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Wirecard AG: the missing EUR 1.9 billion and its aftermath

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Full assertions with source references, qualifications, responses and known outcomes. The topic articles explain these records in context.

published
26 oct 2026
records as of
21 oct 2026
entities
245
sources
105
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the questionWhich records support the articles?

1Wirecard AG: register record, names and identifiers

documentedWirecard AG is a German stock corporation (Aktiengesellschaft) registered with the Munich local court (Amtsgericht München) under HRB 169227 since 6 August 2007. According to its 2019 bond prospectus it was incorporated on 6 May 1999 in Berlin, registered at the Charlottenburg local court under HRB 88060 B, and moved its registered seat after a shareholders' resolution of 14 June 2007. 1 2 3

documentedWirecard AG's September 2019 bond prospectus gives the Legal Entity Identifiers of the five subsidiary guarantors: Wirecard Technologies GmbH 529900Z54V2EA48D2Y27, Wirecard Sales International Holding GmbH 529900VH0MQZASU8AR79, Wirecard Payment Solutions Holdings Limited (Dublin) 529900BWETZJRMZMRV03, CardSystems Middle East FZ-LLC 529900QITH4S89RB2V17 and Wirecard Processing FZ-LLC 529900NB6TN7EHS4MA55. 2

documentedWirecard AG's Legal Entity Identifier is 529900A8LX4KL0YUTH71, as stated in its September 2019 bond prospectus. A commercial registry aggregator lists the same identifier, the European unique identifier DED2601V.HRB169227 and the earlier register numbers HRB 88060 B (Charlottenburg, Berlin) and HRB 131672 (Munich). 2 4

documentedWirecard AG's earlier names were InfoGenie Europe AG and Wire Card AG, and its earlier seats were Berlin and Grasbrunn; a subsidiary's register entry confirms that InfoGenie Europe AG (Charlottenburg HRB 88060 B) was renamed Wirecard AG. 5 4

documentedWirecard AG's registered business purpose is the development, operation and marketing of information services, especially through electronic media, and the development and implementation of technical applications, services and projects in payment systems, including the acquisition and granting of licences in the financial services sector. 4

documentedRegister entries show Wirecard AG's address at Bretonischer Ring 4, Grasbrunn from 3 March 2009, at Einsteinring 35, Aschheim from 22 July 2011 and at Humboldtstraße 8, Aschheim from 27 June 2022. The registered share capital rose in steps from EUR 111,983,452 (9 March 2012) to EUR 123,565,586 (26 January 2016). 1

documentedWirecard AG's subscribed capital at 31 December 2011 was EUR 101,803,139, divided into the same number of no-par bearer shares; after a capital increase registered on 9 March 2012 it was EUR 111,983,452. 6

documentedWirecard AG's register records that InfoGenie Deutschland GmbH and InfoGenie ComService GmbH (both Berlin) were merged into the company, and that under merger agreements of 29 June 2005 net sales GmbH and InfoGenie Global GmbH (both Grasbrunn) were merged into it as well. 3

documentedA registry aggregator lists six group companies at Wirecard AG's later address, Humboldtstraße 8 in Aschheim: WDB Abwicklungs AG (formerly Wirecard Bank AG, HRB 161178), Wirecard Acquiring & Issuing GmbH, Wirecard Global Sales GmbH, Wirecard Sales International Holding GmbH, Wirecard Service Technologies GmbH and Wirecard Technologies GmbH. 1

documentedA registry aggregator's network view of the German register lists Click2Pay GmbH, Wirecard Sales International Holding GmbH and Wirecard Technologies GmbH as 100% holdings of Wirecard AG; for a stock corporation the register keeps no shareholder list. 7

documentedThe 2019 bond prospectus describes an internal cash-management agreement under which Wirecard AG supplied subsidiaries with funds for their operations and collected their unused surpluses. 2

documentedThe invitation to Wirecard AG's annual general meeting of 26 June 2012, published on 16 May 2012, asked shareholders to approve two control and profit-transfer agreements concluded on 10 May 2012 with Wire Card Beteiligungs GmbH (to be renamed Wirecard Acquiring & Issuing GmbH, HRB 156848) and with Trustpay International GmbH (to be renamed Wirecard Sales International GmbH, HRB 187465). Both were signed for Wirecard AG's management board by Dr. Markus Braun, Burkhard Ley and Jan Marsalek; Braun signed for the management of Wire Card Beteiligungs GmbH and Marsalek for that of Trustpay International GmbH. 8

documentedIn its 2018 single-entity accounts Wirecard AG states that, for corporate-law reasons, it issued a letter of comfort covering all liabilities of its subsidiary Wirecard Payment Solutions Holdings Ltd. of Dublin and did not expect to be called upon under it. 9

qualification
The amounts of the liabilities are not legible in the retained text layer of the accounts.

sources in this section

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  2. Company statement source · src-012 identified by category only · Company statement
  3. Corporate registry source · src-006 identified by category only · Corporate registry
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  5. Corporate registry source · src-016 identified by category only · Corporate registry
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  7. Corporate registry source · src-033 identified by category only · Corporate registry
  8. Company statement source · src-050 identified by category only · Company statement
  9. Company statement source · src-008 identified by category only · Company statement

2Wirecard AG: the missing EUR 1.9 billion and its aftermath

documentedThe European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) describes Wirecard AG as a fintech company included in the DAX 30 index from September 2018 and notes that allegations of accounting inconsistencies and other irregularities were raised several times during its rapid growth and were systematically rejected by the company. 1

3Wirecard's group of companies, 2010–2019

documentedWirecard AG's 2010 annual report lists its subsidiaries, each held at 100%: Click2Pay GmbH, InfoGenie Ltd. (Windsor, United Kingdom), Wirecard (Gibraltar) Ltd., Trustpay International GmbH (formerly Trustpay International AG), Wirecard Payment Solutions Holdings Ltd., Wirecard UK and Ireland Ltd. (formerly Wirecard Payment Solutions Ltd.) and Herview Ltd. (Dublin), Wirecard Central Eastern Europe GmbH (formerly Qenta paymentsolutions Beratungs und Informations GmbH, Klagenfurt), Wirecard Technologies AG, Wirecard Communication Services GmbH (Leipzig), Wirecard Retail Services GmbH, cardSystems FZ-LLC (Dubai), Wire Card Beteiligungs GmbH, Wirecard Bank AG, E-Credit Plus Pte. Ltd. (later Wirecard Asia Pte. Ltd., Singapore), E-Credit Plus Corp. (Philippines), Credence Collection SDN BHD (Malaysia) and E-Payments Singapore Pte. Ltd. 1

documentedTo simplify the group, Pro Card Kartensysteme GmbH (Grasbrunn) was merged into Wirecard Retail Services GmbH in 2010, and webcommunication EDV Dienstleistungs und Entwicklungs GmbH (Graz) into Wirecard Central Eastern Europe GmbH; 18 subsidiaries were fully consolidated at 31 December 2010, against 16 a year earlier. 1

documentedWirecard AG's 2011 annual report again lists subsidiaries held at 100%, now including Procard Services FZ LLC (Dubai), Systems@Work Pte. Ltd. (Singapore), Systems@Work (M) SDN BHD (Kuala Lumpur) and Safe2Pay Pte. Ltd. (Singapore), alongside Trustpay International GmbH, Wire Card Beteiligungs GmbH, Wirecard Technologies AG, cardSystems FZ-LLC, Wirecard Asia Pte. Ltd., E-Credit Plus Corp., Wirecard Malaysia SDN BHD (formerly Credence Collection SDN BHD) and E-Payments Singapore Pte. Ltd.; 22 subsidiaries were fully consolidated at 31 December 2011, against 18 a year earlier. 2

documentedIn 2011 Wire Card Beteiligungs GmbH and Trustpay International GmbH, both based in Aschheim, acted as intermediate holding companies for group subsidiaries without operating business of their own. Together with Wirecard Technologies AG they were exempt from preparing their own consolidated accounts under § 291 of the German Commercial Code because Wirecard AG's group accounts covered them. 2

documentedWirecard's 2011 report describes the subsidiaries' functions: Wirecard Technologies AG and Wirecard (Gibraltar) Ltd. developed and ran the software platform at the centre of the group's products; Click2Pay GmbH ran the CLICK2PAY internet payment system; Wirecard Payment Solutions Holdings Ltd., Wirecard UK and Ireland Ltd. and Herview Ltd. (Dublin) and Wirecard Central Eastern Europe GmbH (Klagenfurt) provided sales and processing services. 2

documentedESMA notes that Wirecard's 2014 consolidated accounts covered 33 companies in which it held all the shares. 3

documentedWirecard AG's shareholdings list at 31 December 2016 shows 100% subsidiaries that no longer appear under these names in the 2018 list, among them Payment Technologies Ltd. (Wilmington, USA), Provus Service Provider S.A. (Bucharest), Trans Infotech (Vietnam) Ltd and Trans Infotech (Laos) Ltd. (the Romanian and Vietnamese companies were renamed Wirecard Romania S.A. and Wirecard (Vietnam) Ltd., as the 2017 list records); 46 subsidiaries were fully consolidated, against 37 a year earlier. 4

documentedThe shareholdings list in Wirecard's 2017 annual report records 100% subsidiaries with their earlier names, including Wirecard Singapore Pte. Ltd. (formerly Systems@Work Pte. Ltd.), Wirecard (Vietnam) Ltd. (formerly Trans Infotech (Vietnam) Ltd.), Wirecard Romania S.A. (formerly Provus Service Provider S.A.) and Trans Infotech (Laos) Ltd. 5

documentedIn 2017 the group founded Wirecard (Thailand) Co. Ltd. (Bangkok), Wirecard E-Money Philippines Inc. (Manila), and three German companies in Aschheim: Wirecard Issuing Technologies GmbH, Wirecard Service Technologies GmbH and Wirecard Acceptance Technologies GmbH. 5

