording to the House of Commons committees' May 2018 report, in October 2017 Carillion appointed a permanent successor as Chief Executive from outside the company, whose start date was brought forward to 22 January 2018; by then the company was already in liquidation, having been placed into compulsory liquidation on 15 January 2018. FTI Consulting's January 2018 review and the January 2018 group business plan name him as Andrew Davies, Chief Executive of Wates Group and a non-executive director of Chemring plc and Flowgroup plc, announced as the group's future Chief Executive and due to join on 22 January. 3 14 5 8 6 4
- qualification
- The retained documents do not show Davies taking office: the Companies House officer list for Carillion plc contains no appointment for him. The business plan's appointment profiles are printed in interleaved columns; the attribution of the Wates, Chemring and Flowgroup entries to Davies follows the column layout.
documentedA published governance case study states that Chris Girling was Carillion's Finance Director from 1999 until he retired in April 2007 and was replaced by Richard Adam. Companies House records Christopher Francis Girling as a director of Carillion plc from 8 November 1999 to 30 April 2007. 7 6
documentedRichard Adam was Carillion's Group Finance Director and a board member from 2 April 2007 until he retired on 31 December 2016 (2014 and 2016 annual reports; Companies House; the FCA gives April 2007 to 31 December 2016). In his 20 February 2018 letter to the committees Adam stated that the company announced his retirement on 24 August 2016, that he resigned most of his subsidiary directorships on 31 October 2016 and that he formally retired on 31 December 2016. The 2016 annual report states that he retired after nine years with Carillion and was succeeded by Zafar Khan. 2 18 1 3 6 19
documentedCarillion's 2014 annual report describes Richard Adam as a chartered accountant who qualified with KPMG in 1982, with past roles as Group Finance Director of Associated British Ports Holdings plc, Hodder Headline Plc and TVS Entertainment plc and as non-executive director and audit committee chairman of SSL International plc. It lists his external appointment as Non-Executive Director of Countrywide PLC, where he chaired the Audit and Risk Committee, an appointment made in 2014 after discussion and agreement with the Chairman. 1
documentedCarillion's remuneration reports state that Richard Adam retained fees of £12,249 and £30,885 paid in 2014 as a non-executive director of Wincanton plc and Countrywide PLC respectively, having stood down from the Wincanton board in September 2014, and fees of £55,000 each paid in 2016 for his roles as a non-executive director of Countryside Properties Plc and Countrywide PLC. 1 2
documentedCarillion's 2016 remuneration report gives Richard Adam's single total figure of remuneration for 2016 as £1,060 thousand (salary £460 thousand, benefits £19 thousand, bonus £140 thousand, long-term incentives £278 thousand, pension £163 thousand), excluding a payment in lieu of notice of £135,939 for 1 January to 24 February 2017. The report states that his 2016 bonus was paid fully in cash, that he received salary, pension supplement and car allowance for his notice period, that his deferred bonus shares for 2013 to 2015 were released on his departure, and that his outstanding 2014 to 2016 LEAP awards would vest on the normal dates, pro rata and subject to performance conditions. The House of Commons committees' May 2018 report describes a final pay package of £1.1 million in December 2016. 3 2 4
attributedThe House of Commons committees' May 2018 report concluded that Richard Adam, Finance Director between 2007 and 2016, 'was the architect of Carillion's aggressive accounting policies' and would, more than anyone else, have been aware of the unsustainability of the company's approach; that his voluntary departure at the end of 2016 was 'perfectly timed'; and that he then sold all his shares for £776,000 'just before the wheels began very publicly coming off'. The report quotes Andrew Dougal as saying that Adam 'exercised tight control over the entire finance function' and 'was defensive in relation to some challenges in board meetings'. 3 4 18 19 17 8 13
- qualification
- Conclusions of a parliamentary inquiry report, which Adam disputed; they are not findings of a court or regulator. The FCA and FRC announcements cited below concern Carillion's market announcements and financial reporting and do not mention the share sales.
- response
- In his written response to the committees' 22 May 2018 letter, Adam said the report and subsequent media appearances blamed him and others for the collapse, that he did not believe the evidence justified the committees' conclusions and that their assumptions were unwarranted in respect of his role before his retirement in 2016, and that he was participating in ongoing regulatory investigations. In his 20 February 2018 letter he said he sold his shares on the dates the company invited him to, and that after retiring he had very minimal contact with some former colleagues and provided no advice in any capacity. In oral evidence he had said that in his view he left the company in December 2016 in a healthy state, and in the same letter he speculated that the size of the provision announced on 10 July 2017, together with the exit from markets in the Middle East and Canada, brought capital market, customer and supplier concern that the company could not allay.
- outcome
- The FCA fined Adam £232,800 (press release first published 7 January 2026) after he withdrew his challenge to its decision, following an initial Decision Notice dated 24 June 2022; it found that he acted recklessly and was knowingly concerned in breaches by Carillion of the Market Abuse Regulation and the Listing Rules. The Insolvency Service accepted a disqualification undertaking from Adam on 13 July 2023; a legal briefing by the non-executive directors' lawyers states that none of the three executives' undertakings involved any admission as to the alleged fraud or any direct knowledge of or involvement in preparing incorrect accounts. On 12 May 2026 the FRC announced settled sanctions under which Adam accepted misconduct, admitting acting recklessly and failing to act with integrity, with a recommended 15-year exclusion from the ICAEW, a financial sanction of £550,000 reduced to £222,019 and a severe reprimand; the FRC made no finding, and Adam made no admission, that he acted dishonestly or deliberately.
attributedAccording to the House of Commons committees' May 2018 report, Richard Adam as Finance Director argued in the pension funding negotiations that the company could not afford the contributions sought; the trustee's adviser Gazelle concluded that Adam had an 'aversion to pension scheme deficit repair funding', and Robin Ellison, Chair of the Trustee, observed at the time that Adam viewed funding the pension schemes as a 'waste of money'. The committees also quote the scheme actuary as saying that Carillion's 'primary objective was to minimise the cash payments to the schemes', and report Gazelle's bafflement at how Adam 'managed to persuade the Pensions Regulator not to press for a better recovery plan'. 3 4 20
- qualification
- Characterisations reported by the committees from the trustee's adviser, the scheme actuary and the trustee chair, not findings of a court or regulator. The committees record that the directors rejected accusations that they did not care about funding the pension schemes, referring to meeting their pension obligations under the deficit recovery plan.
- response
- Adam's written response to the report rejected its conclusions about his role generally; no response by Adam addressing these specific remarks was found in the retained documents.
documentedIn his 20 February 2018 letter, replying to the committees' question about his evidence that the purchase of Alfred McAlpine had added '£650 million of goodwill' while Alfred McAlpine held net liabilities of £50 million, Richard Adam stated that Alfred McAlpine's net liabilities of £50.1 million at the date of acquisition and goodwill of £615 million arising on the acquisition are set out in note 32 of Carillion's 2008 annual report, and that he believed cost savings of £100 million were achieved. Companies House records the acquired company, now Carillion (AM) Limited, under the name Alfred McAlpine PLC until 12 February 2008; Carillion's 2016 annual report refers to the acquisition of Alfred McAlpine plc in 2008 and lists Carillion (AM) Limited as a 100% subsidiary. 18 21 2
documentedZafar Khan became Group Finance Director and a board director of Carillion plc with effect from 1 January 2017, succeeding Richard Adam after what the 2016 annual report calls a rigorous selection process involving external and internal candidates. He had been Carillion's Group Financial Controller and, before that, Finance Director of Al Futtaim Carillion, the group's joint venture in the United Arab Emirates; his annual report biography also lists Finance Director, Middle East and North Africa, Carillion plc, Chief Financial Officer of Associated British Ports Holdings Limited and senior financial roles with BBA Group plc and Flag Telecom Holdings Limited. Khan's employment was terminated with effect from 8 September 2017 (his letter to the committees); Companies House records his resignation as a director on 11 September 2017, and the FCA gives his tenure as 1 January 2017 to September 2017. 2 22 6 19
documentedCarillion's 2016 remuneration report set Zafar Khan's package from 1 January 2017 as a base salary of £425,000, an annual bonus opportunity of up to 100 per cent of salary, a LEAP award of 150 per cent of salary, employer pension contributions of 20 per cent of salary up to the £132,700 cap with a 25 per cent cash supplement above it, and a company car allowance of £14,500. In his 21 February 2018 letter to the committees, Khan stated that his service contract provided for 12 months' notice; that after terminating his employment with effect from 8 September 2017 Carillion was contractually obliged to make 12 monthly payments of salary, car allowance and pension until August 2018, of which he received four (September to December 2017) before payments stopped because of the liquidation; and that he had not entered into the draft settlement agreement Carillion sent him, under which he would have released Carillion from his claims and kept the circumstances of his termination confidential. 22 2
attributedIn his 21 February 2018 letter to the committees, Zafar Khan stated that after the 10 July 2017 trading update he reported to the board, typically weekly, the last such report being an oral update on a Sunday-evening conference call on 3 September 2017 on worsening net debt and profit trends; that Keith Cochrane told him shortly afterwards that the update had 'spooked' the board; and that his understanding was that this update, together with the poor financial performance he had been reporting since 10 July 2017, led to the termination of his contract shortly afterwards. Khan wrote that he did not understand why the update would have spooked the board, as the company's difficulties with net debt and profit should already have been apparent to it. 22 3 4
- qualification
- Khan's own account of the reasons for his dismissal; the board's stated view differs (see response). Khan stated that he holds no written record of the 3 September 2017 update and does not know whether minutes were made; none is among the retained documents.
- response
- According to the House of Commons committees' May 2018 report, Philip Green told them that the board concluded collectively that Khan was 'not close enough to the underlying business unit numbers' and not the 'right person' to participate in negotiations with the company's banks; the committees stated that their evidence supported the board's view.
- outcome
- Carillion terminated Khan's employment with effect from 8 September 2017. According to his letter, he did not enter into the draft settlement agreement Carillion then sent him, under which he would, among other things, have released Carillion from his claims and kept the circumstances leading to the termination entirely confidential.
attributedThe House of Commons committees' May 2018 report concluded that Zafar Khan 'failed to get a grip on Carillion's aggressive accounting policies or make any progress in reducing the company's debt', that although he took on the role when the company was already in deep trouble he 'should not be absolved of responsibility', and that he signed off the 2016 accounts, which presented an extraordinarily optimistic view of the company's health; it added that he may not have been the architect of those policies, but that his previous role as group financial controller meant he did not lack experience of how the company operated. 3 22 19 17 8 13 4
- qualification
- Conclusions of a parliamentary inquiry report, not findings of a court or regulator.
- response
- In his 21 February 2018 letter, Khan said he fully accepted responsibility for his actions as a director of Carillion plc but believed that the level of debt allowed to grow in previous years was the principal contributing factor to Carillion's 2017 difficulties; he also said that his oral answer that debt had been reduced reflected a misunderstanding of the question, debt having plainly not reduced during 2017.
- outcome
- The FCA fined Khan £138,900 (press release first published 7 January 2026) after he withdrew his challenge to its decision, following an initial Decision Notice dated 24 June 2022; it found that he acted recklessly and was knowingly concerned in breaches by Carillion of the Market Abuse Regulation and the Listing Rules. The Insolvency Service accepted a disqualification undertaking from Khan on 29 June 2023; a legal briefing by the non-executive directors' lawyers states that none of the three executives' undertakings involved any admission as to the alleged fraud or any direct knowledge of or involvement in preparing incorrect accounts. On 12 May 2026 the FRC announced settled sanctions under which Khan accepted misconduct, admitting acting recklessly and failing to act with integrity, with a recommended 10-year exclusion from the ICAEW, a financial sanction of £225,000 reduced to £60,228 and a severe reprimand; the FRC made no finding, and Khan made no admission, that he acted dishonestly or deliberately.
documentedEmma Mercer replaced Zafar Khan as Group Finance Director in September 2017 and remained in post until the collapse (House of Commons committees' May 2018 report); the January 2018 group business plan lists her as CFO on the Group Executive, appointed in September 2017. FTI Consulting's January 2018 review states that she assumed the role 'although not a board director', and the committees' report notes that she did not join Carillion plc's board; the National Audit Office interviewed her as the Finance Director in post at the time of the insolvency. 3 14 15 5 23 4
- qualification
- The National Audit Office report refers to Mercer and Cochrane as 'former Carillion directors in post' at the insolvency; Mercer held no directorship of Carillion plc, though she was a director of the subsidiary Carillion (AMBS) Limited from December 2017.
documentedAccording to the House of Commons committees' May 2018 report, Emma Mercer returned to the UK in April 2017 after three years in the Canadian part of the business; a published governance case study states that she returned to become Finance Director of Construction Services. 3 7 4
documentedCompanies House records Emma Louise Mercer as a director of the subsidiary Carillion (AMBS) Limited from 8 December 2011 to 10 January 2014 and again from 12 December 2017 to 1 June 2018. 23
attributedThe House of Commons committees' May 2018 report described Emma Mercer as the only director prepared to concede that Carillion had engaged in aggressive accounting: on her return to the UK she quickly spotted an anomaly in the way the company classified receivable balances on construction contracts, calling it 'sloppy accounting', and the committees concluded that she was 'the only Carillion director to emerge from the collapse with any credit'. 3 4
- qualification
- Assessment by a parliamentary inquiry; the committees use 'director' loosely here, as Mercer did not join Carillion plc's board. The accounting review that followed her concerns is covered with the dossier's accounting records.
documentedAndrew Dougal was an independent non-executive director of Carillion plc from 3 October 2011 (annual reports; Companies House) and chaired the Audit Committee, whose table in the 2016 annual report lists him as chairman with membership from 03.10.11; he also sat on the Remuneration, Nominations, Business Integrity and Sustainability Committees. The January 2018 group business plan still lists him as Audit Committee chair, with Justin Read as chair designate, and states that he would step down during 2018; in his 5 April 2018 letter to the committees Dougal described Read as 'replacing me as Chair of the Audit Committee'. 2 1 3 5 6 12
documentedCarillion's 2014 annual report lists Andrew Dougal's external appointments as Senior Independent Non-Executive Director and Audit Committee Chair of Creston plc, Non-Executive Director of Premier Farnell plc, Non-Executive Director of Victrex plc with effect from 1 March 2015, and member of the Council and the Oversight Board of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland; his past roles were Group Finance Director and Chief Executive of Hanson plc, non-executive director and audit committee chairman of Taylor Wimpey plc and Taylor Woodrow plc, and non-executive director and audit committee member of BPB Plc. The 2016 annual report lists his external appointments as Non-Executive Director and Audit Committee Chair of Victrex plc and member of the Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland, with Creston plc and Premier Farnell Plc among his past roles. 1 2
- qualification
- The 2016 biography is printed in three interleaved columns; the attribution of these entries to Dougal follows the column layout.
attributedAccording to the House of Commons committees' May 2018 report, Andrew Dougal, chair of the audit committee, noted in the 2017 'lessons learned' exercise that there appeared to be a 'push for cash at period end', which would reflect well in published results, and 'inadequate reviews on operational contracts'. 3 12 4
- qualification
- Quoted by the committees, who refer to a July 2017 lessons-learned pack and cite unpublished minutes of a board meeting of 7 June 2017; those minutes are not among the retained documents.
- response
- Answering the committees' question, which quoted the minutes of the lessons-learned session, Dougal said in his 5 April 2018 letter that his further remark about 'perhaps also a hold back of bad news' referred to the Royal Liverpool University Hospital contract.
documentedAlison Horner joined Carillion's board as an independent non-executive director on 1 December 2013 (annual reports; Companies House) and in May 2014 succeeded Vanda Murray as chair of the Remuneration Committee; she was also a member of the Audit Committee from 01.12.13 and of the Nominations, Business Integrity and Sustainability Committees. The House of Commons committees' May 2018 report describes her as a non-executive director from December 2013 until the company's collapse and notes that, apart from Philip Green, she was the only proposed member of the new board whose appointment pre-dated the July 2017 profit warning. 3 1 2 6 4
documentedCarillion's 2014 annual report lists Alison Horner's external appointments as Group Personnel Director and member of the Executive Committee of Tesco Plc and Trustee of the Tesco Pension Scheme, with past roles as Operations Director at Tesco and non-executive director of Tesco Bank; the 2016 annual report gives her Tesco title as Chief People Officer and member of the Executive Committee, and the House of Commons committees' May 2018 report describes her as Chief People Officer at Tesco plc with responsibilities for over 500,000 staff. Companies House records Horner as a director of Tesco Pension Trustees Limited from 29 March 2012 to 1 June 2018. 1 3 2 24 4
documentedCeri Powell joined Carillion's board as an independent non-executive director on 2 April 2014 (2014 annual report; Companies House), became a member of all five board committees and chaired the Sustainability Committee. On 19 January 2017 Carillion announced that Powell would stand down from the board on 31 March 2017 owing to an international relocation to take up an appointment as Managing Director of Brunei Shell Petroleum; Companies House records the resignation on 31 March 2017. 2 1 6
documentedCarillion's 2014 annual report lists Ceri Powell's external appointment as Executive Vice President for Exploration at Royal Dutch Shell, which it describes as a customer of, and supplier to, the group; it states that Powell had not been and was not expected to be involved in any commercial dealings between the group and Royal Dutch Shell, and that the board therefore considered the Chairman and each non-executive director independent under the UK Corporate Governance Code. Powell's past roles were Vice President Strategy and Regional Vice President Exploration (Middle East, Caspian and South Asia) at Royal Dutch Shell; the 2016 annual report gives the Shell title as Executive Vice President for Global Exploration. 1 2
documentedVanda Murray, a non-executive director since 2005 who chaired the Remuneration Committee, retired from Carillion's board in 2014 after almost nine years; the 2014 annual report gives 7 May as the date of her resignation, and Companies House records her directorship from 1 June 2005 to 7 May 2014. Alison Horner succeeded her as Remuneration Committee chair in May 2014. 1 6
documentedBaroness Morgan of Huyton (Sally Morgan) was a non-executive director of Carillion plc immediately before the July 2017 profit warning, according to the House of Commons committees' May 2018 report; Companies House records her appointment as a director on 1 July 2017. The January 2018 group business plan lists her as Senior Independent Director and as one of four board appointments since July, describing her as a non-executive director of Countryside Properties plc, a former non-executive director of Dixons Carphone plc and, in 2001-05, director of government relations at 10 Downing Street. 3 5 6 4
- qualification
- The business plan's appointment profiles are printed in interleaved columns; the attribution of these entries follows the column layout.
documentedAlan Lovell was appointed a non-executive director of Carillion plc at the request of the creditors, to strengthen the board's restructuring experience, according to FTI Consulting's January 2018 review; Companies House records his appointment on 1 November 2017. The January 2018 group business plan describes him as Chairman of the Consumer Council for Water and a former chief executive of Infinis, Costain Group and Jarvis plc, with extensive restructuring experience. 14 6 5 3
- qualification
- The business plan's appointment profiles are printed in interleaved columns; the attribution of these entries follows the column layout.
documentedJustin Read became a director of Carillion plc on 1 December 2017 (Companies House) and is named Audit Committee chair designate in the January 2018 group business plan; Andrew Dougal wrote in April 2018 that Read was replacing Dougal as Audit Committee chair. The business plan describes Read as a non-executive director of Ibstock plc and Grainger plc, Chairman of Segro Pension Scheme Trustees Limited, and formerly Group Finance Director of Segro (2011-16) and of Speedy Hire (2008-11). 5 6 12 3
- qualification
- The business plan's appointment profiles are printed in interleaved columns; the attribution of these entries follows the column layout.
documentedRichard Tapp was Company Secretary of Carillion plc: Companies House records his appointment as secretary on 1 December 2001 and his resignation on 25 June 2018, and the 2016 annual report names him as Secretary. The January 2018 group business plan lists him on the Group Executive as Legal and Company Secretary, in the role since 2002, previously Company Secretary and Group Legal Adviser at Blue Circle Industries plc. 2 5 6 3
- qualification
- The business plan's executive profiles are printed in interleaved columns; the attribution of these entries follows the column layout.
documentedCarillion's January 2018 group business plan presents a smaller Group Executive under the Interim Chief Executive: Andy Jones, Chief Operating Officer from 1 October 2017 (latterly President and CEO of Carillion Canada; with Carillion since 2001); Emma Mercer, CFO, appointed September 2017; Janet Dawson, Chief HR Officer, appointed in 2013; Richard Tapp, Legal and Company Secretary, in the role since 2002; Lee Watson, Chief Transformation Officer, appointed September 2017, an EY partner (since 2008) on secondment; and Donald Muir, Head of Business Improvement from November 2017. The plan describes the Chief Transformation Officer and Head of Business Improvement posts as temporary. FTI Consulting's January 2018 review also records Jones's appointment as COO, and the 2016 annual report names Janet Dawson as Group HR Director. 5 14 2 3
- qualification
- The business plan's executive profiles are printed in interleaved columns; the attribution of these entries follows the column layout.
documentedEY told the committees that its partner Lee Watson was seconded to Carillion as Chief Transformation Officer, reporting to the Chief Executive Keith Cochrane, and attended some board meetings in that capacity to provide updates on restructuring activity, but was not a director of Carillion or a member of its board. FTI Consulting's January 2018 review records Watson (of EY) as Chief Transformation Officer and states that Carillion retained EY to support the development of the business plan, working capital, liquidity and cost reduction; the House of Commons committees' May 2018 report states that EY was appointed on 14 July 2017 to support a strategic review of the company. 4 14 3
documentedCarillion's January 2018 group business plan lists five new divisional Managing Directors in role from October 2017: Mark Davies (Infrastructure; previously MD of Carillion Infrastructure), Richard Lumby (Central Government; leading Carillion's defence and security portfolio since 2002), Daniel Easthope (Corporate & Regions; MD from 2013 of CarillionAmey, the joint venture maintaining most of the UK defence estate), Khalid Nawaz (Building; previously Finance Director for the Middle East and Carillion telent) and Simon Buttery (International; latterly MD of the Middle East & North Africa business, previously President & Chief Executive of Carillion Canada). Under the new structure the MDs no longer sat on the Group Executive but continued to report to the Chief Executive. 5 4 3
- qualification
- In his written response to the committees' report, Richard Howson stated that 4 out of the 5 existing experienced divisional managing directors were removed from their roles in the last months before the liquidation.
documentedCarillion's 2014 annual report states that Chief Executive Richard Howson was responsible to the board for sustainability, while Chief Sustainability Officer David Picton was accountable for sustainability across the group, and that a Board Sustainability Committee chaired by non-executive director Dr Ceri Powell had been created to operate from the beginning of 2015. The 2016 annual report thanks Powell for the contribution made particularly as chairman of the Board Sustainability Committee. 1 2
documentedCarillion's 2014 remuneration report states that Richard Howson's base salary was set at £560,000 on his appointment as Chief Executive on 1 January 2012, below the £632,000 paid to his predecessor John McDonough, and was raised by 9% to £610,400 from 1 January 2015, with a further 8% increase to £660,000 intended from 1 January 2016 subject to continued strong business and personal performance. The 2016 report confirms a base salary of £660,000 for 2016, unchanged for 2017, and an 8% rise in his salary and fees between 2015 and 2016 against 2% for UK employees. 1 2 3 4
- qualification
- The House of Commons committees' May 2018 report attributes the rises to benchmarking commissioned from Deloitte in 2015 and gives them as 8% in 2015 and 9% in 2016; Carillion's remuneration reports give the opposite order (9% from 1 January 2015, 8% from 1 January 2016).
documentedCarillion's 2014 remuneration report gives the single total figure of remuneration for 2014 as £1,024 thousand for Richard Howson (salary £560 thousand, benefits £20 thousand, bonus £246 thousand, pension £198 thousand) and £818 thousand for Richard Adam (salary £450 thousand, benefits £21 thousand, bonus £203 thousand, pension £144 thousand), with no long-term incentive vesting; non-executive fees totalled £451 thousand, including £147 thousand for Philip Green, £68 thousand for Philip Rogerson, £61 thousand for Alison Horner, £60 thousand for Andrew Dougal, £57 thousand for Steve Mogford, £37 thousand for Ceri Powell and £21 thousand for Vanda Murray. Its table of Chief Executive pay gives Howson's single figure as £791 thousand for 2012, £1,034 thousand for 2013 and £1,024 thousand for 2014, with annual bonuses of 36% (2013) and 44% (2014) of the maximum opportunity. 1
documentedCarillion's 2016 remuneration report gives the single total figure of remuneration for 2016 as £1,510 thousand for Richard Howson (salary £660 thousand, benefits £28 thousand, bonus £245 thousand, long-term incentives £346 thousand, pension £231 thousand) and £1,060 thousand for Richard Adam, against £1,283 thousand and £971 thousand for 2015; Philip Green's fee was £215 thousand (2015: £193 thousand), each of the other non-executive directors - Andrew Dougal, Alison Horner, Ceri Powell and Keith Cochrane - received £61 thousand, and total directors' remuneration was £3,029 thousand. Howson's 2016 bonus was 37.125% of salary, with no amount earned on the earnings-per-share and cash-conversion targets. The House of Commons committees' May 2018 report states that Howson's total remuneration rose to £1.5 million in 2016 and that he received a bonus of £245,000 (37% of his salary) despite meeting none of his financial performance targets. 3 2 4
documentedCarillion's 2016 remuneration report shows a Chairman's fee of £215,000 for 2016 and 2017 and a basic non-executive fee of £51,000, with an additional £10,500 each for chairing the Remuneration, Audit or Sustainability Committee and for the Senior Independent Non-Executive Director; the Chairman received no additional fee for committee memberships. According to the House of Commons committees' May 2018 report, Philip Green was awarded a 10% increase in his fees as Chairman in 2016, from £193,000 to £215,000, based on benchmarking, while Carillion's wider comparable workforce received a 2% pay rise in 2016. 3 1 2 4
documentedAccording to the House of Commons committees' May 2018 report, Carillion's senior leaders could earn an annual bonus of up to 100% of basic pay, split evenly between financial and other objectives; in December 2016 the Remuneration Committee told shareholders it intended to raise the maximum to 150% of salary, but abandoned the plan in March 2017 after investors such as BlackRock protested in private, and around 20% of investors voted against the remuneration report at the 2017 annual general meeting. Carillion's 2016 annual report records 81% of votes for and 19% against the remuneration report at the 2016 annual general meeting. 3 2 4
documentedAccording to the House of Commons committees' May 2018 report, Carillion's Remuneration Committee agreed in February 2015 a clawback policy allowing bonuses to be recovered if the accounts needed to be restated or a director was guilty of gross misconduct, with the committee as arbiter; in September 2017, as part of its search for a new Chief Executive, it agreed new clawback triggers recommended by Deloitte, including reputational damage, failures of risk management and errors in performance assessments, and considered asking directors to return their 2016 bonuses but concluded that this 'could not be enforced and would be very difficult to achieve at this stage'. Carillion's 2016 remuneration report described a clawback provision giving the committee the right to recover all elements of bonus and a malus provision allowing unvested deferred bonus awards to be reduced in circumstances of corporate failure. 3 2 4
attributedThe House of Commons committees' May 2018 report concluded that Carillion's Remuneration Committee 'was responsible for a policy of short-term largesse' and that Alison Horner, a non-executive director and its chair for four years, 'presided over growing salaries and bonuses at the top of the company as its performance faltered'; it said the clawback terms agreed in 2015 were so narrow they ruled out any bonus being returned. Horner denied that the terms were overly restrictive, telling the committees they made it easier to claw back bonuses and that misstatement and misconduct were used as clawback terms by '80% of the FTSE'. 3 4
- qualification
- Conclusions of a parliamentary inquiry report, not findings of a court or regulator.
- response
- In Horner's written response, she said that in a number of instances the report misquoted or misrepresented the evidence she gave, but that given the ongoing investigations into Carillion's insolvency it would not be right to comment generally on the report at that time. In oral evidence, as the committees record, she sought to justify her approach by pointing to industry standards, the guidance of advisers and conversations with shareholders, and said she was 'sorry for what has happened'.
documentedAccording to the House of Commons committees' May 2018 report, papers of the Remuneration Committee - chaired by Alison Horner since May 2014 - dated 9 July 2017, the day before the first profit warning, show that it agreed to offer retention payments to five senior employees to remain with the company until 30 June 2018, and salary increases of between 25 and 30% 'in the light of the very considerable burden likely to fall on certain roles'. The committees also report, citing Remuneration Committee minutes of 23 October 2017, a decision to pay the new interim Chief Executive Keith Cochrane, a former member of the committee, a fee of £750,000 for the role, which they describe as notably higher than his predecessor's basic pay. 3 4
documentedAccording to the House of Commons committees' May 2018 report, Carillion's former directors, though most were shareholders, were not members of the company's defined benefit pension schemes but received employer contributions to a defined contribution scheme; for 2016 Richard Howson and Richard Adam received employer contributions of £231,000 and £163,000 respectively, matching the pension column of the 2016 remuneration report. That report states that Howson received pension contributions and supplements of 40 per cent of salary up to a cap of £132,700 and 33.6 per cent above it, and that Zafar Khan received 20 per cent up to the cap and 25 per cent above it. 3 1 2 4
- qualification
- Carillion's 2014 remuneration report shows Howson as a deferred member of a defined benefit scheme that was closed to future accrual in April 2009, with an accrued pension of £27,557 at 31 December 2014; the committees' general statement does not mention this deferred entitlement.