documentedAccording to the shareholdings list in its 2018 annual report, Wirecard AG held directly or indirectly 100% of these companies: Wirecard Sales International Holding GmbH (Aschheim), Wirecard Payment Solutions Holdings Ltd., Wirecard UK and Ireland Ltd. and Herview Ltd. (Dublin), Wirecard Central Eastern Europe GmbH (Graz), Wirecard Asia Holding Pte. Ltd. and Wirecard Singapore Pte. Ltd., Wirecard (Vietnam) Ltd., Wirecard Payment Solutions Malaysia SDN BHD, PT Prima Vista Solusi and PT Aprisma Indonesia (Jakarta), Wirecard Myanmar Ltd., Wirecard (Thailand) Co. Ltd., Wirecard India Private Ltd., American Payment Holding Inc. (Toronto), Hermes I Tickets Pte Ltd (Chennai), GI Philippines Corp, Wirecard Forex India Pte Ltd (formerly Star Global Currency Exchange), Wirecard Romania S.A., Romcard S.A. and Supercard Solutions & Services S.R.L. (Bucharest), Wirecard Global Sales GmbH, Wirecard Poland Sp. z o.o., Wirecard LLC (Moscow) and Wirecard Mexico S.A. de C.V. 6

documentedThe continuation of the 2018 list adds further 100% subsidiaries: Wirecard Technologies GmbH, Wirecard Communication Services GmbH (Leipzig), Wirecard Retail Services GmbH, cardSystems Middle East FZ-LLC (Dubai), MyGate Communications Pty Ltd. (Cape Town), Wirecard Acceptance Technologies GmbH, Wirecard Service Technologies GmbH, Wirecard Issuing Technologies GmbH, Wirecard NZ Ltd, Wirecard Australia Pty Ltd, Wirecard Africa Holding Proprietary Ltd., Wirecard South Africa Proprietary Ltd., Wirecard Payment Services (Namibia) (Pty) Ltd, Wirecard Slovakia s.r.o., Click2Pay GmbH, Wirecard (Gibraltar) Ltd., Wirecard Processing FZ LLC (Dubai), Wirecard Acquiring & Issuing GmbH, Wirecard Bank AG, Wirecard Brazil S.A., Wirecard Card Solutions Ltd. (Newcastle), Wirecard E-Money Philippines Inc., Wirecard Luxembourg S.A., Wirecard Ödeme ve Elektronik Para Hizmetleri A.Ş. (Istanbul), Wirecard North America Inc. (Conshohocken), Wirecard Australia A&I Pty Ltd., Wirecard Hong Kong Ltd. and Wirecard Payment Solutions Hong Kong. It holds 60% of GI Technology Pte. Ltd. (Chennai), accounted for by the equity method, and states that 53 subsidiaries were fully consolidated (50 a year earlier). 6

documentedWirecard's 2019 bond prospectus records four companies founded in 2018, Wirecard Slovakia s.r.o. (Košice), Wirecard LLC (Moscow), Wirecard Luxembourg S.A. and Wirecard Payment Services (Namibia) (Pty) Ltd (Windhoek), and three founded in 2019: Beijing Wirecard Technology Solutions Co. Ltd., Wirecard U.S. Holdings, Inc. (Wilmington) and WDB US, Inc. (Salt Lake City). 7

documentedThe 2019 bond prospectus states that Wirecard AG held directly or indirectly 100% of its subsidiaries except GI Technology Pte. Ltd. (60%). The list includes PT Wirecard Technologies Indonesia (Jakarta), Wirecard Solutions South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Cape Town), Beijing Wirecard Technology Solutions Co. Ltd., Wirecard U.S. Holding, Inc. and WDB US, Inc., and it still includes Wirecard Bank AG, Wirecard Card Solutions Ltd. and Wirecard North America Inc. 7

documentedWirecard's half-year report for the first half of 2019 lists 100% subsidiaries at 30 June 2019 except GI Technology Pte. Ltd. (60%, equity method), with 53 subsidiaries fully consolidated; it names PT Wirecard Technologies Indonesia as the former PT Aprisma Indonesia, records the founding of Beijing Wirecard Technology Solutions Co. Ltd. and Wirecard U.S. Holdings, Inc. in the first half of 2019, and the merger of Wirecard South Africa Proprietary Ltd. and MyGate Communications Pty Ltd. into Wirecard Africa Holding Proprietary Ltd. (Cape Town). 8

documentedTrustpay International AG was a stock corporation registered in Munich under HRB 167639 on 30 April 2007 with capital of EUR 50,000 and deleted on 24 August 2010; it began as the shelf company Blitz 07-210 AG (Munich) and later moved to Grasbrunn. 9

documentedWirecard Sales International Holding GmbH (Munich HRB 187465) came into being on 24 August 2010 as Trustpay International GmbH by conversion of Trustpay International AG (HRB 167639) into a limited liability company; its shareholders renamed it Wirecard Sales International GmbH on 10 May 2012 and Wirecard Sales International Holding GmbH on 18 July 2016. 7

documentedAccording to the 2019 bond prospectus, Wirecard AG was the sole shareholder of Wirecard Sales International Holding GmbH, whose share capital of EUR 50,000 consisted of one share; its annual accounts were audited by BakerTilly GmbH & Co. KG Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft (Hamburg). 7

documentedOn 10 May 2012 Wirecard Sales International GmbH concluded a control and profit-transfer agreement with Wirecard AG as the controlling company; its shareholders approved it on 26 June 2012 and the register entry dates from 11 July 2012. A register entry of 10 November 2020 records that the agreement ended by termination on 20 August 2020. 10 11

documentedWirecard Payment Solutions Holdings Limited (Dublin, Companies Registration Office number 409925) was first named Gateway E-Commerce Solutions Holdings Limited, then Gateway Payment Solutions Holdings Limited, and has carried its current name since 21 December 2007. The 2019 bond prospectus describes it as an Irish holding company and a wholly owned subsidiary of Wirecard Sales International Holding GmbH, itself wholly owned by Wirecard AG. 7

documentedIreland's Corporate Enforcement Authority states that from 2015 the sole shareholder of Wirecard UK & Ireland Limited was Wirecard Payments Solutions Holdings Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of Wirecard AG, and that Herview Limited belonged to the same group. The company processed credit and prepaid card transactions and became insolvent as a result of the suspected fraud within the Wirecard AG group, which included a sum of EUR 1.9 billion supposedly held in an escrow account that was later found not to exist. 12

documentedA commercial database summarising Irish register data shows Wirecard UK and Ireland Limited (number 409923) and Wirecard Payment Solutions Holdings Limited (number 409925), both incorporated on 25 October 2005 with an address in Dublin 2 and one shareholder each, as companies in liquidation; the holding company's filings include liquidator's statements up to August 2026. 13 14

documentedWirecard Technologies GmbH was formed on 13 August 2012 by conversion of Wirecard Technologies AG (HRB 142427). According to the 2019 bond prospectus that company was set up on 24 August 2000 as a shelf company registered in Potsdam (HRB 14098 P), was renamed "Wirecard AG" on 21 January 2002, took the name Wirecard Technologies AG on 17 December 2004 and has had its seat in Aschheim since 11 April 2011. 7

qualification
The 2002 name "Wirecard AG" belonged to this predecessor of Wirecard Technologies GmbH, not to the listed parent company, which was then called InfoGenie Europe AG and later Wire Card AG.

documentedThe 2019 bond prospectus describes Wirecard Technologies GmbH as a subsidiary of Wirecard AG and an intermediate holding company within the group, parent of Wirecard Issuing Technologies GmbH and Wirecard Acceptance Technologies GmbH among others. It names Wirecard AG as its sole shareholder, gives its share capital as EUR 1,101,000 and EY as auditor of its 2017 and 2018 accounts. 7

documentedWirecard Technologies GmbH's register shows that, as Wirecard Technologies AG, it concluded a profit-transfer agreement on 19 July 2005 with Wire Card AG (Berlin, HRB 88060) and a control agreement on 7 May 2008 with Wirecard AG (Grasbrunn, HRB 169227). Both were terminated at the end of 2018; a new profit-transfer agreement of 11 December 2018 ended by termination on 20 August 2020. 15 11

documentedAccording to the 2019 bond prospectus, CardSystems Middle East FZ-LLC (Dubai) was an indirect subsidiary of Wirecard AG wholly owned by Wirecard Technologies GmbH. It operated in the group's Asia-Pacific region and cooperated with banks and financial service providers so that it could offer acquiring and issuing services where Wirecard could not use its own licence. 7

documentedWirecard Processing FZ LLC (Dubai) was a wholly owned direct subsidiary of Wirecard AG; according to the 2019 bond prospectus its directors were Oliver Bellenhaus and Susanne Steidl. 7

documentedRegister entries show Wirecard Issuing Technologies GmbH (HRB 235570, partnership agreement of 24 August 2017, registered 2 September 2017), Wirecard Acceptance Technologies GmbH (HRB 238107, agreement of 6 December 2017, registered 10 January 2018) and Wirecard Service Technologies GmbH (HRB 238150, agreement of 6 December 2017, registered 12 January 2018), each with share capital of EUR 25,000 at Einsteinring 35 in Aschheim, developing payment, risk and cash-management applications. 16 17 18

documentedWirecard Acquiring & Issuing GmbH (Munich HRB 156848, capital EUR 25,000) was registered on 15 April 2005 as the shelf company Blitz 05-059 GmbH. On 2 June 2005 its shareholders renamed it Wire Card Beteiligungs GmbH, moved it to Grasbrunn and gave it the purpose of acquiring and managing holdings; on 10 May 2012 it was renamed Wirecard Acquiring & Issuing GmbH. 19

documentedWire Card Beteiligungs GmbH, later Wirecard Acquiring & Issuing GmbH, concluded a control and profit-transfer agreement with Wirecard AG as the controlling company on 10 May 2012, approved by its shareholders on 26 June 2012; the agreement ended by termination with effect from 20 August 2020. 19 11

documentedClick2Pay GmbH (Munich HRB 149001) was registered on 1 September 2003 as Matterhorn 291. V V GmbH and later moved as Click2Pay GmbH to Hallbergmoos, Grasbrunn and Aschheim. Its control and profit-transfer agreement of 28 May 2004 with InfoGenie Europe AG, renamed Wirecard AG, ended by termination on 10 September 2020. 20 11

documentedWirecard Global Sales GmbH (HRB 223366) was founded by a partnership agreement of 15 January 2016 as Wirecard Sales Europe GmbH, a holding company for interests in payment-system companies with share capital of EUR 50,000 at Einsteinring 35, Aschheim; a shareholders' resolution of 18 January 2016, registered on 22 July 2016, renamed it Wirecard Global Sales GmbH. 21

documentedWirecard Communication Services GmbH (Leipzig HRB 24925, capital EUR 30,400) provides communication and call-centre services. It was founded on 7 May 2003 as United Data GmbH in Berlin and moved its seat from Berlin (Charlottenburg HRB 107756 B) to Leipzig by a shareholders' resolution of 22 January 2009; a register database shows it in liquidation. 22 23

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  3. ESMA fast-track peer review on the application of the guidelines on the enforcement of financial information by BaFin and FREP in the context of Wirecard European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) · 3 Nov 2020
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4Wirecard's management and supervisory boards

documentedThe first entry for Wirecard AG in the Munich register (6 August 2007) names Dr. Markus Braun, Rüdiger Trautmann and Burkhard Ley as members of the management board (Vorstand) and grants joint power of attorney (Gesamtprokura) to Andrea Görres, Thorsten Holten, Salim Chujfi La Roche, Eric Pudewill and Jan Marsalek. 1

documentedWirecard's 2010 annual report states that Rüdiger Trautmann stepped down as sales director for personal reasons with effect from 31 January 2010 and that Jan Marsalek was appointed to the management board from 1 February 2010; the register entry of 6 May 2010 records Trautmann's departure, Marsalek's appointment and the end of Marsalek's power of attorney. 2 3

documentedThe management board named in Wirecard's 2010 annual report consisted of Burkhard Ley (chief financial officer), Dr. Markus Braun (chairman and chief technology officer) and Jan Marsalek (sales, from 1 February 2010). 2

documentedWirecard's 2011 annual report gives the board members' start dates as 1 October 2004 for Dr. Markus Braun (chairman, technology), 1 January 2006 for Burkhard Ley (finance) and 1 February 2010 for Jan Marsalek (sales). On 22 December 2011 the supervisory board reappointed all three from 1 January 2012 for three years, and their contracts were extended to 31 December 2014. 4

documentedWirecard's annual reports disclose management board pay: fixed annual salaries for 2010 of EUR 500,000 for Markus Braun, EUR 450,000 for Burkhard Ley, EUR 275,000 for Jan Marsalek and EUR 282,500 for the departed Rüdiger Trautmann, and total remuneration for 2011 of EUR 1.02 million for Braun, EUR 922,000 for Ley and EUR 703,000 for Marsalek. In the event of a change of control (30% or more of the votes), each board member was entitled to a bonus tied to the company's value: 0.4% for Braun and Ley and 0.25% for Marsalek. 2 4

documentedAt the end of 2016 Wirecard's management board consisted of Dr. Markus Braun (chairman, technology), Burkhard Ley (finance) and Jan Marsalek (sales); the supervisory board consisted of Wulf Matthias (chairman), Alfons W. Henseler (deputy), Tina Kleingarn, Stefan Klestil and Vuyiswa M'Cwabeni. Matthias was re-elected chairman on 16 June 2016, and Kleingarn and M'Cwabeni, elected when the 2016 shareholders' meeting enlarged the board, first attended its meeting of 8 September 2016. 5

documentedWirecard's 2017 annual report names Dr. Markus Braun, Burkhard Ley (finance director until 31 December 2017) and Jan Marsalek as the management board, and Wulf Matthias (chairman), Alfons W. Henseler (deputy), Tina Kleingarn, Stefan Klestil and Vuyiswa M'Cwabeni as the supervisory board; the 2018 report's remuneration table shows all five supervisory board members in office throughout 2017. 6 7

documentedThe register entry of 1 March 2018 records that Burkhard Ley left Wirecard AG's management board and that Susanne Steidl and Alexander von Knoop were appointed; Wirecard's 2019 half-year report gives 1 January 2018 as the start of their board membership. 8 9

documentedAt 31 December 2018 Wirecard's management board consisted of Dr. Markus Braun (chairman and technology), Alexander von Knoop (finance), Jan Marsalek (sales) and Susanne Steidl (products); the supervisory board consisted of Wulf Matthias (chairman), Alfons W. Henseler (deputy), Stefan Klestil, Dr. Anastassia Lauterbach, Vuyiswa M'Cwabeni and Susana Quintana-Plaza. The 2018 report states that the supervisory board extended the appointments of the long-serving chief executive Braun and chief operating officer Marsalek. 7

documentedWirecard's half-year report at 30 June 2019 lists Dr. Markus Braun (CEO), Alexander von Knoop (CFO), Jan Marsalek (COO) and Susanne Steidl (CPO) as the management board and Wulf Matthias (chairman), Stefan Klestil (deputy), Thomas Eichelmann, Dr. Anastassia Lauterbach, Vuyiswa M'Cwabeni and Susana Quintana-Plaza as the supervisory board. Alfons W. Henseler left the supervisory board on 18 June 2019, when Eichelmann joined and Klestil became deputy chairman; three supervisory board committees were set up in early 2019. All four management board members signed the report on 6 August 2019. 9

documentedWirecard's September 2019 bond prospectus lists, for the supervisory board chairman Wulf Matthias, membership of the board of administration of Deufol SE and the chair of Wirecard Bank AG's supervisory board, and for the deputy chairman Stefan Klestil a partnership at Speedinvest GmbH (Vienna), the post of managing director of Belview Partners GmbH and membership of Wirecard Bank AG's supervisory board. It lists Thomas Eichelmann, Vuyiswa M'Cwabeni, Dr. Anastassia Lauterbach and Susana Quintana-Plaza as the other members. 10

documentedWirecard's 2011 annual report lists Wulf Matthias as supervisory board chairman and managing director of Bank Sarasin AG in Frankfurt, also sitting on the supervisory boards of Wirecard Bank AG, Wirecard Technologies AG and Deufol AG; Alfons W. Henseler as deputy chairman, an independent consultant also on the boards of Wirecard Bank AG, Wirecard Technologies AG and Diamos AG; and Stefan Klestil as managing director and owner of Belview Partners GmbH. 4

documentedWirecard's related-party disclosure for 2018 states that supervisory board members Wulf Matthias, Stefan Klestil and Alfons W. Henseler also sat on the supervisory board of the subsidiary Wirecard Bank AG, for which the group recorded an expense of EUR 0.1 million each. 7

documentedInvestor-database profiles state that Wulf Matthias chaired the supervisory board of Wirecard Bank AG and had earlier been a supervisory board member of Wirecard Technologies GmbH; that Henseler sat on the supervisory board of WDB Abwicklungs AG (the former Wirecard Bank AG) and earlier on those of Wirecard Technologies GmbH and Wirecard Sales International Holding GmbH; and that Stefan Klestil sat on the boards of Wirecard AG and Wirecard Bank AG and had earlier been a supervisory board member of Trustpay International AG and Wirecard Technologies GmbH. 11 12 13

documentedThe Bundestag reported that Tina Kleingarn told its third committee of inquiry on 19 November 2020 that she had sat on Wirecard's supervisory board in 2016–2017 and left it in protest against an opaque corporate culture, explaining her departure in a letter to the remaining members. According to her, Markus Braun brought new management board members in without effective involvement of the supervisory board, and the management board resisted effective oversight and withheld information the supervisory board needed. 14

documentedAn investor database records that Susana Quintana-Plaza's term on Wirecard AG's supervisory board ended on 6 April 2020. 15

documentedAn investor database lists Dr. Anastassia Lauterbach as a former supervisory board member of Wirecard AG; Wirecard's 2019 prospectus lists her other positions at the time as CEO of Lauterbach Consulting and Venturing GmbH, non-executive director of easyJet plc and of Dun & Bradstreet Corp., and chair of censhare AG. 10

documentedOn 18 June 2020 Wirecard announced that its supervisory board had suspended Jan Marsalek as a member of the management board with immediate effect, on a revocable basis, until 30 June 2020, and had appointed Dr. James H. Freis, Jr. to the board with immediate effect, earlier than the 1 July 2020 date announced on 8 May 2020, to head a newly created Integrity, Legal and Compliance department. 16

documentedWirecard announced on 30 June 2020 that Dr. Markus Braun had resigned from the management board by mutual consent with immediate effect on 19 June 2020 and that the supervisory board had terminated his employment contract with immediate effect. 17

documentedThe register entry of 1 July 2020 records that Dr. Markus Braun and Jan Marsalek left Wirecard AG's management board, that James H. Freis, Jr. (Washington DC) was appointed with sole power of representation, and that Stephan Freiherr von Erffa's power of attorney ended. A registry aggregator shows Wirecard AG as the only German company linked to Freis. 8

documentedThe register entry recording the opening of insolvency proceedings over Wirecard AG states that the powers of attorney of Andrea Görres and Thorsten Holten lapsed as a result, and that the power of attorney of Daniel Steinhoff also ended. 8

documentedA registry aggregator lists Christian von Hammel-Bonten among the holders of joint power of attorney of Wirecard AG, together with Thorsten Holten, Eric Pudewill, Jan Marsalek, Salim Chujfi La Roche, Andrea Görres, Stephan Freiherr von Erffa and Daniel Steinhoff, without the dates on which the powers ended. 18

documentedWhen the shelf company Blitz 05-059 GmbH became Wire Card Beteiligungs GmbH in June 2005, its first managing director Nicole Liebera left and Dr. Markus Braun was appointed sole managing director with power of sole representation. 19