sources in this section
- Company statement source · src-094 identified by category only · Company statement
- Company statement source · src-003 identified by category only · Company statement
- Carillion: Second Joint Report of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (HC 769), chapters on the company and its board House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees · May 2018
- Carillion: Responses from Interested Parties to the committees' report (HC 1392, Second Special Report) House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees · 12 Jul 2018
- Carillion Group Business Plan, January 2018 (published by the committees) House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · Jan 2018
- Companies House officers list: Carillion plc (03782379) Companies House
- Research source · src-105 identified by category only · Research
- FRC findings of 12 May 2026 on former Carillion finance directors and accountants Financial Reporting Council · 12 May 2026
- Other source · src-104 identified by category only · Other
- Letter from the chair of Carillion (DB) Pension Trustee Limited to the Chair of the Work and Pensions Committee House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · 26 Jan 2018
- Written question 203243 on Carillion director disqualification proceedings and the government answer of 24 October 2023 UK Parliament · 24 Oct 2023
- Letter from Andrew Dougal to the committee chairs, 5 April 2018 House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · 5 Apr 2018
- Other source · src-074 identified by category only · Other
- Project Ray: Independent Business Review of the Carillion group prepared by FTI Consulting for the lenders (published by the committees) House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · 15 Jan 2018
- Investigation into the government's handling of the collapse of Carillion (HC 1002) National Audit Office · 7 Jun 2018
- FCA fines former chief executive of Carillion plc (in liquidation) Financial Conduct Authority · 16 Feb 2026
- Regulatory record source · src-095 identified by category only · Regulatory record
- Letter from Richard Adam to the committee chairs, 20 February 2018 House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · 20 Feb 2018
- FCA fines former finance directors of Carillion plc (in liquidation) Financial Conduct Authority · 7 Jan 2026
- Carillion: Second Joint Report of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (HC 769), chapter on external checks and balances House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees · May 2018
- Companies House company record: Carillion (AM) Limited (01367044) Companies House
- Letter from Zafar Khan to the committee chairs, 21 February 2018 House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · 21 Feb 2018
- Companies House officers list: Carillion (AMBS) Limited (SC020258), page 2 Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Alison Jane Horner Companies House
3Carillion's directors in the Companies House register
documentedThe Companies House officer list for Carillion plc (company number 03782379) shows 32 officer entries, 25 of them marked as resigned. Seven directors are listed as active with no termination date: Keith Robertson Cochrane, Andrew James Harrower Dougal, Philip Nevill Green, Alison Jane Horner, Alan Charles Lovell, Baroness Sally Morgan and Justin Richard Read. Companies House records the company as in compulsory liquidation, with the winding up commencing on 15 January 2018; the officer list records no termination for these seven appointments. Emma Mercer does not appear in the list. 1 2
documentedCompanies House records Keith Robertson Cochrane as a director of Carillion plc appointed on 2 July 2015; the officer list shows the appointment as active, with no termination recorded. 1 3
documentedCompanies House records Andrew James Harrower Dougal as a director of Carillion plc appointed on 3 October 2011; the officer list shows the appointment as active, with no termination recorded. 1 4
documentedCompanies House records Philip Nevill Green as a director of Carillion plc appointed on 1 June 2011; the officer list shows the appointment as active, with no termination recorded. The officer record behind this entry lists this single appointment. 1 5
documentedThe Carillion plc officer list also contains a second director entry under the name Philip Nevill Green, recorded as appointed and resigned on the same day, 1 June 2011. The officer record behind this second entry lists that one Carillion plc appointment and no other. 1 6
documentedCompanies House records Alison Jane Horner as a director of Carillion plc appointed on 1 December 2013; the officer list shows the appointment as active, with no termination recorded. 1 7
documentedCompanies House records Alan Charles Lovell as a director of Carillion plc appointed on 1 November 2017; the officer list shows the appointment as active, with no termination recorded. 1 8
documentedCompanies House records Baroness Sally Morgan (Baroness Morgan of Huyton) as a director of Carillion plc appointed on 1 July 2017; the officer list shows the appointment as active, with no termination recorded. The officer record behind this entry lists this single appointment. 1 9
documentedCompanies House records Dirk Olaf Fitzhugh as company secretary of Carillion plc from 28 May 1999 to 1 December 2001. 1
documentedCompanies House records Richard Francis Tapp as company secretary of Carillion plc from 1 December 2001 to 25 June 2018; the recorded resignation date falls after the winding up of Carillion plc commenced on 15 January 2018. 1 2
documentedCompanies House records Richard John Adam as a director of Carillion plc from 2 April 2007 to 31 December 2016. 1 10
documentedCompanies House records Christopher Roger Ettrick Brooke as a director of Carillion plc from 28 May 1999 to 31 December 2001. 1 11
documentedCompanies House records Alan Charles Coppin as a director of Carillion plc from 8 June 1999 to 31 December 2001. 1
documentedCompanies House records Roger Joseph Dickens as a director of Carillion plc from 24 May 2000 to 2 December 2005. 1 12
documentedCompanies House records David Noel Christopher Garman as a director of Carillion plc from 7 September 2004 to 4 May 2011. 1
documentedCompanies House records Christopher Francis Girling as a director of Carillion plc from 8 November 1999 to 30 April 2007. 1 13
documentedCompanies House records Richard John Howson as a director of Carillion plc from 10 December 2009 to 10 July 2017. 1
documentedCompanies House records David Stuart Hurcomb as a director of Carillion plc from 1 January 2008 to 8 December 2009. 1
documentedCompanies House records Thomas Donald Kenny as a director of Carillion plc from 6 September 2006 to 31 August 2010. 1 14
documentedCompanies House records Zafar Iqbal Khan as a director of Carillion plc from 1 January 2017 to 11 September 2017. 1
documentedCompanies House records David Ossian Maloney as a director of Carillion plc from 1 November 2005 to 3 October 2011. 1 15
documentedCompanies House records John McDonough as a director of Carillion plc from 1 January 2001 to 31 December 2011. 1 16
documentedCompanies House records Euan McEwan as a director of Carillion plc from 28 May 1999 to 30 April 2001. 1
documentedCompanies House records Steven Lewis Mogford as a director of Carillion plc from 6 September 2006 to 31 December 2015. 1 17
documentedCompanies House records Vanda Murray as a director of Carillion plc from 1 June 2005 to 7 May 2014. 1 18
documentedCompanies House records Jean Paul Parayre as a director of Carillion plc from 28 May 1999 to 7 December 2004. 1
documentedCompanies House records Andrew Ronald Parrish as a director of Carillion plc from 31 March 2000 to 11 May 2005. 1 19
documentedCompanies House records Ceri Michele Powell as a director of Carillion plc from 2 April 2014 to 31 March 2017; it is the only appointment on her officer record. 1 20
documentedCompanies House records Roger William Robinson as a director of Carillion plc from 28 May 1999 to 6 May 2009. 1
documentedCompanies House records Philip Graham Rogerson as a director of Carillion plc from 1 October 2004 to 7 May 2014. 1 21
documentedCompanies House records Bernard John Sharples as a director of Carillion plc from 28 May 1999 to 16 May 2001. 1
documentedCompanies House records Sir Neville Ian Simms as a director of Carillion plc from 28 May 1999 to 11 May 2005. 1
documentedCompanies House records Keith Robertson Cochrane as a director of four companies, Carillion Services Limited, Carillion (AMBS) Limited, Carillion Integrated Services Limited and Sovereign Hospital Services Limited, each from 12 December 2017 to 14 February 2018. The recorded resignation date falls after the winding up of Carillion plc commenced on 15 January 2018; the register shows all four companies as in liquidation. 3 22 2
documentedKeith Robertson Cochrane's main Companies House officer record lists 99 appointments. It records him as a director of Weir plc (company number SC002934) from 3 July 2006 to 30 September 2016, of Third Energy Onshore Limited from 8 September 2017 to 12 September 2018, and of Buchan 2 Limited from 10 September 2024, the last shown as active. 3
documentedA second Companies House officer record under the name Keith Robertson Cochrane, with registry details matching his Carillion plc entry, lists 114 appointments, among them a directorship of Stagecoach Group Limited from 4 March 1996 to 21 July 2002. 23
documentedRichard John Howson's Companies House officer record lists 61 appointments. It records him as a director of Carillion Construction Limited from 10 December 2009; of Carillion Services Limited, Carillion Services 2006 Limited and Carillion (AMBS) Limited from 15 December 2010; of Carillion JM Limited and Carillion MENA Limited from 6 February 2012; and of Amber LEP Investments Limited from 19 October 2012. Each of these directorships, like every other directorship on the first page of the list apart from John Wood Group Limited, is recorded as ending on 15 January 2018, the date on which the winding up of Carillion plc commenced. 24 22 2
documentedCompanies House records Richard John Howson as a director of John Wood Group Limited from 12 May 2016 to 17 January 2018. 24
documentedZafar Iqbal Khan's Companies House officer record lists 76 appointments. It records him as a director of Carillion Construction Limited from 10 January 2014 and of Carillion Holdings Limited from 31 October 2016, both to 11 September 2017, the date on which his Carillion plc directorship ended. The Carillion (AMBS) Limited officer list records two terms for him as a director: from 10 January 2014 to 11 September 2014, and from 31 October 2016 to 11 September 2017. 25 22 1
documentedRichard John Adam's Companies House officer record lists 163 appointments. The Carillion (AMBS) Limited officer list records him as a director of that company from 12 February 2008 to 31 October 2016. 10 22
documentedCompanies House records Richard John Adam as a director of Countrywide Limited from 9 June 2014 to 25 April 2018, of Countryside Partnerships Limited from 17 December 2015 to 31 December 2017, of FirstGroup plc from 24 February 2017 to 2 February 2018, and of BMT Group Limited from 1 May 2017 to 17 January 2018. 10
documentedAndrew James Harrower Dougal's Companies House officer record lists 70 appointments. Besides Carillion plc, it records him as a director of Taylor Wimpey plc from 18 November 2002 to 21 April 2011, Premier Farnell Limited from 1 September 2006 to 16 June 2015, Digital Unlimited Group Ltd from 7 September 2006 to 30 November 2015, and Victrex plc from 1 March 2015 to 6 February 2018. 4
documentedThe same Companies House record lists Andrew James Harrower Dougal as a director of Hanson Trust Limited from 31 May 1995 to 22 October 1999, of the Construction Products Association from 19 October 1999 to 18 June 2002, and of BPB Limited from 1 August 2003 to 7 December 2005. 4
documentedAlison Jane Horner's Companies House officer record lists two appointments: the Carillion plc directorship and a directorship of Tesco Pension Trustees Limited from 29 March 2012 to 1 June 2018. 7
documentedAlan Charles Lovell's main Companies House officer record lists 8 appointments. Besides Carillion plc, it records him as a director of Sepura Limited from 24 October 2016 to 24 May 2017, Birmingham Highways Holdings Limited from 20 August 2018 to 29 June 2019, Amey Limited from 29 April 2019 to 31 July 2019, and Mitie Group plc from 1 January 2021 to 5 March 2021. 8
documentedA second Companies House officer record under the name Alan Charles Lovell, with registry details matching his Carillion plc entry, lists one appointment: director of University of Winchester Academy Trust from 5 August 2015 to 16 December 2016. 26
documentedA second Companies House officer record, under the name Sally Morgan of Huyton and with registry details matching her Carillion plc entry, lists one appointment: director of The Professional Teaching Institute from 29 May 2020 to 31 December 2024. 27
documentedJustin Richard Read's Companies House officer record lists 262 appointments. Besides Carillion plc, it records him as a director of Speedy Hire Centres Limited from 1 April 2008 to 27 August 2011, SEGRO Public Limited Company from 30 August 2011 to 31 December 2016, Ibstock plc from 1 January 2017 to 21 May 2026, Grainger plc from 13 February 2017 to 18 June 2026, and Affinity Water Limited from 14 July 2020, the last shown as active. 28
documentedA second Companies House officer record under the name Dirk Olaf Fitzhugh, with the same correspondence details as his Carillion plc secretary entry, lists three appointments, among them company secretary of Carillion Nominees Limited from 21 July 1999 to 1 December 2001, the date on which his Carillion plc secretaryship ended. 1 29
documentedRichard Francis Tapp's Companies House officer record lists 119 appointments. It records him as company secretary of Carillion Nominees Limited from 1 December 2001 to 18 December 2018, and as director and company secretary of Carillion Group Limited from 1 December 2001 with no end date recorded; both companies are shown as dissolved. 30
documentedCompanies House shows Richard Francis Tapp as an active director of Marchwiel Properties Limited and as active company secretary of Carillion AM Developments Limited, both appointments dated 12 February 2008; the register records both companies as in liquidation. 30
documentedCompanies House records Richard Francis Tapp as a director of The Centre for Tomorrow's Company from 25 February 2017, with no resignation date; the company is shown as dissolved. 30
documentedChristopher Roger Ettrick Brooke's Companies House officer record lists 40 appointments. It records him as a director of Candover Investments plc from before 15 May 1991 to 11 May 1999, of Tarmac Holdings (THL) Limited from 20 April 1994 to 29 July 1999, of SEGRO Public Limited Company from before 1 June 1992 to 15 May 2001, of Foresight Enterprise VCT plc from 4 February 1998 to 10 December 2012, and of IP Group plc from 20 December 2001 to 31 August 2011. 11
documentedThe Companies House officer list for Marshalls plc shows 30 officers, 22 of them resigned. It includes three former directors of Carillion plc: Alan Charles Coppin, director from 12 May 2010 to 18 May 2016 under the same officer record as his Carillion plc directorship; Vanda Murray, director from 9 May 2018 and shown as active; and Philip Graham Rogerson, director from 1 September 2021 to 14 December 2021. 31
documentedRoger Joseph Dickens's Companies House officer record lists 29 appointments. It records him as a director of KPMG Audit Limited from 3 October 1995 to 30 September 1998, of Tarmac Holdings (THL) Limited from 1 October 1998 to 14 March 2000, and of Tarmac Group Limited from 24 May 1999 to 14 March 2000. 12
documentedCompanies House records Roger Joseph Dickens as a director of The National Exhibition Centre Limited from 10 December 1998 to 29 January 2006, of iSOFT Solutions Limited from 21 July 2000 to 22 April 2004, and of Headlam Group plc from 6 February 2004 to 29 January 2006. 12
documentedDavid Noel Christopher Garman's Companies House officer record lists 60 appointments. It records him as a director of Babble Cloud Holdings Limited from 25 October 2017 to 9 November 2020, and of Project Volta Bidco Limited and Project Volta Topco Limited from 16 July 2026, both shown as active. 32
documentedChristopher Francis Girling's Companies House officer record lists 97 appointments. It records him as a director of Carillion Construction Limited, Carillion Private Finance Limited, Carillion Professional Services Limited and Carillion GB Limited, each from 8 November 1999 to 2 April 2007, and of Carillion Group Limited and Sovereign Harbour Waterfront Holdings Limited from 16 May 2001 to 2 April 2007. 13
documentedCompanies House records Christopher Francis Girling as a director of Carillion Pensions Limited from 4 May 2001 to 20 June 2007, of Carillion Pension Trustees Limited from 4 May 2001 to 30 April 2007, and of Carillion Trustees Limited from 16 May 2001 to 29 June 2007; all three companies are shown as dissolved. 13
documentedCompanies House records Christopher Francis Girling as a director of Elementis plc from 29 April 2005 to 31 July 2013, of Slaughter and May Pensions Trustees Limited from 26 June 2007 to 25 April 2024, and of Arco Limited from 22 November 2007 to 30 November 2014. 13
documentedDavid Stuart Hurcomb's Companies House officer record lists 87 appointments. It records him as a director of NG Bailey Group Limited and NG Bailey Limited from 24 September 2010 to 1 June 2024, and of Van Elle Holdings Limited from 1 November 2017 to 15 June 2026. 33
documentedThomas Donald Kenny's Companies House officer record lists 50 appointments. It records him as a director of Schal International Management Limited from 1 January 2005 and of Planned Maintenance Engineering Limited from 8 March 2005, both to 31 August 2010, the date on which his Carillion plc directorship ended, and as a director of Lavendon Group Limited from 1 October 2011 to 30 October 2020. 14 1
documentedA second Companies House officer record under the name Thomas Donald Kenny, with registry details matching his Carillion plc entry, lists 25 appointments. They include directorships of Lavendon Holdings Limited and Nationwide Platforms Limited from 3 January 2012 to 30 October 2020, of Blue Sky Topco Limited and Bluesky Solutions Limited from 10 September 2018 to 30 October 2020, and of Balcombe Breeze Limited from 5 February 2021 to 29 February 2024. 34
documentedDavid Ossian Maloney's Companies House officer record lists 149 appointments. It records him as a director of Micro Focus International Limited from 4 April 2005 to 25 September 2014, Cineworld Group plc from 22 May 2006 to 26 May 2015, Ei Group Limited from 10 July 2008 to 5 July 2018, and Stock Spirits Group Limited from 21 October 2013 to 29 November 2021. 15
documentedJohn McDonough's Companies House officer record lists 86 appointments. It records him as a director of Carillion Construction Limited from 1 February 2001, of Carillion Holdings Limited from 15 November 2004 and of Carillion (AMBS) Limited from 12 February 2008, each to 31 December 2011, the date on which his Carillion plc directorship ended. 16 35 1
documentedCompanies House records John McDonough as a director of Black Country Consortium Limited from 1 April 2011 to 30 March 2012; the company is shown as dissolved. 16
documentedEuan McEwan's Companies House officer record lists 123 appointments. It records him as a director of Carillion Construction Overseas Limited from 1 March 1996 and of Carillion LGS Limited from 14 May 1996, both to 30 April 2001, the date on which his Carillion plc directorship ended, and of G4S Carillion Limited and Semperian (Fazakerley) Limited from 16 November 1999 to 16 May 2001. 36 1
documentedCompanies House records Euan McEwan as a director of AWG Group Limited from 10 October 2002 to 14 April 2004 and of Currie & Brown International Limited from 1 February 2006 to 17 January 2013, and as a director of Case Estates Limited from 1 January 2026 and of Case Property No. 1 Limited from 4 August 2026, both shown as active. 36
documentedSteven Lewis Mogford's main Companies House officer record lists 20 appointments. It records him as a director of BAE Systems plc from 1 April 2000 to 9 May 2007, Leonardo UK Ltd from 1 January 2008 to 1 January 2011, United Utilities Group plc from 5 January 2011 to 31 March 2023, and Water Plus Group Limited from 1 June 2016 to 26 April 2023. 17
documentedVanda Murray's Companies House officer record lists 35 appointments. It records her as a director of SIG plc from 1 July 2009 to 16 March 2011, Manchester Airports Holdings Limited from 28 February 2013 to 31 March 2024, Bunzl Public Limited Company from 1 February 2015 to 24 April 2024, and Yorkshire Water Services Limited from 1 July 2021 to 30 September 2026. 18
documentedCompanies House shows Vanda Murray as an active director of Marshalls plc from 9 May 2018, of Howden Joinery Group plc from 1 February 2024, and of English National Opera from 26 February 2026. 18
documentedAndrew Ronald Parrish's Companies House officer record lists 21 appointments. It records him as a director of Senior plc from 1 January 1997 to 22 March 2000, shortly before his Carillion plc appointment on 31 March 2000, and of UCAS Media Limited from 10 June 2005 to 9 June 2009. 19 1
documentedRoger William Robinson's Companies House officer record lists 96 appointments. It records him as a director of Carillion Construction Limited and Postworth Limited from 1 January 1996, of Carillion Private Finance Limited from 16 May 2001 and of Carillion Holdings Limited from 15 November 2004, each to 30 June 2009. The Carillion (AMBS) Limited officer list records him as a director of that company from 12 February 2008 to 30 June 2009. 37 35
documentedCompanies House still shows Roger William Robinson as an active director of Carillion Civil Engineering Limited, appointed on 1 January 1996; the register records the company as in liquidation. 37
documentedCompanies House records Roger William Robinson as a director of Integrated Accommodation Services plc from 16 May 2001 to 30 June 2009 and of Infrastructure Investments (Defence) Limited from 28 April 2006 to 30 June 2009. 37
documentedPhilip Graham Rogerson's main Companies House officer record lists 36 appointments. It records him as a director of Aggreko Limited from 28 August 1997 to 25 April 2012, ZIGUP plc from 5 November 2003 to 31 December 2009, THUS Group Limited from 1 September 2004 to 2 October 2008, and Bunzl Public Limited Company from 1 January 2010 to 15 April 2020, and as a member of Ingenious Film Partners LLP from 4 February 2005 to 6 April 2010. 21
documentedA second Companies House officer record under the name Philip Graham Rogerson, with registry details matching his Carillion plc entry, lists one appointment: director of Marshalls plc from 1 September 2021 to 14 December 2021. 38
documentedA second Companies House officer record under the name Neville Ian Simms, with registry details matching his Carillion plc entry, lists two appointments: director of Equiniti Enterprises Limited from 1 July 2009 and of Equiniti X2 Enterprises Limited from 25 March 2010, both to 31 August 2011; both companies are shown as dissolved. 39
documentedCompanies House's officer record for Emma Mercer lists five appointments, all directorships recorded as starting and ending on the same day: Carillion (AM) Limited, Carillion Utility Services S.E. Limited and Carillion JM Limited on 27 March 2009, and Carillion Capital Projects Limited and Dudley Bower Group Plc on 24 March 2010. Carillion plc is not among them. 40
documentedThe Companies House officer list of Carillion (AMBS) Limited records a director named Emma Louise Mercer, a separate officer record whose registry details match those of the Emma Mercer record, for two terms: from 8 December 2011 to 10 January 2014, and from 12 December 2017 to 1 June 2018. The second term began on the day Keith Robertson Cochrane was also appointed to that company and ended after the winding up of Carillion plc commenced on 15 January 2018. 35 22 2
documentedCompanies House lists Edward John Macnamara as a member of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP from 1 July 2012, shown as active; it is the only appointment on his officer record. The special managers' published case information names Edward John Macnamara as one of the special managers of Carillion plc. 41 42
documentedCompanies House lists Michael John Andrew Jervis as a member of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP from 31 December 2002 to 4 January 2023; it is the only appointment on his officer record. 43
documentedPwC's list of Carillion entities in liquidation (as at 2 August 2018) names David Chapman, Official Receiver, as liquidator in the compulsory liquidations and lists the special managers by initials: Michael John Andrew Jervis and David James Kelly for Carillion Plc; Jervis, Kelly, Peter David Dickens and David Matthew Hammond for Carillion Construction Limited (00594581); and Jervis, Kelly, David Christian Chubb and Russell Downs for the other four companies wound up on 15 January 2018. The list gives the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales as the regulatory body of each PwC insolvency practitioner named. 44
sources in this section
- Companies House officers list: Carillion plc (03782379) Companies House
- Companies House insolvency record: Carillion plc (03782379) Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Keith Robertson Cochrane Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Andrew James Harrower Dougal Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Philip Nevill Green Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Philip Nevill Green (second record) Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Alison Jane Horner Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Alan Charles Lovell Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Baroness Sally Morgan Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Richard John Adam Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Christopher Roger Ettrick Brooke Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Roger Joseph Dickens Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Christopher Francis Girling Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Thomas Donald Kenny Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: David Ossian Maloney Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: John McDonough Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Steven Lewis Mogford Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Vanda Murray Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Andrew Ronald Parrish Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Ceri Michele Powell Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Philip Graham Rogerson Companies House
- Companies House officers list: Carillion (AMBS) Limited (SC020258), page 1 Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Keith Robertson Cochrane (second record) Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Richard John Howson Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Zafar Iqbal Khan Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Alan Charles Lovell (second record) Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Sally Morgan of Huyton Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Justin Richard Read Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Dirk Olaf Fitzhugh (second record) Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Richard Francis Tapp Companies House
- Companies House officers list: Marshalls plc (05100353) Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: David Noel Christopher Garman Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: David Stuart Hurcomb Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Thomas Donald Kenny (second record) Companies House
- Companies House officers list: Carillion (AMBS) Limited (SC020258), page 2 Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Euan McEwan Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Roger William Robinson Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Philip Graham Rogerson (second record) Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Neville Ian Simms (second record) Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Emma Mercer Companies House
- Company statement source · src-071 identified by category only · Company statement
- Companies House officer appointments: Edward John Macnamara Companies House
- Companies House officer appointments: Michael John Andrew Jervis Companies House
- Company statement source · src-054 identified by category only · Company statement
4Carillion's results, borrowing, funding and dividends, 2014–2018
documentedIn the chairman's statement of its 2014 annual report, dated 4 March 2015, Carillion plc reported total revenue unchanged at £4.1 billion, reported profit before taxation up 29 per cent to £142.6 million (2013: £110.6 million) and net borrowing of £177.3 million at 31 December 2014 (2013: £215.2 million), after the £38.5 million impact of two bolt-on acquisitions in Canada. It stated that the convertible bond issued in December 2014 raised an additional £170 million and took total available funding to approximately £1.3 billion. 1 2 3
- qualification
- Figures as reported by Carillion. TPR later stated that its assessment of material obtained and shared by other agencies indicated that Carillion PLC had published misleading information about its financial performance between July 2015 and July 2017, and on 12 May 2026 the FRC announced that two former Group Finance Directors of Carillion plc had accepted misconduct in preparing accounting information material to reported performance between 2013 and 2016 inclusive and the half year to 2017, each admitting recklessness and a failure to act with integrity, with no finding or admission of dishonesty.
documentedThe audit committee report in Carillion's 2014 annual report gives group revenue of £4,071.9 million for 2014 (2013: £4,080.9 million) and underlying profit before tax of £172.9 million (2013: £174.7 million). 1
documentedPhilip Green signed the chairman's statements of Carillion plc's 2014 annual report (dated 4 March 2015) and 2016 annual report (dated 1 March 2017) as Chairman, and both reports list him as Chairman among the non-executive directors. The House of Commons committees' May 2018 report describes him as a non-executive director from June 2011 and Chairman since May 2014. 1 4 5
documentedCarillion's consolidated balance sheet at 31 December 2014, approved by the board on 4 March 2015 and signed on its behalf by Group Finance Director Richard Adam, showed intangible assets of £1,610.8 million, trade and other receivables of £1,325.4 million, cash and cash equivalents of £472.0 million and total assets of £3,890.4 million, against trade and other payables of £1,727.1 million, borrowing of £35.3 million (current) and £614.0 million (non-current) and retirement benefit liabilities of £515.8 million, leaving net assets of £894.5 million (2013: £983.6 million). 1
documentedThe five-year review in Carillion's 2014 annual report shows the group's net retirement benefit liability (net of deferred tax) at £182.1 million in 2010, £229.3 million in 2011, £269.9 million in 2012, £295.1 million in 2013 and £406.2 million in 2014, and intangible assets rising from £1,221.2 million in 2010 to £1,610.8 million in 2014. 1
documentedThe parent-company balance sheet of Carillion plc at 31 December 2014, signed by Richard Adam, showed investments in subsidiary undertakings and joint ventures of £1,889.4 million, net current liabilities of £267.2 million (2013: net current assets of £221.8 million), borrowing due after more than one year of £435.0 million and net assets of £1,187.2 million. The company then had undrawn committed borrowing facilities of £722.0 million (2013: £550.5 million), £714.9 million of them expiring in two to five years, and borrowings in foreign currencies of £257.9 million (US dollars £195.6 million, Canadian dollars £54.4 million, UAE dirhams £7.9 million). 1
documentedCarillion plc's own financial statements record parent-company guarantees: at the end of 2014, guarantees of subsidiaries' borrowings of £203.9 million (2013: £23.1 million), of deferred equity payments in PPP special purpose entities of £117.6 million and of bank letters of credit for PPP customers' performance contracts of £35.0 million; in both 2014 and 2016, guarantees and counter-indemnities to financial institutions for performance and other contract-related bonds and to certain defined benefit pension schemes for deficit recovery payments; and in 2016 performance guarantees for subsidiaries, joint ventures and joint arrangements and a guarantee of the £170 million convertible bonds issued by its wholly owned subsidiary Carillion Finance (Jersey) Limited. At 30 June 2017 the group's guarantees of bank letters of credit for deferred equity payments, joint-venture interest payments and PPP performance contracts totalled £81.5 million (31 December 2016: £103.5 million). 1 4 6
documentedCarillion plc's 2016 annual report, whose strategic report was approved on 1 March 2017, reported total revenue of £5.2 billion (2015: £4.6 billion), group revenue of £4.4 billion (2015: £4.0 billion), underlying profit before taxation of £178.0 million (2015: £176.5 million), reported profit before taxation of £146.7 million (2015: £155.1 million), underlying earnings per share of 35.3p and basic earnings per share of 28.9p (2015: 30.9p), an order book of £16.0 billion (2015: £17.4 billion) and a pipeline of contract opportunities of £41.6 billion. Net borrowing was £218.9 million at 31 December 2016 (2015: £169.8 million) and average net borrowing for 2016 was £586.5 million (2015: £538.9 million). 4 2 3
- qualification
- Figures as reported by Carillion. TPR later stated that its assessment of material obtained and shared by other agencies indicated that Carillion PLC had published misleading information about its financial performance between July 2015 and July 2017, and on 12 May 2026 the FRC announced that two former Group Finance Directors of Carillion plc had accepted misconduct in preparing accounting information material to reported performance between 2013 and 2016 inclusive and the half year to 2017, each admitting recklessness and a failure to act with integrity, with no finding or admission of dishonesty.
documentedBy geography, Carillion's 2016 annual report shows total revenue of £3,831.1 million in the United Kingdom (74 per cent; 2015: £3,356.7 million), £596.4 million in Canada (11 per cent) and £786.7 million in the Middle East and North Africa (15 per cent). By segment, support services revenue was £2,712.7 million (2015: £2,534.2 million; UK 78 per cent, Canada 17 per cent, Middle East 5 per cent), Middle East construction services £668.3 million (2015: £601.6 million; Oman 31, Dubai 31, Qatar 29, Abu Dhabi 5 and Saudi Arabia 4 per cent) and construction services excluding the Middle East £1,520.2 million (2015: £1,258.3 million; UK 96 per cent, Canada 4 per cent). 4
documentedAt 31 December 2016, according to Carillion's 2016 annual report, the group held cash and cash equivalents of £469.8 million against bank overdrafts of £2.1 million, bank loans of £145.9 million, finance lease obligations of £15.6 million and other loans of £525.1 million, giving gross borrowing of £688.7 million and net borrowing of £218.9 million (2015: £169.8 million). The five-year review shows a net retirement benefit liability, net of deferred taxation, of £663.2 million (2015: £317.6 million) and net assets of £729.9 million (2015: £1,016.6 million). 4 2 3
- qualification
- Figures as reported by Carillion. TPR later stated that its assessment of material obtained and shared by other agencies indicated that Carillion PLC had published misleading information about its financial performance between July 2015 and July 2017, and on 12 May 2026 the FRC announced that two former Group Finance Directors of Carillion plc had accepted misconduct in preparing accounting information material to reported performance between 2013 and 2016 inclusive and the half year to 2017, each admitting recklessness and a failure to act with integrity, with no finding or admission of dishonesty.
attributedAccording to the House of Commons committees' May 2018 report, Carillion's borrowing increased from £242 million in December 2009 to £689 million in December 2016, and its debt-to-equity ratio reached 5.3 by December 2016, considerably above the ratio of 2 that the committees described as widely considered acceptable. 5 4
- qualification
- The committees' figures come from Carillion's published accounts; the £689 million corresponds to the gross borrowing of £688.7 million in the 2016 annual report. The assessment of the ratio is the committees'.
- response
- Philip Green told the committees that 'the board consistently challenged management on debt, and management then developed a so-called self-help plan to reduce debt', while also saying that he regretted the board 'did not reduce net debt sooner'.
documentedThe committees' May 2018 report states that Carillion's accounts were signed off with an unmodified opinion each year by KPMG as auditor and that, until July 2017, there was little public information to suggest they presented anything other than a true and fair picture; Carillion's 2014 and 2016 annual reports name KPMG LLP as auditor. 5 1 4
documentedIn its results for the six months to 30 June 2017, approved on 29 September 2017, Carillion reported total underlying revenue of £2,498 million (H1 2016: £2,487 million), underlying profit before taxation of £50 million (H1 2016: £85 million) and a reported loss before taxation of £1,153 million (H1 2016: profit of £84 million), a basic loss per share of 261.2p and net debt of £571 million (H1 2016: £291 million). It left unchanged the £845 million provision for construction contracts announced with the profit warning of 10 July 2017, added a £200 million provision for support services contracts and a £134 million goodwill impairment for the UK and Canadian construction businesses, and suspended 2017 dividends. Non-recurring operating items of £1,189.5 million comprised £668.0 million in construction services excluding the Middle East, £313.9 million in Middle East construction services and £208.1 million in support services, and the reconciliation shows a reported loss of £1,153.3 million against underlying profit before taxation of £50.3 million. 6 5 2 3
- qualification
- Figures as reported by Carillion. TPR later stated that its assessment of material obtained and shared by other agencies indicated that Carillion PLC had published misleading information about its financial performance between July 2015 and July 2017, and on 12 May 2026 the FRC announced that two former Group Finance Directors of Carillion plc had accepted misconduct in preparing accounting information material to reported performance between 2013 and 2016 inclusive and the half year to 2017, each admitting recklessness and a failure to act with integrity, with no finding or admission of dishonesty.
documentedCarillion's 2017 half-year accounts attribute the £134 million goodwill impairment to the UK construction business (£123.5 million), after a value-in-use review prompted by poor first-half trading and the decision to stop undertaking construction in the UK PPP market, and to construction activities in Canada (£10.5 million), after the decision to exit that market. 6
documentedIn its 2017 half-year accounts Carillion treated the contract provisions of £1,045.5 million recorded in the interim accounts as changes in estimate under IAS 8, recognised them as current-period items and did not restate comparative amounts for prior-period errors. 6
- qualification
- This is Carillion's own accounting position as published in September 2017.
documentedCarillion's 2017 half-year accounts show cash used in operations of £270.1 million in the first half of 2017 (H1 2016: £38.4 million used; full year 2016: £115.5 million generated) and dividends of £54.4 million paid to equity holders of the parent (H1 2016: £54.0 million; full year 2016: £78.9 million). The interim review states that these items, together with paying the 2016 final dividend in June 2017, meant that net borrowing rose to £571 million at 30 June 2017, with average net borrowing of £694 million in the first half. 6
documentedCarillion's condensed balance sheet at 30 June 2017 showed total assets of £3,669.4 million and total liabilities of £4,074.6 million, giving net liabilities of £405.2 million (31 December 2016: net assets of £729.9 million). Liabilities included trade and other payables of £1,999.8 million, borrowing of £36.9 million (current) and £924.3 million (non-current), provisions of £221.2 million (current) and £70.3 million (non-current) and retirement benefit liabilities of £721.5 million. Bank loans had risen to £321.3 million (31 December 2016: £145.9 million), other loans were £627.6 million and cash £390.4 million, for net borrowing of £570.8 million. The committees' May 2018 report summarises the position as net liabilities of £405 million and borrowing of £961 million. 6 5
documentedCarillion's funding table at 30 June 2017 lists committed borrowing facilities of £835 million maturing in 2020, private placement borrowing of £350 million (£135 million and US$280 million) maturing between 2017 and 2024, Schuldschein borrowing of £112 million (£60 million, US$27 million and €35 million) maturing in 2020 and 2022, and convertible bonds of £170 million maturing by November 2019. 6
documentedCarillion's 2017 half-year report states that the financial covenants in its committed bank facilities and private placement notes were leverage (net debt to EBITDA, as defined in the facility agreements) of no more than 3.5 times and interest cover (operating cash flow to net interest) of no less than 3.5 times; that the group complied with them at 30 June 2017 and was forecast to comply at 31 December 2017 and 30 June 2018; and that compliance with the leverage covenant depended on forecasts assuming the completion of a number of PPP disposals and settlement receipts on contracts. The board continued to adopt the going concern basis notwithstanding the net liability position in the interim balance sheet. 6 7 3
- outcome
- According to the National Audit Office, on 17 November 2017 Carillion announced that it expected to breach the terms of its banking covenants at the end of 2017, and on 22 December 2017 its lenders agreed to delay the covenant test date to April 2018. The FRC's announcement of 12 May 2026 likewise records that in November 2017 Carillion indicated it would breach its banking covenants the following month.
documentedOn 29 September 2017 Carillion announced that a term sheet for £140 million of additional committed facilities had been agreed with five of the group's core lenders, subject to documentation and conditions precedent; the facilities were to reduce to £100 million on 30 April 2018, when £40 million matured, and be repayable on 31 December 2018. The National Audit Office records the same announcement of £140 million of additional lending facilities agreed with Carillion's banks, and FTI's draft review for the lenders describes the £140 million as emergency financing provided in September 2017. 6 8 7
documentedIn its September 2017 interim announcement Carillion stated that self-help measures would not alone achieve its target of moving towards average net debt of 1.0 to 1.5 times EBITDA by the end of 2018, and that the board was therefore considering other options, including raising equity to repair and strengthen the balance sheet in due course; it guided to full-year 2017 average net debt of between £825 million and £850 million. 6
documentedCarillion's main credit facilities included a syndicated multicurrency revolving credit facility of £770 million according to its 2014 annual report and of £790 million according to its 2016 annual report. Both reports state that on a change of control any lender could, within a 30-day consultation period, cancel its commitment, with cancellation and repayment three days after that period, and that the company had to offer to prepay its private placement notes with accrued interest; the 2014 report adds that holders of the £170 million convertible bonds could require redemption at principal with accrued interest. 1 4
documentedCarillion's 2014 annual report gives total available funding of £1.3 billion: committed bank facilities of £850 million, of which £785 million matured in 2018 (the facilities included a £770 million five-year syndicated facility and £80 million of bilateral facilities, at floating rates), private placement funding of £314.5 million expiring between 2017 and 2024, and £170 million of convertible bonds maturing by 2019. The board's going concern review included a forecast of the covenants on the bank facilities, private placement and convertible bond funding. 1
documentedAccording to Carillion's 2014 annual report, in the first half of 2014 the group increased its borrowing capacity with two separate £15 million bilateral facilities, one with Barclays and one with the National Bank of Abu Dhabi. 1
documentedOn 12 December 2014 Carillion Finance (Jersey) Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of Carillion plc incorporated in Jersey, issued £170 million of senior unsecured convertible bonds guaranteed by Carillion plc and subject to a negative pledge. The bonds carried a coupon of 2.50 per cent a year payable semi-annually and an initial conversion price of £3.9856 (a 25 per cent premium to the volume-weighted average share price between launch and pricing), convertible into 42,653,553 ordinary shares, about 9.9 per cent of the issued share capital before the offering; unless previously redeemed, converted or cancelled they were to be redeemed at par on or around 19 December 2019, and on conversion the company could deliver shares, pay a cash alternative or combine the two. 4 1
documentedThe borrowing note of Carillion's 2016 annual report records that at inception the convertible bond proceeds comprised a derivative liability component of £13.4 million and a debt component of £156.6 million, and that the debt component was £162.2 million at 31 December 2016, including £5.6 million of interest accretion. Convertible bond coupon payments and interest accretion of £7.1 million and private placement interest of £14.3 million (2015: £14.3 million) were charged in 2016. 4
documentedCarillion's 2016 annual report shows £360.8 million of private placement financing at fixed rates in eight tranches: US$25.0 million at 3.85 per cent (November 2017), £49.0 million at 4.38 per cent (September 2018), £17.5 million at 3.62 per cent (August 2019), US$80.0 million at 4.29 per cent (November 2019), £51.0 million at 5.10 per cent (September 2021), £17.5 million at 4.19 per cent (August 2022), US$140.0 million at 4.86 per cent (November 2022) and US$35.0 million at 5.01 per cent (November 2024). The group's US$280 million of private placement finance came from a number of United States-based investors and was hedged with cross-currency derivatives fixing interest and capital repayments at the exchange rates prevailing when it was secured in 2013. 4
documentedAccording to Carillion's 2016 annual report, its funding at 31 December 2016 comprised committed bank facilities totalling £870 million (the £790 million five-year syndicated facility maturing in November 2020 and £80 million of bilateral facilities, both at floating rates linked to the London Interbank Offered Rate and the Canadian Dollar Offered Rate), private placement borrowing of £361 million and £170 million of convertible bonds at 2.5 per cent, together £1.4 billion; in January 2017 a further £112 million of five-year funding was raised in the German Schuldschein market to replace £116 million maturing in 2017, taking available funding to some £1.5 billion, most of it maturing in November 2020 and beyond. Undrawn committed facilities were £731.6 million (2015: £761.2 million); bank loans of £145.9 million were largely unsecured, £3.7 million being secured on the related assets; and money market and short-term overdraft facilities were also available to Carillion plc and certain subsidiaries. 4
documentedIn the strategic report of its 2016 annual report, approved on 1 March 2017, Carillion's board stated that its review included a forecast of the covenants on the group's bank facilities and private placement funding, that the directors had a reasonable expectation that the company and the group had adequate resources to continue in operational existence for the foreseeable future, and that there were no material uncertainties in relation to going concern. Carillion issued its profit warning on 10 July 2017. 4 5
attributedIn a letter of 21 February 2018 to the chairs of the Work and Pensions and Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committees, former Group Finance Director Zafar Khan stated that Carillion's average net debt, on a monthly basis, had increased from £41.8 million in 2010 to £586.5 million in 2016; that on an intra-month basis the 2016 position would have been about £150 million higher than the monthly average, broadly consistent with the net interest expense of £37.1 million paid in 2016; that the peak funding requirement in 2016 was higher still; and that the year-end debt figure, to which Richard Adam's answer to the committees related, did not reflect the much higher debt levels experienced during the rest of 2016. 9 4 10
- qualification
- This is Zafar Khan's own account as a party to the inquiry, and the intra-month estimate is his. Carillion's 2016 annual report gives year-end net borrowing of £218.9 million and average net borrowing of £586.5 million for 2016. In the same letter he described the level of debt allowed to grow in previous years as the principal contributing factor to Carillion's difficulties in 2017.