documentedRegister entries for Wirecard Acquiring & Issuing GmbH show that Markus Braun left as managing director on 10 April 2013, when Oliver Bellenhaus, Andrea Görres, Burkhard Ley and Susanne Steidl were appointed; Ley left on 26 January 2018 and Alexander von Knoop was appointed; Bellenhaus and von Knoop left on 20 August 2020, when von Erffa's power of attorney also ended; and on 2 September 2020 Görres and Steidl left and the lawyer Dr. Christoph Schotte became sole managing director, while the powers of attorney of Thorsten Holten and Daniel Steinhoff ended. 19

documentedThe first register entry for Trustpay International GmbH (25 August 2010), later Wirecard Sales International Holding GmbH, names Jan Marsalek as sole managing director and Stephan Freiherr von Erffa, Andrea Görres and Thorsten Holten as joint authorised signatories. On 25 August 2016 Holten (replacing his power of attorney) and Brigitte Häuser-Axtner were appointed managing directors; on 14 July 2020 Häuser-Axtner and Marsalek left and von Erffa's power of attorney ended. The 2019 bond prospectus lists Marsalek, Holten and Häuser-Axtner as managing directors. 20 10

documentedThe first register entry for Wirecard Sales Europe GmbH, later Wirecard Global Sales GmbH, names Thorsten Holten, Brigitte Häuser-Axtner and Jan Marsalek as managing directors, with joint powers of attorney for Stephan Freiherr von Erffa and Andrea Görres; on 30 June 2020 Häuser-Axtner and Marsalek left and von Erffa's power of attorney ended. 21

documentedThe first register entry for Wirecard Technologies GmbH (14 August 2012) names Burkhard Ley, Jan Marsalek and Dr. Markus Braun as managing directors and Michael Brinkmann, Stephan Freiherr von Erffa, Andrea Görres and Thorsten Holten as joint authorised signatories. On 5 December 2012 Ley and Marsalek left and Carlos Häuser, Jörg Möller and von Erffa became managing directors; Susanne Steidl followed on 7 November 2017; Häuser left on 27 January 2018, Braun and von Erffa on 30 June 2020 and Möller on 3 October 2020. The 2019 bond prospectus lists Braun, Möller, von Erffa and Steidl as managing directors. 22 10

documentedClick2Pay GmbH was dissolved by a register entry of 30 October 2019 naming Daniel Heuser and Jan Marsalek as liquidators and Andrea Görres and Thorsten Holten as joint authorised signatories; Marsalek ceased to be a liquidator with an entry of 18 July 2020, and on 2 March 2021 TEAM TREUHAND GmbH (Munich HRB 152237) replaced Heuser as liquidator. 23

documentedWirecard Communication Services GmbH's first Leipzig register entry (30 March 2009) names Heiner Bauer, Markus Plänitz and Dr. Markus Braun as managing directors. Braun left on 1 March 2010 and Michael Brinkmann took his place; Plänitz left with entry no. 9 of 15 May 2018, when Amra Blume was appointed; Brinkmann left with an entry of 11 August 2020, leaving Blume as managing director. A register database also lists Bettina Funk as a managing director until 6 July 2020. 1 24 25 26 27 28

documentedThe three subsidiaries founded in 2017–2018 had small management teams. Wirecard Acceptance Technologies GmbH started with Stefan Buck, Sreelekha Sankar and Susanne Steidl as managing directors, and Buck left on 25 October 2019; Wirecard Issuing Technologies GmbH started with Sebastian Krahe, Sankar and Steidl, and managing director Arne Matthias left on 25 October 2019; Wirecard Service Technologies GmbH started with Yiannakis Ioannou and Steidl, Tom Schmidt was appointed on 16 May 2019, Ioannou left on 12 September 2019 and Thomas Neeff, also a managing director, left as well. Stephan Freiherr von Erffa, Andrea Görres and Thorsten Holten held joint powers of attorney, and Daniel Steinhoff received one on 25 October 2019. 29 30 31

documentedThe 2019 bond prospectus names Jan Marsalek, Alan White (also company secretary), Helen Margaret Meehan and Markus-Konrad Fuchs as directors of Wirecard Payment Solutions Holdings Limited (Dublin). 10

documentedThe 2019 bond prospectus names Jan Marsalek and Oliver Bellenhaus as directors of CardSystems Middle East FZ-LLC (Dubai Media City) and Bellenhaus as the general manager who ran its business day to day; Wirecard Processing FZ LLC in Dubai had Bellenhaus and Susanne Steidl as directors and Nabila Nouinou as general manager. 10

documentedThe UK companies register lists Oliver Bellenhaus (13 February 2012 to 30 June 2020), Burkhard Ley (13 February 2012 to 31 December 2017) and Alexander von Knoop (1 January 2018 to 6 July 2020) as former directors of Wirecard Card Solutions Limited (company 07875693), and Thomas Michael Richard Jennings (since 8 December 2011) and Andrea Farace (since 19 August 2020) as its current directors; the company is in liquidation. 32 33 34

qualification
A registry aggregator gives slightly different dates for the changes of 2018 and 2020, based on publication dates.

documentedRegister publications summarised by an aggregator show Alexander von Knoop at Wirecard Bank AG (now WDB Abwicklungs AG) as an authorised signatory from 10 March 2010, a management board member from an entry of 31 January 2014 and leaving the board with an entry of 9 July 2020; Burkhard Ley left the bank's management board with a publication of 3 January 2018, when Daniel Heuser was appointed. 35 36

documentedA registry aggregator shows Alexander von Knoop on the board of directors of Wirecard Luxembourg S.A. (RCS B229425, registered on 14 November 2018), leaving together with Thomas Jennings in a publication of 28 August 2020. 35

attributedA technology news site described supervisory board deputy chairman Stefan Klestil on 23 July 2020 as a partner of the Vienna venture capital firm Speedinvest, responsible for investments such as Iyzico, Curve, Payworks, Wefox, Billie and Fincompare, a co-founder of Fintech Austria, a member of the Austrian government's fintech advisory council and the first investor in N26; it reported that Markus Braun had brought him onto the board many years earlier. Wirecard's 2019 half-year report lists board mandates at Wirecard Bank AG, Billie, Curve, Iyzico, N26 Bank, N26, Payworks, wefox and FinCompare for the member who became deputy chairman on 18 June 2019. 37 9 38

qualification
In the half-year report the mandate list is printed without the member's name; it is attributed to Klestil from its position and its match with the published profile.
response
Asked for an interview, Klestil replied through a representative that only the chairman spoke for the supervisory board and that he, like the whole board, was doing everything to help clarify all open questions about Wirecard's accounts.
outcome
In 2024 the Munich I regional court dismissed the insolvency administrator's damages claim against him: it found that he had neglected his supervisory duties but doubted that proper supervision would have changed the management board's conduct; no criminal offence is alleged against him.

sources in this section

  1. Corporate registry source · src-006 identified by category only · Corporate registry
  2. Company statement source · src-023 identified by category only · Company statement
  3. Corporate registry source · src-007 identified by category only · Corporate registry
  4. Company statement source · src-010 identified by category only · Company statement
  5. Company statement source · src-032 identified by category only · Company statement
  6. Company statement source · src-020 identified by category only · Company statement
  7. Company statement source · src-005 identified by category only · Company statement
  8. Corporate registry source · src-002 identified by category only · Corporate registry
  9. Company statement source · src-066 identified by category only · Company statement
  10. Company statement source · src-012 identified by category only · Company statement
  11. Other source · src-097 identified by category only · Other
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  14. Bundestag text archive: third committee of inquiry hears Markus Braun and other witnesses German Bundestag · 19 Nov 2020
  15. Other source · src-099 identified by category only · Other
  16. Company statement source · src-040 identified by category only · Company statement
  17. Company statement source · src-048 identified by category only · Company statement
  18. Corporate registry source · src-033 identified by category only · Corporate registry
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  29. Corporate registry source · src-041 identified by category only · Corporate registry
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  32. Companies House: officers of Wirecard Card Solutions Limited (07875693) Companies House
  33. Companies House: appointments of Andrea Farace Companies House
  34. Companies House: appointments of Thomas Michael Richard Jennings Companies House
  35. Corporate registry source · src-065 identified by category only · Corporate registry
  36. Corporate registry source · src-080 identified by category only · Corporate registry
  37. Media source · src-082 identified by category only · Media
  38. Media source · src-062 identified by category only · Media