- response
- Richard Adam, Group Finance Director until the end of 2016, said in his response published by the committees on 12 July 2018 that he did not believe the evidence the committees heard and read justified their conclusions about his role before his retirement in 2016.
attributedZafar Khan's letter of 21 February 2018 states that, after an initial review of several UK construction contracts in May 2017 and as the performance of major contracts deteriorated, the Carillion board began considering with its advisers the feasibility of a rights issue to strengthen the balance sheet; that he worked closely with Carillion's brokers to plan for it; that, in his recollection, the need for an enhanced contract review as part of the preparations for a possible rights issue was ultimately a collective board decision; and that KPMG were asked to assist with that review. 9 2 11 12
- qualification
- This is Zafar Khan's recollection as a party to the inquiry. The committees describe the review as an enhanced management review of key contracts in May 2017 audited by KPMG, and TPR's regulatory intervention report describes the July 2017 profit warning as following a review of Carillion's material contracts by its auditors, KPMG LLP; the conduct and status of that review belong to the accounting and audit topic.
- response
- Andrew Dougal, audit committee chair, gave a consistent account in his letter of 5 April 2018: management, the board and the audit committee decided on an internal forward-looking analysis of the key contracts, principally involving Emma Mercer, which would also be required for any potential equity raising then starting to be considered in May 2017; the board asked KPMG to perform certain audit procedures on it, the audit committee asking for some year-end procedures to be accelerated, and the combined reviews became the 'Enhanced Contract Review'.
- outcome
- No equity was raised: according to the committees, Morgan Stanley told the board in July 2017 that it would not underwrite a proposal to raise further equity, and the board failed to attract the large injection of capital required from investors. Dougal's letter states that the review recommended a provision of £695 million, which management increased to £845 million.
documentedThe 'Board of Directors and Advisers' pages of Carillion plc's 2014 and 2016 annual reports list KPMG LLP as auditor, National Westminster Bank plc as banker, Morgan Stanley and Stifel Nicolaus Europe Ltd as joint brokers, Lazard as financial adviser, Slaughter and May as legal adviser and Equiniti as share registrar; the 2014 report adds that Equiniti maintained the company's share register. 4 1
documentedFTI's draft review of January 2018 states that the group had retained Lazard to assist with the financial restructuring and EY to support the business plan, working capital, liquidity and cost reduction. The committees' May 2018 report lists Carillion's payments to advisers on Friday 12 January 2018, three days before the company was declared insolvent, including £551,716 to Lazard & Co, £1,196,093 to Slaughter and May, £1,018,666 to FTI Consulting and £37,211 to Sacker & Partners, out of a total of £6,396,141. 8 11
attributedAccording to the committees' May 2018 report, in July 2017 Morgan Stanley told the Carillion board that it would not underwrite a proposal to raise further equity, having concluded that Carillion's senior management could neither produce nor deliver an investment proposition that would convince shareholders and new investors to support a potential rights issue; after its representatives left the meeting, the board concluded that the broker's position was 'not credible' and that, while it would continue to work with Morgan Stanley as broker in the short term, that would change. Morgan Stanley confirmed that HSBC were appointed joint corporate broker on 14 July 2017 and that Carillion thereafter sought its advice less frequently. 11 10
- qualification
- The committees' account, based on board minutes and Morgan Stanley's evidence. Philip Green had told the committees that Carillion sought quality advice, naming Slaughter and May as its lawyers, Lazard as its bankers and Morgan Stanley as its brokers.
- response
- In his response published by the committees on 12 July 2018, Philip Green said that he disagreed with many of the report's conclusions but would not comment while investigations were ongoing.
documentedThe Companies House charges register for Carillion plc (company number 03782379) lists six charges, all outstanding and none satisfied or part satisfied. The earliest, charge code 0378 2379 0001, was created on 9 December 2016 and delivered on 16 December 2016, with Santander UK PLC, as security agent for the secured parties, as the person entitled; its brief description reads 'Contains fixed charge'. 13
documentedThe other five charges registered against Carillion plc name Glas Trust Corporation Limited as the person entitled: charge codes 0378 2379 0003, 0004 and 0005 were created on 24 October 2017 and delivered on 27 October 2017, 0006 was created on 24 October 2017 and delivered on 28 October 2017, and 0002 was created on 26 October 2017 and delivered on 27 October 2017. Each is described as containing a fixed charge and is shown as outstanding. 13
analysisThe five charges in favour of Glas Trust Corporation Limited were created on 24 and 26 October 2017, after Carillion announced on 29 September 2017 a term sheet for £140 million of additional facilities with five core lenders; four of them were created on 24 October 2017, the day on which, according to the pension trustee, its contribution-deferral agreement, negotiated with Carillion and its lenders, was documented. The retained register entries do not state which obligations the charges secure, so a link between the charges and the new facilities is not established by the reviewed records. 13 6 14
- qualification
- Analysis based on the coincidence of dates in the Companies House register, Carillion's interim announcement and the Trustee's letter; no retained primary document states the secured obligations.
documentedCompanies House records identify the acquired companies: Carillion JM Limited (company number 00077628) was named John Mowlem & Company PLC until 31 December 2002, Mowlem PLC until 25 April 2006 and Mowlem Limited until 24 May 2006; Carillion (AM) Limited (01367044) was Alfred McAlpine PLC from 4 February 1985 to 12 February 2008 and Alfred McAlpine Limited until 18 March 2008; and Carillion Energy Services Limited (03858865) was Eaga PLC from 27 February 2007 to 20 April 2011 and Eaga Limited until 13 June 2011. Carillion's 2014 annual report refers to its acquisitions of Eaga plc in 2011, Alfred McAlpine plc in 2008 and Mowlem plc in 2006. 15 16 17 1
attributedAccording to the committees' May 2018 report, Carillion bought Mowlem for £350 million in 2006 and Alfred McAlpine for £565 million in 2008, taking on responsibility for their pension scheme deficits, and in 2011 bought Eaga, a supplier of heating and renewable energy services, which had made accumulated profits of £31 million before the purchase and then five consecutive years of losses totalling £260 million by the end of 2016; the committees said the Eaga purchase cost Carillion £298 million. They also state that Carillion funded its acquisitions through debt rather than equity: borrowing increased substantially between 2006 and 2008 as Mowlem and Alfred McAlpine were bought and almost trebled between 2010 and 2012 to help fund the Eaga purchase. 5
- qualification
- Committees' figures and characterisations (they called the Eaga purchase 'disastrous'). The acquired companies are now Carillion JM Limited, Carillion (AM) Limited and Carillion Energy Services Limited (see the Companies House previous-name records).
- response
- Philip Green told the committees that he regretted the board 'did not reduce net debt sooner' and conceded that it had been too slow to explore raising equity rather than relying on debt.
attributedThe committees' May 2018 report states that the accumulation of debt, and Carillion's inability to reduce it, concerned investors: Standard Life Investments began selling its shares from December 2015 onwards, citing a high debt burden unlikely to fall in the near term because of acquisitions and a high dividend pay-out, and in early 2015 UBS claimed that total debt was higher than Carillion was publicly stating, triggering a big increase in short selling of Carillion's shares. 5
- qualification
- Committees' account of investors' evidence; UBS's analysis and Carillion's handling of it are covered in the accounting topic.
attributedThe committees' May 2018 report states that Carillion purchased Mowlem, Alfred McAlpine and Eaga for substantially more than their tangible net assets and recorded goodwill of £431 million from Mowlem, £615 million from Alfred McAlpine and £329 million from Eaga, each higher than the purchase price; the committees noted that these figures are the arithmetic difference between price and net tangible assets, so their accuracy depends on the appropriateness of the price paid. 5 1 6 18 19
- qualification
- Committees' analysis and characterisation. Carillion's 2014 annual report shows group intangible assets of £1,610.8 million at 31 December 2014. A governance case study gives different figures: £512 million of goodwill added by the Mowlem purchase, an acquisition price of £554.5 million for Alfred McAlpine and goodwill of £329.1 million on Eaga; the retained records do not explain the differences from the committees' £431 million and £565 million.
- response
- Richard Adam, Finance Director from April 2007 to December 2016, wrote to the committees on 20 February 2018 that Alfred McAlpine's net liabilities of £50.1 million at acquisition and the resulting goodwill of £615 million are set out in note 32 of Carillion's 2008 annual report, that the value and rationale of the acquisition were set out in the market announcement of 10 December 2007, and that he believed cost savings of £100 million were achieved, as reflected in the 2008 and 2009 annual reports.
- outcome
- Carillion's 2017 half-year accounts recorded a goodwill impairment of £134 million in respect of the UK and Canadian construction businesses.
documentedCarillion's 2014 annual report records a non-operating charge of £9.9 million (2013: £0.7 million) for costs associated with the aborted merger discussions with Balfour Beatty plc and the acquisition of a 60 per cent interest in Rokstad Power Corporation. 1
documentedAt 31 December 2014 the Carillion group had 42,367 employees (31 December 2013: 41,304), and the Carillion plc board comprised five male and two female directors. 1
documentedCarillion's 2016 annual report shows trade payables of £749.2 million (2015: £591.4 million) and other creditors of £760.5 million (2015: £561.7 million) within current trade and other payables, which totalled £2,090.1 million at 31 December 2016; at 30 June 2017 trade and other payables were £1,999.8 million. TPR's report describes the interim 2017 accounts, the last published before insolvency, as listing trade creditors of approximately £2 billion and bank debt of just below £1 billion. 4 6 2
documentedCarillion's 2017 half-year accounts identify the UK Government as the group's major customer, with revenue of £1,719.0 million in 2016 (support services £861.3 million, PPP projects £174.5 million and construction services excluding the Middle East £683.2 million) and £856.1 million in the first half of 2017 (H1 2016: £1,009.0 million). 6
documentedCarillion's Group Business Plan of January 2018 states that the group had written about £1.1 billion off its balance sheet and that net debt had increased by about £850 million in 2017 because of legacy contracts, delays in settlements and PFI transactions; that year-end 2017 spot net debt was higher than expected at £1,100 million, while average net debt was in line with expectations at £886 million; that the group was materially over-leveraged and unable to generate enough EBITDA to fund the completion of legacy contracts and future financing, debt and pension obligations; and that it therefore needed to restructure its balance sheet and raise new finance. It expected net liabilities of £500–600 million at 31 December 2017 and 2018. In September 2017 Carillion had guided to full-year average net debt of £825 million to £850 million. 20 6
documentedThe January 2018 business plan put the funding requirement at a peak of about £360 million in September 2018 and about £350 million in September 2019, assuming intra-month peaking of about £100 million, headroom of about £75 million and continued use of the early payment facility at about £320 million during 2018, with dividend policy not yet determined; the plan was prepared on a 'business as usual' basis for bank financing, bonding, the early payment facility and leasing, and its cash flows were presented unlevered with no pension contributions. According to FTI's draft review, the plan was presented to lenders on 10 January 2018, and the group's own view of its funding requirement was £360 million, most of it needed by May 2018, plus up to £309 million of bonding and letters of credit. 20 8
documentedThe January 2018 business plan forecast (RF4) 2017 total revenue of £4,739 million and operating profit of £155 million, and planned 2018 revenue of £3,958 million (£3,537 million rebased, excluding £217 million from legacy contracts and £204 million from disposals that do not recur) with operating profit of £131 million. It cited an order book of £12.9 billion, a pipeline of £28.8 billion and revenue visibility of 75 per cent for 2018 (48 per cent for 2019), and stated that adopting IFRS 15 from 1 January 2018 would reduce reserves by £118 million with no cash impact. 20
documentedAccording to the National Audit Office, on 23 October 2017 Carillion's major lending banks (the Coordinating Committee) commissioned consultants to carry out an independent business review of Carillion's restructuring business plan; the lenders commissioned FTI to produce that review, and Carillion presented its plan first to the major lenders and their advisers FTI and then to the Cabinet Office. The committees' table of Carillion's payments to advisers on 12 January 2018 includes £1,018,666 to FTI Consulting. 7 11
attributedIn the executive summary of its draft 'Project Ray' independent business review for Carillion's lenders, published by the committees, FTI Consulting stated that the group had been poorly managed for a considerable period, with significant underperformance and contract issues masked by aggressive accounting and working capital management; that historical year-end and half-year reporting of net debt had been aggressively managed through short-term deferral of payments, acceleration of receipts and short-term loans from joint ventures; that Plc borrowings were in the region of £1.5 billion from banks and debt investors, including £140 million of emergency financing in September 2017; that the group had a further £250–300 million of off-balance-sheet 'core debt' through its early payment facility, which extended supplier payment terms from about 30 to about 120 days, and had received significant advance payments on construction and ICT (Wipro) supplier contracts; and that the group had signalled a need for full equitisation of Plc debt and about £360 million of additional financing. 8 7 21
- qualification
- FTI's views in a draft which, according to the National Audit Office, remained subject to agreement with Carillion's management and was not shown to the lenders or the Cabinet Office. The cover date of the retained copy reads 15 January 2017; the published file and the NAO's citation date it 15 January 2018.
- response
- FTI recorded that management believed its sensitivities overstated the risks and were too harsh; former directors told the NAO that they objected to the draft's analysis of their capacity to win future business and of achievable margins, which they believed was too pessimistic and overstated Carillion's capital needs.
- outcome
- In October 2023 the Insolvency Service, accepting an eight-year disqualification undertaking from Richard Howson, stated that payments procured from Wipro in 2013 and 2014 and in 2016 had been wrongly reported and accounted for as profit, understating net debt by £41.0m in the 2013 financial statements and by £39.2m in the 2016 financial statements, and that Mr Howson ought to have known of the concealment from the auditors of the true picture regarding Carillion's obligation to make repayments to Wipro.
attributedFTI's draft review estimated the technical provisions funding deficit of the group's defined benefit schemes at about £700 million and their section 75 liability at about £2.8 billion, and warned that, given the scale of the pension liabilities and the schemes' claims in an insolvency, further new money would be extremely high risk. It found that the business plan showed a funding requirement of about £240 million before disposals, sensitivities and financing costs, which the group assessed at £360 million after management sensitivities, and that FTI's own sensitivities raised the requirement to £495 million in August 2019 before future financing costs. 8
- qualification
- FTI's estimates and views in a draft document.
- response
- FTI recorded that management believed its sensitivities overstated the risks and were too harsh; FTI said it considered them a balanced view rather than a worst case.
documentedFor 2014 Carillion's board recommended a final dividend of 12.15 pence per share, making a proposed full-year dividend of 17.75 pence (2013: 17.50 pence), an increase of one per cent despite lower underlying earnings per share, with dividend cover of 1.9 times (2013: 2.0 times); the final dividend was payable on 12 June 2015. The 2014 cash flow statement shows dividends of £75.7 million paid to equity holders of the parent (2013: £74.6 million), deficit pension contributions of £46.0 million and net cash flows from operating activities of £123.8 million (2013: outflow of £78.4 million). 1
documentedFor 2016 Carillion's board proposed a final dividend of 12.65 pence per share (2015: 12.55 pence), making a total of 18.45 pence (2015: 18.25 pence), with full-year cover of 1.9 times underlying earnings per share under a progressive dividend policy; the final dividend was to be paid on 9 June 2017 to shareholders on the register on 12 May 2017, subject to approval at the annual general meeting on 3 May 2017. The 2017 half-year accounts show dividends of £54.4 million paid to equity holders of the parent in the first half of 2017 (£55.0 million including non-controlling interests). The committees' May 2018 report describes the 2016 final dividend, of £55 million, as paid on 9 June 2017, one month before dividends were suspended with the July 2017 profit warning. 4 6 5
attributedAccording to the committees' May 2018 report, January 2017 board minutes show that Zafar Khan, then Finance Director, proposed withholding the 2016 final dividend to conserve cash and reduce debt, but faced opposition from Andrew Dougal, chair of the audit committee, and Keith Cochrane, then senior independent non-executive director, who were concerned about the message withholding would send to the market; Cochrane suggested it might be appropriate to send a message about debt reduction 'at the right time' and told the committees that management were committed to reducing average net debt after paying the dividend. The February 2017 minutes record only that the board recommended a dividend of 18.45p per share. 5 4 10 9 21
- qualification
- The committees' account of board minutes of 26 January and 28 February 2017; the committees concluded that other considerations, including the debt burden, were over-ridden. The 18.45p figure is the full-year dividend for 2016; the final dividend was 12.65p.
- response
- In responses published by the committees on 12 July 2018, Keith Cochrane said he did not accept many of the report's conclusions and Andrew Dougal that he disagreed with many of them, both declining to comment in detail during ongoing investigations. Zafar Khan's letter of 21 February 2018 states that before accepting the Finance Director role he sought comfort that the board would support him in making debt reduction a priority in 2017.
- outcome
- According to the committees, the 2016 final dividend of £55 million was paid on 9 June 2017, one month before dividends were suspended entirely in the July 2017 profit warning. Among the grounds the Insolvency Service gave on 4 October 2023 for Richard Howson's disqualification undertaking was that he caused Carillion to make the 2016 final dividend payment of £54.4m, paid on 9 June 2017, which he ought to have known could not be justified by reference to the FY2016 financial statements and was not one Carillion could reasonably afford in view of its true financial performance.
attributedThe committees' May 2018 report states that over the six years 2011–2016 Carillion paid £441 million in dividends compared with £246 million in pension scheme deficit recovery payments, based on their analysis of the annual reports' cash flow statements, and that across Richard Adam's ten years as Finance Director deficit recovery payments increased by 1 per cent whereas dividends increased by 199 per cent. 5 11 2
- qualification
- The committees' figures and characterisation, derived from Carillion's cash flow statements; they argued that funding pension schemes is an obligation and paying dividends is not.
- response
- Keith Cochrane denied to the committees that dividends were given priority; Richard Adam answered that from 2012 to 2016 dividends increased by only 12 per cent whereas pension payments increased by 50 per cent; and TPR told the committees that Carillion's ratio of dividend payments to pension contributions was better than other FTSE companies.
- outcome
- TPR's later regulatory intervention report concluded that, had the 2015 and 2016 dividends been withheld, it did not automatically follow that the schemes would have received additional payments, given the group's bank debt and other creditors.
sources in this section
- Company statement source · src-094 identified by category only · Company statement
- Carillion group: regulatory intervention report The Pensions Regulator
- FRC findings of 12 May 2026 on former Carillion finance directors and accountants Financial Reporting Council · 12 May 2026
- Company statement source · src-003 identified by category only · Company statement
- Carillion: Second Joint Report of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (HC 769), chapters on the company and its board House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees · May 2018
- Company statement source · src-042 identified by category only · Company statement
- Investigation into the government's handling of the collapse of Carillion (HC 1002) National Audit Office · 7 Jun 2018
- Project Ray: Independent Business Review of the Carillion group prepared by FTI Consulting for the lenders (published by the committees) House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · 15 Jan 2018
- Letter from Zafar Khan to the committee chairs, 21 February 2018 House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · 21 Feb 2018
- Carillion: Responses from Interested Parties to the committees' report (HC 1392, Second Special Report) House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees · 12 Jul 2018
- Carillion: Second Joint Report of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (HC 769), chapter on external checks and balances House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees · May 2018
- Letter from Andrew Dougal to the committee chairs, 5 April 2018 House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · 5 Apr 2018
- Companies House charges register: Carillion plc (03782379) Companies House
- Letter from the chair of Carillion (DB) Pension Trustee Limited to the Chair of the Work and Pensions Committee House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · 26 Jan 2018
- Companies House company record: Carillion JM Limited (00077628) Companies House
- Companies House company record: Carillion (AM) Limited (01367044) Companies House
- Companies House company record: Carillion Energy Services Limited (03858865) Companies House
- Letter from Richard Adam to the committee chairs, 20 February 2018 House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · 20 Feb 2018
- Research source · src-105 identified by category only · Research
- Carillion Group Business Plan, January 2018 (published by the committees) House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · Jan 2018
- Regulatory record source · src-095 identified by category only · Regulatory record
5Carillion's pension schemes, their deficits and the Pensions Regulator
documentedAccording to the committees' May 2018 report, when Carillion entered liquidation in 2018 it had responsibility for funding 13 UK defined benefit pension schemes: the Carillion Group Section, Permarock Products Pension Scheme, Carillion 'B' Pension Scheme, The Carillion Staff Pension Scheme, Alfred McAlpine Pension Plan, Mowlem Staff Pension and Life Assurance Scheme, Planned Maintenance Engineering Limited Staff Pension and Assurance Scheme, Bower Group Retirement Benefits Scheme, The Carillion Public Sector Scheme, The Mowlem (1993) Pension Scheme, Prudential Platinum Carillion Integrated Services Limited Section, Carillion Rail (Centrac) Section and Carillion Rail (GTRM) Section; Carillion also had defined benefit obligations in Canada following acquisitions there. TPR's regulatory intervention report states that 19 of the roughly 350 entities in the group were participating employers in the 13 schemes. 1 2
documentedCarillion's annual reports describe 15 defined benefit schemes at the end of 2014 (13 in the UK, one in Canada and one in the Republic of Ireland), eight of them closed to future accrual and funded under deficit recovery plans agreed with the trustees, and 14 schemes at the end of 2016 (13 in the UK and one in Canada), plus other post-retirement benefits under four arrangements in Canada. In the 2016 report, five UK final-salary schemes operated under a single trust arrangement accounted for 83.2 per cent (£669.8 million) of the total deficit at 31 December 2016. 3 4
documentedAccording to the committees' May 2018 report, Carillion's two main defined benefit schemes for its employees were the Carillion Staff and Carillion 'B' schemes, the latter available only to executive directors and other senior employees; they were closed to further accrual in April 2009, after which employees could join a defined contribution plan. From the schemes' annual reports and accounts the committees put their combined deficits at £48 million in 2008, £165 million in 2011 and £86 million in 2013. 1
documentedThe committees' May 2018 report states that Mowlem had a year-end pension deficit of £33 million when it was purchased in 2006 and Alfred McAlpine a year-end deficit of £123 million when purchased in 2008, and that by the end of 2011 the combined deficit on these two schemes had grown to £424 million. 1
documentedCarillion (DB) Pension Trustee Limited was the single trustee of six Carillion defined benefit schemes: the Carillion Staff Pension Scheme, Carillion B Pension Scheme, Alfred McAlpine Pension Plan, Bower Group Retirement Benefits Scheme, Mowlem Staff Pension and Life Assurance Scheme, and Planned Maintenance Engineering Limited Staff Pension and Assurance Scheme. The committees' May 2018 report dates the formation of this single trustee board to 6 April 2011 and states that these schemes accounted for the large majority of Carillion's total pension deficit and membership. In his letter of 26 January 2018 its chairman, Robin Ellison, wrote that the company became trustee of the six schemes on 1 April (the year is not legible in the retained copy) and that he had been chairman since then; he named the Trustee's lawyers as Sacker & Partners LLP. 1 5
documentedMembership figures in the sources differ by scope: the committees cite Trustee data of 20,587 members across the single-trustee schemes at the end of 2013 and Carillion's 2013 annual report figure of 28,785 members across all schemes; Carillion's 2016 annual report shows 28,561 members (609 active, 15,542 deferred and 12,410 pensioners) with a defined benefit obligation of £3,361.6 million at 31 December 2016; and the PPF's letter of 20 February 2018 refers to about 27,500 members of the 13 PPF-eligible schemes. 1 4 6
documentedThe Trustee's letter of 26 January 2018 states that its board took advice from external covenant assessors for the triennial valuations and received quarterly reporting from Carillion on covenant metrics, but that until 2017 the information available to it was largely public and it had no legal power to require more; its last formal covenant report, of May 2017, prepared for the 31 December 2016 valuation, indicated potential weaknesses in Carillion's debt position but concluded that Carillion had scope to increase its pension contributions. Discussions on the 2016 valuation were halted after the July 2017 profit warning while Carillion, with the assistance of EY, reviewed contracts and cash flow. 5
attributedAccording to the committees' May 2018 report, Carillion and the trustees failed to agree the 2008 valuation within 15 months, mainly because Carillion pushed for more optimistic investment-return assumptions than the trustees considered prudent; the trustees considered contributions of £35 million a year necessary and affordable as a minimum while Carillion said it could not afford more than £23 million, and Carillion wanted a 15-year recovery plan, which the trustees noted exceeded the 10-year maximum the Regulator suggested. The valuation and recovery plans were agreed in October 2010, seven months late, with payments averaging £26 million over 16 years. 1 5 7
- qualification
- The committees' findings, based on correspondence with TPR and scheme reports. The Trustee's own letter confirms that for the 2008 and 2011 valuations agreement was not reached by the statutory due date because the Trustee (and, for 2008, the schemes' former trustees) sought a more prudent funding approach than the company considered it could afford, that this was reported to TPR, and that TPR decided not to exercise its powers.
- response
- The Trustee's letter records that Carillion repeatedly told the Trustee in valuation discussions that it was constrained in agreeing higher contributions by cash-flow constraints connected with its business model.
- outcome
- In its response published by the committees on 12 July 2018, TPR accepted the report's criticisms of how quickly it sought to use its powers in its engagement with the sponsoring employer and trustee at the 2008 and 2011 valuations.
attributedFor the 2011 valuation, the committees report that the Trustee calculated the deficit at £770 million and requested annual recovery payments of £65 million for 14 years, while Carillion, using more optimistic assumptions, put the deficit at £620 million and presented annual contributions of £33.4 million for 15 years as a take-it-or-leave-it offer. The Trustee's covenant adviser, Gazelle Corporate Finance, advised that Carillion could increase annual contributions to above £64 million without a significant impact on available cash flow and noted that it had historically prioritised other demands on capital ahead of deficit reduction; despite annual dividend increases, the company refused the Trustee's requests to link the level of dividends formally to pension contributions. 1
- qualification
- Findings and characterisations of the committees, drawing on Trustee correspondence and Gazelle's advice; the deficit figures are the parties' competing calculations for the same valuation.
- response
- According to the committees, Richard Adam, as Finance Director, argued that the company could not afford such high contributions.
- outcome
- According to the committees, a compromise reached in early 2014 on a new valuation date of 31 January 2013 left initial annual contributions at £33 million, in line with Carillion's original offer and £30 million less than the Trustee had requested.
attributedThe committees report that TPR wrote to both sides in June 2013 that contributions of £33 million to £39 million would not be 'acceptable based on the evidence we have seen', but Carillion refused to increase its offer. In early 2014 a compromise was reached on a new valuation date of 31 January 2013, when improved markets had reduced the deficit to £605 million: the Trustee reluctantly accepted initial annual contributions of £33 million, in line with Carillion's original offer and £30 million less than it had requested, scheduled to rise to £42 million from 2022; the group would guarantee payments only up to the end of 2017, after which the schemes would have recourse only to individual sponsoring companies; and the next valuation, at 31 December 2013, was to use the same assumptions. 1 3 7
- qualification
- The committees' account; they described the outcome as a victory for Carillion in minimising its contributions. The valuation date '31 January 2013' is as printed in the committees' report; Carillion's 2014 annual report states that the valuations as at 31 December 2011 and 31 December 2013 for five schemes were concluded with the trustees in 2014.
- response
- According to the committees, Carillion's directors rejected accusations that they did not care about funding the pension schemes and repeatedly referred to meeting their pension obligations, meaning fulfilling the deficit recovery plan.
- outcome
- In its response published by the committees on 12 July 2018, TPR accepted that it should have reached a decision more quickly to bring its powers to bear at the 2011 valuation.
attributedAccording to the committees, TPR's involvement in the 2008 valuation was 'less intense' than its 'proactive engagement' on the 2011 valuation, during which it referred to its section 231 power to impose a schedule of contributions in correspondence on seven occasions between June 2013 and March 2014 without using it; the committees noted that TPR had not used that power once in 13 years. TPR argued that its involvement increased Carillion's contributions by £85 million across the recovery period, comparing Carillion's initial offer of £33.4 million with the agreed plan rising from £25 million in 2013 to £42 million by 2022, whereas the Trustee had sought an additional £342 million through annual contributions of £65 million; Gazelle called the intervention 'disappointing'. The Trustee wrote to TPR requesting 'formal intervention' on the 2013 valuation and recovery plan, and Robin Ellison argued that the agreements were effectively 'imposed'. 8 5 7
- qualification
- The committees' assessment of TPR's role; the £85 million is TPR's own estimate, and the committees said the extent of TPR's responsibility for the increase was unclear. The committees describe Carillion's initial £33.4 million offer as for 15 years in one chapter and for 16 years in the comparison of TPR's figure.
- response
- The Trustee's letter of 26 January 2018 states that for all three valuations (2008, 2011 and 2013) TPR decided not to exercise its powers.
- outcome
- In its response published by the committees on 12 July 2018, TPR accepted the report's criticisms of how quickly it sought to use its powers at the 2008 and 2011 valuations and said it should have taken more decisive action at the 2011 valuation.
attributedThe committees found that TPR was willing to accept recovery plans for the Carillion schemes significantly longer than the average of 7.5 years, the plans agreed by Carillion and the Trustee averaging 16 years in both 2008 and 2011, and that there was little evidence of TPR seriously challenging Carillion's dividend policy, although in April 2013 TPR told the company and the Trustee that it was 'not comfortable with recovery plans increasing whilst dividends are being increased'. 8 7
- qualification
- The committees' findings.
- response
- TPR told the committees that it did not want its approach to be perceived as focused too heavily on recovery-plan length, that longer plans may be appropriate where liabilities are based on prudent assumptions, that Carillion's ratio of dividend payments to pension contributions was better than other FTSE companies, and that it 'cannot and should not prevent companies paying dividends, if that is the right thing to do'. In its response published by the committees on 12 July 2018, TPR said that in this period it had been too reliant on educating and enabling those it regulated when much bolder intervention was needed, while arguing that it was wrong to extrapolate the criticisms to its current culture.
documentedThe committees' May 2018 report, citing an analysis of scheme valuation reports that excludes the Bower scheme (which had a different valuation cycle), gives combined deficits for the main Carillion schemes of £327 million at 31 December 2008, £617 million at 31 December 2011 and £439 million at 31 December 2013, and states that for the 31 December 2016 valuation, which was overtaken by events, the Trustee expected a total deficit of around £990 million. 1
documentedIn his letter of 26 January 2018 to the chair of the Work and Pensions Committee, Robin Ellison, chairman of Carillion (DB) Pension Trustee Limited, distinguished four deficit measures: the company accounting deficit, which he took to be the £587 million figure quoted by the committee and which covers all of the company's defined benefit schemes; the Trustee's technical provisions basis used for the statutory triennial valuations, on which the deficit of the five largest single-trustee schemes (excluding the Bower scheme) was £508 million at the 31 December 2013 valuation, while for the 31 December 2016 valuation the Trustee had tabled a proposal that would lead to a deficit of about £990 million across the five main schemes, mainly because of lower interest rates; the PPF basis, on which the deficit of the six schemes at 31 December 2016 was about £0.8 billion; and the buy-out basis, on which it was nearer £2 billion. The 2016 valuations had not been completed when Carillion plc was put into compulsory liquidation on 15 January 2018. 5
unresolvedThe retained sources give different pension deficit figures because they use different bases and scopes, and some differences are unexplained. For 31 December 2013 the committees give £439 million for the main schemes excluding Bower (from scheme valuation reports, basis not stated), the Trustee gives £508 million on its technical provisions basis for the five largest schemes excluding Bower, and Carillion's 2014 annual report shows an IAS 19 deficit of £370.1 million for all group schemes; for 31 December 2011 the committees give £617 million while reporting the Trustee's calculation of £770 million and Carillion's of £620 million. Later figures include an IAS 19 deficit of £804.8 million at 31 December 2016 (all schemes, Carillion), about £0.8 billion on the PPF basis (Trustee, six schemes, 31 December 2016) and about £800 million on a PPF basis at insolvency (PPF), a buy-out deficit of about £1.8 billion for the 13 schemes at the end of 2016 (TPR) and nearer £2 billion for the six schemes (Trustee), a technical provisions deficit of about £700 million and a section 75 liability of about £2.8 billion (FTI, January 2018), and net pension liabilities of around £2.6 billion at the collapse (committees; their footnote calls it a provisional estimate on a section 75 basis). 1 3 4 2 9 8 7 5
- qualification
- Not established: the basis of the committees' £439 million and £617 million figures and why they differ from the Trustee's £508 million (2013) and £770 million (2011) figures. Figures on different bases or scopes are not comparable and are not combined here.
documentedCarillion's 2014 annual report shows, at 31 December 2014, defined benefit scheme assets of £2,320.4 million against funded obligations of £2,808.2 million and unfunded obligations of £10.6 million, a minimum funding requirement of £11.3 million and a total IAS 19 deficit of £509.7 million (2013: £370.1 million), or £406.2 million net of deferred tax (2013: £295.1 million); employer contributions were £58.5 million (2013: £48.9 million). It states that the triennial valuations as at 31 December 2011 and 31 December 2013 for five schemes were concluded with the trustees in 2014 with a revised deficit recovery plan, that deficit recovery payments of £46.0 million in 2014 were in line with the 2014 agreement with the Trustee of the main schemes for the three-year period to 2016, and that committed funding payments for all defined benefit schemes in 2014, 2015 and 2016 were around £50 million a year. 3
documentedCarillion's 2016 annual report shows IAS 19 pension liabilities of £3,377.5 million (2015: £2,695.9 million) against scheme assets of £2,572.7 million (2015: £2,302.4 million), giving an IAS 19 deficit of £804.8 million (2015: £393.5 million) before deferred tax and £663.2 million (2015: £317.6 million) after it, using a discount rate of 2.70 per cent (2015: 3.95 per cent); actuarial losses from changes in financial assumptions were £724.8 million. Employer contributions in 2016 were £51.6 million (2015: £54.3 million) and deficit recovery payments £46.6 million (2015: £47.4 million), reflecting the current agreement with the trustees of the main schemes. 4
documentedThe pensions note of the 2016 annual report states that the triennial valuations at 31 December 2013 for five schemes, including the three largest (Carillion Staff, Mowlem Staff and Alfred McAlpine Staff), were concluded with the trustees in 2014 with a revised recovery plan under which deficit recovery payments could continue until 2029 if required; that the five schemes' assets at the valuation date were £1.8 billion, a funding level of 76 per cent; that the 31 December 2016 valuation was under way; and that the group expected to pay £50.2 million to defined benefit schemes during the following financial year. A longevity swap entered into in 2013 by five schemes covered around 9,000 pensioners and around 40 per cent of total defined benefit liabilities, and had a fair value of a £26.9 million liability at 31 December 2016 (2015: £1.4 million liability). 4
documentedCarillion's 2017 half-year report states that its pension deficit net of taxation fell by £76 million to £587 million at 30 June 2017 (31 December 2016: £663 million) because of higher asset values and lower inflation rates; the IAS 19 defined benefit obligation was £3,313.7 million and scheme assets £2,621.3 million, a net pension liability of £711.4 million before tax. It added that since the half year Carillion had given notice to the pensions trustee that discretionary pension increases would be withdrawn, reducing the deficit by a further £80 million, and was in discussions with its principal pensions trustee on changes including basing future increases on CPI rather than RPI, which could potentially reduce the deficit by a further £120 million. Deficit pension contributions in the first half were £21 million (H1 2016: £22 million). 10 5
- outcome
- According to the Trustee's letter of 26 January 2018, no final decision on moving pension increases from RPI to CPI had been taken by 15 January 2018, when Carillion plc was put into compulsory liquidation.
documentedAfter the July 2017 profit warning, Carillion asked its pension trustee in early August 2017 to defer contributions as part of its discussions with lenders on additional facilities. According to the Trustee's letter of 26 January 2018, the Trustee joined the negotiations with Carillion and its lenders towards the end of September, understood that the banks saw its agreement as an integral part of their providing new money, and, considering that a refusal would lead to the banks not lending and the group becoming insolvent, agreed (subject to protections) to defer eight months of contributions, to be repaid in full with interest by the end of January 2019 at the latest; the term sheet was agreed at the end of September 2017 and the final agreement documented on 24 October 2017. The committees put the deferred contributions at £25.3 million, due between September 2017 and April 2018. The agreement fell away when Carillion plc went into compulsory liquidation and the deferred contributions became due to the schemes. 1 5
documentedOther bodies describe the 2017 deferral. The PPF says that between August and October 2017, while not directly involved, it was kept informed by TPR of discussions on the proposal to defer deficit recovery contributions and conveyed to TPR its discomfort with the proposal, which related to whether the deferred contributions would eventually be made and to the schemes' treatment against other creditors; it considered it probable that 'PPF drift' would add cost for the period from the deferral agreement to insolvency, but could not quantify it. The committees report that TPR took part in a series of meetings on the deferral and that EY helped negotiate the agreement to defer £25 million of deficit recovery contributions. TPR's later report states that scheduled deficit repair contributions were paid until three months before the group's liquidation. 2 6 8
attributedGazelle, covenant adviser to the Trustee, told the committees that Carillion may have set out to 'manage' the Trustee so that it did not present an effective negotiating counterparty, partly through the 'dominating influence' on the Trustee board of Carillion employees, who faced an inherent conflict of interest, and also cited Carillion's budgetary control over the Trustee and pressure on the scheme actuary at trustee meetings. The committees found that the Trustee nonetheless pushed Carillion hard for additional contributions, consistently acted on TPR's advice, and agreed the 2008 and 2011 valuations well outside the statutory 15-month deadline while seeking a better deal. 8
- qualification
- Gazelle's allegations as reported by the committees, which concluded that the pension trustees were outgunned in negotiations with directors intent on paying as little as possible.