5Wirecard's shareholders, reported results and financing

documentedWirecard's 2010 annual report records that MB Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH held 7.60% of Wirecard AG's shares and that its managing director was Dr. Markus Braun, chairman of Wirecard AG's management board. 1

documentedShareholders with more than 3% of the votes at 31 December 2011 were MB Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH (7.60%), Jupiter Asset Management Ltd. (6.26%), Alken Fund Sicav (5.00%), Wasatch Holdings (3.10%), Columbia Wanger AM (3.08%) and Ameriprise Financial (3.04%); the free float was 92.4%. 2

documentedWirecard's annual reports show MB Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH with 7.0% of the shares at the end of 2016 and 2017. Other holders above 3% at 31 December 2016 included Jupiter Asset Management (6.27%), Alken Luxembourg (5.44%), Citigroup (5.06%) and Artisan Partners (5.01%); at 31 December 2017 they included Jupiter (6.27%), BlackRock (5.12%), Artisan Partners (4.99%), Citigroup (4.93%) and Alken Luxembourg (4.92%). 3 4

documentedAt 31 December 2018 MB Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH held 7.05% of Wirecard AG and the free float was 92.95%, including BlackRock Inc (6.7%), Jupiter Asset Management Ltd. (5.1%), Citigroup Inc (4.93%) and Artisan Partners Asset Management Inc. (3.0%). The shares were no-par bearer shares (ISIN DE0007472060, WKN 747206), listed since 25 October 2000. 5

documentedVoting-rights notifications listed in Wirecard's half-year report at 30 June 2019 show MB Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH with 7.05%, BlackRock 5.77%, Artisan Partners 5.24%, Jupiter Asset Management 5.00%, Citigroup 4.93% and Goldman Sachs 3.53%. The September 2019 bond prospectus gives the position at 31 August 2019 as MB Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH, attributed to Markus Braun, 8.04%, BlackRock 5.82%, Artisan 5.24%, Jupiter Fund Management plc 5.00%, Citigroup 4.93% and Goldman Sachs 3.53%. 6 7

documentedWirecard's 2011 annual report says the group's interest-bearing bank liabilities rose by EUR 64.0 million to EUR 86.0 million after being moved in the second quarter of 2011 into a long-term framework loan for completed and potential acquisitions; a further EUR 17.1 million was used as guarantee facilities. 2

documentedWirecard AG reported a firm credit line with a bank consortium of EUR 1,000 million in its 2017 annual report and of EUR 1,905.6 million in its 2018 report; each consortium member could cancel its share and demand repayment on a change of control. The banks are not named in those passages. 4 5

documentedAccording to the 2019 bond prospectus, Wirecard AG was the borrower under a EUR 1,750 million syndicated revolving credit facility dated 15 June 2018, guaranteed by four subsidiaries, with ABN Amro Bank N.V., Commerzbank AG, ING Bank (a branch of ING-DiBa AG) and Landesbank Baden-Württemberg as mandated lead arrangers and Commerzbank as agent. 7

documentedWirecard's 2018 annual report states that commercial banks had lent the group EUR 1,466.1 million at 31 December 2018 at interest rates between 0.85% and 3.10%, without naming the banks; Wirecard AG's own bank liabilities rose from EUR 1,075.1 million to EUR 1,455.3 million in 2018, which the company linked to acquisitions of companies and customer portfolios. 5

documentedWirecard's unaudited half-year report for 2019 states that interest-bearing liabilities rose by EUR 251.6 million to EUR 1,717.6 million at 30 June 2019, citing acquisitions, digital lending and licences in Asia and the United States, with bank credit commitments of EUR 1,898.3 million in total; long-term interest-bearing liabilities rose by EUR 245.9 million to EUR 1,594.6 million. 6

documentedIn September 2019 Wirecard AG issued EUR 500 million of 0.50% notes due 2024 (ISIN DE000A2YNQ58), unconditionally and jointly guaranteed by Wirecard Technologies GmbH, Wirecard Sales International Holding GmbH, Wirecard Payment Solutions Holdings Limited, CardSystems Middle East FZ-LLC and Wirecard Processing FZ-LLC. The bond initially carried a Moody's Baa3 investment-grade rating, withdrawn on 22 June 2020, and was listed on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange's Euro MTF. 7 8

documentedThe cover of the 2019 bond prospectus names Crédit Agricole CIB, ABN AMRO and Credit Suisse as joint global coordinators and Deutsche Bank, ING, Citigroup and Lloyds Bank Corporate Markets Wertpapierhandelsbank as joint bookrunners. 7

documentedAfter the 2018 reporting date Wirecard AG signed a binding memorandum of understanding with SoftBank Group Corp. under which a SoftBank group company would invest about EUR 900 million through a convertible bond, together with a strategic partnership in digital payments aimed at Japan and South Korea. The 2019 prospectus records a binding term sheet of 24 April 2019 for five-year convertible bonds 2019/2024 convertible into up to 6,923,076 shares at EUR 130, approved by the shareholders' meeting on 18 June 2019; the bonds are unsecured, unsubordinated and carry 1.90% interest. 5 7

documentedThe convertible bond of EUR 900 million due 2 October 2024 (ISIN DE000A2R76L7) was issued by WD Invest S.à r.l., formerly Luxembourg Investment Company 326 S.à r.l. (RCS B237265; LEI 52990062BWDZT8AJSS21 according to a registry aggregator), and guaranteed by Wirecard AG; a list of deliverable obligations drawn up by a credit-derivatives determinations committee on 18 July 2020 includes both this bond and Wirecard AG's EUR 500 million 0.5% notes. 9 10

documentedLuxembourg register publications summarised by an aggregator show that the shelf company Luxembourg Investment Company 326 S.à r.l. was registered on 23 August 2019 with Intertrust (Luxembourg) S.à r.l. as shareholder and RCS Management (Luxembourg) S.à r.l. as manager, both of which left in September 2019. Thorsten Holten (from 17 September 2019) and Stephan Freiherr von Erffa (17 September 2019 to 1 July 2020) became managers, as did Riccardo Incani and Luigi Maula (30 September 2019 to 3 July 2020). 10

documentedWirecard reported for 2010 group revenue up 19% to EUR 271.6 million and EBITDA up 21% to EUR 73.3 million, with more than 12,000 merchant customers; through the Singapore subsidiary bought in December 2009 it announced partnerships with Alipay and China UnionPay. 1

documentedWirecard reported for 2016 group revenue of EUR 1,028.4 million (2015: EUR 771.3 million), EBITDA of EUR 307.4 million, net profit of EUR 266.7 million, equity of EUR 1,475.0 million and total assets of EUR 3,482.1 million. 3

documentedWirecard reported cash and cash equivalents of EUR 2,719.8 million at 31 December 2018 (2017: EUR 1,901.3 million), including short-term customer deposits of Wirecard Bank AG and Wirecard Card Solutions Ltd., and a company-calculated net cash position of EUR 1,646.6 million (2017: EUR 848.6 million) after deducting EUR 1,263.0 million of banking customer deposits. 5

documentedWirecard's unaudited half-year report for 2019, approved by the management board on 6 August 2019 and neither audited nor reviewed by an auditor, reported revenue of EUR 1,209.8 million (first half 2018: EUR 885.2 million), EBITDA of EUR 342.1 million, cash and cash equivalents of EUR 3,047.7 million and total assets of EUR 6,697.6 million at 30 June 2019; Asia-Pacific revenue (EUR 609.4 million) exceeded Europe's (EUR 580.3 million) for the first time. 6

documentedThe notes to the 2019 half-year report show that the group's cash of EUR 3,047.7 million at 30 June 2019 included EUR 1,559.1 million of banking customer deposits and EUR 346.9 million of Wirecard Bank's acquiring funds; unused bank credit lines amounted to EUR 291.6 million. 6

documentedThe 2019 half-year report records financing agreements, including with sales partners, of EUR 132.4 million and banking receivables, mainly from fintech customers, of EUR 107.0 million among other financial assets, and shows legal and reporting costs rising from EUR 6.3 million to EUR 20.9 million and consulting costs from EUR 13.4 million to EUR 20.8 million, which the company attributed to the investigations in Asia. 6

documentedThe shareholders' meeting of 18 June 2019 resolved a dividend for 2018 of EUR 24.71 million, EUR 0.20 per share, from profit of EUR 167.83 million on 123,565,586 shares; for 2016 the supervisory board had proposed EUR 0.16 per share. 6

attributedAccording to the investigation summarised by Germany's Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), banks in Germany and Japan and other investors misled by false financial statements lent Wirecard AG about EUR 3.2 billion in loans and similar funds, which were probably largely lost in the insolvency. 11

qualification
The figure and its characterisation are the prosecution's account in a wanted notice, not a court finding.

documentedWirecard warned in an ad hoc announcement of 18 June 2020 that loans of about EUR 2 billion could be terminated if audited annual and consolidated accounts for 2019 were not presented by 19 June 2020; on 25 June 2020 it stated that without agreement with lenders loans of EUR 800 million could be terminated on 30 June 2020 and EUR 500 million on 1 July 2020. A European Parliament briefing notes that the consortium reportedly included Commerzbank, LBBW and ING. 12 8

documentedA news agency report of 6 July 2020 stated that Wirecard's creditors' committee represented the lending banks through ING and LBBW, bondholders through a law firm appointed by Cyrus Capital and other security holders through a firm called Tilp, and that the company owed creditors about EUR 4 billion. 13

documentedAccording to the consolidated balance sheet at 31 December 2015 reproduced in the special investigators' report, Wirecard reported cash and cash equivalents of EUR 1,062.968 million, receivables from the acquiring business of EUR 334.055 million and total assets of EUR 2,935.501 million. 14

sources in this section

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  2. Company statement source · src-010 identified by category only · Company statement
  3. Company statement source · src-032 identified by category only · Company statement
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  7. Company statement source · src-012 identified by category only · Company statement
  8. European Parliament briefing: Banking Union – Wirecard European Parliament (Directorate-General for Internal Policies) · Jun 2020
  9. Other source · src-022 identified by category only · Other
  10. Corporate registry source · src-021 identified by category only · Corporate registry
  11. Wanted notice: Jan Marsalek (Wirecard) Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA)
  12. Company statement source · src-024 identified by category only · Company statement
  13. Media source · src-094 identified by category only · Media
  14. Research source · src-027 identified by category only · Research

6Markus Braun

documentedWirecard's 2011 annual report discloses that Wirecard AG had lent money to MB Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH, whose sole shareholder was management board member Dr. Markus Braun: the loan stood at EUR 235,000 at 31 December 2010, peaked at EUR 241,000 during 2011 and was fully repaid in 2011. 1

documentedMB Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH was registered in Munich under HRB 152399 on 11 May 2004 with capital of EUR 25,000; it was later deleted from the Munich register after moving its seat to Limburg an der Lahn, where an aggregator shows it under HRB 6968 with the Legal Entity Identifier 529900W00T44TXFNWF20. A subsidiary's register page lists it at Einsteinring 35 in Aschheim, Wirecard AG's address until 2022. 2 3 4

documentedMB Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH secured loans with private assets of Markus Braun. By order of 21 February 2024 (9 IN 20/24) the Limburg an der Lahn local court ordered provisional administration of its assets, appointed the lawyer Carsten Koch as provisional insolvency administrator and imposed a general prohibition on disposals. In the suspended suits against it, claimants seek damages on the ground that the company, acting through Braun as its then managing director, unlawfully helped to put his assets beyond the reach of his creditors. A registry aggregator records a liquidation entry of 25 June 2024 and an update of the insolvency proceedings on 8 May 2026. 5 4

qualification
The claim that the company helped shield Braun's assets is the claimants' allegation as summarised by the court.