- response
- Robin Ellison, the Trustee chair, disagreed, stating that 'all the directors of the trust company were independently-minded'.
documentedThe PPF's letter of 20 February 2018 to the Work and Pensions Committee states that its first direct engagement with Carillion's representatives was in early December 2017, when it said that any restructuring proposal would need to meet its published criteria; that at a meeting on 8 January 2018 the company and the group's advisers discussed options including a potential Regulated Apportionment Arrangement (RAA); that on 9 January the PPF and TPR received an initial, high-level RAA proposal, which the PPF told the company on 11 January failed its published criteria, while offering further dialogue; that no revised proposal was received before the insolvency on 15 January; and that by then an RAA was increasingly unviable and would not, in isolation, have changed the end result. The committees state that Carillion sought to offload its pension schemes into the PPF in a bespoke deal, though it had far from sufficient funding to produce a proposal attractive to the Trustee, TPR or the PPF. 6 1
documentedIn its letter of 20 February 2018 the PPF stated that Carillion plc had 13 PPF-eligible defined benefit schemes with about 27,500 members, 12 of which had entered PPF assessment, the remaining one to follow when the last of its sponsoring employers was put into liquidation, and one further defined benefit scheme that would not enter assessment; on its initial estimate at the point of insolvency, based on a roll-forward of scheme information from TPR and subject to revision, the eventual claim would be in the region of £800–900 million, possibly one of its biggest since it opened in 2005. TPR's report states that the 15 January 2018 liquidation triggered PPF assessment for the 13 schemes, and the committees' May 2018 report that all but two of the 13 UK schemes were likely to enter the PPF, which estimated the aggregate deficit for PPF purposes at around £800 million, the largest ever hit on its resources. 6 1 2 7
- outcome
- In a letter published by the committees on 12 July 2018, the PPF's chief executive put the funding shortfall at the point of insolvency at about £800 million on a PPF basis for about 27,500 members, said that most schemes had entered assessment, and reported indicative completion dates for some of the schemes at the end of 2019.
documentedTPR opened an anti-avoidance investigation into the Carillion Group on 18 January 2018, after Carillion PLC entered compulsory liquidation on 15 January 2018, focused on whether there were grounds to use its anti-avoidance powers, in particular a Contribution Notice. In its regulatory intervention report TPR concluded that there was no prospect of securing a Contribution Notice, that no Financial Support Direction could be issued because the whole group was insolvent, and that the criminal offence relating to false or misleading information (section 80 of the Pensions Act 2004) was not made out, and it closed the investigation. 2 8
- qualification
- The retained copy of the report is undated; it refers to the Official Receiver's January 2022 High Court claim against KPMG and to TPR's Annual Report and Accounts 2018 to 2019. In May 2018 the committees had questioned the timing of the investigation.
attributedTPR's report found that disposals between 2013 and 2017, including PPP assets and a real estate business, provided essential liquidity that enabled the group to keep paying deficit repair contributions, so the schemes were not detrimentally affected. It also considered whether misleading financial information published between July 2015 and July 2017, and the resulting dividends, caused material detriment, and concluded that they did not: the contract losses before and during 2016 were so great that the group was arguably facing inevitable insolvency by the end of that year; had the 2015 and 2016 dividends not been paid, the directors would reasonably have used the cash to pay down debt rather than increase scheme payments, given trade creditors of about £2 billion and bank debt just below £1 billion in the interim 2017 accounts; and earlier disclosure would most likely have brought the collapse forward, so the schemes would not have received the contributions they did in 2016 (£47 million) and 2017 (£29 million). 2
- qualification
- TPR's conclusions on the statutory test for a material-detriment Contribution Notice; TPR said it supported the action taken by other agencies against the parties involved where alleged failings had been identified.
documentedIn its response to the committees' report, published by the committees on 12 July 2018, TPR accepted the report's criticisms of how quickly it had sought to use its powers in its engagement with the sponsoring employer and trustee at the 2008 and 2011 valuations, said that it should have reached a decision more quickly to bring its powers to bear at the 2011 valuation and taken more decisive action, and described itself in that period as too reliant on educating and enabling those it regulated; it argued, however, that it was wrong to extrapolate those criticisms to its current culture and leadership. 7
attributedThe committees concluded in May 2018 that TPR failed in all its objectives regarding the Carillion pension schemes: members would receive reduced pensions, the PPF and its levy payers faced their biggest bill, and the PPF expected to take on 11 of Carillion's 13 UK schemes with a funding shortfall of around £800 million; they also stated that Carillion collapsed with net pension liabilities of around £2.6 billion. 8 7 2
- qualification
- The committees' findings and characterisation. Their footnote describes the £2.6 billion as the provisional estimate of the schemes' deficit on a section 75 basis, the buy-out measure that becomes due on insolvency.
- response
- TPR accepted the criticism of its approach at the 2008 and 2011 valuations but disputed that it applied to its current culture (response published on 12 July 2018).
- outcome
- TPR's anti-avoidance investigation, opened after the liquidation and questioned by the committees for its timing, ended with TPR's conclusion in its regulatory intervention report that there was no basis for using its powers and no prospect of securing a Contribution Notice; it closed the investigation. The liquidation triggered PPF assessment for the 13 schemes, and in a letter published by the committees on 12 July 2018 the PPF said that the majority had entered assessment and it expected the final scheme to follow.
sources in this section
- Carillion: Second Joint Report of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (HC 769), chapters on the company and its board House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees · May 2018
- Carillion group: regulatory intervention report The Pensions Regulator
- Company statement source · src-094 identified by category only · Company statement
- Company statement source · src-003 identified by category only · Company statement
- Letter from the chair of Carillion (DB) Pension Trustee Limited to the Chair of the Work and Pensions Committee House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · 26 Jan 2018
- Letter from the Pension Protection Fund to the Chair of the Work and Pensions Committee on the Carillion defined benefit schemes House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · 20 Feb 2018
- Carillion: Responses from Interested Parties to the committees' report (HC 1392, Second Special Report) House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees · 12 Jul 2018
- Carillion: Second Joint Report of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (HC 769), chapter on external checks and balances House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees · May 2018
- Project Ray: Independent Business Review of the Carillion group prepared by FTI Consulting for the lenders (published by the committees) House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · 15 Jan 2018
- Company statement source · src-042 identified by category only · Company statement
6Contract accounting and the 2017 write-downs
documentedAccording to the joint report of the House of Commons Work and Pensions and Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committees, Carillion issued a profit warning on 10 July 2017 announcing that it would reduce the value of several major contracts by a total of £845 million in its interim results; when those results were published in September 2017 a further £200 million was added, leaving net liabilities of £405 million and borrowing of £961 million, with goodwill reduced by £134 million and the working capital ratio down to 0.74. Carillion's own announcement of 29 September 2017 reported no change to the £845m provision for construction contracts, a further £200m provision for support services contracts, a £134m goodwill impairment charge for the UK and Canadian construction businesses and a first-half loss before taxation of £(1,153)m. 1 2
documentedA footnote to the House of Commons committees' joint report, citing unpublished audit committee papers, states that an initial contract provision figure of £695m was presented to Carillion's board on 7 July 2017 and increased to £845m by 9 July, with a corresponding £15m increase in the provision against the Royal Liverpool hospital contract; Keith Cochrane, who took on the role of Interim Chief Executive after the profit warning, explained to the committees that he personally took the decision to increase the provision over that weekend. The committees' written questions to Andrew Dougal, printed in his reply, likewise state that the 2017 contract review recommended a provision of £695 million, subsequently increased by management to £845 million. 1 3 2 4
documentedCarillion's group business plan of January 2018, as cited by the House of Commons committees, shows that of the total £1,045 million contract provision, £729 million was set against trade receivables and the rest added to future costs; the committees describe the £729 million as revenue Carillion had previously recognised and conceded would not be obtainable. The FRC's notice of 12 October 2023 likewise records that in July and September 2017 Carillion announced expected provisions totalling £1.045 billion, primarily from expected losses on a number of contracts, and a goodwill impairment charge of £134 million. 1 5
documentedCarillion's January 2018 group business plan reported that the total contract provision increased in the RF4 2017 forecast from £1,045m (as at 30 September 2017) to £1,105m, an increase of £60m that it attributed to items including more aggressive cash settlements on the TTC and Battersea contracts (£10m), further deterioration and contingencies on Royal Liverpool (£15m, completion delayed from December 2017 to April 2018), Aberdeen (£15m) and the Canadian Union and Bremner contracts (£6m, additional legal costs), and a further re-evaluation of the National Offender Management Service prisons services contract with the Ministry of Justice (£11m). The lenders' adviser FTI referred in its draft review to £1.1bn of provisions taken in 2017. 6 1 4
attributedThe House of Commons committees concluded that Carillion 'used aggressive accounting policies to present a rosy picture to the markets', citing contract margins maintained despite evidence that they were optimistic, revenue recognised for work not yet agreed and the accounting for its early payment facility, and stated that, 'whether or not all this was within the letter of accountancy law, it was intended to deceive lenders and investors'. Before the report, the Comptroller and Auditor General had told the Liaison Committee that 'when all the drains have been pulled up on Carillion we will see some pretty aggressive accounting practices'. 1 7 8 5 9
- qualification
- Conclusion of a parliamentary select committee report, not a judicial or regulatory finding; the committees expressly left open whether the practices were within accounting law.
- response
- Zafar Khan, who signed off the 2016 accounts, told the committees he did 'not agree that there was a concerted effort to adopt aggressive accounting as such' and that the reported numbers 'were appropriate, based on the information that was available at that point in time'. The board's public position was that there was no misstatement and that the provisions related to a sudden deterioration on key contracts between March and June 2017. Former directors told the NAO that all but one of the practices identified by FTI were in accordance with accounting standards or had been appropriately disclosed.
- outcome
- In October 2023 the Insolvency Service published statements quantifying misstatements in the 2015 and 2016 accounts, accompanying a disqualification undertaking given by Richard Howson, and the FRC published findings of serious breaches in KPMG's audits of those years. In May 2026 the FRC announced that the former finance directors Richard Adam and Zafar Khan had accepted misconduct, each admitting recklessness and a failure to act with integrity, in respect of areas including major UK construction contracts and a supply chain finance facility; it made no finding, and they made no admission, that either acted dishonestly or deliberately.
attributedAccording to the House of Commons committees, September 2017 audit committee papers showed that at least 18 contracts suffered losses over the March–June 2017 period, and a June 2017 'lessons learned' board minute noted that 'management need to be aware that high-level instructions such as that to "hold the position" (i.e. maintain the traded margin) may, if crudely implemented, have unintended consequences'. The minutes record Andrew Dougal identifying 'perhaps also a hold back of bad news' on one recent contract, which he later told the committees was the Royal Liverpool University Hospital contract. 1 2 7 3
- qualification
- The committees' reading of internal board and audit committee papers that are only partly published; Dougal's remark is quoted from the minutes and explained in his own letter.
- response
- Dougal wrote that the hospital project had suffered significant problems, including an asbestos issue, power supply delays, design issues and a cracked beam, which deteriorated further in the second quarter of 2017, and that he was raising whether the serious consequences of these deteriorations were made clear enough to the board as soon as they could have been.
- outcome
- The enhanced contract review led to the £845m provision for construction contracts announced on 10 July 2017; Carillion's interim results of 29 September 2017 left it unchanged, added a further £200m provision for support services contracts and a £134m goodwill impairment charge, and treated the contract provisions as changes in estimate requiring no restatement of comparative amounts. In October 2023 the Insolvency Service, accepting an eight-year disqualification undertaking from Richard Howson, stated that he caused the 2015 and 2016 financial statements to account for the major contracts, including the Royal Liverpool University Hospital, in a way he ought to have known falsified and concealed the reality of their deterioration.
documentedAndrew Dougal's letter of 5 April 2018 states that in the 2017 Enhanced Contract Review the KPMG audit team reviewed 58 contracts, representing 73% of total group receivables, on an accelerated basis, the 11 most significant and complex being subject to 'enhanced' testing by KPMG major contract specialists. Answering the committees' question, which cited KPMG's note that it had challenged management to consider whether the results evidenced a prior period error, Dougal wrote that management concluded the changes related to subsequent events — the decision to withdraw from construction in Canada, Qatar and Saudi Arabia and challenges on certain UK contracts that crystallised after the 2016 annual report — that KPMG's report to the audit committee of 9 July 2017 agreed with management's assessment, and that the committee, having questioned the position at length, was satisfied. Carillion's interim results of 29 September 2017 accordingly treated the contract provisions of £1,045.5m as changes in estimate under IAS 8, with no restatement of comparative amounts. 3 7 2 5
- outcome
- In October 2023 the Insolvency Service stated that the 2015 and 2016 financial statements were misstated in respect of the major contracts by £95.4m and £179.2m respectively, and the FRC found serious breaches in KPMG's audit work on Carillion's contracts in 2014–2016.
documentedAccording to the National Audit Office's investigation into the government's handling of Carillion's collapse, Carillion's board received in May 2017 the results of an accounting review of some construction projects which identified that some accounting practices had understated the costs of some contracts; Carillion decided that there was an associated understatement of revenue, so that it did not need to restate its 2016 accounts, and its auditors KPMG agreed. The House of Commons committees describe the same review as KPMG agreeing with the board's conclusion that, although Carillion had misclassified assets, it had not misstated revenue, and as the trigger for the wider contract review that led to the £845 million provision in July 2017. 8 1
attributedThe House of Commons committees reported that Emma Mercer, on returning to Carillion's UK business in April 2017 after three years in its Canadian business, spotted an anomaly in the way the company classified receivable balances on construction contracts: the use of 'negative accruals', netting off payables and receivables balances, which KPMG confirmed was permitted under international accounting standards on construction contracts but which Carillion had a 'golden rule' not to use. According to the committees, the board agreed that her concerns should be investigated but did not commission a full independent review, instead inviting KPMG to review work it had previously audited and approved. 1 3 8
- qualification
- Account of the parliamentary committees based on board minutes (including those of 15 May 2017) and Emma Mercer's evidence; the audit committee chair's account of how the review was set up is given in the response.
- response
- Andrew Dougal wrote that a board meeting on 9 May 2017 first planned a four-stage review including an independent external firm, but the board then agreed a three-stage review — an internal review with Mrs Mercer in a key role, a review by a KPMG team not involved in the 2016 audit of the UK Construction balance sheet, and a sub-committee he chaired — considering that it ensured sufficient independence without the delay of an external review.
- outcome
- According to the NAO, the accounting review whose results the board received in May 2017 found that some accounting practices had understated the costs of some contracts; Carillion decided that there was an associated understatement of revenue, so that it did not need to restate its 2016 accounts, and KPMG agreed. The committees record that the review nonetheless triggered the wider contract review that led to the £845 million provision in July 2017.
attributedIn his letter of 5 April 2018 to the committee chairs, Andrew Dougal, chair of Carillion's audit committee, wrote that he first became aware of concerns about negative accruals shortly after the board meeting and annual general meeting of 3 May 2017, when the chairman, Philip Green, told him that Mrs Mercer had raised them and that the Head of Risk, Robin Herzberg, was looking into them urgently. He stated that KPMG had identified one non-material negative accrual on a UK services contract during the audit of the 2016 accounts, referred to in its year-end audit memorandum to the audit committee of 23 February 2017, which management described as a one-off administrative error, whereas Mrs Mercer's concerns indicated wider use in the UK Construction business affecting several projects. 3 8
- qualification
- Party statement by the audit committee chair; his and others' knowledge is stated only as he states it. The letter prints the meeting date as '3 May 2047', evidently meaning 2017.
- outcome
- According to the NAO, the resulting accounting review, whose results the board received in May 2017, found that some accounting practices had understated the costs of some contracts; Carillion decided that it did not need to restate its 2016 accounts, and KPMG agreed.
attributedAndrew Dougal wrote that Zafar Khan, then Group Finance Director and formerly Group Financial Controller, confirmed at the 9 May 2017 board meeting that he had not been aware of the use of negative accruals until Mrs Mercer tabled it, and that he (Dougal) did not know whether Mr Khan's predecessor, Richard Adam, had been aware of it. Dougal described the use of negative accruals as a breach of Carillion's internal reporting guidelines, though acceptable under accounting standards, and wrote that it was ultimately the responsibility of the UK Construction division's finance director and the Group Finance Director to ensure the guidelines were followed, to identify breaches and, where necessary, to bring them to the attention of the auditors, the audit committee and the board; he added that the audit committee was disappointed that the use of negative accruals had not been identified in the audit. 3 10 11
- qualification
- Party statement; Mr Khan's and Mr Adam's knowledge is stated only as Dougal reports or does not know it.
- outcome
- In July 2022 the FCA, publicly censuring Carillion, stated its view that Carillion's systems, procedures and controls were not sufficiently robust to ensure that contract accounting judgments in its UK construction business were appropriately made, recorded and reported internally to the board and the audit committee. In January 2026, after Richard Adam and Zafar Khan withdrew their challenges, the FCA fined them £232,800 and £138,900, stating that as finance directors they had responsibility for Carillion's procedures, systems and controls relating to financial reporting.
attributedThe House of Commons committees reported that KPMG's work on the enhanced review of key contracts begun in May 2017, which KPMG called a 'deep dive' 'beyond the level of detail that would typically be completed by the audit team', noted that 'claims are booked earlier in the Group than would be by certain others in the industry' and 'a lack of consistency and guidance around the Group in when to recognise value on claims'. The committees considered that these findings emerging only from 'deep dives' raised questions over the adequacy of KPMG's core audit work, and that KPMG's explanation of the provision mirrored the directors' account that its causes were events after the accounts were published on 1 March 2017. 12 3 2 5
- qualification
- The committees' assessment; KPMG's report on the enhanced contract review is not published.
- response
- Peter Meehan, the KPMG audit partner who signed off the accounts, told the committees that KPMG's previous work was extensive, citing large numbers of site visits. Andrew Dougal wrote that neither he nor, to his knowledge, other audit committee members were aware of the lack of consistency on claims before KPMG's report, that he understood the observation to refer to guidance at contract and business-unit level rather than to senior management's approach at division and group level, and that he did not believe it compromised the accuracy of the revenue recognised.
- outcome
- KPMG's report to the audit committee of 9 July 2017 agreed with management's assessment that the changes related to subsequent events rather than a prior period error, and Carillion's interim results of 29 September 2017 treated the £1,045.5m of contract provisions as changes in estimate. In October 2023 the FRC found significant and serious breaches in each of KPMG's audits of Carillion for 2014 to 2016, many of them relating to audit work on the most financially significant UK and overseas construction and services contracts.
attributedIn letters to the committee chairs of 13 and 27 March 2018, Deloitte, Carillion's internal auditor, reported that its work in July and August 2017 on peer reviews undertaken between January 2015 and July 2017 for the contracts that received provisions found that 42% recommended a forecast end-of-life margin lower than management's contract appraisal, more than half of these by over £5 million, and 14% a higher one. Deloitte listed 11 peer reviews on four contracts where the adverse variance exceeded £5m: Royal Liverpool University Hospital (£53.9m in November 2016, £31.3m in May 2016, £12.9m in September 2015, £7.8m in March 2015), Midlands Metropolitan Hospital (£16.9m in November 2016, £5.6m in April 2017), Battersea (£75.3m in October 2015, £6.6m in March 2015, £6.3m in April 2016) and the Toronto Transit Commission (£24.5m in June 2016, £15.0m in July 2015). The 27 March letter was signed by Michael Jones, the Deloitte partner responsible for Carillion's internal audit. 13 3 7 1
- qualification
- Deloitte's own account of its July–August 2017 work given to the committees; Deloitte stated that the reviews, spread over 30 months, reflect how the contracts evolved, including variations and settlements, and that it had no responsibility for preparing or auditing the 2016 financial statements.
- response
- Answering the committees' question on these findings, Andrew Dougal wrote that management's view, with which KPMG agreed after an audited re-examination of the key contracts, was that the write-down was connected to matters in the 2017 financial year and that there was no fundamental error in the positions traded in the 2016 accounts.
- outcome
- In October 2023 the Insolvency Service, accepting an eight-year disqualification undertaking from Richard Howson, stated that Carillion's 2015 and 2016 financial statements were misstated in respect of the major contracts, among them the Royal Liverpool University Hospital, Midlands Metropolitan Hospital and Battersea Power Station, by £95.4m for 2015 and £179.2m for 2016.
attributedThe House of Commons committees reported that a November 2016 peer review of the Royal Liverpool University Hospital contract indicated a loss of 12.7% against a contract appraisal margin of 4.9% profit, so that the annual accounts published in March 2017 recognised approximately £53 million more revenue than the peer review estimate would have produced; the July 2017 profit warning included a provision of £53 million against that contract. Deloitte quoted a difference of £53.9 million based on the November reviews, while audit committee papers show the year-end position used a margin of 4.44%, which the committees equate to £52.5 million. 1 13 7
- qualification
- The committees' calculation from Deloitte's figures and unpublished audit committee papers; Deloitte said it could not comment on what the 4.44% margin reconciled to.
- response
- Richard Howson told the committees that the costs of rectifying cracked beams at the hospital arose in the second quarter of 2017 and added 'over £20 million of cost to our completion', and that Carillion 'did not just cover it up'.
- outcome
- In October 2023 the Insolvency Service, accepting an eight-year disqualification undertaking from Richard Howson, stated that he caused Carillion's 2015 and 2016 financial statements to account for the Royal Liverpool University Hospital and the other major contracts in a way he ought to have known falsified and concealed the reality of their deterioration, and put the 2016 misstatement in respect of the major contracts at £179.2m.
attributedAndrew Dougal wrote that Michael Jones of Deloitte first raised with him the variance between management's views and the peer review appraisals in September 2017, that he did not know whether Richard Howson, Zafar Khan or Richard Adam knew this information at the time and, if so, why it was not shared, and that the issues were not flagged to the board or audit committee by the company's internal or external auditors. He wrote that with hindsight it would have been helpful for the audit committee to have the information to factor into its challenge of management's judgements, but that management's view, with which KPMG agreed, remained that there was no fundamental error in the positions traded in the 2016 accounts. 3 10 11 14
- qualification
- Party statement; each person's knowledge is stated only as Dougal states it. Deloitte's account, quoted to Dougal by the committees, is that the CFO, the audit committee chair and the interim CEO expressed surprise at the differences when they were shared in August and September 2017.
- outcome
- In July 2022 the FCA stated, in Decision Notices that were then provisional, its view that Richard Howson, Richard Adam and Zafar Khan were each aware of the deteriorating expected financial performance of Carillion's UK construction business and failed to make the board and the audit committee aware of it. After they withdrew their challenges, the FCA fined Mr Adam £232,800 and Mr Khan £138,900 in January 2026 and Mr Howson £237,700 in February 2026, stating that each had been aware of serious financial troubles in the UK construction business and had failed to alert the board and audit committee.
documentedThe audit committee's report in Carillion's 2016 annual report states that management had implemented a system of 'peer reviews', under which experienced teams from other projects reviewed the performance of individual contracts, that summaries of the peer review reports were provided to, and reviewed by, the committee, and that the committee was satisfied that the peer review process continued to work well and was a very useful additional source of assurance. 15 3
- qualification
- The report does not say what the summaries contained. Deloitte's later account, quoted to Andrew Dougal by the committees, is that the differences between the peer reviews and management's appraisals surprised the CFO, the audit committee chair and the interim CEO when they were shared in August and September 2017.
attributedThe House of Commons committees reported that in December 2016 Carillion was recognising £294 million of construction revenue that was 'traded not certified' — revenue not yet signed off by clients, such as claims and variations — an increase of over £60 million since June 2014 and over 10% of total construction contract revenue; the amount was never publicly disclosed in the financial statements but was included in papers reviewed quarterly by the audit committee. Emma Mercer told the committees that on her return to the UK she found 'slightly more aggressive trading of the contracts' than she had previously experienced there. 1 3
- qualification
- Committees' account drawn from unpublished February 2017 audit committee papers; the audit committee chair disputes the inference that the figures show more optimistic accounting.
- response
- Andrew Dougal wrote that year-end non-certified trading revenue in construction was relatively stable from 2011 to 2015, between £248 million (2011) and £264 million (2012), and that the December 2016 figure of £294 million included £37 million of foreign-currency effects, leaving an underlying £257 million against £250 million at 31 December 2015, so that in his view it did not point to a change to more optimistic accounting; he wrote that until mid-2017 he was not aware of slightly more aggressive or overly optimistic accounting in traded positions.
- outcome
- The committees record that the July 2017 provision conceded that £729 million of revenue Carillion had previously recognised would not be obtainable, the part of the £1,045 million total provision that, according to Carillion's January 2018 business plan, was set against trade receivables. Dougal wrote that after the Enhanced Contract Review it was clear that some 2017 traded positions were no longer justified, which led in part to the July 2017 provision.
attributedThe House of Commons committees concluded that the bonus clawback terms agreed by Carillion's remuneration committee in February 2015 — enabling clawback if the accounts needed to be restated or the director was guilty of gross misconduct — were 'so narrow they ruled out a penny being returned', even after the failures behind the £845 million write-down. In September 2017 the remuneration committee agreed new clawback triggers recommended by Deloitte and, at the same meeting, considered asking directors to return their 2016 bonuses, but concluded 'that could not be enforced and would be very difficult to achieve at this stage'; the new terms were too late to affect earlier bonuses. The committees also cite March 2015 board minutes showing that the board was concerned that potential clawback of their bonuses should not include 'retrospective judgements on views taken on contracts in good faith'. 1
- qualification
- Committees' assessment of the remuneration committee's policy.
- response
- Alison Horner, chair of the remuneration committee, denied that the terms were overly restrictive, said they made it easier to claw back bonuses and told the committees that misstatement and misconduct were the terms used by '80% of the FTSE'.
documentedIn its 2016 audit report KPMG described the £20.0 million of licence income recognised in 2016 as a new risk: the licensing agreement had been entered into at or around the same time and with the same counterparty as a series of contracts extending the scope of the services of the group's back-office outsourcing provider, and the income was recognised immediately in revenue. KPMG identified the risks that the agreements were not independent so that the income should be spread over the term of the outsourcing contract, that ongoing obligations required it to be spread over another period, or that it should be other income rather than revenue, and reported examining the contracts, meeting the group's legal advisers and third-party expert, and assessing fair values and ongoing obligations. 15 7
- response
- Carillion's 2016 accounts stated that management, after a benchmarking review indicating that the contracts extending the outsourced back-office services were at fair market value and so not linked to the licensing agreement, concluded that the transactions should be recognised independently and, there being no continuing support obligations, recognised the licence revenue immediately; the strategic report said the agreement let its outsourcing partner use elements of Carillion's IT platform in territories where Carillion does not operate and generated some £20 million of profit in 2016. The audit committee concluded that the judgement was reasonable.
- outcome
- In October 2023 the Insolvency Service stated that Carillion's 2016 financial statements wrongly reported as profit payments from Wipro in 2016, including £20.0m in respect of 'Geneva' under 'IP Assignment & Licence' agreements dated 9 December 2016.
documentedCarillion's 2014 accounting policies stated that revenue from the sale of a licence is recognised immediately where an agreement is in substance an outright sale — a signed non-cancellable contract, the licensee free to exploit its contractual rights, no significant ongoing delivery obligations and a fee not expected to be materially adjusted for future activity — with contingent revenue recognised as earned, or the sale income spread over the life of the technology if contingent revenue is significant. Carillion's 2016 accounts described licensing income as part of its ordinary activities, 'having completed a similar licensing agreement in 2013'. 16 15
analysisRead together, the retained records indicate that the counterparty to Carillion's 2013 and 2016 intellectual property and licence transactions was Wipro, its IT and business-process outsourcing provider: the Insolvency Service names Wipro as the payer under an IP Assignment Agreement dated 6 December 2013 and 'IP Assignment & Licence' agreements dated 9 December 2016; Carillion's 2014 annual report set the objective of transitioning its business process outsourcing arrangements to a new provider during 2014 and its 2016 report records an 'extension of the Wipro service scope and contract period'; the lenders' adviser FTI referred to advance payments on 'ICT (Wipro) supplier contracts'; and both KPMG's 2016 audit report and the FRC's summary of the 2013 transactions describe agreements with the same counterparty as the outsourcing contract. The FRC notice itself does not name the counterparty. 5 15 7 16 4
- qualification
- Inference from matching dates, structure and descriptions across documents; no single retained document states that the counterparty in the FRC and KPMG descriptions is Wipro.
attributedThe Insolvency Service's background information to its 4 October 2023 announcement that it had accepted an eight-year disqualification undertaking from Richard Howson states that Mr Howson caused Carillion to procure payments from Wipro of £39.0m in 2013 — £25.0m in respect of 'Ecopod' on signing an IP Assignment Agreement dated 6 December 2013 and £14.0m of termination charges 'purportedly payable' by Carillion under a Master Services Agreement of the same date — and £2.0m in 2014, and of £40.0m in 2016 — £20.0m in respect of 'Geneva' and £10.0m for certain intellectual property under 'IP Assignment & Licence' agreements dated 9 December 2016, and £10.0m of mobilisation costs under change control notes of that date. It states that these payments were wrongly accounted for as profit, overstating 2013 profit by £39.0m and understating net debt by £41.0m, and overstating 2016 profit by £34.4m (Geneva) and understating net debt by £39.2m, in breach of IAS 18, IAS 32 (and for 2016 IAS 38) and the IFRS framework, and that Mr Howson ought to have known of the false accounting and of the concealment from the auditors of the true picture regarding Carillion's obligation to make repayments to Wipro. 17 18 7 15
- qualification
- Statements of the Insolvency Service accompanying its acceptance of a disqualification undertaking; they are not findings of a court, and the procedural status of the undertaking is addressed with the disqualification proceedings.
- response
- Carillion's 2016 accounts stated that management had concluded, after a benchmarking review, that the 2016 licensing agreement and the extended outsourcing contracts should be recognised independently. No response by Mr Howson to these specific statements was found in the retained documents; according to the non-executive directors' lawyers, none of the executives' undertakings involved admissions as to the alleged fraud.
- outcome
- Companies House records the 8-year undertaking as running from 25 October 2023 to 24 October 2031.
attributedThe Insolvency Service's background information also states that Mr Howson ought to have known that Carillion's 2015 and 2016 financial statements did not give a true and fair view. It puts the 2015 misstatement in respect of the major contracts (Royal Liverpool University Hospital, Battersea Power Station, Aberdeen Western Peripheral Route, Midlands Metropolitan Hospital and Msheireb Phase 1(B)) at £95.4m, so that profits should have been £65.3m rather than the £155.1m reported and net current assets £(57.0m) rather than £41.5m; and the 2016 misstatement at £179.2m for the major contracts and £29.3m for the Ecopod and Geneva transactions, so that Carillion should have reported a loss of £(61.7m) rather than a profit of £146.7m and net current assets of £(232.5m) rather than £52.4m. It further states that Mr Howson ought to have known that Carillion had failed to disclose to its auditors information on the major contracts and the Ecopod and Geneva transactions for the periods ending 31 December 2013, 2015 and 2016, information which he ought to have known was material. 7 3 17 18 1
- qualification
- Statements of the Insolvency Service accompanying its acceptance of a disqualification undertaking; not findings of a court.
- response
- In 2017 Carillion's board publicly maintained that the 2016 accounts were not misstated and that the provisions arose from deterioration on key contracts between March and June 2017, and KPMG agreed that there was no prior period error. No response by Mr Howson to these specific statements was found in the retained documents; according to the non-executive directors' lawyers, none of the executives' undertakings involved admissions as to the alleged fraud.
- outcome
- The statements accompanied the Insolvency Service's acceptance of an 8-year disqualification undertaking from Mr Howson, which Companies House records as running from 25 October 2023 to 24 October 2031.
attributedAccording to the FRC's October 2023 summary of its second decision, Carillion in 2013 changed its provider of outsourced IT and business process services and, at the same time, concluded other agreements with the same counterparty for the assignment of certain IP rights for a significant sum and for a further sum as a contribution to 'exit fees' payable to the former outsourcing provider; treating these transactions as independent of each other resulted in a significant increase in Carillion's reported 2013 profit. The FRC found that KPMG Audit Plc and Darren Turner did not obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence that this treatment was appropriate, did not approach the audit with adequate professional scepticism, failed to consider and respond to the risk of fraud, and failed to identify that the related disclosures in the 2013 financial statements might be misleading. 5
- qualification
- Findings summarised from an unpublished Final Settlement Decision Notice under the Audit Enforcement Procedure, reflecting the respondents' co-operation and admissions. The FRC stated that the Decision 2 breaches were not intentional, dishonest, deliberate or reckless.
- response
- Beyond the co-operation and admissions recorded by the FRC, no separate public response by KPMG Audit Plc or Mr Turner was found in the retained documents.
- outcome
- KPMG Audit Plc was fined £3,500,000 reduced to £2,450,000 and severely reprimanded; Mr Turner was fined £100,000 reduced to £70,000 and severely reprimanded.
documentedCarillion's audit committee reports describe goodwill as the largest single item on the group balance sheet: £1,449.7 million at 31 December 2013, £1,519.1 million at 31 December 2014, £1,544.3 million at 31 December 2015 (restated for adjustments to 2015 acquisitions) and £1,571.0 million at 31 December 2016. In its 2014 and 2016 reports the committee stated that, after reviewing management's impairment assumptions and the external auditor's views, it agreed with management that no impairment was necessary; KPMG listed the carrying value of goodwill among the risks with the greatest effect on its audits. 16 15
attributedThe House of Commons committees noted that goodwill of £1.6 billion in the 2016 accounts represented 35% of Carillion's gross assets and more than double its net assets of £730 million, and that it was never impaired in the annual accounts, including the £330 million recorded on the 2011 acquisition of Eaga despite five consecutive years of substantial losses. They cited KPMG's 2017 half-year update finding that 'historically at least 80% of the Group's net present value has been derived from the perpetuity calculation', an assumption they said neither the company nor its auditor disclosed, and an FRC audit quality review of KPMG, whose sample did not include Carillion, that found 'insufficient challenge of management's assumptions' in some goodwill testing. 12 16 2 5 15 19
- qualification
- Committees' assessment of the goodwill accounting; not a regulatory finding.
- response
- Carillion's audit committee had stated in its reports that it critically reviewed management's impairment assumptions and sensitivity analysis and agreed that no impairment was necessary. KPMG's audit report on the 2016 accounts identified the carrying value of goodwill (£1,571.0 million) as one of the key judgemental areas for its audit and stated that its procedures included critically assessing the key assumptions applied in determining the recoverable amount of each cash-generating unit.
- outcome
- Carillion's interim results for the first half of 2017 included a goodwill impairment charge of £134m for the UK and Canadian construction businesses, and the FRC's 2023 findings on KPMG's audits included breaches relating to the testing of goodwill for impairment. A High Court judgment of 3 June 2020, which dismissed Carillion's application for pre-action disclosure against KPMG, records that Carillion's solicitors had indicated that KPMG's failure to give proper consideration to the carrying value of goodwill would be among the core allegations of its intended proceedings.
attributedAccording to the National Audit Office, the independent business review that Carillion's major lending banks (the Coordinating Committee) commissioned from FTI in October 2017, which remained in draft and was not seen by the Cabinet Office or lenders before the insolvency, reported practices it described as having 'enhanced reported financial performance above underlying operating performance': including profits from equity sales in PPP and PFI projects in operating profit and cash flow; consolidating some joint ventures wholly into cash flow and operating profit; short-term management of working capital and short-term loans from joint ventures to reduce year-end net debt; using early payment facilities to improve supplier payment terms; and securing large advance payments on new contracts at the expense of future profitability. FTI's draft itself stated that 'significant underperformance and contract issues have been masked by aggressive accounting and working capital management'. 8 4 5 9
- qualification
- Findings of a draft review prepared for the lenders, reported by the NAO; not a regulatory or judicial finding.
- response
- Former Carillion directors told the NAO that, apart from the advance-payments point, they believed these practices were in accordance with accounting standards or had been appropriately disclosed; the advance-payments issue had been identified by management and reported to the board in June 2017, which intended to remedy it.
- outcome
- In October 2023 the FRC found breaches in KPMG's 2016 audit work on Carillion's reported debt and going concern, including consideration of its use of a supply chain finance facility; in May 2026 it announced that the former finance directors Richard Adam and Zafar Khan had accepted misconduct, each admitting recklessness and a failure to act with integrity, in respect of areas including a supply chain finance facility.
documentedThe House of Commons committees' joint report states that Richard Adam was Carillion's Finance Director from 2007 until he retired at the end of 2016; that he was replaced by Zafar Khan, previously the Group Financial Controller, who held the post for nine months; and that Emma Mercer replaced Mr Khan in September 2017 and remained in post until the company collapsed, without joining Carillion plc's board. Carillion's 2016 annual report refers to the change of Group Finance Director with effect from 1 January 2017. 1 15
documentedCarillion's 2014 annual report names Robin Herzberg as Group Head of Risk, responsible for co-ordinating the reporting of strategic risk issues across the group, oversight of risk management and training, and an independent appraisal of all projects before submission to the Major Projects Committee; Andrew Dougal's letter describes him as Head of Risk when he looked into Emma Mercer's concerns about negative accruals. 16 3
sources in this section
- Carillion: Second Joint Report of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (HC 769), chapters on the company and its board House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees · May 2018
- Company statement source · src-042 identified by category only · Company statement
- Letter from Andrew Dougal to the committee chairs, 5 April 2018 House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · 5 Apr 2018
- Project Ray: Independent Business Review of the Carillion group prepared by FTI Consulting for the lenders (published by the committees) House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · 15 Jan 2018
- Sanctions against KPMG LLP, KPMG Audit Plc and two former partners (Carillion audits) Financial Reporting Council · 12 Oct 2023
- Carillion Group Business Plan, January 2018 (published by the committees) House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · Jan 2018
- Regulatory record source · src-095 identified by category only · Regulatory record
- Investigation into the government's handling of the collapse of Carillion (HC 1002) National Audit Office · 7 Jun 2018
- FRC findings of 12 May 2026 on former Carillion finance directors and accountants Financial Reporting Council · 12 May 2026
- FCA publishes Decision Notices against Carillion plc (in liquidation) and three of its former executive directors Financial Conduct Authority · 28 Jul 2022
- FCA fines former finance directors of Carillion plc (in liquidation) Financial Conduct Authority · 7 Jan 2026
- Carillion: Second Joint Report of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (HC 769), chapter on external checks and balances House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees · May 2018
- Letter from Deloitte LLP (Michael Jones) to the chairs of the BEIS and Work and Pensions Committees, 27 March 2018 House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · 27 Mar 2018
- FCA fines former chief executive of Carillion plc (in liquidation) Financial Conduct Authority · 16 Feb 2026
- Company statement source · src-003 identified by category only · Company statement
- Company statement source · src-094 identified by category only · Company statement
- Other source · src-074 identified by category only · Other
- Companies House disqualified director record: Richard John Howson Companies House
- Carillion plc (in liquidation) v KPMG LLP and KPMG Audit plc [2020] EWHC 1416 (Comm), judgment High Court of Justice, Commercial Court (The National Archives, Find Case Law) · 3 Jun 2020
7KPMG's audits of Carillion and the FRC's sanctions
documentedCarillion's audit committee reports state that KPMG was appointed as the company's auditor at its inception in 1999. The House of Commons committees' joint report states that KPMG audited Carillion for all 19 years of its existence and over that period charged £29 million in audit fees, alongside charges for taxation and other assurance services, and that the financial statements show KPMG never offered a qualified audit opinion. 1 2
documentedCarillion's 2014 audit committee report states that KPMG Audit Plc resigned as auditor on 13 March 2014 under section 516 of the Companies Act 2006 and that on 13 May 2014 the directors appointed KPMG LLP as auditor to fill the casual vacancy under section 485(3). The 2014 accounts state that auditors' remuneration for 2013 related solely to amounts paid to KPMG Audit Plc and for 2014 solely to amounts paid to KPMG LLP. 3
documentedCompanies House records KPMG Audit Limited, company number 03110745, incorporated on 2 October 1995, with the previous name KPMG AUDIT PLC for the period from 2 October 1995 to 24 September 2024. 4
documentedCarillion's 2014 audit committee report states that, following publication of the 2013 results, Peter Meehan succeeded Darren Turner as KPMG's Group Audit Partner for Carillion, Mr Turner attending the May 2014 annual general meeting before relinquishing his responsibilities; the 2016 report names Mr Meehan as Group Audit Partner, attending each audit committee meeting in 2016. The FRC's notice of 12 October 2023 describes Mr Turner, a former partner of KPMG LLP, as Audit Engagement Partner for the financial year 2013, audited by KPMG Audit Plc, and Mr Meehan, a former partner of KPMG LLP, as Audit Engagement Partner for the 2014, 2015 and 2016 audits and the additional audit work in 2017. 3 1 5
documentedCarillion's audit committee reports give KPMG's total fees as £1.7m for 2013 (audit £1.5m or 88%, non-audit £0.2m or 12%; paid to KPMG Audit Plc), £1.6m for 2014 (audit £1.3m or 81%, non-audit £0.3m or 19%), £1.8m for 2015 (audit £1.4m or 78%, non-audit £0.4m or 22%) and £1.6m for 2016 (audit £1.4m or 88%, non-audit £0.2m or 12%). Non-audit services in 2014 related to tax advisory and compliance work towards regulatory reports for a potential transaction, and in 2016 to tax advisory and other assurance services. 3 1
documentedAndrew Dougal's letter of 5 April 2018, citing KPMG's letter to the committees of 2 February 2018, lists KPMG's statutory audit fees for Carillion as £1.8 million in 2008, £1.3 million in 2009, £1.5 million in 2010, £1.4 million in 2011, £1.5 million in 2012 and 2013, £1.3 million in 2014 and £1.4 million in 2015 and 2016, an average of £1.46 million; he wrote that, although he could not say for certain, the acquisition of Alfred McAlpine completed in 2008 was likely a significant part of the higher fee that year. 6
documentedCarillion's 2014 audit committee report stated that the group would tender its audit by the year ending 31 December 2019 and rotate to a new audit firm by the year ending 31 December 2023. The 2016 report stated that, in view of regulatory changes and the change of Group Finance Director with effect from 1 January 2017, the timing of a tender would be kept under annual review and that the company would not renew or enter into an audit engagement with KPMG for the financial year beginning 1 January 2024. Andrew Dougal wrote that no tender was held in 2017 mainly because a new Finance Director had very recently been appointed, and that in late 2017 he concluded that a retender should be held in 2018 and was agreeing this with Justin Read, who was replacing him as audit committee chair, when the company went into liquidation. 3 1 6
documentedCarillion's audit committee rated KPMG's effectiveness as external auditor at 4.9 out of 5.0 in its February 2015 review and 4.7 out of 5.0 in its February 2017 review, and recommended reappointment; in its 2014 report the committee stated that it had discussed with the Group Audit Partner the findings of the FRC's Audit Quality Review of KPMG's work on the financial year ended 31 December 2013, which it said supported its view that KPMG remained effective. Andrew Dougal wrote in his 2018 letter that he was generally happy with the level of challenge and scrutiny KPMG offered the audit committee. 3 1 6
documentedKPMG LLP's audit report on Carillion's 2014 financial statements, signed by Peter Meehan as senior statutory auditor on 4 March 2015, stated that its opinion was unmodified. It identified as the risks of material misstatement with the greatest effect on the audit the recognition of contract revenue, margin and related receivables and liabilities (total revenue £3,493.9 million) and the carrying value of goodwill (£1,519.1 million); set materiality at £9.0 million, 5.9 per cent of normalised group profit before tax; and subjected five of the group's ten reporting components to audits for group reporting purposes and three to specified risk-focused procedures. It noted that KPMG's report on 2013 had included the timing of revenue recognition from licence arrangements among the risks with the greatest effect on the audit, a risk it considered less significant in 2014. 3
documentedKPMG LLP's audit report on Carillion's 2016 financial statements, signed by Peter Meehan as senior statutory auditor on 1 March 2017, stated that its opinion was unmodified and that the financial statements gave a true and fair view of the group's and parent company's affairs at 31 December 2016 and of the group's profit for the year. KPMG set group materiality at £8.0 million (2015: £8.0 million), 5.4 per cent of normalised group profit before tax of £147.8 million; the risks with the greatest effect on the audit were contract revenue and margin recognition, a new 'other revenue judgements' risk on £20.0 million of licence income, and the carrying value of goodwill (£1,571.0 million). KPMG stated that it had nothing material to add or draw attention to regarding the directors' viability statement or the disclosures on the use of the going concern basis. 1
documentedAccording to the FRC's 2023 notice, its investigation into the statutory audit of Carillion's financial statements for 2014, 2015 and 2016 and additional audit work in 2017 was opened on 26 January 2018; the House of Commons committees report that on 29 January 2018 the FRC announced an investigation under its audit enforcement procedure into KPMG's auditing of Carillion's financial statements from 2014 onwards, with particular focus on the company's 'use and disclosure of the going concern basis of accounting, estimates and recognition of revenue on significant contracts, and accounting for pensions'. On 19 March 2018 it announced investigations into the conduct of the former finance directors Richard Adam and Zafar Khan in relation to the preparation and approval of the financial statements. A second audit investigation, into certain transactions in the 2013 financial statements, was opened on 12 February 2019. 2 5
- response
- KPMG welcomed the investigation, stating that 'it is important that regulators acting in the public interest review the audit work related to high profile cases such as Carillion'.
documentedResponding to the committees' joint report, the FRC's chief executive wrote that its investigation would focus on whether KPMG breached audit standards and whether the two accountants within its remit committed misconduct, reviewing four years of audit files, KPMG's and Carillion's emails and company documents, interviewing employees and instructing an independent expert witness. The FRC stated that it had begun an audit quality review of the 2016 audit after the July 2017 profit warning, which showed that the case for enforcement action should be considered, and that the committees' points on goodwill, reverse factoring and other matters would form part of the investigation. It explained that the case against the auditor proceeds under the Audit Enforcement Procedure, which requires a breach of relevant requirements, while the accountants in business are investigated under the Accountancy Scheme, whose misconduct test is much higher. 7 8
attributedThe House of Commons committees reported that the FRC's 2015 corporate reporting review of Carillion's accounts raised twelve issues, from a lack of clarity in goodwill assumptions to an inadequate explanation of a significant decline in the book-to-bill ratio; that Carillion made the requisite disclosures in subsequent accounts but the FRC did not review the following year's accounts or investigate further; and that the FRC had not reviewed KPMG's auditing of Carillion's accounts since 2013, looking more closely at the accounts and their audit only after the July 2017 profit warning. They concluded that the FRC had been 'far too passive' in relation to Carillion's financial reporting. 2 7 9 5
- qualification
- Committees' assessment. The FRC's own accounts of its review sequence differ from the committees' on whether the 2016 accounts were reviewed, and the retained documents do not resolve the point.
- response
- The FRC's chief executive told the committees that 'with hindsight, clearly it would have been better to have had a further look', but that the FRC 'did not think that the lack of disclosure was symptomatic of something more serious'. In its response to the report the FRC stated that it 'followed up with a review of the 2016 accounts' and started a review of the 2016 audit following the July 2017 profit warning; its letter of 21 March 2018 states that its Corporate Reporting Review team reviewed Carillion's December 2015 and December 2011 accounts. The FRC added that its audit powers were aimed at overall audit quality and had not been envisaged to prevent the failure of individual companies, that confidentiality requirements prevented it from publishing views on individual company audits, and that it now intended to enhance its focus on the audits of companies which appear to be in danger.
- outcome
- The FRC's investigation into KPMG's audits of Carillion for 2014 to 2016 was opened on 26 January 2018 and ended in the October 2023 sanctions. In 2018 the Secretary of State for Business asked Sir John Kingman to conduct a comprehensive independent review of the FRC's governance, impact and powers, writing that its capabilities and culture needed to be strengthened; Kingman told the committees that their Carillion report formed 'a very important part of the context' for the review.
documentedOn 12 October 2023 the FRC announced that its Executive Counsel had issued two Final Settlement Decision Notices under the Audit Enforcement Procedure, concluding her investigations into the audits of Carillion. Under the first, KPMG LLP received a financial sanction of £26,500,000, reduced by 30% to £18,550,000 to reflect the firm's co-operation and admissions; a severe reprimand; a declaration that the relevant audit reports signed on its behalf did not satisfy the Relevant Requirements; and an order to take remedial action, including evaluating and reporting whether the measures it had taken since 2017 were sufficient. KPMG LLP also pays Executive Counsel's costs of both investigations, £5,324,365.68. The Executive Counsel described the financial sanction as the highest ever imposed by the FRC. 5
- qualification
- Settlement decisions reflecting the respondents' co-operation and admissions; the decision notices themselves were not published when the outcome was announced.
documentedUnder the same October 2023 decision the FRC imposed on Peter Meehan, a former KPMG LLP partner and audit engagement partner for the Carillion audits of 2014 to 2016, a financial sanction of £500,000 reduced by 30% to £350,000 to reflect his co-operation and admissions, a severe reprimand, and exclusion from membership of the ICAEW for 10 years, running concurrently with the exclusion already imposed in other proceedings. 5
documentedUnder the second October 2023 decision, concerning the audit of certain transactions in Carillion's 2013 financial statements, the FRC imposed on KPMG Audit Plc a financial sanction of £3,500,000 reduced by 30% to £2,450,000 to reflect the firm's co-operation and admissions, a severe reprimand and a declaration that its audit report did not satisfy the Relevant Requirements, and on Darren Turner, a former KPMG LLP partner and the 2013 audit engagement partner, a financial sanction of £100,000 reduced by 30% to £70,000 to reflect his co-operation and admissions, and a severe reprimand. 5
attributedThe FRC's summary of findings for its first October 2023 decision states that KPMG gave unqualified opinions on Carillion's 2014, 2015 and 2016 financial statements, the 2016 opinion being dated 1 March 2017, and that Carillion was 'not subject to rigorous, comprehensive, and reliable audits in the three years leading up to its demise'. It found that in 2016 KPMG's and Mr Meehan's work on going concern and Carillion's financial position was 'seriously deficient', failing to respond to numerous indicators that core operations were loss-making and reliant on short-term and unsustainable measures to support cash flows; that breaches concerned the most significant UK and overseas construction and services contracts, reported debt and going concern including the use of a supply chain finance facility, 2016 pension liabilities and goodwill impairment testing; and that KPMG failed to gather sufficient appropriate audit evidence and to apply adequate professional scepticism to management's judgements and estimates. 5 7
- qualification
- Findings summarised by the FRC's Executive Counsel from an unpublished Final Settlement Decision Notice that reflects the respondents' co-operation and admissions. The FRC stated that the Decision 1 breaches were not dishonest and in the majority of cases not intentional, deliberate or reckless.
- response
- In 2018 KPMG told the committees that it respectfully disagreed with their characterisation of its audit work as 'complacent' and that a company failing after an unqualified audit opinion 'does not automatically mean the auditor did a bad job'. No later public response by KPMG or Mr Meehan to the 2023 findings was found in the retained documents.
- outcome
- KPMG LLP was fined £26,500,000 reduced to £18,550,000 and Mr Meehan £500,000 reduced to £350,000, each with a severe reprimand; Mr Meehan was excluded from ICAEW membership for 10 years.
attributedThe FRC's summary of its first October 2023 decision also states that Carillion was a very important client for KPMG and key members of the audit team, creating a risk to their objectivity, and that in a number of instances Mr Meehan and other team members accepted 'the presentation of financial information that suited Carillion's management'. In the 2016 audit, procedures in a range of areas were not completed until more than six weeks after the audit report was signed, records of the preparation and review of working papers were unreliable and in some cases misleading, and Mr Meehan 'did not have a proper basis to be satisfied' that the 2016 opinion was appropriate. The FRC records 'a finding of a lack of integrity in respect of Mr Meehan's record of his review of the 2016 audit', four findings of a lack of objectivity and one finding of a failure to assess a threat to independence. 5
- qualification
- Findings summarised by the FRC from an unpublished Final Settlement Decision Notice reflecting co-operation and admissions; the FRC states that the Decision 1 breaches were not dishonest and in the majority of cases not intentional, deliberate or reckless, and that the notice makes no findings about any other persons or entities.
- response
- No public response by Mr Meehan to these findings was found in the retained documents; the sanctions were discounted by 30% to reflect his and the firm's co-operation and admissions.
- outcome
- Under the same decision KPMG LLP received a financial sanction of £26,500,000, reduced by 30% to £18,550,000, and Mr Meehan one of £500,000, reduced to £350,000, each with a severe reprimand; Mr Meehan was excluded from ICAEW membership for 10 years, concurrently with the exclusion already imposed in other proceedings, and the FRC declared that the relevant audit reports signed on behalf of KPMG LLP did not satisfy the relevant requirements.
documentedOn 25 July 2022 the FRC announced sanctions against KPMG LLP, a former KPMG partner and four former KPMG employees after an independent Disciplinary Tribunal, following a five-week hearing in January and February 2022, made findings of misconduct concerning the provision of false and misleading information and documents to the FRC's Audit Quality Review inspectors in connection with KPMG's audits of Regenersis plc (period ended 30 June 2014) and Carillion plc (period ended 31 December 2016). KPMG admitted liability for the acts of all the individuals and that those acts amounted to misconduct; it was fined £20 million, reduced to £14.4 million to reflect self-reporting, co-operation and admissions, severely reprimanded and ordered to appoint an independent reviewer of its AQR policies and procedures, and agreed to pay £3.95 million towards Executive Counsel's costs of the investigation, together with the costs of the Tribunal. 10
- qualification
- Proceedings under the FRC's Accountancy Scheme. The Formal Complaint did not allege misconduct in the performance of the audits, nor that the financial statements had not been properly prepared; the Tribunal's report was not published at the time. A national newspaper later described the outcome as a settlement, whereas the FRC describes Tribunal findings after a hearing, with sanctions determined at a further hearing in May 2022.
attributedThe Disciplinary Tribunal found that, for the AQR inspection of the 2016 Carillion audit, minutes of year-end 'clearance' meetings and an audit working paper on the selection of construction contracts for testing (the 'CCS Paper') were presented to the inspectors as having been created during the audit, and that they were false or misleading. It found that Peter Meehan had assisted or encouraged the creation of the false or misleading minutes and was, with three of the former employees, party to the dishonest misleading of the AQR inspectors; in respect of the CCS Paper it found that Mr Meehan acted without the integrity required of an accountant, but not dishonestly. A further allegation against him about the content of the minutes was found not proved. Mr Meehan was excluded from ICAEW membership for 10 years and fined £250,000; the four former employees received exclusions of seven or eight years with fines, or a severe reprimand. 10 5
- qualification
- Findings of an independent Disciplinary Tribunal under the FRC's Accountancy Scheme; the FRC notes that they relate only to the members and member firm who were subjects of the proceedings, and the Tribunal's report was not published at the time.
- response
- KPMG admitted liability for the acts of all the individuals; no statement by Mr Meehan responding to these findings was found in the retained documents.
- outcome
- The FRC's separate October 2023 settlement decision on the 2014–2016 audits imposed a further 10-year ICAEW exclusion on Mr Meehan, running concurrently with this one.
attributedThe House of Commons committees concluded that KPMG, having audited Carillion for 19 years and been paid £29 million, never qualified its audit opinion, 'instead signing off the figures put in front of them by the company's directors', and that 'in failing to exercise—and voice—professional scepticism towards Carillion's aggressive accounting judgements, KPMG was complicit in them'. They noted that KPMG's 2016 report described contract revenue risks only in general terms, while its February 2017 presentation to the audit committee had described the traded position on contracts as 'challenging' though 'reasonable' when considered with the provisions. 7 2 5
- qualification
- Conclusions of a parliamentary select committee report, made while KPMG's audits were under FRC investigation.
- response
- KPMG replied that its 2014–2016 audit work and its 2017 work were the subject of the FRC's ongoing investigation, that it 'respectfully' disagreed with the committees' characterisation of its audit work as 'complacent', which did not reflect the hard work and commitment of the Carillion audit team, and that a company failing after an unqualified audit opinion 'does not automatically mean the auditor did a bad job'. KPMG's head of audit had told the committees she did not believe 19 years was 'too long to be impartial'.
- outcome
- In October 2023 the FRC's settlement decision found serious breaches of relevant requirements in KPMG's 2014–2016 audits and imposed on KPMG LLP a financial sanction of £18,550,000 after a 30% discount.
documentedKPMG LLP's independent review report on Carillion's half-yearly financial report for the six months to 30 June 2017, signed by Peter Meehan on 29 September 2017, concluded under the International Standard on Review Engagements (UK and Ireland) 2410 that nothing had come to its attention indicating that the condensed financial statements were not prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with IAS 34 and the FCA's Disclosure Guidance and Transparency Rules; it states that a review is substantially less in scope than an audit and expresses no audit opinion. The board continued to adopt the going concern basis 'notwithstanding that the interim balance sheet shows a net liability position'. 11
documentedCarillion's 2014 and 2016 audit committee reports state that the group's internal audit function was outsourced to Deloitte LLP; the 2014 report lists representatives of the internal auditors (Deloitte LLP) and the external auditors (KPMG LLP), and the Group Head of Risk, Robin Herzberg, among those attending committee meetings by invitation, and the committee rated the internal audit function 4.8 out of 5.0 in December 2014 and 4.7 out of 5.0 in December 2016. The House of Commons committees state that Deloitte charged on average £775,000 a year as Carillion's internal auditor since 2010, and name Michael Jones as the Deloitte partner responsible for Carillion's internal audit. 3 2 1 8
attributedThe House of Commons committees reported that Deloitte, as internal auditor, rarely identified issues as high priority — only 15 of 309 recommendations between 2012 and 2016 — and that across 61 internal audit reports in 2015 and 2016 only a single report, in 2016, found inadequate controls. They concluded that Deloitte 'were either unable to identify effectively to the board the risks associated with their business practices, unwilling to do so, or too readily ignored them'. 2 6 12 7
- qualification
- Committees' assessment of the internal auditor; not a regulatory finding.
- response
- Andrew Dougal wrote that he was generally happy with the quality of Deloitte's internal audit work, which he believed was undertaken thoroughly and with a high level of professionalism, that the audit committee's annual evaluations were positive, and that he had no reason to believe Deloitte was aware of the management and financial control issues that came to light in 2017; in mid-2017 he proposed extending internal audit's scope to the identification of negative accruals and the use of peer review information. Deloitte told the committees that it had no responsibility for preparing or auditing the 2016 financial statements. Responding to the report, Deloitte wrote that with regard to internal audit 'there are undoubtedly areas to reflect upon following the Carillion experience', noted that internal audit in the corporate sector is not a statutory requirement, and proposed a debate on whether the Corporate Governance Code should further clarify the role of internal audit and the audit committee's reporting obligations.
documentedCarillion's 2014 remuneration report states that Deloitte, appointed by the remuneration committee in 2005, advised the committee for time-based fees of £29,520 for 2014 (2013: £20,025), and also provided certain specialist consultancy services and internal audit resource but otherwise had no other connections with the group. The House of Commons committees reported that Deloitte also offered due diligence on the 2011 takeover of Eaga and then received £730k for a subsequent transformation programme there, and that over the previous decade the 'Big Four' firms collectively received £51.2 million for services to Carillion. 3 2
sources in this section
- Company statement source · src-003 identified by category only · Company statement
- Carillion: Second Joint Report of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (HC 769), chapter on external checks and balances House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees · May 2018
- Company statement source · src-094 identified by category only · Company statement
- Companies House company record: KPMG Audit Limited (03110745) Companies House
- Sanctions against KPMG LLP, KPMG Audit Plc and two former partners (Carillion audits) Financial Reporting Council · 12 Oct 2023
- Letter from Andrew Dougal to the committee chairs, 5 April 2018 House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · 5 Apr 2018
- Carillion: Responses from Interested Parties to the committees' report (HC 1392, Second Special Report) House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees · 12 Jul 2018
- Carillion: Second Joint Report of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (HC 769), chapters on the company and its board House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees · May 2018
- Letter from the Chairman of the Financial Reporting Council to the committee chairs, 21 March 2018 House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · 21 Mar 2018
- Sanctions against KPMG and others in connection with the Regenersis and Carillion audits Financial Reporting Council · 25 Jul 2022
- Company statement source · src-042 identified by category only · Company statement
- Letter from Deloitte LLP (Michael Jones) to the chairs of the BEIS and Work and Pensions Committees, 27 March 2018 House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · 27 Mar 2018
8Supplier payment terms and the early payment facility
documentedIn a letter of 21 March 2018 to the committee chairs, sent under its chairman's covering letter, the FRC wrote that Carillion's accounts provided 'no significant material disclosures' on its use of reverse factoring, so that it was 'impossible to determine, at this stage, whether Carillion's approach was in line with our expectations'; derecognition of the original trade payable might have been appropriate with the replacement liability still shown within trade and other payables, but conclusions required information on the facility terms and would not be drawn pending the FRC's investigations. The FRC explained that the 98% figure cited by Moody's compared the increase in other creditors with net cash inflows from operations, and that the arrangement did result in Carillion retaining cash for longer, which was not apparent without disclosure. It stated that its review of the December 2015 and December 2011 accounts had not raised reverse factoring because no question of non-compliance was apparent, and that its Enforcement Division investigation would consider whether the accounting treatment adopted was appropriate. 1
documentedThe House of Commons committees reported that after the July 2017 profit warning EY oversaw 'Project Ray', a transformation programme for which Carillion paid it £10.8 million over six months, partly to identify up to £123 million of cost savings; EY also helped negotiate the pension trustee's deferral of £25 million of deficit recovery contributions and an October 2017 'time to pay' arrangement with HMRC deferring £22 million of tax. On 12 January 2018 Carillion paid advisers a total of £6,396,141, including £2,508,000 to Ernst & Young, £1,196,093 to Slaughter and May, £1,018,666 to FTI Consulting, £276,000 to PricewaterhouseCoopers and £78,000 to KPMG. 2 3
- response
- EY stated that its role was to support management in reorganising the business and reducing costs, to identify ways of improving cash flow and to help prepare the financial model used for the five-year business plan presented to creditors, and disputed the committees' description of 'six months of failed turnaround advice'.
attributedThe House of Commons committees reported that in the company's final months Carillion considered a proposal by its restructuring consultants, EY, to extend standard payment terms to 126 days as an untapped 'cash generative opportunity'. 3 4
- qualification
- Committees' account; EY disputes that the suggestion concerned suppliers generally.
- response
- EY wrote that the suggestion was not made for all of Carillion's suppliers but was confined to four larger suppliers already registered on Carillion's Supply Chain Finance platform on non-standard 120-day terms, for whom it recommended that Carillion consider applying its current standard terms of 126 days, and that this did not materially disadvantage those suppliers as regards the timing of their access to cash.
documentedCarillion's January 2018 group business plan assumed, for its Building segment, that the early payment facility would cover about 81% of supplier payments with a 'continuing benefit from 126 day payment terms', and projected EPF use in Building falling as volumes declined, to be broadly compensated by onboarding additional suppliers in services. 5 4
attributedAccording to the House of Commons committees, the construction trade body Build UK estimated that Carillion's supply chain spanned 30,000 companies when it collapsed. Carillion signed the Government's Prompt Payment Code in 2013, under which signatories should pay 95% of invoices within 60 days unless there are exceptional circumstances and work towards 30-day payment terms; the committees reported that in 2016 the Federation of Small Businesses protested to Carillion on behalf of suppliers waiting up to 126 days for payment, and concluded that late payments, routine quibbling of invoices and extended delays across reporting periods were company policy. 4 6
- qualification
- Build UK's estimate and the committees' characterisation; the former directors' evidence and Carillion's own figures differ.
- response
- Richard Adam, Richard Howson and Philip Green told the committees they did not recognise cases of suppliers waiting 120 to 126 days; Emma Mercer said 'a few outliers' of 'about five per cent' of the supply chain were paid after more than 120 days and 'less than ten per cent' waited 60 days. Carillion told the Cabinet Office that in the first five months of 2017 it paid suppliers on average 45 days after the invoice date (33 days from receipt of a validated invoice), with almost one third of invoices paid more than 60 days later; the Cabinet Office told the NAO it was unable to verify this. In April 2015 Carillion had told the Cabinet Office that it was paying sub-contractors on government contracts within 30 days.
- outcome
- The committees reported that suppliers left unpaid for goods and services supplied before the collapse were, in the vast majority, uninsured and had joined the long list of creditors unlikely to see anything they were owed.
attributedThe House of Commons committees reported that Carillion was a founding participant in the Government's Supply Chain Finance Scheme announced in 2012 and, shortly after its launch, changed its standard payment terms to 120 days; suppliers could sell their invoices at a discount to Carillion's bank to receive payment after 45 days, while Carillion reimbursed the bank only when the standard terms expired. Emma Mercer accepted that suppliers were asked to sign up to 120-day terms with an early payment facility option, which she called 'supply chain factoring', and said the EPF was used to avoid 'damaging our working capital'. The committees concluded that suppliers 'could be paid in 45 days, but had to take a cut for the privilege'. 4 3
- qualification
- Committees' characterisation of the facility; disputed by Richard Howson.
- response
- Richard Howson wrote that this was 'just not correct': the EPF let suppliers choose when to take payment on approved invoices, at no cost to themselves at 30 days on government contracts and 45 days on non-government contracts, the bank deducting interest for which Carillion made the supplier whole, and the 120 days in the contract 'effectively set the time period with which Carillion paid its EPF partner banks, not the time period it took to pay its suppliers'. EY described the platform as allowing suppliers to draw down funds in line with agreed terms at no additional cost, or earlier at an additional cost.
- outcome
- The committees reported that in the liquidation the Official Receiver had reduced payment terms for goods and services provided during and for the benefit of the liquidation to 'there or thereabouts, within 30 days of invoice rather than the 120 days' the committees had heard of.
documentedCarillion's 2014 annual report stated that its Early Payment Facility, introduced at the beginning of 2013, paid all suppliers on at least the same terms as before they joined and in many cases up to 20 days earlier at no cost to suppliers, and that it was used by 396 suppliers, with payments of £977.6 million made through it in 2014. Its 2016 report described 'prompt and fair supplier payments through our Early Payment Facility, which 85 per cent of our suppliers would recommend to others', with 55 per cent (2015: 58 per cent) of external expenditure with local suppliers and SMEs. In its 2017 interim results Carillion said it intended to retain an EPF but over the medium term to reduce the period within which it paid its partner banks, which would reduce the cost of the facility. 7 8 9
attributedAccording to the House of Commons committees, when Carillion collapsed it had access to credit of up to £500 million for the 'early' payment of suppliers and was drawing around £350 million, and the credit rating agency S&P Global told them that 'the lack of transparency concerning Carillion's reverse factoring practices likely obscured its weak balance sheet and cash flow position'. The draft independent business review prepared by FTI for Carillion's lenders, commissioned in October 2017, described a further c.£250m to £300m of 'core debt' accumulated through off-balance-sheet supplier financing (EPF) arrangements that extended payment terms on the supplier base from about 30 days to about 120 days. 4 10 6
- qualification
- Characterisations by a credit rating agency and by the lenders' adviser in a draft review; the FRC said it could not determine whether Carillion's accounting for the facility met its expectations without further information.
- response
- Former Carillion directors told the NAO that the practices FTI listed, including the use of early payment facilities to improve supplier payment terms, were in accordance with accounting standards or had been appropriately disclosed in the accounts; they excepted only the securing of large advance payments on new contracts.
attributedA trade-press report of 16 January 2018 stated that about a third of Carillion's £1.5bn debt to banking partners was 'reverse factoring', a liability of about £500m accumulated under the Early Payment Facility introduced in 2013, under which the banks paid suppliers first and recovered the capital from Carillion; that RBS, Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds and Santander UK were owed around 60% of the company's debt; and that in a July 2017 update Carillion put EPF utilisation at £412m, 6% up on 2016, when Keith Cochrane told analysts the company would seek to reduce its reliance on reverse factoring. The report stated that the maximum payment term had been increased from 65 to 120 days. 11 9
- qualification
- Non-official trade-press reporting; the banks' shares of the debt and the £1.5bn figure are not confirmed in the official records retained, and the committees give different EPF figures (access up to £500 million and drawings of around £350 million at the collapse; £472 million drawn according to audit committee papers).
- response
- Carillion's interim results of 29 September 2017 stated that the EPF continued to be very attractive to suppliers and had significant benefits for Carillion, which therefore intended to retain an EPF but over the medium term to work towards reducing the period within which it paid its partner banks, reducing the cost of the facility.
attributedThe House of Commons committees reported that the credit rating agencies Moody's and Standard & Poor's argued that Carillion's early payment facility created a financial liability to the banks that should have been presented as borrowing rather than as liabilities to 'other creditors'; Moody's claimed that as much as £498 million was misclassified, while Carillion's audit committee papers show £472 million drawn. Moody's also found that between 2013 and 2016 Carillion reported operating cash inflows of £509 million against group operating profit of £501 million, but that reclassifying £472 million of EPF inflows as financing would leave only £37 million (7%) of operating profit cash-backed. The committees noted that Carillion's financial statements did not highlight the EPF, the only reference in the 2016 annual report being in the strategic report. 4 1 3 12 13
- qualification
- Assessments by credit rating agencies as reported by the committees; the FRC would not confirm whether it agreed and said that the precise terms of an arrangement dictate how it is accounted for.
- response
- The FRC wrote that, absent disclosure, it was impossible to determine whether Carillion's approach met its expectations, and that derecognition of the trade payable with the replacement liability shown in trade and other payables could have been appropriate depending on the terms. Richard Howson maintained that the 120-day period governed Carillion's payments to its EPF partner banks rather than to suppliers.