documentedOn 9 June 2022 the 5th commercial chamber of the Munich I regional court confirmed an attachment order (Arrest) of EUR 140 million against Markus Braun (5 HK O 17659/21). According to the court in January 2023, the main action relating to the attachment (5 HK O 17452/21) was pending, already ran to more than 1,000 pages and was not expected to reach an oral hearing before autumn 2023. 6

attributedAccording to a press report of 14 July 2020, a BaFin spokesperson said the authority had filed a criminal complaint with the Munich public prosecutor against MB Beteiligungsgesellschaft, the company behind Braun, over the sale of Wirecard shares for EUR 6.6 million on 24 June 2020, the day before the insolvency filing; further sales of EUR 3.4 million two days earlier were still under review. Braun had sold most of his 8% stake on 18 and 19 June for EUR 155 million; BaFin said these sales would also be examined for possible insider trading. Braun had been released from custody on 22 June 2020 on bail of EUR 5 million. 7

qualification
A complaint and an examination, not a finding; the record contains no outcome of the insider-trading review.
response
According to the report, it was said at the time that he had to sell the shares to meet lenders' margin calls after the share price collapse.

attributedA press report of 1 July 2020 stated that Braun had pledged real estate, including a villa in Kitzbühel worth millions. 8

qualification
Press report; the record does not say to whom the property was pledged.

attributedThe same report, citing a newspaper, said that Wirecard Bank had granted Markus Braun a loan early in 2020, reportedly of EUR 35 million, approved according to that newspaper by the supervisory board on which Klestil sat; the supervisory board said it had not known of the loan. 9

qualification
Second-hand press account of a rumoured amount; the record contains no bank or court document on the loan.
response
The supervisory board stated that it had not known of the loan.

sources in this section

  1. Company statement source · src-010 identified by category only · Company statement
  2. Corporate registry source · src-017 identified by category only · Corporate registry
  3. Corporate registry source · src-016 identified by category only · Corporate registry
  4. Corporate registry source · src-091 identified by category only · Corporate registry
  5. Court record source · src-102 identified by category only · Court record
  6. Munich I regional court: press release 03/2023 on the Wirecard complex Munich I Regional Court (Bavarian State Ministry of Justice portal) · 27 Jan 2023
  7. Media source · src-063 identified by category only · Media
  8. Media source · src-034 identified by category only · Media
  9. Media source · src-082 identified by category only · Media

7Third-party acquiring: Wirecard's partner business

documentedWirecard's 2017 annual report states that Wirecard UK & Ireland Ltd., Wirecard Brasil S.A., cardSystems Middle East FZ-LLC (Dubai) and many East Asian subsidiaries worked with various banks and financial service providers so that they could offer acquiring and issuing services where Wirecard could not use its own licence, and that the network of these acquiring partners was expanded by the 2017 purchases from Citigroup; the partners are not named. 1

documentedWirecard's 2018 annual report explains that when another bank, an external acquiring partner, processed transactions, the partner recorded the payment volumes and Wirecard showed as acquiring receivables only its commissions and rolling security reserves. Its risk report states that most receivables arose from acquiring, that Wirecard bore the main opportunities and risks whether transactions ran through the group's licensed acquirers or external acquiring partners, and that Wirecard Bank AG in some cases lent to strategic partners. 2

documentedThe 2018 annual report says that volumes in the Payment Processing & Risk Management segment increasingly ran through a "technical acquiring model" and third-party banks, and that outside the European licensing area acquiring was offered through BIN-sponsorship models with third-party banks, which it does not name. 2

documentedThe special investigators appointed by the Bundestag's third committee of inquiry examined the audits of Wirecard AG's annual and consolidated accounts for 2014 to 2018, with emphasis on 2014–2016, and where necessary the internal IFRS reporting packages of CardSystems Middle East FZ-LLC, Wirecard Technologies GmbH, Wirecard UK & Ireland Ltd. and Wirecard Bank AG, using EY's electronic working papers; their report was delivered on 16 April 2021. 3

documentedThe special investigators describe two business models at Wirecard: an own business covering the whole payment chain with the group's own acquiring bank, Wirecard Bank, and third-party acquiring (TPA), in which the payment process and the acquiring bank's services were outsourced to three partners, Al Alam, PayEasy and Senjo, which used other acquiring banks and alone held contracts with the merchants, while Wirecard kept customer acquisition and support. 3

documentedAccording to EY's working papers as summarised by the special investigators, certain merchant groups (adult content and dating, gambling and gaming, multi-level marketing, pharmacy, health and beauty) were moved to the third-party acquirers because they were no longer to be processed on Wirecard's platform or because Wirecard Bank AG had no acquiring licence for the merchants' countries; from Wirecard's point of view the third-party acquirer acted as an outsourcing provider. 3

documentedThe TPA business rested on reseller agreements which, according to EY's notes, were identical for Al Alam, PayEasy and Senjo: Wirecard earned a commission for referring merchants, payable six to nine months later, and deposited cash collateral with the partners, in Al Alam's case first EUR 10 million and later up to EUR 20 million. Wirecard also indemnified the partners against liability and losses not caused by their own technical errors and had to provide a second security, a rolling 12-month reserve on transaction volumes with long-term risk exposure such as subscriptions. 3

attributedThe special investigators found that Wirecard's actual settlement practice departed considerably from the reseller agreements: receivables from the partners were not paid after six to nine months but "reclassified", by agreement between Wirecard and the partner, into claims arising from security deposits, so that with fast-growing high-risk business the partners paid Wirecard little or nothing and receivables and reserves kept accumulating, while no claims were ever made on these securities. The safekeeping of funds at the partners was monitored through meetings between the management board and the partners' management without formal documentation. 3

qualification
This is the special investigators' evaluation of EY's audit files for the parliamentary committee, not a court finding.

attributedAccording to the special investigators, EY's concurrence memorandum of 3 March 2016 gave as the essential business reason for the TPA business the legal carving-out of critical transactions (adult entertainment, gambling, food supplements) and circumvention of Visa and Mastercard rules and Wirecard Bank's internal rules. They note that the transfer of merchants to the third-party acquirers was documented close to the entry into force of the EU payment services directive, that Wirecard had contracts neither with the acquiring banks nor with the merchants, and that the extended liability for residual risks served the accounting purpose of showing revenue and costs gross. 3

qualification
These are the special investigators' reading and evaluation of EY's working papers; the underlying description came from Wirecard's management.

attributedThe special investigators state that Wirecard recorded the TPA business gross in its income statement but received money only net, so that on 2015 figures about 27% of group revenue and about 51% of the cost of materials were non-cash transactions, a fact not disclosed in the notes to the 2015 consolidated accounts. 3

qualification
Calculation and evaluation by the special investigators from EY's working papers.

documentedA table of key figures compiled by the special investigators from Wirecard's consolidated accounts and EY's working papers shows TPA revenue rising from EUR 308 million (2014) to EUR 376 million (2015), EUR 541 million (2016), EUR 727 million (2017) and EUR 1,034 million (2018), against group revenue of EUR 2,016 million in 2018; escrow balances included in cash rose from EUR 114 million (2015) to EUR 348 million, EUR 662 million and EUR 976 million (2018), against group cash of EUR 2,720 million in 2018, and merchant cash advance loans of EUR 250 million appear for 2018. 3

documentedThe special investigators calculate that in 2014 the TPA business accounted for half of Wirecard's revenue (EUR 308.5 million of EUR 601.0 million), about two thirds of receivables (EUR 229.5 million) and three quarters of EBITDA (EUR 132.7 million of EUR 172.3 million), and in 2015 for EUR 375.8 million of EUR 771.3 million revenue (48.7%) and EUR 164.0 million or 72.2% of group EBITDA; the sections of the 2015 group management report on the business model never named the TPA business explicitly. 3

attributedThe special investigators report that receivables from PayEasy, Al Alam and Senjo Group (formerly Rising Sun), claims on escrow accounts and merchant cash advance loans grew steadily from 2014 to a total of EUR 1,465.5 million at the end of 2018, that individual TPA transactions could not be traced from origination to payment in Wirecard's accounting, and that EY's 2018 group audit report did not mention bookkeeping deficiencies in the TPA business. 3

qualification
Evaluation by the special investigators of EY's audit files.

attributedThe special investigators found that Wirecard kept permanent cash collateral of EUR 15–20 million with PayEasy and Al Alam although the acquirer was already protected by four lines of security, that an increase of PayEasy's collateral to EUR 50 million was agreed in 2016, and that Wirecard financed growing collateral, including EUR 14.5 million paid to PayEasy Solutions Inc., from its own and borrowed funds while the partners' payments were small relative to turnover and arrived only net; the report calls this economically very unusual. 3

qualification
Evaluation by the special investigators; EY did not perform analytical procedures on these payment flows.