- outcome
- The FRC's October 2023 findings on KPMG's 2016 audit included breaches concerning Carillion's reported debt and going concern, 'including consideration of Carillion's use of a supply chain finance facility'. In May 2026 the FRC announced that the former finance directors Richard Adam and Zafar Khan had accepted misconduct, each admitting recklessness and a failure to act with integrity, in respect of areas including a supply chain finance facility, which the FRC described as material to Carillion's reported financial performance in one or more years between 2013 and 2016 or the 2017 half-year.
attributedThe House of Commons committees stated that presenting EPF drawings as 'other creditors' excluded them from total debt and so from the net debt to EBITDA ratio, a key covenant test between Carillion and its lenders; Carillion announced in its third profit warning on 17 November 2017 that it was likely to breach that covenant, and the committees considered that, had £472 million been classified as debt, it would most likely have breached the test far earlier. 4
- qualification
- Committees' analysis, dependent on the contested classification of the EPF liability.
documentedAccording to the House of Commons committees, Carillion's board minutes of April 2015 described as 'disappointing' an analysis by UBS that included both the pension deficit and the EPF in Carillion's total debt position, and the May 2015 minutes noted that short-selling of Carillion shares was up significantly, with the 'bulk' having 'followed the UBS note in March'. 4
attributedResponding to the committees' joint report, the Confederation of British Industry called Carillion's payment practices, 'which included extending terms of up to 120 days and charging a fee for early payment', 'indefensible', saying they let Carillion hold on to cash for longer while transferring financial risk to its supply chain and putting smaller firms under pressure; the Institute of Directors noted concerns that Carillion had signed the Prompt Payment Code but did not follow the commitment to pay 95% of invoices within 60 days and to aim towards 30-day terms; and the Federation of Small Businesses agreed that the code was 'clearly ineffective in the case of Carillion'. 3
- qualification
- Views of business organisations submitted to the committees, not findings.
- response
- Carillion's annual reports described the EPF as paying suppliers at least on their previous terms and often earlier at no cost to them, and Richard Howson wrote that suppliers could be paid without cost at 30 or 45 days and that, as regards late payment, 'this problem starts at the top', with the Government and public-sector customers' administration of payments to contractors.
attributedThe House of Commons committees reported that Vaughan Engineering Ltd, which employed around 200 people providing mechanical and electrical building services on large commercial projects and had worked extensively with Carillion over the previous decade, complained of 120-day standard payment terms that could only be circumvented through the early payment facility, delays in certification of payments and unsubstantiated counter-claims, and believed it was owed £830,000 by Carillion, which left it unable to cover its liabilities. 4
- qualification
- Vaughan Engineering's own account as reported by the committees; the claimed debt is the company's belief, not an adjudicated amount.
- outcome
- Vaughan Engineering filed for administration on 28 March 2018, one of the first companies hit by Carillion's collapse according to the committees. It described that collapse as the principal factor in its downfall, while also citing contract disputes with other contractors and inadequate Government support after Carillion's insolvency.
sources in this section
- Letter from the Chairman of the Financial Reporting Council to the committee chairs, 21 March 2018 House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · 21 Mar 2018
- Carillion: Second Joint Report of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (HC 769), chapter on external checks and balances House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees · May 2018
- Carillion: Responses from Interested Parties to the committees' report (HC 1392, Second Special Report) House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees · 12 Jul 2018
- Carillion: Second Joint Report of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (HC 769), chapters on the company and its board House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees · May 2018
- Carillion Group Business Plan, January 2018 (published by the committees) House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · Jan 2018
- Investigation into the government's handling of the collapse of Carillion (HC 1002) National Audit Office · 7 Jun 2018
- Company statement source · src-094 identified by category only · Company statement
- Company statement source · src-003 identified by category only · Company statement
- Company statement source · src-042 identified by category only · Company statement
- Project Ray: Independent Business Review of the Carillion group prepared by FTI Consulting for the lenders (published by the committees) House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · 15 Jan 2018
- Media source · src-060 identified by category only · Media
- Sanctions against KPMG LLP, KPMG Audit Plc and two former partners (Carillion audits) Financial Reporting Council · 12 Oct 2023
- FRC findings of 12 May 2026 on former Carillion finance directors and accountants Financial Reporting Council · 12 May 2026
9Carillion and the state: public contracts, oversight and the collapse
documentedOn 15 January 2018, the day of the liquidation, the Cabinet Office stated that Carillion held approximately 450 contracts with government, representing 38% of its 2016 reported revenue, and that key central government contracts were held with the Department for Education, the Department for Health and Social Care, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Defence and the Department for Transport. A notice published the same day by the Insolvency Service and the Department for Work and Pensions gave the same figures, described the contracts as covering services for hospitals, schools, prisons and transport, and named the same departments other than the Ministry of Defence. 1 2
attributedThe Insolvency Service and Department for Work and Pensions notice of 15 January 2018, after describing Carillion's government contracts and naming the departments holding the key central government contracts, stated that 'these are not the cause of the company's present financial difficulties'. 1 3 4
- qualification
- Government position stated on the day of the liquidation. The National Audit Office's June 2018 investigation reported that in 2017 Carillion faced estimated losses of £91 million on its Aberdeen bypass joint venture, £83 million on the Royal Liverpool University Hospital and £48 million on the Midland Metropolitan Hospital, all public sector PFI projects, and that its central government facilities management unit was only just profitable.
- response
- Richard Howson, Carillion's former chief executive, argued in his response to the committees' report (published July 2018) that no analysis of the causes of the failure was complete without looking at how government and the wider public sector procured services from Carillion and failed to administer payments, and said that when he left substantial amounts were properly due to Carillion from government and government-owned entities on a range of contracts.
documentedIn the Cabinet Office release of 15 January 2018, the Minister for the Cabinet Office announced that the government would continue to deliver all public sector services after Carillion's insolvency and would provide the funding required by the Official Receiver – appointed by the court as liquidator, with partners at PwC as special managers – to maintain public services; he said that 'taxpayers cannot be expected to bail out a private sector company'. 2
documentedThe National Audit Office (NAO), in its investigation of 7 June 2018 into the government's handling of the collapse, found that Carillion was a strategic supplier to government with around 420 UK public sector contracts at the point of liquidation, including direct contracts, sub-contracts and special purpose vehicles delivering private finance schemes; by value it was central government's sixth largest supplier in 2017, and public sector contracts accounted for 33% of its total revenue and 45% of its UK revenue. Carillion's accounts recorded £1.72 billion of UK public sector revenue for 2016, against global revenue of £5.2 billion. 3
documentedThe NAO's estimate of UK public sector spending with Carillion in 2016-17 (its Figure 2) showed the Ministry of Defence at £510m, Network Rail at £372m, NHS bodies in England at £287m, Highways England at £140m and devolved government at £135m, with smaller amounts for other departments and bodies; the amounts shown totalled £1,685 million, against £1,719 million of UK public sector revenue in Carillion's 2016 annual report. For CarillionAmey, Aspire Defence Ltd, Carillion Kier JV, Balfour Beatty Carillion JV and Costain Carillion JV the NAO added 50% of the joint ventures' reported revenue, which it assumed to be Carillion's share based on ownership shares disclosed in Carillion's accounts. 3
documentedThe NAO identified 423 Carillion contracts with public bodies at the point of insolvency in January 2018 (its Figure 3): 312 with schools in England, 25 with NHS bodies in England, 22 with Network Rail, 14 with local authorities in England, 11 with Highways England, 10 with the Ministry of Defence, 6 with the Department for Education (including two Priority Schools Building Programme contracts), 6 with fire and rescue authorities, 5 with devolved government, 3 with the Ministry of Justice, 2 with HS2 Ltd and one each with the British Museum, British Transport Police, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, HM Land Registry, HM Revenue & Customs and the Home Office. It noted that around 255 public sector contracts were included in the insolvency regime and that this number differs from its estimate of around 420. 3
documentedAccording to the NAO, Carillion targeted a net profit margin of 4.5% to 5.5% on its central government facilities management work. Advisers to its creditors found its 'central government' business unit profitable, though less so over time: operating profit was forecast at £9 million in 2017 on £647 million of forecast revenue (1.4%), low mainly because of losses on a large Ministry of Justice contract. The NAO's summary put the projected 2017 margin at 1%, compared with 13% to 15% on local government work (described in the body of the report as work for schools and hospitals). 3
attributedThe House of Commons Work and Pensions and Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy committees, in their report published on 16 May 2018, stated that although Carillion issued three profit warnings between July and November 2017, there was no Crown Representative in place for it between August and November 2017, owing to 'normal staff turnover'; the government conceded a 'longer-than-usual delay' while it sought someone with experience of corporate restructuring. Officials told the committees that the July profit warning was a complete surprise and that 25 meetings between the government and Carillion were held between July and January. The committees concluded that the assignment of a Crown Representative 'served no noticeable purpose' in alerting the government before the July 2017 profit warning. 5 4 3
- qualification
- Committees' account and assessment. The NAO dates the vacancy from July to October 2017, when the Cabinet Office's Director for Markets and Suppliers took on the role, and counted around 50 formally arranged calls and meetings between the Cabinet Office and Carillion after the July 2017 profit warning.
- response
- Philip Green described Carillion's relationship with its Crown Representative to the committees as 'transparent' and the 'key relationship' it had with government; Richard Howson said he met the Crown Representative each quarter and on an ad hoc basis in between.
documentedThe NAO reported that the Cabinet Office began monitoring strategic suppliers, including Carillion, after publishing a risk management policy in 2012; strategic suppliers (27 at the time of the report) were shadowed by 16 crown representatives, who with Cabinet Office officials formed the Commercial Relations Board, meeting every six weeks to assign risk ratings. There was no crown representative for Carillion from July to October 2017: recruitment was delayed when the Cabinet Office changed the requirement after the first profit warning to a person with experience in corporate restructuring, and in the meantime the Director for Markets and Suppliers took on the role. Carillion had a partnership manager throughout 2017. 3
documentedAccording to the NAO, the Cabinet Office's Commercial Relations Board raised Carillion's risk rating in 2013 over late payments to sub-contractors and returned it to green in August 2013 after Carillion signed the Prompt Payment Code; the rating stayed green until January 2016 and rose to amber in February 2016 after poor performance on a Ministry of Defence facilities management contract, and amber was maintained because of other concerns, notably the HM Prison and Probation Service prisons facilities management contract. Carillion told the Cabinet Office in April 2015 that it paid sub-contractors on government contracts within 30 days; asked in June 2017 to review its payments, it reported paying suppliers on average 45 days after invoice date in the first five months of 2017 (33 days from receipt of a validated invoice), with almost one third of invoices paid more than 60 days later. The Cabinet Office told the NAO it was unable to verify this information. 3
documentedThe NAO found that the Commercial Relations Board discussed raising Carillion's rating from amber to red on financial distress grounds on 18 July 2017 and confirmed the increase in September 2017 after seeking legal advice. On 29 November 2017, after Carillion announced that it expected to breach its banking covenants, the Cabinet Office proposed its highest category, 'high risk'; Carillion objected that the Cabinet Office already had the financial information such a rating required, that the rating would risk precipitating its financial collapse and that discussions with lenders were constructive. On 15 December 2017 the Board decided not to rate Carillion 'high risk', as officials were already receiving detailed financial information as 'insiders' and it did not wish to risk precipitating Carillion's financial collapse, while reserving the right to raise the rating later. 3
documentedThe NAO reported that the Cabinet Office spoke to Carillion on 11 July 2017 about the profit warning of 10 July 2017, began enhancing government contingency plans for its possible failure on 20 July, appointed the law firm Dentons on 24 August and appointed PwC on 17 September to advise on contingency planning and the consequences of insolvency (at a final cost of £600,000). By December it was speaking to the company nearly every day, and eight Cabinet Office and UK Government Investments officials had agreed to be Carillion 'insiders', receiving the same information as its major lenders, including cash flow statements. 3
documentedAccording to the NAO, on 20 July 2017 the Cabinet Office called together Carillion's central government customers and asked about their contracts and contingency plans; after the second profit warning on 29 September 2017 it asked for contract-by-contract plans by 17 November, and the Minister for the Cabinet Office later required completed plans by 20 December. It ultimately received 65 contingency plans from 26 public bodies, 16 of which (62%) did not provide costed preferred options. The costed plans totalled £238 million (Figure 15, in £000: Network Rail 146,650, Ministry of Justice 52,550, Ministry of Defence 27,750, Oxfordshire County Council 3,405, Department for Education 3,000, London Boroughs of Harrow and Ealing 2,617, London Borough of Hounslow 1,468, Leeds City Council 401, Stockport Strategic Partnership 345; total 238,186). Network Rail described its £147 million estimate as a worst-case scenario and expected actual costs to be much lower. Highways England, the Metropolitan Police Service, Greater Manchester Police and several hospitals, including the Royal Liverpool University Hospital, submitted uncosted plans. 3
documentedThe NAO's examples of Carillion's public sector activity at the time of its collapse (its Figure 1) included construction of the 58km Aberdeen Western Peripheral Route for Transport Scotland, working with Balfour Beatty and Galliford Try; electrification of the Glasgow to Edinburgh line for Network Rail; facilities management for 49,300 homes owned by the Northern Ireland Housing Executive; construction and facilities management of the new Royal Liverpool University Hospital under a PFI contract; maintenance of parks, allotments, cemeteries and open spaces in the London Borough of Hounslow; facilities services for Oxfordshire County Council schools (contracts with 97 Oxfordshire, 62 Tameside and 63 Stockport council schools and schools in 23 other council areas); facilities management of 50 prisons across the south of England for HM Prison & Probation Service; and facilities management of around 320 Ministry of Defence sites, working in joint ventures with Amey and Aramark. 3
documentedThe NAO reported that after the 10 July 2017 profit warning Carillion announced four central government contracts and three variations worth around £1.9 billion, including £1.3 billion of HS2 contracts; its summary counted eight contracts and variations in all. The two Ministry of Defence contracts had been signed before the warning but not announced, and joint venture partners were required to step in if Carillion failed. HS2 Ltd had completed procurement before 10 July and signed shortly afterwards; on 12 July it commissioned consultants to re-run the bidding-stage financial tests, which Carillion passed on its 2016 accounts, and the contracts went to a joint venture whose other parties had to step in if Carillion failed. Network Rail confirmed the next phase of two electrification contracts in November 2017, having carried out financial due diligence in 2014-15; in two of the three variations a joint venture partner was obliged to take over Carillion's role, and in the other the contract has since been re-let in line with contingency plans. The NAO's summary also describes Network Rail confirming the next phase of one contract worth £63 million after the September profit warning. The Cabinet Office did not believe there was a basis for refusing any of the awards. 3
documentedThe NAO's Figure 16 lists the work announced after the first profit warning of 10 July 2017: for HS2, two civil engineering contracts (Chiltern tunnels to Brackley, and Brackley to Long Itchington) with joint venture partners Kier and Eiffage, total contract value £1,340 million, of which £10 million had been spent by 15 January 2018; for the Ministry of Defence, two facilities management contracts with joint venture partner Aramark, covering 103 sites in Scotland and Northern Ireland and 130 sites in the north of England, awarded on 3 May and 28 June and announced on 18 July, total value £182 million, of which £4.1 million had been spent; and for Network Rail, three variations to existing contracts to electrify and upgrade track between London and Corby and between Glasgow and Edinburgh, with joint venture partner Powerlines Ltd, total value £365 million, of which £34.3 million had been spent. 3
documentedThe NAO reported that Carillion also won local government work after its first profit warning: on 3 October 2017 Leeds City Council awarded it £4.1 million to construct a cycle superhighway, conditional on a performance bond from a third-party financial institution to protect the council in the event of Carillion's insolvency. 3
documentedAccording to the NAO, in December 2017 Carillion's main creditors told it they would not give further short-term funding unless it also approached the government. On 31 December 2017 Carillion wrote to the Cabinet Office with an urgent request for support, followed by further versions on 8, 12, 13 and 14 January 2018; it said its restructuring would probably need 'virtually all' of its £1.5 billion of debts to convert to equity. It sought £223 million to bridge to April 2018 – a £160 million loan or guarantee of bank lending from the Cabinet Office and a £63 million temporary deferral of tax by HM Revenue & Customs – contingent on the banks agreeing £60 million of further unsecured loans, the amount to fall if £39 million of disputed claims and invoices were settled. By 13 January it asked for the £160 million in five stages: £10 million in the week beginning 15 January and £10 million in the week beginning 22 January, each matched by unsecured bank lending; a guarantee on its early payment facility capped at £60 million–£70 million; a £110 million government guarantee to the banks; and a further £30 million guarantee for lending between February and April, matched by £40 million of unsecured bank lending. 3
documentedCarillion's wider requests, as tabulated by the NAO for 31 December 2017 to 14 January 2018, included up to £125 million from the government towards completing the Midland Metropolitan Hospital in exchange for an equity stake; help persuading the Pension Protection Fund, the pension trustees and the Pensions Regulator to accept a restructuring of its 13 principal defined benefit schemes that would extinguish £2.6 billion of liabilities; settlement of the HM Prison and Probation Service contract (claims and work in progress of £20 million); transfer of its equity stake in the Aberdeen Western Peripheral Route joint venture to the government at 'full value' with advance payment of part of its claims against Transport Scotland; an extension of the Ministry of Defence's Next Generation Estate Contracts with settlement of claims; help to exit loss-making contracts in the UK and the Middle East; protection from regulators' fines for actions before July 2017 (later withdrawn); and a commitment to give Carillion its 'fair share' of work and to prevent government customers and others from exercising rights to terminate contracts. Across the versions the requested tax deferral fell from £91 million to £63 million and the loan or guarantee, initially unquantified, was put at £210 million and then £160 million. The NAO's timeline describes the first formal request of 31 December 2017 as also seeking immunity from penalties arising from regulatory investigations. On 5 January the Cabinet Office told Carillion there could be no special treatment over future contract awards, and it told Carillion it could not legally grant some of its requests. 3
documentedThe committees reported that Carillion formally approached the government for financial assistance on 31 December 2017, when this became a prerequisite of discussions with its existing lenders; by then the only relief granted had been an HMRC 'time to pay arrangement' deferring £22 million of tax liabilities in October 2017. A further request to HMRC to defer £91 million of tax liabilities across the first four months of 2018 was refused at that point, HMRC stating that it would have to be referred to its Commissioners. On 13 January 2018 Philip Green wrote a final letter to the Cabinet Office making the case for government guarantees of up to £160 million between January and April 2018. 5
attributedIn a letter of 13 January 2018 to John Manzoni, Permanent Secretary for the Cabinet Office, Philip Green, as chairman of Carillion plc, wrote that confidence in the group had been shaken by media reports and by the withdrawal of previously committed support from key banks, and that the group faced two options: short-term funding from HM Government and certain key banks to bridge to a restructuring, or an insolvency. He described the request as temporary support alongside commercial bank support, to be cancelled and repaid in full on completion of a restructuring that would include a debt for equity swap, with a commercial rate of interest in the interim; said the restructuring would likely involve adjustments to the Midland Metropolitan Hospital, Aberdeen Western Peripheral Route and HMPPS contracts and that the previous senior management team had all exited the business; and warned that an insolvency would be 'very disorderly and value destructive' and come at enormous cost to HM Government. 6 5 4 3
- qualification
- Statements of Carillion's chairman in support of a funding request. The committees later described the letter as a 'last-minute ransom note' in which Green hoped the government would conclude that Carillion was too big to fail.
- response
- In his response to the committees' report (published July 2018), Green said he disagreed with many of its conclusions but would not comment while the investigations by the Insolvency Service, the FCA and the FRC were ongoing.
- outcome
- According to the NAO, the chief executive of the civil service, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Minister for the Cabinet Office had approved the option of a trading liquidation on 11 January 2018; on 14 January Cabinet Office officials refused support, the lenders then said they too would not offer further support, and Carillion placed itself in compulsory liquidation on 15 January. By then the Cabinet Office was broadly satisfied with central government's readiness, and it found almost no examples of disruption to services. The committees concluded that the government was correct not to bail out Carillion.
attributedIn the same letter Green stated that the board kept under review, with advice from Slaughter and May and Lazard, whether it was appropriate to continue trading; that if support from any source were withdrawn the board might well conclude there was no longer a reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation; and that it would then look to place Carillion plc and key operating subsidiaries into an insolvency process. He wrote that the strong advice of senior insolvency practitioners at EY was that no contingency plan fit for purpose existed or could have been created in the time available, and that Carillion had provided information to the government's advisers to help them, in collaboration with EY, develop a contingency plan for an insolvency. 6 3
- qualification
- Chairman's account of the advice the board received. The NAO recorded that the Cabinet Office had coordinated 65 contingency plans from 26 public bodies and was broadly satisfied with central government's readiness by the time of liquidation, while still seeking improvements in schools and local authorities.
- response
- The Cabinet Office told the NAO that it had more difficulty persuading Carillion to do its own contingency planning and had asked it from October onwards to plan to protect the delivery of services; the NAO recorded that Carillion provided data to support the government's contingency planning.
- outcome
- Carillion told the High Court that without funding it had been unable to identify any insolvency practitioners willing to act as administrators. It placed itself in compulsory liquidation on 15 January 2018, and the court appointed the Official Receiver to manage a trading liquidation, with PwC employees as special managers.
documentedThe NAO found that the Cabinet Office decided that a trading liquidation – in which Carillion entered liquidation but continued to provide services until other arrangements could be made for each contract – was better than providing financial support, citing concerns about Carillion's business plans, the legal implications, potentially open-ended funding commitments, the possibility of setting a precedent and the likelihood of further requests. Its options appraisal with PwC estimated a trading liquidation at £314m to £374m, an unsupported insolvency at £658m to £678m, a pre-sale of assets at -£49m to £51m and bridging investment at £233m to £267m, and the two cheapest options were considered too risky. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Minister for the Cabinet Office and the Prime Minister approved the preferred option in principle on 11 and 12 January 2018; on 14 January officials told Carillion that the government would not provide support but would fund a trading liquidation, its main creditors then also refused further support, and the board filed for liquidation with the High Court on 15 January. 3
documentedThe NAO's timeline for January 2018 records that on 3 January the Financial Conduct Authority announced an investigation into the 'timeliness and content' of some of Carillion's stock market announcements between 7 December 2016 and 10 July 2017; on 5 January government representatives met Carillion, its major lenders and pensions representatives, Carillion estimating a requirement of about £275–£350 million and the lenders' advisers saying it could well be more; on 8 January Carillion shared a draft business plan with the Cabinet Office and other creditors and made a more detailed request for support; on 10 January it presented its business plan to creditors, reporting the loss of £655 million of cash from operations in 2017; on 11 January the chief executive of the civil service, the Chancellor and the Minister for the Cabinet Office approved the option of a trading liquidation; and on 12 January major banking lenders said they would not proceed without government guarantees and resolution of the pension liabilities, Carillion reported that HMRC was not minded to support its tax deferral request, and the Prime Minister approved the trading liquidation option. 3
documentedAccording to the NAO, the Cabinet Office asked the Insolvency Service to continue to operate Carillion's service contracts through the Official Receiver and gave the Official Receiver £150 million of initial liquidity, secured from Parliament in February 2018; it also indemnified the Official Receiver against proceedings or claims connected with the liquidation. The Insolvency Service told the NAO this was the first example of a public limited company continuing to trade while being wound up. The NAO reported that the Cabinet Office would ultimately pay the net loss on the liquidation, then estimated at £148 million (the Official Receiver expected total costs of £522 million, including £50 million for the special managers), which the £150 million would cover; this was lower than the Cabinet Office's pre-liquidation estimate of £314 million to £374 million, and the total cost to the taxpayer would be higher because some public bodies were paying a 20% premium for post-liquidation services and some customers would incur replacement costs. 3
documentedThe NAO reported that Carillion staff continued to provide public services and that the Cabinet Office believed almost all services continued uninterrupted: Carillion's joint venture partners took over many of the larger construction projects, the Ministry of Justice established a new government company to run the prisons facilities management contract, and construction of the two PFI hospitals, Midland Metropolitan Hospital and Royal Liverpool University Hospital, was stopped until the PFI investors found alternative construction companies. On 23 May 2018, 21 public sector contracts remained within the insolvency regime, and the Official Receiver expected all customers to have ended or transferred their Carillion contracts by the end of June 2018. 3
documentedThe NAO reported that, in parallel with arranging a new £140 million lending facility, Carillion allowed its major banking lenders to form a Coordinating Committee to represent creditors' interests in a restructuring; the committee appointed advisers including FTI Consulting and on 23 October 2017 commissioned consultants (FTI) to carry out an independent business review of Carillion's restructuring plan, which remained in draft and was not seen by the Cabinet Office or lenders before the insolvency. On 22 December 2017 the lenders agreed to delay the date for testing compliance with the banking covenants to April 2018. 3
attributedAccording to the NAO, in the draft executive summary of the independent business review (later published by the committees) the lenders' advisers FTI took the view that there were significant doubts about Carillion's true past trading position and cash generation because of its focus on enhancing reported profitability and net debt, that its business plan was too optimistic about disputed claims and short-term building work, and that their sensitivity analysis would raise additional funding requirements to £495 million by August 2019. 3
- qualification
- Views of the lenders' advisers in a draft that was still subject to agreement with Carillion's management.
- response
- Former Carillion directors told the NAO that they did not see a draft of the report's main body until 13 January, objected to its analysis of their capacity to win future business and achievable margins as too pessimistic and as overstating capital needs, and said the funding estimate was reducing in ongoing discussions.
- outcome
- The review was never finalised. The NAO records that, in the timeline leading to liquidation in January 2018, major banking lenders would not proceed without government guarantees and resolution of the pension liabilities, that on 14 January the Cabinet Office informed Carillion it would not provide support, and that on 15 January Carillion's directors applied to the High Court for liquidation.
attributedIn his 2018 response to the committees' report, Richard Howson said that on the National Offender Management Service contract for facilities management of prisons in the south of England the government had 'completely underestimated' in its tender documents the size of the estate, which turned out some 60% bigger by number of assets, and that Carillion bore significant additional costs for which it was not paid. He said that when he left, substantial amounts were properly due to Carillion from government or government-owned entities on a range of contracts (for example the MoD on NGEC, Highways England, Transport for Scotland, NOMS and Network Rail), and that he understood similar large amounts were still outstanding at the liquidation. 4 3 7
- qualification
- Statements of Carillion's former chief executive; his letter does not quantify the amounts. The NAO recorded that in January 2018 Carillion put the disputed claims and invoices it wanted settled at £39 million; it also reported that the lenders' advisers attributed losses on the prisons contract to its being a 'first generation' outsourcing contract and to inaccurate tender assumptions, and that the government does not necessarily agree with the size of the losses on the four loss-making contracts it lists. Carillion's own January 2018 business plan described NOMS as a loss-making contract against which a group provision had been made in 2017 and added a further £11m for it.
- response
- The NAO reported that many public sector customers, including the special purpose vehicles delivering PFI contracts, dispute outstanding invoices relating to the period before liquidation.
attributedA news agency report republished by a regional newspaper said that court documents, including a statement by Carillion's interim chief executive Keith Cochrane submitted to the High Court in London, showed Carillion owing almost £1.3 billion to its lenders with only £29 million of cash reserves at the collapse. According to the report, Cochrane said that Royal Bank of Scotland, one of its main lenders, had tightened funding terms three days before the collapse, taking 'unilateral action, which in the company's view undermined the group's efforts to conserve cash', by proposing that suppliers be paid two days earlier than planned, which hit liquidity by between £2 million and £20 million, and he accused Santander, another of its largest lenders, of putting the brakes on Carillion payments before it reversed its decision after talks. 8
- qualification
- Interim chief executive's account in a court statement, reported in the press; the court statement itself is not among the retained documents.
- response
- According to the report, RBS declined to comment, and Santander said its step had been prudent and that it continuously reviews its lending to reduce exposure to losses.
sources in this section
- Carillion declares insolvency: information for employees, creditors and suppliers Insolvency Service (GOV.UK) · 15 Jan 2018
- Government protects essential public services as Carillion declares insolvency Cabinet Office (GOV.UK) · 15 Jan 2018
- Investigation into the government's handling of the collapse of Carillion (HC 1002) National Audit Office · 7 Jun 2018
- Carillion: Responses from Interested Parties to the committees' report (HC 1392, Second Special Report) House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees · 12 Jul 2018
- Carillion: Second Joint Report of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (HC 769), chapter on external checks and balances House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees · May 2018
- Letter from the chairman of Carillion plc to the Permanent Secretary of the Cabinet Office, 13 January 2018 House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · 13 Jan 2018
- Carillion Group Business Plan, January 2018 (published by the committees) House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · Jan 2018
- Media source · src-059 identified by category only · Media
10Carillion's contracts: problem projects, joint ventures and customers
attributedThe NAO, drawing on an FTI Consulting report for Carillion's major lenders, listed four loss-making public sector contracts with expected 2017 losses: the Aberdeen Western Peripheral Route (£91m), a joint venture to design, build, finance and operate a 58km ring road, where the lenders' advisers cited a very low bid price, unforeseen water and peat ground conditions and oil pipeline constraints; Midland Metropolitan Hospital (£48m), where critical design elements were 17 months late, structural designs were poor and space was constrained; the Royal Liverpool University Hospital (£83m), with a 14-week asbestos delay, design delays, structural deficiencies requiring repair due to poor design and a lack of due diligence before construction; and a HM Prison & Probation Service facilities management contract for 52 prisons in England and Wales, originally with the Ministry of Justice (£12m), attributed to its being a 'first generation' outsourcing contract and to inaccurate tender assumptions. 1
- qualification
- The causes are the assessment of the lenders' advisers as reported by the NAO. The NAO noted that the government does not necessarily agree with the size of the losses, which may have implications for future claims.
- response
- Former Carillion directors told the NAO that the reasons for the losses were multiple and complex and that the list reflected only some of them.
- outcome
- After the liquidation, according to the NAO, construction work on the Midland Metropolitan and Royal Liverpool University hospitals stopped while the PFI investors found alternative construction companies, and the Ministry of Justice established a new government company to provide facilities management services in prisons.
documentedIn its half-year results announcement of 29 September 2017, Carillion stated that since its trading update of 10 July a Carillion joint venture had been awarded two packages for the first phase of HS2 between London and Birmingham, worth about £1.4bn in total, of which Carillion had a one-third share; the first 16-month stage covered design, programme and target cost, and the construction stage was expected to take four to five years. The construction value was not yet in the order book because proceeding to stage two depended on the outcome of stage one. 2
documentedCarillion's half-year results for 2017 reported that the UK Defence Infrastructure Organisation had awarded a Carillion joint venture the HESTIA multi-activity services contract for the London and South East region, with potential revenues above £200m over an initial five-year period, and that after the half year two further HESTIA contracts, for the Northern and the Scotland and Northern Ireland regions, had been awarded to a Carillion joint venture, with potential revenues above £300m over the initial five years. 2
analysisThe two Ministry of Defence facilities management contracts that the NAO lists as won by Carillion's joint venture with Aramark (103 sites in Scotland and Northern Ireland and 130 sites in the north of England, awarded 3 May and 28 June and announced 18 July) appear to correspond to the two HESTIA regional contracts (Northern, and Scotland and Northern Ireland) that Carillion reported after its 2017 half year; its January 2018 business plan names Aramark as its HESTIA joint venture partner. The values differ: the NAO gives a total contract value of £182 million, whereas Carillion described a potential of more than £300m over the initial five years. 1 2 3
- qualification
- Analysis matching regions, timing and partner across the NAO figure, Carillion's half-year results and its business plan; no retained document states expressly that the NAO's two contracts are the HESTIA awards.
documentedThe NAO's timeline records that on 10 July 2017 Carillion announced a £845 million provision for losses on three UK public sector PFI construction contracts (Midland Metropolitan Hospital, Royal Liverpool University Hospital and the Aberdeen Western Peripheral Route), which accounted for 27% of the provision, and on construction contracts in the Middle East, and that its chief executive resigned; on 14 July it appointed restructuring consultants; government contingency planning began on 20 July; and on 11 September senior management including the finance director were asked to resign, a Chief Transformation Officer was seconded from EY and a new Chief Financial Officer took over. 1
documentedAccording to the committees' report, The Hospital Company (Liverpool) Ltd and the hospital trust agreed a private finance initiative contract for the design and construction of the Royal Liverpool Hospital on 13 December 2013, and on the same date The Hospital Company (Liverpool) awarded Carillion Construction Ltd (CCL) a five-year, £235 million design and construction contract. CCL began construction in February 2014 with phase 1 due by 31 March 2017; delays due to asbestos were reported as early as May 2015, pushing expected completion to 30 June 2017. (The report names the trust as 'The Royal Broadgreen University Hospitals NHS Trust'; Carillion's 2014 annual report names the Royal Liverpool and Broadgreen University Hospitals NHS Trust.) 4 5
documentedCarillion's 2014 annual report stated that at the beginning of 2014 Carillion began construction of the £335 million Royal Liverpool University Hospital project for the Royal Liverpool and Broadgreen University Hospitals NHS Trust, due for completion by 2017, in which it would invest £15.5 million of equity, expecting around £200 million of revenue over the 30-year concession and around £100 million from non-clinical support services. Its 2016 annual report lists a 50% interest in The Hospital Company (Liverpool) Limited. 5 6
documentedIn a letter of 21 February 2018 to the chairs of the Work and Pensions and Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy committees, The Hospital Company (Liverpool) Ltd stated that TPS Consult Ltd, a Carillion Group company, had overall responsibility for the structural design of the Royal Liverpool University Hospital works; that the design and installation of the floor plates and integral beams was subcontracted to Heyrod Construction Ltd, which subcontracted aspects of the structural design to Freyssinet Ltd; and that Freyssinet designed the beams and Heyrod manufactured and installed them. Cracks were first discovered in two beams on 24 November 2016, and exclusion zones below and above them remained until 24 January and 24 March 2017; a review commissioned by CCL identified six beams needing remedial work. Remedial costs were being borne principally by Heyrod and Freyssinet until liability was established, CCL had incurred costs and made some payments to Heyrod, and monthly payments to Carillion were reduced to cover a proportion of the remedial costs. 7
attributedThe Hospital Company (Liverpool) told the committees that five of the eight defective beams could have failed under the load of a fully occupied and operational hospital, and that had the defects not been identified and remedied during construction this could have resulted 'at best, unsafe working conditions and at worst, injury and loss of life'. 1 7 8 4
- qualification
- Assessment of the PFI project company, given in response to evidence from Richard Howson; liability for the defects had not been established at the time of the letter.
- response
- Richard Howson told the committees that Carillion 'did not just cover it up' but properly rectified the beams at a cost, that 'those beams would probably never fail in their cracked state', and that rectification added 'over £20 million of cost' to completion.