documentedAccording to the special investigators, the partners' payments did not refer to invoices and some came from unknown third parties: on 30 December 2014 Ressource Management Systems Pte. (Singapore) paid EUR 23.0 million into an account at Wirecard Bank with the reference "SETTL. INV PEASYGRP 02-14", which EY noted as a payment by an unknown third party without further work; in 2015 Tuscany Capital Advisors Pte. Ltd. paid EUR 10 million for Rising Sun/Senjo, and a further EUR 4.744 million came from "PayEasy Solutions LTD. 5 ECOM". Senjo's management said Tuscany belonged to the Senjo group, but Senjo's 2018 accounts do not list it as a subsidiary. 3

documentedThe special investigators found that Al Alam paid Wirecard in 2015–2017 mainly by cheques without payment references (EUR 39.9 million), drawn on accounts at Wirecard Bank (account 60757 EUR 36.3 million, account 59049 EUR 4.8 million), that on 29 December 2017 EUR 14,267,271 arrived from account 59049, and that a transaction slip for a cheque of EUR 2,997,988.82 dated 9 July 2015 named Wirecard Bank AG itself, not Al Alam, as the issuing client. Al Alam held several accounts at Wirecard Bank in Germany and used German-language cheque forms, which the report counts among signs of the partners' particular closeness to Wirecard. 3

documentedThe special investigators report that in 2018, while the TPA business grew sharply, only one payment arrived from the partners, about EUR 15 million from PayEasy in the first quarter, against receivables from PayEasy including merchant cash advances of about EUR 278 million at 31 December 2018 (EUR 207 million a year earlier); the payment was booked as a lump sum without reference to particular invoices. 3

attributedThe special investigators note that the gross margin of Wirecard Bank AG's own acquiring business fell to 10% in 2018 while the TPA business showed margins of 43–56%, although Wirecard did less of the work there, and that Wirecard's explanation that the TPA business carried high risks is contradicted by the absence of any liability claims. 3

qualification
Comparison and evaluation by the special investigators.

documentedAt 31 December 2014 receivables from PayEasy Solutions Inc. stood at EUR 62.5 million, about 18% of group receivables; revenue with PayEasy in 2014 was EUR 75.8 million (about 13% of group revenue) and EBITDA EUR 31.4 million (about 14%), according to the special investigators. 3

attributedEY's forensic team could not confirm the existence and location of PayEasy Solutions Inc. in March 2015: it was not registered with the Philippine Department of Trade and Industry, was no longer a tenant at its address in Makati, its website was down and its latest filing with the Philippine securities regulator was a general information sheet for 2011. A letter from PayEasy's financial controller of 13 March 2015 explaining the registration gaps went to Jan Marsalek, who forwarded it to Burkhard Ley, who passed it to EY; the special investigators found no check of these letters, and EY's forensic review ended without remarks before the audit opinion of 7 April 2015 despite warning signs, including two management board members personally obtaining the evidence. 3

qualification
Facts from EY's working papers and evaluation by the special investigators; the final clarification of PayEasy's status is not documented in the working papers.

attributedInstead of financial statements, EY received from PayEasy a letter of 26 March 2015 with a few figures for 2014; the special investigators calculate that PayEasy did about 57% of its 2014 business with Wirecard, or almost all of it if it also reported gross, and that Wirecard's 2014 revenue with PayEasy (EUR 75.8 million) exceeded PayEasy's own total revenue (EUR 72.2 million). PayEasy's reported revenue rose to EUR 666.1 million in 2018 with transaction volume of EUR 5,519.9 million and personnel costs of EUR 267,000, and its audited accounts (local auditor's opinion of 19 March 2019) were available to Wirecard's auditor only for 2018. 3

qualification
Figures as given in documents in EY's files; the comparison and the conclusion that the gap cannot be explained are the special investigators'.

attributedUnder the agreements PayEasy received rates of 2.15–3% plus transaction and chargeback fees and Al Alam only 2%, yet PayEasy reported much lower profit (gross margin of 0.24% in 2017); the special investigators also found personnel costs of both partners extremely small for their turnover, and that since September 2016 two registrations of PayEasy Solutions Inc. existed with the same name but different numbers and addresses. PayEasy was registered on 8 August 2011 and Al Alam Solution Provider founded in 2011/2012, close to the start of the TPA business. 3

qualification
Observations of the special investigators drawn from EY's compliance quick check and working papers.

documentedThe special investigators report that PayEasy's main merchant, Escalion, accounted for EUR 1.238 billion in the fourth quarter of 2018, 90% of PayEasy's volume, and that on 20 February 2019 EY reconciled the volume only on totals together with Oliver Bellenhaus, without checking individual transactions. For the PayEasy merchant Helix Gaming International, Wirecard's payment system showed 23,033 transactions worth EUR 742,583.92 for October 2018, while a controlling export showed 286,921 transactions worth 6,304,544.47; such order-of-magnitude differences also appeared in other months and were not investigated by the auditor. 3

attributedA credit report in EY's files showed revenue of about USD 3 million for Al Alam Solutions Provider FZ-LLC for 2016, far below the mid-three-digit million US dollar figures Al Alam reported for 2015–2018, and the registrant e-mail of Al Alam's website used a different domain. The special investigators found that EY had only preliminary estimates or forecasts from Al Alam's management for 2015–2018 and no actual accounts, that Al Alam's volumes for the first and second quarters were identical in 2016 and 2017 (EUR 866,491,337 and EUR 963,579,293), and that its gross margin rose from 20.6% (2015) to 51.0% (2018) while Wirecard Bank's acquiring margin fell; the auditor did not examine this. 3

qualification
Findings of the special investigators in EY's audit files; Al Alam's own position is not in the record.

documentedAccording to the special investigators, EY received no audited or other financial statements from the TPA partners for 2015–2017, only unverified summary figures; statements were obtained only for 2018 and only from PayEasy Solutions Inc. and Senjo Group Ltd. 3

documentedDuring the 2014 audit EY's internal forensic specialists ran compliance quick checks on Al Alam Solution Provider FZ-LLC, PayEasy Solutions Inc., Rising Sun Co. Ltd., Hamesh Ltd and Bonatal Trading Industries Ltd. 3

attributedEY's 2016 compliance check, as summarised by the special investigators, notes that leading managers of the TPA partner Senjo had earlier been business partners of Wirecard: they sold E-Creditplus Pte. Ltd. to Wirecard for EUR 12.8 million and later bought it back for a net EUR 0.1 million, which the short-seller Zatarra called roundtripping; a director of Senjo Payment Asia Pte. Ltd. had worked at Wirecard Asia Pte. Ltd.; and the secretary of Senjo Payments Asia Pte. Ltd., R. Shanmugaratnam, matched by name and document number the signatory of a trustee confirmation of 25 May 2016, which the investigators say could indicate a link between Senjo and the trustee and a conflict of interest. 3

qualification
The roundtripping label is the short-seller's; the possible link and conflict of interest are the special investigators' inference, not an established fact.

documentedAmong the annexes to the insolvency administrator's TPA report for the Bundestag committee, the special investigators list an e-mail of 2 June 2015 from Jan Marsalek asking that Senjo be supported and remarking that this would not create a competitor. 3

documentedThe special investigators report that Senjo Group bought Kalixa Payments Group Pte. Ltd. as of 1 June 2017 for EUR 29.0 million, of which EUR 25.0 million was a loan from Wirecard Bank approved by the bank in May 2017 and by Wirecard's management and supervisory boards; Senjo was the only TPA partner whose creditworthiness was checked. Wirecard Bank's auditors considered Senjo only partly able to service debt and noticed inconsistent financial information in the 2018 audit, but the group auditor did not take this into account and recorded no signs of financial problems in its TPA monitoring. 3

attributedAccording to the special investigators, Wirecard gave the auditor no external documents (accounts, credit reports, register extracts, references) on the TPA partners' financial stability; instead the auditor received memos by Jan Marsalek (COO) explaining why the partners were chosen, and Wirecard had no formalised assessment of the partners. For receivables from other debtors that were not confirmed at the end of 2014, the auditor obtained internal memos from Marsalek, while Al Alam (EUR 18.1 million), PayEasy (EUR 62.5 million) and Rising Sun (EUR 47.8 million) confirmed their balances without the slightest deviation. 3

qualification
Findings of the special investigators in EY's working papers.

documentedThe special investigators found that in the 2015 audit documentation and simple reconciliations for the TPA business were provided by senior managers: Oliver Bellenhaus as managing director of CardSystems Middle East FZ-LLC, the head of Wirecard Sales International, Jan Marsalek as chief operating officer and Stephan von Erffa as executive vice president accounting; Marsalek personally joined the auditor's enquiries, and the auditor updated its understanding of the process by interviewing Bellenhaus and the head of Wirecard Sales International. 3

attributedWith the switch to IFRS 15, Wirecard concluded new contracts with all TPA partners as of 1 January 2018: according to the special investigators' second addendum, CardSystems Middle East FZ LLC bought the e-payment platforms of Senjo Payment Asia (contract of 16 April 2018) and of Al Alam (contract of 30 July 2018), each retroactively to 1 January 2018 and each for EUR 6.5 million; the two contracts have identical technical specifications, the Al Alam contract names Senjo instead of Al Alam six times, and there is no sign that the systems were integrated into Wirecard. PayEasy's transactions were moved to Wirecard's "Elastic Engine" platform, a "liability notice" was introduced, and Wirecard could withdraw money from the trust accounts without the partners' consent. 3

qualification
The special investigators conclude that gross accounting and treatment of trust funds as cash looked formally justified from 2018, but that EY's files contain no evidence that Wirecard actually controlled the business.

attributedIn the 2018 audit EY could not perform its methodology's prescribed test of ten cash transactions at CardSystems Middle East because Wirecard's accounting could not trace TPA transactions individually. To test whether the TPA business existed it made five test purchases with Wirecard cards at the partners' merchants; on 16 February 2019 Oliver Bellenhaus, managing director of CardSystems, proposed websites for the purchases, and EY's files do not say how the merchants were chosen. The confirmation e-mail for one purchase came from an unrelated hosting address hours before the purchase recorded in the auditor's screenshots, and Bellenhaus supplied screenshots of a bitcoin purchase only on 8 April 2019. 3

qualification
Findings of the special investigators, who note that the e-mail may have been altered.

attributedESMA, drawing on Financial Times reporting, names Al Alam Solution Provider FZ LLC (Dubai), Senjo Payment Asia Pte Ltd (Singapore) and PayEasy Solution Inc. (Philippines) as the three largest TPA partners in 2018, with TPA revenue reaching the group through Cardsystems Middle East FZ LLC, Wirecard UK & Ireland Ltd. and Wirecard Technologies GmbH; Wirecard itself had stated that neither Wirecard Bank AG nor other group companies outside the EU held their own acquiring licence in the third countries concerned. 4

qualification
Attribution to the newspaper as summarised in ESMA's report.