- outcome
- After Carillion's liquidation, construction work on the hospital was stopped while the PFI investors found an alternative construction company (NAO, June 2018), and the Hospital Company told the committees it had entered negotiations with alternative contractors to complete the works safely to a revised timetable. A national newspaper reported in February 2023 that the collapse had delayed the 646-bed hospital, due to open in 2017, and that the project ran hundreds of millions of pounds over budget. The retained documents record no determination of liability for the beam defects.
documentedThe Hospital Company (Liverpool) told the committees that Carillion Construction Limited, as main contractor, had been the critical party in remedying the defects and progressing the project, and that since the insolvency of the Carillion group it had entered into negotiations with alternative contractors to complete the works safely in line with a revised timetable to be agreed with the Trust. 7
documentedCarillion's 2016 annual report stated that a Carillion joint venture, The Hospital Company (Sandwell) Limited, was delivering the Midland Metropolitan Hospital public private partnership project for the Sandwell and West Birmingham Hospitals NHS Trust – a hospital of around 683 beds and 13 operating theatre suites – in which Carillion would invest £13 million of equity, build the hospital at a capital cost of £297 million and provide hard facilities management and maintenance worth about £140 million over the 30-year concession. The report lists a 50% interest in The Hospital Company (Sandwell) Limited. 6
documentedCarillion's January 2018 business plan forecast a £67m net cash outflow on the Msheireb contract, 96% complete, with claims of £97m; the key risks it listed were the completion date (Q2 2018), recovery of outstanding value for preliminaries and agreement to and payment of £97m of extension of time claims, and it noted that the client held an on-demand performance bond of about £54m. The plan assumed a final settlement in August 2018 with a receipt of £39m and release of 40% of the retention (£11m), offset by payments to the supply chain. 3
documentedThe January 2018 business plan forecast a £26m net cash outflow on the Aberdeen contract (79% complete) with claims of £40m; its key risks were the completion date (May/June), liquidated damages and lane occupation changes, recovery of £25m of claim value from Transport Scotland by June 2018 and recovery of £15m from designers and insurance by December 2018. 3
documentedThe January 2018 business plan forecast net cash outflows of £119m on the Midland Metropolitan Hospital (47% complete, claims £33m; risks: the completion date of June 2019 and recovery of a £10m claim against Aecom by June 2018), £24m on the Royal Liverpool hospital (87% complete, claims £43m; risks: completion including commissioning and recovery of £34m of claims from third parties) and £23m on the PF2 schools (93% complete), where a £5m claim for change and variations was under negotiation with the Education & Skills Agency. 3
documentedCarillion's January 2018 business plan described its Central Government segment (2018 revenue £745m) as providing support services to the MoD and other central government departments, with key customers the MoD and the Defence Infrastructure Organisation, the MoJ and the Home Office, and key joint ventures Aspire (with KBR), NGEC (with Amey) and Hestia (with Aramark); it listed the key contracts with their end years as Aspire ('41), NGEC ('19), Northwood ('31), NOMS Prisons ('22) and Hestia ('23). The plan's provision review added a further £11m for NOMS, which it described as the National Offender Management Service prisons services contract with the MoJ. 3
documentedCarillion's 2014 annual report stated that during 2014 a Carillion joint venture achieved financial close on the Aberdeen Western Peripheral Route, in which it expected to invest some £20 million of equity, and a Carillion joint venture was selected as preferred bidder for the Midlands Priority Schools Programme (equity of up to £5 million); Carillion was shortlisted for the Midlands Metropolitan Hospital, in which it could invest up to £40 million. At 31 December 2014 it had 17 PPP projects with £42 million of equity invested and £112 million of further planned investment, valued by the directors at £48 million at a nine per cent discount rate (2013: £68 million); in 2014 it sold equity investments in four projects for about £37 million, generating a pre-tax profit of £13.9 million. 5
documentedCarillion's 2016 annual report stated that it had financially closed 66 PPP projects and that its 2016 PPP revenue was £313.0m (2015: £192.8m), of which 81% was in the UK and 19% in Canada. 6
documentedIn its 2017 half-year results Carillion reported a portfolio at 30 June 2017 of 15 financially closed PPP projects with £27m of equity invested and commitments to invest a further £52m, valued by the directors at about £46m at a nine per cent discount rate and £65m at seven per cent. Only one equity investment was sold in the first half of 2017, for £2m (first half of 2016: £48m), and the PPP pipeline fell after a strategic decision no longer to bid for PPP construction. 2
documentedAccording to Msheireb Properties' letter of 27 February 2018 to the committee chairs, the joint venture of Carillion (Qatar) LLC, which it described as a subsidiary of Carillion plc, and Qatar Building Company was selected after a competitive tender to construct Phase 1B of the Msheireb Downtown Doha project – 27 low- to mid-rise residential, hotel and office buildings with a gross floor area of about 160,000 m2 – under a contract based on the FIDIC Red Book; work commenced on 29 December 2011 with completion originally scheduled for 25 June 2014, and it was the first project Carillion undertook in Qatar. The committees described it as a 2011 contract with Msheireb Properties, a Qatari company, due to complete in 2014 but still unfinished at the time of their report. Msheireb Properties' letterhead describes it as a subsidiary of Qatar Foundation. 9 4
documentedCarillion's 2016 annual report lists Carillion (Qatar) LLC as a 49% holding of the group; Msheireb Properties described the company as a subsidiary of Carillion plc. 9 6
unresolvedThe committees heard 'claim and counter-claim' from Carillion's directors and Msheireb Properties, each of whom said the other owed them £200 million; they did not determine the true position, said they were baffled that neither Carillion's internal nor its external auditors could tell them, and found it clear that the contract was not well managed by Carillion, citing a July 2017 board 'lessons learned' pack that referred to a weak supply chain, poor planning and failure to understand the design requirements up front. 4
- qualification
- Who owed whom on the Msheireb contract is disputed between the parties; the retained documents contain no arbitral award, judgment or settlement determining the amounts.
attributedMsheireb Properties' letter summarises the evidence of Richard Howson, Carillion's former chief executive, as stating that Carillion was owed £180–200 million by Msheireb Properties when he left the business (March 2017) and that Carillion's works were due to finish in May 2017. In his later response to the committees' report, Howson said the payment problems Carillion faced with Msheireb Properties had also been experienced by a number of other contractors and sub-contractors in Qatar. The committees' report cites his oral evidence (Q482) for Carillion's side of the £200 million dispute. 9 10 4
- qualification
- Party statements: Howson's evidence as summarised by the counterparty, and his own later letter to the committees. Neither the amount nor the completion date was determined in the retained documents.
- response
- Msheireb Properties 'entirely disputes' that it owed Carillion £180–200 million, suggesting that the figure may refer to the value of construction work remaining to be completed plus delay claims not yet established, and says that after the extensions of time granted the completion date was September 2016, not May 2017.
attributedMsheireb Properties rejected as factually incorrect Carillion's allegation that it had not been paid for 18 months, stating that the contractor – the Carillion (Qatar) LLC joint venture – was paid at regular monthly intervals from January 2012 to January 2017 on amounts assessed by the contract administrators: QAR 1,027 million for 2012–2014, QAR 819 million for 2015, QAR 1,287 million for 2016 and QAR 13 million for 2017, the 2017 figure being lower because Msheireb Properties had agreed to pay Carillion's subcontractors directly as Carillion was 'unable or unwilling' to do so. It also said there were about 700 variations on the project, not the 2,500 Carillion had alleged, and rejected the evidence that its contract allowed it not to pay on time, stating that the conditions of contract contained no such clause and that a contractor not paid on time could give notice and suspend or terminate. 9 10
- qualification
- Employer's account in its letter to the committees; Carillion's directors gave a contrary account and the dispute was not resolved in the retained documents.
- response
- The letter answers Carillion's evidence to the committees that 'we were not paid for 18 months'. In his response to the committees' report (published July 2018), Richard Howson said Carillion's payment experience with Msheireb Properties had been shared by a number of other contractors and sub-contractors in Qatar.
attributedMsheireb Properties stated that Carillion owed it a similar amount, citing good-faith overpayments of QAR 149 million in December 2016 – an on-account payment of QAR 50 million against a 2016 prolongation claim that its consultants had valued at zero, and an early release of QAR 99 million of retention – direct payments to subcontractors whom Carillion had not paid, and liquidated damages for delay of QAR 237 million (about £47 million). It said the 'on-demand' performance bond, provided by an approved bank on behalf of the contractor, was 10% of the contract sum (about £47 million) and could be used only on events prescribed in the contract. 9 3 4 10
- qualification
- Employer's account; the counter-claim was not determined in the retained documents. Carillion's January 2018 business plan put the on-demand performance bond held by the client at about £54m and its own extension-of-time claims at £97m.
- response
- Carillion's directors told the committees that it was Msheireb Properties that owed Carillion about £200 million. In his response to the committees' report (published July 2018), Richard Howson said Carillion's payment experience with Msheireb Properties had been shared by a number of other contractors and sub-contractors in Qatar.
attributedMsheireb Properties also stated that Carillion made a claim of QAR 771 million in 2016 for extension of time and prolongation costs, which an independent consultant assessed as without merit; that earlier variation claims had been paid (QAR 17 million in 2014/15 and QAR 187 million in June 2015 and May 2016); that after extensions of time the completion date was September 2016 and the project was 8 months late by May 2017; that it had taken legal advice in March 2017 on pursuing Carillion; and that it hired a new contractor in June 2017 because Carillion was unable to complete the works and was not paying its subcontractors. It said Carillion's demise 'was not attributable to monies "owed" on this Project'. 9 10
- qualification
- Employer's account, contrary to that of Carillion's former chief executive; no determination in the retained documents.
- response
- The letter answers Richard Howson's evidence, which Msheireb Properties summarised as inferring that the project and the failure to settle its final account 'helped to sink Carillion'. In his response to the committees' report (published July 2018), Howson said Carillion's payment experience with Msheireb Properties had been shared by a number of other contractors and sub-contractors in Qatar.
documentedThe committees' report records that in 2014 Carillion, already the second biggest construction firm in the UK, attempted to merge with the only larger firm, Balfour Beatty; the move was rejected after the Balfour Beatty board dismissed Carillion's claims that the merger would generate cost savings of £175 million a year. 4
documentedCarillion's 2016 annual report stated that in 2006 Aspire Defence Limited, a 50:50 joint venture between Carillion and KBR, was awarded a 35-year concession for Project Allenby Connaught, the largest infrastructure PPP project ever let by the UK Ministry of Defence, worth about £8 billion at 2006 prices and ending in 2041, and that Carillion/KBR joint ventures had since delivered about 550 new and refurbished buildings and facilities management services for them. 6
documentedCarillion's 2016 annual report stated that in 2016 Carillion/KBR (50:50) joint ventures were awarded Ministry of Defence contracts supporting the Army Basing Programme across the Salisbury Plain Training Area and Aldershot, together worth over £1.1 billion: a design and construction contract for 130 new buildings and related works with an estimated value of £680 million (Carillion's share £340 million over 2016 to 2020), and facilities management under a variation to the Project Allenby Connaught contract expected to generate a further £430 million (Carillion's share about £215 million). 6
documentedCarillion's 2014 annual report stated that in 2014 a Carillion joint venture won all five Next Generation Estates Contracts for which it bid to provide hard facilities and asset management services to the Defence Infrastructure Organisation – the National Prime Housing contract and four Regional Prime contracts – initially for five years and extendable to 10, worth up to £4.5 billion to the joint venture and up to £2.5 billion to Carillion over 10 years, covering around 85 per cent of the Ministry of Defence estate. 5
documentedCarillion's 2014 annual report stated that in 2014 it won a £200 million, five-year contract (extendable to seven years) to provide total facilities management to some 50 per cent of the public sector prisons operated by the Ministry of Justice, a £200 million, five-year facilities management contract with the Nottingham University Hospitals NHS Trust, support services contracts for private sector customers including the Royal Bank of Scotland, Arqiva, Heathrow Airport Limited and Canadian Natural Resources Limited, together worth over £400 million over five years, and selection for Network Rail framework contracts it estimated at up to £500 million. 5
documentedCarillion's 2016 annual report described Carillion as one of the leading suppliers of rail infrastructure services in the UK, working with Network Rail since 1999 under framework agreements in England, Scotland and Wales, with rail revenue above £350 million, and as the only supplier consistently among Network Rail's top two suppliers in recent years. 6
documentedCarillion's 2014 annual report described it as the largest supplier of infrastructure services to Network Rail, which in 2014 awarded Carillion contracts worth some £600 million plus framework agreements with an estimated revenue value to Carillion of up to £500 million. 5
documentedCarillion's 2016 annual report stated that it had several major framework agreements, notably for Network Rail, Highways England and Scape – for whom it was the sole provider of facilities management services for local authorities – and with UK central government under its Facilities Management Contracting Model; framework values were not included in its order book, but at the year end it had visibility of at least some £1.5 billion of revenue from these frameworks over the next five years. 6
documentedCarillion's 2014 annual report stated that it was one of five contractors selected by the Highways Agency to deliver contracts worth between £100 million and £450 million under the Agency's £5 billion Collaborative Delivery Framework, and that it achieved financial close on the Sunderland Regeneration Programme, potentially worth up to £800 million to Carillion over 20 years. 5
documentedCarillion's 2016 annual report listed among its 2016 UK successes two Northern Ireland Housing Executive contracts worth up to £366 million to maintain 22,000 houses over 10 years, a £64 million facilities management contract at London Overground stations for Arriva Trains and a £42 million contract for the Cabinet Office, together with re-bid wins including a seven-year Nationwide contract worth around £350 million, a £240 million four-and-a-half-year extension with Petroleum Development Oman and a five-year, £90 million extension with Centrica that extended an existing 10-year partnership. 6
documentedCarillion's 2016 annual report stated that it had provided facilities management for Nationwide Building Society's property estate since 2008 and that, on a re-bid in 2016, it was awarded a new seven-year contract from 1 October 2016, extendable by three years to 10, expected to generate about £350 million of revenue. 6
documentedCarillion's 2016 annual report described Carillion telent, a 60:40 joint venture, as Openreach's main delivery partner for maintaining and extending its telephone and data network; early in 2017 Carillion telent signed a three-year extension (extendable to five years) of its framework agreement, expected to generate up to £900 million of revenue over three years (Carillion's share over £500 million) and potentially up to £1.5 billion over five years (Carillion's share up to £900 million). The 2017 half-year results stated that Carillion had a 60 per cent interest in the joint venture. 6 2
documentedCarillion's 2016 annual report stated that its business in Oman, Carillion Alawi, had provided integrated facilities management at 12 locations for Petroleum Development Oman (PDO) since 2013 and in 2016 signed a 4.5-year extension expected to generate some £240 million of revenue for Carillion; it described PDO as owned by the Government of Oman (60 per cent), Royal Dutch Shell (34 per cent), Total (4 per cent) and Partex (2 per cent). 6
documentedCarillion's 2017 half-year results stated that on 30 June 2017 the group disposed of 50% of its economic interest in its Oman subsidiary Carillion Alawi LLC to its partner, the Al Zawawi family. Before the disposal the group owned 49% of the business (the partner 51%) but had a 100 per cent economic interest and controlled the board and day-to-day operations, and so fully consolidated it; afterwards the two shared economic interests and control equally, and Carillion Alawi was deconsolidated and equity accounted as a 50% joint venture. The cash consideration was £12.8m (described in the narrative as £13m), with deferred consideration of up to £29m depending on performance; the loss on disposal was £0.8m after a fair value of £31.9m was attributed to the retained interest. In 2016 Carillion Alawi contributed £282m of revenue, a loss before tax of £(4)m and gross assets of £323m. 2
documentedCarillion's 2014 annual report stated that on 24 December 2014 the group completed the acquisition of a 60 per cent equity shareholding in Rokstad Power Corporation, a Canadian powerlines and transmission business operating mainly in British Columbia and Alberta, for total cash consideration of around £31 million dependent on performance and payable in instalments to July 2017 (£11.1 million on completion), and that Carillion had committed to acquire the remaining 40 per cent after five years at 4.5 times Rokstad's 2019 EBITDA, capped at £42 million. Carillion's stock exchange announcement of the same date described the acquisition as a 60 per cent interest in the trade and assets of Rokstad Power Corporation, on terms announced on 1 December 2014. 11 5
documentedCarillion's 2016 annual report stated that Rokstad, acquired in December 2014, won Canadian power transmission contracts worth up to £200 million in 2016, notably a £120 million contract for Manitoba Hydro in December 2016 for the next phase of its Bipole III transmission line (scheduled for completion in 2018) and a £62 million contract for Emera; that the Bouchier Group won oil-sector contracts worth around £115 million, notably a three-year £63 million contract for Suncor Energy and a £26 million contract for Canadian Natural Resources Limited; and that in January 2017 Carillion acquired some of The Compass Group's facilities management business in Canada. 6
documentedCarillion's 2016 annual report stated that the group had a 49 per cent equity shareholding in the Bouchier Group, a Canadian business consolidated as a subsidiary, and listed Bouchier Contracting Ltd. among its 49% holdings. 6
documentedCarillion's January 2018 business plan assumed that the disposals of its UK Healthcare activities (the subject of an already announced transaction with Serco), Rokstad, Bouchier, Northern Ireland and Utilities would complete by 30 June 2018; its disposals table showed assumed proceeds of £18m for Rokstad (Q2 2018), £8m for Bouchier (Q1 2018), £46m for Salus (Q2 2018), £13m for Northern Ireland (Q1 2018) and £1m for Utilities (Q1 2018), £86m in total. 3
documentedThe January 2018 business plan put 2018 revenue of the Corporate & Regions segment at £688m and listed its key customers as BT Openreach, Gigaclear, Tameside, Nationwide, Centrica and Heathrow, with Carillion telent as its key joint venture; it attributed part of the expected 2017–18 growth to Carillion telent (the Gigaclear win). 3
documentedThe January 2018 business plan listed as key MENA contracts, with their end dates in its abbreviated form, Msheireb (mid-18), Al Dara (June-18), PDO (Dec-21) and hospitals in Oman at Salalah (Nov-17 to Oct-21) and Khasab (Nov-17 to July-21), and expected MENA revenue to fall in 2018 mainly because of the deconsolidation of Carillion Alawi and construction exits in Qatar and Saudi Arabia. 3
documentedCarillion's January 2018 business plan stated that EY was supporting the company in establishing a risk management and assurance framework building on lessons learnt from the contract reviews. 3
documentedCarillion's 2014 annual report stated that Carillion would be the first company to benefit from UK Export Finance's new Direct Lending Facility, which it used to secure a £75 million contract for Phase 1 of the Dubai World Trade Centre District for the Dubai World Trade Centre, and that it had already secured four contracts in the Middle East and North Africa with the support of UKEF's Standard Buyer Credit Facility. Its 2016 annual report said that in the Middle East it focused primarily on winning contracts with UKEF support, which helped margins, payment times and cash flow, and that on 7 December 2016 it announced the closure of its Caribbean construction operations, having gradually withdrawn from general construction in Canada. Its 2017 half-year results mentioned a fee for putting UKEF finance in place for Phase 3 of the One Central development for the Dubai World Trade Centre. 6 5 2
documentedCarillion's 2014 annual report stated that Al Futtaim Carillion, its joint venture in the United Arab Emirates, was nearing completion of the £112 million Al Jalila Speciality Children's Hospital for the Dubai Health Authority and in 2014 won contracts for two luxury hotels worth some £300 million and a £75 million contract for Phase 1 of the Dubai World Trade Centre development, while in Saudi Arabia Carillion won a £70 million contract for the Aldara Hospital and Medical Centre in Riyadh. The report lists Al Futtaim Carillion LLC (UAE) as a 49% joint venture. 5
documentedCarillion's 2014 related-party note reported group sales to joint ventures of £277.0m in 2014 (2013: £486.2m), of which £248.6m to PPP joint ventures, including Healthcare Infrastructure Partners (NOH) Partnership (Canada) £50.3m, The Hospital Company (Liverpool) Ltd £34.4m and The Hospital Company (Southmead) Ltd £26.3m; sales to CarillionAmey Ltd were £11.3m, and the group's payable balance to Al Futtaim Carillion LLC (UAE) was £24.9m. 5
documentedCarillion's 2016 related-party note reported group sales to PPP joint ventures of £306.0m (2015: £156.4m), including The Hospital Company (Liverpool) Ltd £108.6m, The Hospital Company (Sandwell) Ltd £91.0m, 'PBSP Midlands Limited' £75.2m and Inspiredspaces Bundle 5 (Ireland) Ltd £28.0m; total sales to all joint ventures were £316.7m, with receivables of £59.9m and payables of £(112.4)m. Payables included £(70.8)m to Al Futtaim Carillion LLC (UAE) (2015: £(56.5)m) and £(16.8)m to CarillionAmey Ltd. 6
analysisThe 'PBSP Midlands Limited' shown in Carillion's 2016 related-party note (group sales £75.2m in 2016) is most likely PSBP Midlands Limited (09598377), which the same report's list of undertakings shows as a 42.5% holding; no company spelt 'PBSP Midlands' appears in that list, and the 2014 report refers to a Carillion joint venture selected for the Midlands Priority Schools Programme. 6 5
- qualification
- Identification by spelling and context within Carillion's own reports; the related-party note does not give a company number.
documentedCarillion's 2014 annual report stated that Carillion was well advanced with Phase 1 of the £400 million redevelopment of Battersea Power Station, begun in the second half of 2013 and scheduled for completion in 2016, on a site owned by a Malaysian consortium of S P Setia, Sime Darby Property and Employees' Provident Fund, with the development managed by the Battersea Power Station Development Company. 5
documentedCarillion's 2014 annual report reported two fatal accidents in 2014 on its projects – an employee in Oman who fell about three metres from an unfixed panel, and a sub-contractor's employee in Qatar struck by a vehicle while crossing a highway during maintenance work – and a collision on the M4 motorway in England in which three Carillion employees died and a fourth was seriously injured; it stated that there were no prosecutions by the relevant UK enforcement authorities in 2014. 5
analysisCarillion's 2016 annual report lists Carillion Powerlines Limited as a 50% holding. The NAO names 'Powerlines Ltd' as Carillion's joint venture partner on three Network Rail electrification variations announced after the July 2017 profit warning (London–Corby and Glasgow–Edinburgh, £365 million). The NAO does not name the joint venture company, so it is not established from these records that the variations were held by Carillion Powerlines Limited. 1 6
- qualification
- Inference limited to the two records; the partner named by the NAO is a different name from the 50% joint venture company listed by Carillion.
sources in this section
- Investigation into the government's handling of the collapse of Carillion (HC 1002) National Audit Office · 7 Jun 2018
- Company statement source · src-042 identified by category only · Company statement
- Carillion Group Business Plan, January 2018 (published by the committees) House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · Jan 2018
- Carillion: Second Joint Report of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (HC 769), chapters on the company and its board House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees · May 2018
- Company statement source · src-094 identified by category only · Company statement
- Company statement source · src-003 identified by category only · Company statement
- Letter from The Hospital Company (Liverpool) Ltd to the committee chairs on the Royal Liverpool University Hospital project House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · 21 Feb 2018
- Media source · src-076 identified by category only · Media
- Letter from Msheireb Properties to the committees on the Msheireb Downtown Doha Phase 1B contract House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees)
- Carillion: Responses from Interested Parties to the committees' report (HC 1392, Second Special Report) House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees · 12 Jul 2018
- Company statement source · src-093 identified by category only · Company statement
11Carillion's liquidation: office-holders, costs and creditors
documentedOn 15 January 2018 winding-up orders were made against Carillion plc and associated companies and the court appointed the Official Receiver as liquidator. The Insolvency Service notice published that day lists Carillion plc (03782379), Carillion Construction Ltd (00594581), Carillion Services Ltd, Planned Maintenance Engineering Ltd (00737307), Carillion Integrated Services Ltd (03679838) and Carillion Services 2006 Ltd. 1
analysisThe Insolvency Service notice of 15 January 2018 gives company number 02684154 for Carillion Services Ltd and 03011791 for Carillion Services 2006 Ltd, and PwC's August 2018 list of appointments repeats that pairing. The Companies House register shows the reverse: 03011791 is Carillion Services Limited (incorporated 19 January 1995) and 02684154 is Carillion Services 2006 Limited (incorporated 4 February 1992), and the special managers' anticipated distributions table pairs the names and numbers as the register does. The register pairing is used in this dossier. 1 2 3 4 5
- qualification
- The two lists appear to have transposed the numbers; this reading rests on the register records and the later distributions table, not on any statement by the Insolvency Service or PwC correcting their lists.
documentedCompanies House records one insolvency case for Carillion plc (03782379): a compulsory liquidation with petition date and commencement of winding up both 15 January 2018, and the Official Receiver as practitioner. 6
documentedAccording to the House of Commons committees' May 2018 report, at 6.40am on 15 January 2018 the High Court granted a winding-up order for Carillion plc and five subsidiaries, appointing David Chapman, the Official Receiver, as liquidator. The report records the Insolvency Service chief executive's evidence that private insolvency practitioners were unwilling to take on an administration because there was no certainty that enough money was left in the company to pay their costs, and that the Government made £150 million available to support the insolvency in 2017–18. 7
documentedThe special managers' information page states that on Monday 15 January 2018 the High Court appointed the Official Receiver as liquidator of Carillion Plc and several subsidiaries on the petition of the companies' directors, and simultaneously appointed special managers to support him. The Insolvency Service notice states that the Official Receiver became responsible for the day-to-day control and management of the liquidated companies and that partners at PwC were appointed as special managers to assist. 8 1 7
documentedThe committees' May 2018 report cites, as an unpublished source, the first witness statement of Keith Robertson Cochrane dated 15 January 2018 (exhibit KC1), filed in the High Court in the matter of Carillion plc and of the Insolvency Act 1986. 9
attributedThe committees' May 2018 report describes the Official Receiver as acting both as liquidator and, at the Government's request, running the public services Carillion had provided; it states that he had secured the employment of more than 11,000 former Carillion employees, kept public services operating and cut supplier payment terms from Carillion's 120 days to 30 days, while more than 2,000 employees had been made redundant. 10 11 7
- qualification
- Committee report figures at the time of the report; the National Audit Office's figures for May 2018 are recorded separately.
- response
- Replying in July 2018, the Insolvency Service welcomed the committees' recognition of the work done to effect an orderly liquidation of the Carillion companies, including the early improvement of payment terms and the preservation of many jobs.
- outcome
- In his letter of 30 September 2019 the Official Receiver reported that the remaining 125 Carillion employees had been made redundant by 31 December 2018 and that overall 16% of the workforce had been made redundant while 84% of jobs were saved, mostly through transfers to new contractors.
documentedAccording to the special managers' page, David Chubb, appointed by court orders as a special manager of various Carillion companies, retired from PwC on 31 March 2019 and was discharged at a hearing on 31 May 2019; Russell Downs retired from PwC on 31 December 2021 and a hearing to discharge him was held on 16 December 2021. 8
documentedThe special managers' page states that, following the death of Michael Jervis, one of the joint special managers, at a court hearing on 30 August 2023 he was discharged as special manager of the companies, Adam Seres was appointed as replacement special manager for all of the companies, and Toby Banfield was appointed as an additional special manager for Carillion Plc and Carillion Construction Limited. The page's appointments table lists Mark James Tobias Banfield as a special manager of both companies. 8
documentedThe special managers' current appointments table lists Edward John Macnamara, Adam Seres and Mark James Tobias Banfield as special managers of Carillion Plc (compulsory liquidation from 15 January 2018), and Mark James Tobias Banfield, Adam Seres, Peter Dickens and Matthew Hammond for Carillion Construction Ltd. Banfield and Seres are listed for every other company in the table. David Kelly does not appear in the current table. 8
documentedGroup companies placed in compulsory liquidation later, with the Official Receiver as liquidator and Mark James Tobias Banfield and Adam Seres listed as special managers, include Carillion Construction Overseas Limited (21 September 2018), Carillion Private Finance (Education) 2015 Limited (12 December 2018), Carillion AM Developments Limited and Marchwiel Properties Limited (10 April 2019) and Carillion Private Finance Limited (25 September 2019). 8
documentedPwC's August 2018 list records compulsory liquidations, with the Official Receiver as liquidator, of Carillion Asset Management Limited (01122808), Carillion Energy Services Limited (03858865) and Carillion LGS Limited (03198709) from 25 January 2018, and of Carillion Fleet Management Limited (00537677), Everprime Limited, Postworth Limited (02508579), TPS Consult Limited (02574820), Carillion Specialist Services Limited (02574792), Carillion Utility Services Limited (00728599) and Carillion AM Government Limited (00885404) from 26 January 2018. 5
documentedThe same list records compulsory liquidations, with the Official Receiver as liquidator, of Sovereign Hospital Services Limited (03232308) from 2 February 2018 and, from 16 February 2018, of Carillion JM Limited (00077628), Carillion Holdings Limited (03783019), Carillion Project Investments Limited, Schal International Management Limited (02646690), Sovereign Consultancy Services Limited, Dudley Bower Group plc (00566465), PME Technical Services Limited, PME Partnerships Limited, Carillion Professional Services Limited (02916489) and Carillion Property Services Limited. 5
documentedFrom 13 June 2018 the list records compulsory liquidations, with the Official Receiver as liquidator, of Carillion (AM) Limited (1367044), Carillion Swindon Limited (2294384), Carillion Capital Projects Limited (247624) and Churchward plc (2489314), with Jervis and Kelly as special managers, and of Carillion Utility Services Group Limited (1521006), Carillion Utility Services S.E. Limited (2355338), G T Railway Maintenance Holdings Limited (3126198) and six other group companies without special managers. 5
documentedThe list records further compulsory liquidations with the Official Receiver as liquidator: on 4 July 2018 of Centrac Limited, Clinicenta Limited and Eaga Energy Solutions Limited (among others); on 8 August 2018 of Alfred McAlpine International Limited, Carillion (Singapore) Limited, Carillion MENA Limited (398443) and Carillion Support Services & Investments Limited (among others); and on 22 August 2018 of G T Railway Maintenance Limited. Carillion Energy Services Scotland Limited (SC102827) entered interim liquidation in Scotland on 14 August 2018. 5
documentedCarillion (AMBS) Limited (SC020258) went into provisional liquidation in Scotland on 19 January 2018, interim liquidation on 25 April 2018 and court liquidation on 6 June 2018, with PwC partners Jervis, Kelly, Chubb and Downs listed as office-holders and no Official Receiver entry; Carillion (AMBS) Holdings Limited (SC203910) and AMBS 1 Limited entered interim liquidation in Scotland on 19 June 2018, with Jervis and Kelly listed. The special managers' page explains that companies outside the Official Receiver's geographical jurisdiction needed an insolvency practitioner other than the Official Receiver as liquidator. 5 8
documentedCarillion Finance (Jersey) Limited (117045) entered a just and equitable winding up in Jersey on 26 January 2018, and Carillion Insurance Company Limited (Guernsey, 24845) a compulsory liquidation under the Companies (Guernsey) Law 2008 on 20 March 2018; PwC's list names Nicholas John Vermeulen and Christian Van Den Berg of PwC in the Channel Islands as the office-holders for both. 5
documentedCarillion Irishenco Limited (Irish company number 290713; registered in the UK as an overseas company) entered liquidation in Ireland on 27 June 2018 with Declan McDonald of PwC Dublin listed as liquidator; P.J. Walls (Civil) Limited entered liquidation in Ireland on 8 August 2018 with Michael O’Regan of PwC Dublin listed. 5
documentedSix Carillion companies with Aspire in their names, Carillion (Aspire Services) Limited (5704254), its two holding companies and Carillion (Aspire Construction) Limited with its two holding companies, were placed in members' voluntary liquidation with Robert Nicholas Lewis and Laura May Waters of PwC as liquidators. PwC's August 2018 list dates all six to 30 May 2018; the special managers' page gives 25 April 2018 for Carillion (Aspire Services) Limited and 30 May 2018 for the other five. 5 8
- qualification
- The two PwC sources differ on the date for Carillion (Aspire Services) Limited and the difference is not explained.
documentedThe Official Receiver and the special managers of the 84 UK Carillion group companies in liquidation published an update on the anticipated distribution and closure of 74 UK subsidiaries and the status of the remaining 10, with an anticipated distribution schedule. They state that the schedule is based on current information, depends on realisations and costs, and cannot be relied upon as guidance to the actual outcome. 12
documentedIn the anticipated distributions table, the prospect of a dividend to unsecured creditors is shown as "Not anticipated" for Carillion Plc (03782379, liquidation from 15 January 2018) and as "Nil" for Carillion Construction Limited (00594581). 3
documentedOn 16 October 2026, further to an update of 6 May 2026, the Official Receiver and the special managers of Carillion Plc (in liquidation) gave notice of their intention to apply to the court under section 176A(5) of the Insolvency Act 1986 for an order that section 176A(2) shall not apply, so that they would be under no obligation to make a prescribed part available for the company's unsecured creditors, on the basis that the costs of doing so would far exceed the value of the prescribed part. 12
- qualification
- A notice of intended application; the retained record does not show the court's decision.
documentedA notice of intended first and final dividend was issued for Carillion Advice Services Limited, Carillion MENA Limited, Carillion Private Finance Limited and SA 1 Developments LLP, with 25 March 2026 as the final date for proving claims. 12
documentedThe anticipated distributions table marks a dividend to unsecured creditors as expected ("Yes") for, among others, Carillion Holdings Limited (03783019), Carillion JM Limited (00077628), Carillion Energy Services Limited (03858865), Carillion (AM) Limited (01367044), Carillion Services Limited (03011791), Carillion Fleet Management Limited (00537677), Carillion LGS Limited (03198709), Carillion Utility Services Limited (00728599), Carillion MENA Limited, Carillion Private Finance Limited, Carillion Capital Projects Limited, Churchward plc, Eaga Energy Solutions Limited, Carillion AM Developments Limited and Marchwiel Properties Limited. 3
- qualification
- Indicative schedule; the office-holders state it is subject to change.
documentedThe same table shows a nil prospect of an unsecured dividend for, among others, Carillion Construction Limited, Carillion Services (2006) Limited (02684154), Carillion Integrated Services Limited, Planned Maintenance Engineering Limited, Carillion Asset Management Limited, Carillion AM Government Limited, Postworth Limited, TPS Consult Limited, Carillion Specialist Services Limited, Sovereign Hospital Services Limited, Schal International Management Limited, Dudley Bower Group plc, Carillion Professional Services Limited, Carillion Swindon Limited, Carillion Utility Services Group Limited, Carillion Utility Services S.E. Limited, G T Railway Maintenance Holdings Limited, G T Railway Maintenance Limited, Centrac Limited, Clinicenta Limited, Alfred McAlpine International Limited, Carillion (Singapore) Limited, Carillion Support Services & Investments Limited, Carillion Construction Overseas Limited, Carillion Regeneration Limited (02630590, liquidation from 20 March 2019), Carillion GB Limited (03105686, liquidation from 7 October 2020) and The Hospital Company (Sandwell) Limited and its holding company (liquidation from 9 January 2019). 3 5
- qualification
- The table writes dates in month/day/year order (for example 10/7/2020 for 7 October 2020); the Clinicenta date 7/4/2018 is 4 July 2018, as PwC's August 2018 list also shows.
analysisCounting the rows of the anticipated distributions table as retrieved for this dossier gives 84 companies: 23 marked "Yes", 60 marked "Nil" and Carillion Plc marked "Not anticipated". A trade-press report of 22 September 2025 on the schedule published by PwC, as special manager, that day gave the same 60 and 23 but described the status of Carillion Plc as "uncertain"; the later table records no anticipated dividend for Carillion Plc's unsecured creditors. 13 3 12
- qualification
- Row counts are our own; the trade-press table converted some month/day dates incorrectly (for example Clinicenta Limited shown as 07/04/2018), so dates are taken from the special managers' table and PwC's list.
documentedThe National Audit Office's 2018 investigation reports that, on figures as of 18 May 2018, the Official Receiver expected total liquidation costs of £522 million (including £50 million of payments to the special managers, £164 million to subcontractors and £170 million of Carillion staff payroll), income of £417 million and an expected £44 million distribution to creditors and reimbursement of fees, giving a net cost of £148 million. The NAO states that the Cabinet Office will ultimately pay this loss, which would be covered by the £150 million it had already provided. 14
- qualification
- Forecast subject to uncertainties; the NAO notes it would take a long time to establish the final cost.
documentedAccording to the NAO, thirty-one of Carillion's 198 companies were in liquidation; by 29 May 2018 the Official Receiver had found continuing employment for 11,638 (64%) of the pre-liquidation UK workforce through contract transfers, made 2,332 staff (13%) redundant without new jobs and still employed around 3,000, while 1,116 had left voluntarily. The NAO expected non-government creditors to recover little, with some payments to creditors of subsidiaries with positive net assets, a large proportion going to tax liabilities and the pension schemes. 14
documentedThe NAO cites the Construction Products Association's report that 11,600 subcontractors worked directly for Carillion, and states that the government coordinated lending facilities of up to £1 billion for small and medium-sized firms in the supply chain, with limited call on them at the time of the report. 14
documentedThe committees' May 2018 report records that special manager David Kelly, charged out at £865 per hour, told them that PwC's first eight weeks of work would cost £20.4 million, that PwC staff were working at an average hourly rate of £360 and that 112 people had worked on Carillion in the week before his evidence. 7
attributedThe committees' May 2018 report questioned PwC's appointment and oversight: the Official Receiver said he could not run a tender and chose a firm that was not conflicted, had sufficient resources and some existing knowledge of the group; PwC had most recently supported the Cabinet Office's contingency planning for Carillion; and the committees said the court had set no clear remuneration terms and that PwC was "effectively writing their own pay cheque, without adequate scrutiny". 11 7 10
- qualification
- Committee conclusions contested by PwC and the Insolvency Service in their July 2018 responses; the committees also found it credible that the other Big Four firms were considered more conflicted.
- response
- The Insolvency Service replied (July 2018) that PwC's prior knowledge was not of a level that would constitute a conflict of interest and that remuneration is scrutinised by the Official Receiver and approved by the court. PwC replied that there was no conflict of interest when it was appointed, that the Official Receiver had negotiated a 20% discount on its standard market rates and that its fees are subject to High Court review.
- outcome
- On 28 June 2018 the court concluded that £22.9m (net of VAT) was due to the special managers for 15 January to 31 March 2018. In September 2019 the Official Receiver put the special managers' costs at £43.7m for 15 January to 31 December 2018 and £8.5m for 1 January to 31 August 2019.
documentedIn its letter published in the committees' special report of 12 July 2018, the Insolvency Service stated that on 28 June 2018 the court considered PwC's remuneration application and concluded that £22.9m (net of VAT) was due for 15 January to 31 March 2018, a sum reflecting the discount negotiated by the Insolvency Service and representing a saving of £5.7m. It added that the expected net cost of the liquidation was around £148 million and that PwC's final bill as special managers was expected to be about £50m, around 10% of the total gross costs. 10
attributedThe Insolvency Service told the committees (July 2018) that PwC's knowledge of Carillion's affairs had helped it take on the special manager role quickly but "was not however of a level that would constitute a conflict of interest" under the considerations an insolvency practitioner applies before accepting an appointment. 10
- qualification
- The Insolvency Service's position in reply to the committees' doubts; not tested by a court in the retained material.
attributedIn its July 2018 response to the committees, PwC described the Carillion liquidation as the largest ever compulsory liquidation in the UK, said it deployed 257 people with specialist skills in the first week, stated that there was no conflict of interest in its appointment (a view it said the Official Receiver shares), and said the Official Receiver had negotiated a 20% discount on its standard market rates. 10 11
- qualification
- PwC's own account of its appointment and fees in reply to the committees' criticism.
- outcome
- On 28 June 2018 the court concluded that £22.9m (net of VAT) was due to the special managers for 15 January to 31 March 2018, a sum that took into account the discount negotiated by the Insolvency Service; in September 2019 the Official Receiver put the special managers' costs for 15 January to 31 December 2018 at £43.7m.
documentedIn a letter to the committee chairs dated 30 September 2019, David Chapman, the Official Receiver, reported total realisations (including trading receipts) of just over £500m across the liquidation estates, about £88m more than at December 2018, and expected further recoveries above £10m; 81 companies were in compulsory liquidation with him as liquidator, 15 more than in December 2018, and special managers had been appointed over 46 of them. 11
documentedThe Official Receiver's letter of 30 September 2019 put the special managers' costs across the liquidation companies at £43.7m for 15 January to 31 December 2018 (against an earlier estimate of £44.2m) and £8.5m for 1 January to 31 August 2019, of which about £6.7m related to shortfall entities; PwC staff assisting averaged 14.6 whole-time equivalents a week in June to August 2019, against 155.2 in January to March 2018. He expected to keep needing the special managers to progress litigation against a number of parties. 11
documentedThe same letter states that the group had 13 defined benefit pension schemes and that the Pension Protection Fund was estimated to be entitled to a dividend from three Carillion companies with a surplus; that the net cost of the liquidations was estimated at £62m for 61 of the estates (the committees had asked whether it remained £72 million); and that the remaining 20 companies in liquidation should show a surplus enabling distributions. 11
documentedIn his September 2019 letter, answering a committee question that noted the liquidation trading phase had ended in August 2018, the Official Receiver wrote that the remaining 125 Carillion employees were made redundant by 31 December 2018 and that overall 16% of the workforce had been made redundant while 84% of jobs were saved, mostly through transfers to new contractors. 11
documentedThe High Court's judgment of 27 October 2021 in the FCA's appeal records the Official Receiver's evidence that Carillion was the largest trading liquidation in UK history, that proofs of debt received exceeded £7.1 billion while realisations "as of last year" totalled only some £575 million, that the Insolvency Service's fee income had been spent and all realisations absorbed by liquidation expenses, and that any costs of Carillion participating in FCA enforcement proceedings would have to be met from public funds. 15
documentedOn 15 June 2026 the Insolvency Service announced that David Chapman, its Senior Official Receiver, had been made an OBE in the King's Birthday Honours; the announcement credits him with leading the resolution of the Carillion, Thomas Cook and British Steel insolvencies. 16
sources in this section
- Carillion declares insolvency: information for employees, creditors and suppliers Insolvency Service (GOV.UK) · 15 Jan 2018
- Companies House company record: Carillion Services 2006 Limited (02684154) Companies House
- Company statement source · src-073 identified by category only · Company statement
- Companies House company record: Carillion Services Limited (03011791) Companies House
- Company statement source · src-054 identified by category only · Company statement
- Companies House insolvency record: Carillion plc (03782379) Companies House
- Carillion: Second Joint Report of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (HC 769), chapter on external checks and balances House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees · May 2018
- Company statement source · src-071 identified by category only · Company statement
- Carillion: Second Joint Report of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (HC 769), chapters on the company and its board House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees · May 2018
- Carillion: Responses from Interested Parties to the committees' report (HC 1392, Second Special Report) House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees · 12 Jul 2018
- Letter from the Official Receiver to the committee chairs on the Carillion liquidations, 30 September 2019 House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (written evidence published by the committees) · 30 Sep 2019
- Company statement source · src-072 identified by category only · Company statement
- Media source · src-087 identified by category only · Media
- Investigation into the government's handling of the collapse of Carillion (HC 1002) National Audit Office · 7 Jun 2018
- Court record source · src-086 identified by category only · Court record
- Insolvency Service official receiver receives OBE in King's Birthday Honours list Insolvency Service (GOV.UK) · 15 Jun 2026
12Enforcement against Carillion, its directors and its auditor
documentedThe Insolvency Service told the committees in July 2018 that the Official Receiver's investigation into Carillion's failure had obtained more than 350TB of electronic data from the company and had contacted those who were directors in the three years before liquidation; it noted the Official Receiver's statutory duty to investigate and report misconduct, the possibility of disqualification for up to 15 years, and that recoveries against company officers and third parties were being considered. 1
documentedThe FCA's chief executive told the committees (letter published July 2018) that, as Carillion had announced on 3 January 2018, the FCA was investigating the timeliness and content of Carillion's announcements, focusing on whether the matters in the 10 July 2017 trading update, including the £845 million contract provision, were identified and announced at the appropriate time and whether earlier announcements were false or misleading; the investigation covered potential breaches of the Market Abuse Regulation, Listing Rules and Listing Principles, and the FCA was looking into allegations of insider trading before 10 July 2017. 1
documentedAsked by the committees about a reported request from Carillion's former chairman, Philip Green, to protect the company and its lenders from fines or penalties for conduct before July 2017, the FCA's chief executive replied that he was not aware of a request from Carillion or the Cabinet Office to the FCA to withhold action or grant immunity. 1
documentedOn 18 September 2020 the FCA issued a Warning Notice concerning alleged market abuse and Listing Rules breaches by Carillion and others and published a statement; for Carillion it proposed a public censure, not a financial penalty. The notice was issued under the permission granted by the Insolvency and Companies Court order of 7 August 2020. 2
documentedIn The Financial Conduct Authority v Carillion Plc (in liquidation) [2021] EWHC 2871 (Ch), judgment of 27 October 2021 (Mr Justice Michael Green), the High Court heard the FCA's appeal against ICC Judge Jones's order of 7 August 2020, which had held that the FCA needed the court's permission under section 130(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986 to take regulatory action against a company in liquidation and had granted that permission; the grant itself was not challenged. Carillion was represented through the Official Receiver as liquidator. 2
- qualification
- The retained published copy of the judgment ends before the court's conclusion, so the outcome of the appeal is not recorded here.
attributedOn 28 July 2022 the FCA published its Decision Notice imposing a public censure on Carillion plc (in liquidation) rather than a financial penalty because the company was insolvent; otherwise it would have imposed a penalty of £37,910,000. The FCA considers that Carillion recklessly published misleading announcements on 7 December 2016, 1 March 2017 and 3 May 2017 and, between 1 July 2016 and 10 July 2017, breached Article 15 of the Market Abuse Regulation, Listing Rule 1.3.3R, Listing Principle 1 and Premium Listing Principle 2. Carillion did not refer the notice to the Upper Tribunal. 3 4
- qualification
- FCA findings; Carillion, through the Official Receiver, made no representations and neither admits nor denies the matters, and the FCA states that this was not treated as an admission.
- response
- According to the FCA, because Carillion is in insolvent liquidation and no penalty was sought, Carillion (acting by the Official Receiver as liquidator) did not make representations on the Warning Notice; its position is that it neither admits nor denies the matters set out in it.
- outcome
- The FCA's February 2026 press release lists a 2026 Final Notice for Carillion plc (in liquidation).
attributedIn Decision Notices dated 24 June 2022 and published on 28 July 2022, the FCA decided to fine former chief executive Richard Howson £397,800 and former finance directors Richard Adam £318,000 and Zafar Khan £154,400. The FCA considers that each acted recklessly and was knowingly concerned in Carillion's contraventions: they were aware of the deteriorating expected performance of the UK construction business but did not ensure the announcements reflected it, and did not make the Board and Audit Committee aware of it. 3 5 4
- qualification
- The three referred their Decision Notices to the Upper Tribunal; the FCA stated that the findings were provisional and the action had no effect pending the Tribunal's determination.
- response
- All three individuals contested the decisions by referring them to the Upper Tribunal.
- outcome
- Each later withdrew his challenge; the FCA imposed final penalties of £232,800 on Richard Adam and £138,900 on Zafar Khan (January 2026) and £237,700 on Richard Howson (February 2026).
attributedOn 7 January 2026 the FCA announced that it had fined Richard Adam (finance director from April 2007 to 31 December 2016) £232,800 and Zafar Khan (finance director from 1 January 2017 to September 2017) £138,900, after both withdrew their challenges to its decision. The FCA found that both acted recklessly and were knowingly concerned in Carillion's breaches of the Market Abuse Regulation and the Listing Rules. The FRC's May 2026 notice gives these FCA fines as £232,830 and £138,960. 5 1 3 6
- qualification
- FCA findings that became final after the individuals withdrew their references; the press release does not state that either admitted them. The small differences between the FCA's and the FRC's figures are not explained.
- response
- Both had contested the FCA's Decision Notices of 24 June 2022 by referring them to the Upper Tribunal, and the fines were imposed after they withdrew those challenges. In 2018 Adam had told the committees that he was participating in the regulatory investigations, which he hoped would be fair and involve due process, and Khan that he would explain his position in the course of those investigations.
attributedOn 16 February 2026 the FCA announced that it had fined Richard Howson, Chief Executive of Carillion from 1 January 2012 to 10 July 2017, £237,700 after he withdrew his challenge. The FCA found that he acted recklessly and was knowingly concerned, between 1 July 2016 and 10 July 2017, in Carillion's breaches of Article 15 of the Market Abuse Regulation, Listing Rule 1.3.3R, Listing Principle 1 and Premium Listing Principle 2: aware of serious financial troubles in the UK construction business, he did not reflect them in announcements or alert the board and audit committee. The FCA noted that primary responsibility for the accuracy of financial information lay with the group finance director, while Howson was the board member with most construction expertise. 4 3
- qualification
- FCA findings that became final after Mr Howson withdrew his reference; the press release does not state that he admitted them.
- response
- Howson had contested the FCA's Decision Notice of 24 June 2022 by referring it to the Upper Tribunal; the fine was imposed after he withdrew that challenge.
documentedThe FCA's February 2026 release states that Richard Howson was one of two executive directors on Carillion's board, the other being the group finance director, first Richard Adam and then Zafar Khan, and it lists a 2026 Final Notice for Carillion plc (in liquidation) alongside Howson's. 4
attributedOn 12 May 2026 the FRC announced sanctions on Carillion's former group finance directors Richard Adam and his successor Zafar Khan (previously Financial Controller), who accepted Misconduct, admitting that they acted recklessly and failed to act with integrity in preparing accounting information on specific transactions, major UK construction contracts and a supply chain finance facility material to one or more financial years from 2013 to 2016 and the half year to 2017. Under the agreed settlements Adam received a recommended 15-year exclusion from the ICAEW, a financial sanction of £550,000 reduced to £222,019 and a severe reprimand; Khan a recommended 10-year exclusion, £225,000 reduced to £60,228 and a severe reprimand, the reductions reflecting the FCA fines and settlement discounts. 6 1
- qualification
- Enforcement concluded by agreed settlements rather than a contested tribunal hearing; the FRC published the settlement agreements and the joint particulars of facts and acts of misconduct, edited for publication.
- response
- Adam and Khan accepted their Misconduct and each admitted acting recklessly and failing to act with integrity; the FRC made no findings, and they made no admissions, that either acted dishonestly or deliberately. In 2018 Adam had told the committees that he did not believe the evidence justified their conclusions about his role, and Khan that he did not agree with their views insofar as his own position was concerned.
- outcome
- The settlement terms agreed by the FRC's Executive Counsel were approved by a member of the independent Tribunal Panel, and the FRC stated that the announcement marked the conclusion of its investigations arising out of Carillion's collapse.
documentedThe FRC's Executive Counsel also sanctioned three other former Carillion senior accountants, not named because of specific and exceptional confidential circumstances, with recommended exclusions of 8, 5 and 2 years, financial sanctions of £70,000 discounted to £45,500 and of £40,000 discounted to £26,000 (twice), and severe reprimands; the settlements were approved by a member of the independent Tribunal Panel. The FRC said the announcement concluded its investigations arising from Carillion's collapse, after its earlier enforcement concerning KPMG's audits. 6
- qualification
- The FRC states that the announcement should not be treated as evidencing an investigation into, or findings about, any other persons or entities.
documentedAccording to a government answer in Parliament of 24 October 2023, the Insolvency Service, acting for the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, commenced disqualification proceedings on 12 January 2021 against three executive and five non-executive directors of Carillion plc. Its estimated costs in the proceedings against all eight were £11,064,519, and £2,725,000 of costs had been recovered following the disqualification of the three executive directors. 7
attributedA legal briefing by the non-executive directors' lawyers (20 October 2023) states that the proceedings followed the Official Receiver's 2018–2020 investigation, were issued in the High Court in January 2021 under section 6 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 shortly before a limitation deadline, and alleged in substance that the two former finance directors knowingly caused the publication of non-compliant accounts for seven contracts and transactions, misleading market announcements and an unjustified dividend, and that the former chief executive ought to have known of this. Between 29 June and 4 October 2023 the three executives gave undertakings of 12.5, 11 and 8 years. 8 9 7
- qualification
- Account of lawyers acting for the non-executive directors, a party to the same proceedings; the allegations were not tried. The Insolvency Service's own announcements state the grounds of the chief executive's undertaking separately.
- response
- According to the briefing, none of the undertakings involved any admission by the executives as to the alleged fraud or any direct knowledge of or involvement in the preparation of incorrect accounts.
- outcome
- The Insolvency Service announced that it had accepted the three executives' undertakings on 29 June, 13 July and 4 October 2023. A government answer of 24 October 2023 refers to the proceedings against the five non-executive directors as dropped in October 2023 and to costs of £2,725,000 recovered following the disqualification of the three executive directors.
attributedAccording to the same briefing, on the eve of trial the Insolvency Service discontinued the proceedings against the five former non-executive directors; the trial, listed for about 13 weeks, had been due to start on 16 October 2023. The case against them rested on an alleged strict duty to know the company's true financial position (the "NED Duty"), which the Insolvency Service's counsel had called a "test case"; the directors argued that no such duty exists in law. The briefing also notes that neither the FCA nor the FRC brought action against any of the non-executive directors. 8 7
- qualification
- The briefing is by the non-executive directors' own lawyers. A written parliamentary question answered on 24 October 2023 refers to the proceedings 'dropped in October 2023', but the retained official records do not state the Insolvency Service's reasons or name the five directors.
- response
- The non-executive directors argued that the Insolvency Service's reliance on the case Re Westmid Packing Services (No.2) was erroneous, that a strict duty to know would contradict the codified duty of care in section 174 of the Companies Act 2006 and be impossible to comply with, and that unfitness requires a want of probity or really gross incompetence, for which they said the Insolvency Service never advanced a proper basis.
- outcome
- The government answer of 24 October 2023 put the Insolvency Service's estimated costs against all eight directors at £11,064,519, with £2,725,000 recovered.
attributedAn online encyclopedia article on Philip Green states that in January 2021 the Insolvency Service said it would seek to ban eight former Carillion directors, including Green, and that the trial due to start on 16 October 2023 was cancelled after the Insolvency Service decided it was not in the public interest to pursue the former chairman and other directors. 10 1 7
- qualification
- Secondary, non-official source; the retained official records do not name the non-executive directors concerned or state the Insolvency Service's reason.
- response
- In his July 2018 response to the committees, Green said he disagreed with many of their conclusions and would cooperate fully with the Insolvency Service, FCA and FRC investigations.
- outcome
- A government answer of 24 October 2023 confirms that the disqualification proceedings begun in January 2021 against five non-executive directors of Carillion plc were dropped in October 2023; no finding was made against Green.
documentedCompanies House records a disqualification undertaking given by Richard John Adam on 13 July 2023 for his conduct while acting for Carillion plc, under section 7 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, running from 3 August 2023 to 2 February 2036 (twelve and a half years). The Insolvency Service accepted the undertaking. 11 9
documentedCompanies House records a disqualification undertaking given by Zafar Iqbal Khan on 29 June 2023 for his conduct while acting for Carillion plc, under section 7 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, running from 20 July 2023 to 19 July 2034 (eleven years). The Insolvency Service accepted the undertaking. 12 9
documentedOn 4 October 2023 the Insolvency Service, acting for the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, announced that it had accepted an 8-year disqualification undertaking from Richard Howson, Chief Executive Officer of Carillion Plc until 10 July 2017, for his conduct as a director of Carillion Plc. Companies House records the undertaking as given on 4 October 2023 under section 7 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, running from 25 October 2023 to 24 October 2031. 13 9
attributedThe Insolvency Service's announcement of Howson's undertaking states that he caused Carillion plc to account for and report the performance of its major construction contracts (Royal Liverpool University Hospital, Battersea Power Station, Aberdeen Western Peripheral Route, Midlands Metropolitan Hospital and Msheireb Phase 1(B)) in its 2015 and 2016 financial statements in a way he ought to have known falsified and concealed their deterioration; that the 2015 misstatement on those contracts was £95.4m (profit should have been £65.3m, not the £155.1m reported); and that for 2016 the misstatements of £179.2m on the contracts and £29.3m on the Ecopod and Geneva transactions meant a loss of £61.7m should have been reported instead of a £146.7m profit. 9 13 8 1
- qualification
- Grounds stated by the Insolvency Service for an undertaking, framed as what Mr Howson 'ought to have known'; not tried in court. A legal briefing for the non-executive directors states that none of the executives' undertakings involved admissions as to the alleged fraud or direct knowledge of or involvement in preparing incorrect accounts.
- response
- In his July 2018 response to the committees, Howson said the reasons for Carillion's demise were mixed and varied and that debt was too high, and argued that any examination must cover the final months before liquidation and the amounts owed to Carillion by public-sector customers.
- outcome
- The grounds accompanied the Insolvency Service's acceptance of an 8-year disqualification undertaking from Howson, which Companies House records as running from 25 October 2023 to 24 October 2031.
attributedThe Insolvency Service also states that Howson caused Carillion to procure payments from Wipro in 2013 (£39.0m: £25.0m for Ecopod under an IP assignment agreement and £14.0m of termination charges) and 2014 (£2.0m) that were wrongly accounted for as profit in the 2013 financial statements, overstating profit by £39.0m and understating net debt by £41.0m, and payments in 2016 totalling £40.0m that overstated 2016 profit by £34.4m (Geneva transaction) and understated net debt by £39.2m; that he ought to have known of the false accounting and of the concealment from the auditors of Carillion's obligation to make repayments to Wipro. 8 14 9 13
- qualification
- Insolvency Service statement of grounds for an undertaking; not tried.
- response
- According to the non-executive directors' lawyers, none of the executives' undertakings involved admissions as to the alleged fraud or direct knowledge of or involvement in preparing incorrect accounts. Carillion's 2016 accounts stated that management had concluded, after a benchmarking review, that the 2016 transactions should be recognised independently and in their own right.
- outcome
- The grounds accompanied the Insolvency Service's acceptance of an 8-year disqualification undertaking from Howson, which Companies House records as running from 25 October 2023 to 24 October 2031.
attributedThe Insolvency Service further states that Howson caused Carillion plc to make market announcements on 7 December 2016, 1 March 2017 and 3 May 2017 that he ought to have known were misleading, in breach of Listing Rule 1.3.3R and Article 15 of the Market Abuse Regulation, and to pay a 2016 final dividend of £54.4m on 9 June 2017 that he ought to have known could not be justified by properly prepared accounts and was not in the interests of the company, its members or creditors. 8 9 13 3 4
- qualification
- Insolvency Service statement of grounds for an undertaking; not tried. A national newspaper later summarised the dividend ground as a £54m dividend signed off in June 2017.
- response
- According to the non-executive directors' lawyers, none of the executives' undertakings involved admissions as to the alleged fraud or direct knowledge of or involvement in preparing incorrect accounts.
- outcome
- The grounds accompanied the Insolvency Service's acceptance of an 8-year disqualification undertaking from Howson, which Companies House records as running from 25 October 2023 to 24 October 2031. Separately, the FCA, whose 2022 notice to Carillion concerned announcements of the same three dates, fined Howson £237,700 in February 2026 for being knowingly concerned in Carillion's breaches between 1 July 2016 and 10 July 2017, after he withdrew his challenge.
documentedIn Carillion Plc (in liquidation) v KPMG LLP and KPMG Audit Plc [2020] EWHC 1416 (Comm), judgment of 3 June 2020, Mr Justice Jacobs dismissed Carillion's application under CPR 31.16 for pre-action disclosure of KPMG's electronic audit files. Carillion intended to claim that KPMG, as auditor of Carillion and many subsidiaries, failed to detect that the financial statements did not reflect the true position on construction contract revenue and goodwill. The judge considered that, after KPMG's letter of response, Carillion should plead its case in the usual way. 15 16
documentedThe 2020 application concerned the audits for 2014 to 2016 and, for contract accounting, 9 contracts out of 58 reviewed by Carillion's management between May and July 2017 (write-downs were made on at least 45): the Aberdeen Western Peripheral Route, Royal Liverpool Hospital, Battersea Power Station, Midland Metropolitan Hospital, Southmead, TTC Vaughan and Union Station in Canada, and Msheireb and Al Dara in the Middle East. 15
documentedThe 2020 judgment records that on 1 October 2019 Carillion's solicitors wrote to KPMG's solicitors referring to write-downs in June and September 2017 of £845 million on certain contracts, a further £200 million on support services contracts and a £134 million goodwill impairment, and that a standstill agreement had earlier been concluded while KPMG's work was investigated by the office-holders. 15
attributedAccording to the Pensions Regulator's regulatory intervention report, the Official Receiver, acting as liquidator of the Carillion group, issued High Court proceedings against KPMG in January 2022 claiming damages of £1.3 billion for alleged negligent audits of Carillion plc's financial statements. 17 18
- qualification
- Allegation of negligence in a civil claim; it was not adjudicated.
- response
- On the settlement, KPMG's UK chief executive said, as reported by a national newspaper: "I am pleased that we have been able to resolve this claim... it is important that we all learn the lessons from its collapse."
- outcome
- A national newspaper reported on 17 February 2023 that KPMG had settled the claim; the terms are confidential.
attributedA national newspaper reported on 17 February 2023 that KPMG had settled the £1.3bn claim brought by Carillion's liquidator, the Official Receiver, over audits of Carillion's accounts for 2014 to 2016; neither KPMG nor the Official Receiver would confirm the amount, and a spokesperson for the liquidator said the parties had agreed that the terms would remain confidential. The report states that the creditors include HMRC and that the claimants alleged Carillion paid £210m in dividends in reliance on KPMG's audits. 18
- qualification
- Press report; the settlement terms are confidential and no admission of liability is reported.
- response
- KPMG's UK chief executive said in a statement that he was pleased the claim had been resolved, that Carillion was an extreme and serious corporate failure and that it was important that all learn the lessons from its collapse.
attributedThe Pensions Regulator's report states that the FCA and the Insolvency Service concluded from their investigations that there were grounds to use their respective powers, based on findings of governance and reporting failings, and that TPR set up a working group with these agencies and the FRC to share information. 3 4 5 9 7 17
- qualification
- TPR's summary of other agencies' conclusions.
- outcome
- The FCA published Decision Notices in July 2022 and imposed its sanctions by Final Notices in 2026, after the three former executive directors withdrew their challenges. The Insolvency Service accepted disqualification undertakings from the three former executive directors between 29 June and 4 October 2023, and its proceedings against five non-executive directors were dropped in October 2023.
attributedResponding to the committees' May 2018 report, Richard Adam wrote that the reasons for Carillion's collapse were complex, that he did not believe the evidence justified the report's conclusions and that the assumptions made were unwarranted in respect of his role before his retirement in 2016; he said he was participating in the regulatory investigations, which he hoped would be fair and involve due process. 1
- qualification
- Adam's own account, published in the committees' special report of July 2018.
attributedKeith Cochrane, former interim chief executive, wrote that the committee appeared in several instances to have taken his evidence out of context and that he did not accept many of the report's conclusions, but that because of the ongoing investigations he would not comment in detail. 1
- qualification
- Cochrane's own account, published in the committees' special report of July 2018.
attributedRichard Howson wrote that the report had not considered all the key issues, that the reasons for Carillion's demise were mixed and varied, and that debt was too high but he had been committed to working through the challenging contracts and reducing it; he argued that the last months before liquidation, when 4 of the 5 experienced divisional managing directors were removed, and the amounts owed by government customers should have been examined. 1
- qualification
- Howson's own account, published in the committees' special report of July 2018.
attributedFormer chairman Philip Green wrote that he disagreed with many of the report's conclusions but would not comment while the investigations by the Insolvency Service (assisted by PwC as special manager), the FCA and the FRC were ongoing, and that he would continue to cooperate fully; Andrew Dougal, former audit committee chair, and Alison Horner, former remuneration committee chair, respectively disagreed with many conclusions and said the report misquoted or misrepresented her evidence, and each wrote that because of the ongoing investigations it would not be right to comment in detail (Dougal) or generally (Horner) at that time. 1
- qualification
- Their own accounts, published in the committees' special report of July 2018.
sources in this section
- Carillion: Responses from Interested Parties to the committees' report (HC 1392, Second Special Report) House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees · 12 Jul 2018
- Court record source · src-086 identified by category only · Court record
- FCA publishes Decision Notices against Carillion plc (in liquidation) and three of its former executive directors Financial Conduct Authority · 28 Jul 2022
- FCA fines former chief executive of Carillion plc (in liquidation) Financial Conduct Authority · 16 Feb 2026
- FCA fines former finance directors of Carillion plc (in liquidation) Financial Conduct Authority · 7 Jan 2026
- FRC findings of 12 May 2026 on former Carillion finance directors and accountants Financial Reporting Council · 12 May 2026
- Written question 203243 on Carillion director disqualification proceedings and the government answer of 24 October 2023 UK Parliament · 24 Oct 2023
- Other source · src-074 identified by category only · Other
- Regulatory record source · src-095 identified by category only · Regulatory record
- Other source · src-104 identified by category only · Other
- Companies House disqualified director record: Richard John Adam Companies House
- Companies House disqualified director record: Zafar Iqbal Khan Companies House
- Companies House disqualified director record: Richard John Howson Companies House
- Company statement source · src-003 identified by category only · Company statement
- Carillion plc (in liquidation) v KPMG LLP and KPMG Audit plc [2020] EWHC 1416 (Comm), judgment High Court of Justice, Commercial Court (The National Archives, Find Case Law) · 3 Jun 2020
- Companies House company record: KPMG Audit Limited (03110745) Companies House
- Carillion group: regulatory intervention report The Pensions Regulator
- Media source · src-076 identified by category only · Media
13Richard Howson, Carillion chief executive 2012–2017
attributedA national newspaper reported on 19 January 2024 that Richard Howson had been named construction president at TECfusions, a Tampa-based company that builds and renovates data centres and combined heat and power systems, and that he had started there in January 2024. 1
- qualification
- Press report; the retained documents contain no company or registry record of the appointment.
sources in this section
- Media source · src-085 identified by category only · Media
14Carillion's Canadian businesses under the CCAA
documentedOn 25 January 2018 Carillion Canada Holdings Inc., Carillion Canada Inc., Carillion Canada Finance Corp. and Carillion Construction Inc. obtained an Initial Order from the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (court file CV-18-590812-00CL), staying proceedings until 23 February 2018 and appointing Ernst & Young Inc. as Monitor; the stay was most recently extended to 30 April 2021. Further applicants, including Carillion Services Inc., were added on 1 March 2018. 1
documentedThe Monitor's report describes Carillion plc, acting by its special managers, as the ultimate parent of the Canadian applicants. 1
- qualification
- The report does not set out the intermediate holding companies.
documentedAccording to the Monitor, Carillion plc carried out a cash sweep of about C$28 million from the Canadian applicants' cash management system on 12 January 2018. About C$27.8 million swept into Carillion Canada's account with HSBC UK was not returned and is held by HSBC UK; on the Monitor's motion the court made an Investigation Order (revised on 6 March 2019) directing the Monitor to investigate, and on 21 February 2020 declared that HSBC UK had attorned to its jurisdiction to determine entitlement to the funds. 1
documentedUnder the group's global liquidity arrangements, cash of certain Canadian group companies was swept daily into a Carillion Canada account at HSBC Canada and from there into a Carillion Canada account at a branch of HSBC UK. 1
documentedErnst & Young Inc. signed its April 2021 report as Monitor of Carillion Canada Holdings Inc., Carillion Canada Inc., Carillion Canada Finance Corp., Carillion Construction Inc., Carillion Pacific Construction Inc., Carillion Services Inc. and other applicants including Rokstad Power GP Inc. and Plowe Power Systems Ltd., and as Receiver of companies including Carillion Investments (Canada) Inc. 1
documentedOn 29 April 2020 the court appointed Ernst & Young Inc. as equitable receiver of related Canadian companies, including Carillion Investments (Canada) Inc., 491313 BC Limited, 2447586 Ontario Inc., Carillion Canada (WOHC) Inc., TWD Roads Management Inc. and Vanbots Capital Corporation, harmonising the receivership with the CCAA proceedings. 1
documentedThe Monitor's motion of 30 September 2020 seeking relief on trust funds of C$21,699,020.71 was heard on 28 January 2021 and dismissed on 2 March 2021; on 16 March 2021 the Monitor served a notice seeking leave to appeal, which its thirty-third report of 15 April 2021 supported. The Monitor noted that the trust funds of C$21.7 million would flow directly to the surety and subcontractors, reducing their claims against Carillion Construction Inc. 1
- qualification
- The outcome of the leave application is not in the retained report.
documentedThe Retirement Plan for Employees of Carillion Canada, providing defined benefit and defined contribution pensions, is sponsored and administered by Carillion Canada Inc. 1
documentedIn the CCAA proceedings the Canadian services portfolio (Business Support Services and the Outland entities) was sold to Fairfax, defined as Hamblin Wasta Investment Counsel Ltd. acting as investment manager of Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited and affiliates; the vendors included Carillion Construction Inc. and Carillion Services Inc., and the initial closing took place on 7 March 2018. 1
documentedThe Monitor's glossary describes two further sales: the Ellis Don transaction, among "CCI" and its related party Carillion Ottawa Holdings Inc. as vendors and EllisDon Corporation and EllisDon Ottawa Inc. as purchasers; and the sale of the road maintenance business (year-round maintenance of about 40,000 km of highways in Ontario and Alberta) by "CCI", "CCFC" and TWD Roads Management Inc. to Emcon Services Inc. and 1165565 B.C. Ltd. 1
analysisThe abbreviation "CCI" in the Monitor's glossary most likely denotes Carillion Canada Inc.: the glossary defines the "CCI CDN Master Account" and "CCI UK Master Account" as bank accounts of Carillion Canada (defined as Carillion Canada Inc.), and lists "Carillion Construction" and "CCI" separately among the Fairfax vendors, so CCI is not Carillion Construction Inc. On this reading Carillion Canada Inc. was a vendor in the EllisDon and road maintenance sales. 1
- qualification
- Inference from the glossary; the retained pages do not spell out CCI, so the vendor identity in these two sales is not directly stated.
documentedOn 13 June 2018 the Ontario court added Rokstad Power GP Inc., 0891115 BC Ltd., Golden Ears Painting & Sandblasting Ltd., Plowe Power Systems Ltd. and Carillion General Partner (B.C.) Limited to the CCAA proceedings as the Rokstad additional applicants. The Monitor's glossary defines the Rokstad transaction as the sale by Rokstad Power GP Inc., 0891115 BC Ltd., Golden Ears Painting & Sandblasting Ltd. and Plowe Power Systems Ltd. to Rokstad Holdings Corporation or its designated purchaser. 1
documentedA list of contracts in a 2024 court-filed receiver's report records June 2018 agreements on the sale of the Rokstad business: an asset purchase agreement dated 12 June 2018 among Rokstad Holdings Corporation, RPC Limited Partnership, Rokstad Power GP Inc., 0891115 B.C. Ltd., Plowe Power Systems Ltd., Golden Ears Painting & Sandblasting Ltd., Carillion Canada Holdings Inc., Carillion Canada Inc., Rokstad Power Corporation and two individuals; a co-operation and realization agreement dated 18 June 2018 among RPC Limited Partnership, Rokstad Holdings Corporation, Rokstad Power Corporation, the same two individuals, Carillion Canada Holdings Inc. and Carillion Canada Inc.; and a share purchase agreement dated June 2018 between Carillion USA Inc. and Rokstad Holdings Corporation. 2
- qualification
- The list records the agreements and parties, not their terms or consideration.
documentedOn 6 November 2024 the Supreme Court of British Columbia appointed FTI Consulting Canada Inc. as receiver and manager of Rokstad Holdings Corporation, Rokstad Power (2018) Ltd. and related companies, on the petition of Stellex Power Line Opco LLC and 1501841 B.C. Ltd., after an interim receivership from 10 October 2024. 2
- qualification
- A later receivership of the business after it left the Carillion group in 2018, concerning that business's own lenders; it contains no finding about Carillion, and the receiver, FTI Consulting Canada Inc., has no role in the Carillion proceedings in the retained record.
sources in this section
- Court record source · src-088 identified by category only · Court record
- Court record source · src-082 identified by category only · Court record