documentedFigures from the financial reporting enforcement panel (FREP) in ESMA's report show trust account balances of EUR 849 million at 30 June 2018 and EUR 1.9 billion at 31 December 2019, which could not be verified and were most likely inaccessible; revenue with questionable TPA partners in the first half of 2018 was about EUR 460 million (51% of EUR 898 million), with gross profit of about EUR 250 million against EBITDA of EUR 245 million. 4

documentedESMA notes that Wirecard's 2014 accounts showed acquiring deposits at Wirecard Bank of EUR 240 million as a separate item, whereas the 2015 accounts no longer showed them separately. 4

documentedThe 2019 bond prospectus states that CardSystems Middle East FZ-LLC's annual accounts for 2017 and 2018 were not audited and that the company had not appointed its own auditor. 5

documentedESMA's chronology records that Wirecard's Dubai TPA partner Al Alam went into liquidation on 15 May 2020; on 18 May 2020 BaFin told the auditor oversight body about the restructuring of Wirecard's Dubai subsidiary and of Al Alam, and from that date BaFin's market-abuse team investigated whether the liquidation of CardSystems Middle East FZ-LLC and Al Alam Solutions FZ LLC was inside information Wirecard should have disclosed; BaFin received documents on Al Alam from a third-country regulator on 22 September 2020, and the investigation was not finished when ESMA reported. 4

sources in this section

  1. Company statement source · src-020 identified by category only · Company statement
  2. Company statement source · src-005 identified by category only · Company statement
  3. Research source · src-027 identified by category only · Research
  4. ESMA fast-track peer review on the application of the guidelines on the enforcement of financial information by BaFin and FREP in the context of Wirecard European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) · 3 Nov 2020
  5. Company statement source · src-012 identified by category only · Company statement

8The trust accounts and the missing EUR 1.9 billion

documentedAfter trust (escrow) accounts were set up in 2015, Citadelle Corporate Services Pte. Ltd. (Singapore) acted as trustee; according to the special investigators the trust agreement gave Wirecard no information rights such as monthly statements, bank balance confirmations or proof that the accounts had been opened, and EY requested balance confirmations from the trustee for 2015–2017. 1

attributedThe special investigators list inconsistencies in the trustee confirmations for 2015–2016, which EY did not follow up: a confirmation named Wirecard Technologies GmbH as beneficiary of account 6508 4162 0001 although CardSystems Middle East FZ-LLC had concluded the trust agreement with Al Alam; Citadelle's e-mail addresses and contact names varied (Shan Rajartnam and R. Shanmugaratanam); on 25 May 2016 a balance of EUR 41,500,000 was confirmed on Senjo's account for Al Alam with Wirecard UK & Ireland as beneficiary; and at the end of 2016 Al Alam paid EUR 80,000,000 into an escrow account. 1

qualification
Findings of the special investigators in EY's working papers; whether the confirmations reflected real balances is addressed in later records.

attributedEY's 2016 audit files contain two Citadelle confirmations dated 2 December 2016, one for EUR 97,533,053.84 at 30 November 2016 on account 6508 4162 0001 addressed to Wirecard UK & Ireland Ltd and one for EUR 84,009,703.83 at 22 November 2016 on account 6010 9797 5201 addressed to Cardsystems Middle East FZ LLC. According to the special investigators, the signature and seal were inserted electronically in both PDFs, and the stamp properties name the author "Oliver". 1

qualification
Technical findings of the special investigators on files in EY's working papers; the identity of the author named in the file properties is not established in the report.

documentedThere is no trustee confirmation at 31 December 2016 for escrow account 6010 9797 5201, only one at 22 November 2016 showing EUR 84,009,703.83; from the end of 2017 the account was no longer used as a TPA escrow account, and EY's files contain no documents on the transfer of the funds, according to the special investigators. 1

attributedFor the 2018 audit, the special investigators report, the trustee was still Citadelle; EY inspected bank statements during the trustee's visit to Aschheim on 26 March 2019 without receiving copies, and Citadelle's confirmation of 12 April 2019, received by e-mail on 11 April, named neither the account numbers nor the bank and carried a different stamp from earlier ones. The auditor did not test the plausibility of trust balances of about EUR 976 million at OCBC Bank in Singapore, sent no confirmation requests to merchants and did not test the transaction chain through the partners, so that confirmation of TPA revenue and cash rested only indirectly on confirmations from the partners and the trustee. 1

qualification
Findings and evaluation of the special investigators.

documentedAccording to the special investigators, EY's 2019 audit file very probably contains a balance confirmation from Banco de Oro (BDO Unibank) of 16 March 2020 and a confirmation and statement from Bank of the Philippine Islands of 17 March 2020 for 31 December 2019, addressed to EY; a management board decision of 20 February 2020 replacing the trustee Citadelle Corporate Services with M. K. Tolentino; EY's letter of 16 June 2020 to supervisory board chairman Thomas Eichelmann about possible irregularities; and EY's refusal of an audit opinion on the 2019 consolidated accounts. 1

documentedInsolvency administrator Dr. Michael Jaffé sent the Bundestag committee of inquiry a short statement on the existence and possible size of Wirecard AG's third-party acquiring business; its annexes, as listed by the special investigators, include a 2016 Citadelle confirmation with "obviously forged signatures". 1

documentedESMA, citing KPMG's special investigation report of 27 April 2020, states that KPMG could confirm only payments of EUR 85 million by two TPA partners to accounts of Wirecard Technologies and Cardsystems Middle East at Wirecard Bank, while Wirecard could not produce trustee statements to verify a final balance of about EUR 1 billion; unsecured credit lines of EUR 250 million ran in the opposite direction, and the subsidiaries had undertaken to compensate the TPA partners for losses, secured by withholdings or escrow accounts at the trustee. 2

documentedExtracts of the KPMG report quoted by ESMA state that statements and bank confirmations from the bank managing the trust accounts were not provided to KPMG because "Trustee 1" had ended its relationships with the Wirecard companies and did not answer enquiries. 2

attributedESMA summarises Financial Times articles of 29 March, 24 April and 20 May 2019 as reporting that half of Wirecard's worldwide revenue and almost all its profit came from three opaque partners, which in 2016 produced 95% of EBITDA and more than half of revenue, that profits were channelled mainly through CardSystems Middle East in Dubai, and that the accounts disclosed none of this. Later reporting from October 2019 said that in 2016–2017 Wirecard had routed billions of euros of payments for 34 clients through Al Alam, eight of which had ceased trading and 15 of which told the newspaper they had never heard of Al Alam, and on 9 December 2019 that EUR 334 million linked to Al Alam and held on trust accounts in 2017 had been wrongly classified as cash. 2 3

qualification
Newspaper reporting as summarised by ESMA; Wirecard systematically rejected such allegations at the time.
outcome
On 22 June 2020 Wirecard stated that there was a prevailing likelihood that the trust account balances of EUR 1.9 billion did not exist.

documentedIn an ad hoc announcement of 18 June 2020 Wirecard AG stated that its auditor Ernst & Young had informed it that sufficient audit evidence for cash balances on trust accounts of EUR 1.9 billion, about a quarter of the consolidated balance sheet total, could not be obtained, that there were indications that the trustee or the banks keeping the trust accounts had presented false balance confirmations to deceive the auditor, and that publication of the 2019 accounts was postponed. 4

documentedAccording to ESMA's chronology, EY informed Wirecard on 16 June 2020 that the banks said to hold the accounts had stated that Wirecard had presented forged balance confirmations for trust accounts of EUR 1.9 billion in the 2019 audit; the same day EY informed BaFin, which says KPMG's report had until then contained only red flags without a finding of fraud, and BaFin notified the public prosecutor on 18 June 2020. 2

documentedOn 22 June 2020 Wirecard announced that there was a prevailing likelihood that the bank balances on trust accounts of EUR 1.9 billion did not exist; ESMA records that Wirecard said the EUR 1.9 billion supposedly held on escrow accounts in the Philippines did not exist and that the auditors had not completed their opinion by the Transparency Directive deadline, and that the company filed for insolvency a week later. A European Parliament briefing notes that on 3 May 2020 Wirecard had said the KPMG report had not confirmed any of the allegations. 3 2

attributedOn 21 June 2020 the governor of the Philippine central bank, Benjamin Diokno, said initial information showed that the missing Wirecard funds (put at US$2.1 billion) had not entered the Philippine financial system and that BDO Unibank and Bank of the Philippine Islands had suffered no losses, their names having been used in an attempt to cover the perpetrators' tracks. 5

qualification
Statements of the central bank governor and the two banks as reported in the press; no court finding.
response
Both banks stated that Wirecard was not their client and that they had no business relationship with it.

attributedA European Parliament briefing states that the key question of KPMG's special audit was whether EUR 1.9 billion supposedly held in an escrow account at OCBC Bank in Singapore existed, and that KPMG's report did not clarify all questions. 3 6

qualification
The OCBC statement is known from press reporting of the administrator's information, not from a document of the bank.
response
According to a later press report citing a newspaper, OCBC told Wirecard's insolvency administrator that it had never held significant sums on behalf of the trustee and that some of the accounts had never existed.
outcome
On 22 June 2020 Wirecard stated that there was a prevailing likelihood that the trust account balances of EUR 1.9 billion did not exist.

attributedAccording to the Munich I public prosecutor's investigation as summarised in the BKA wanted notice, Jan Marsalek and Dr. Markus Braun inflated Wirecard AG's balance sheet total and revenue from no later than 2015, including fictitious revenue from payment transactions with so-called third-party acquirers; in the 2019 audit the auditor found that bank confirmations of trust accounts were forged or not genuine, and assets of EUR 1.9 billion, a quarter of the balance sheet total, did not exist. 7

qualification
Suspicion stated in a wanted notice; Braun denies the charges in the pending trial and Marsalek has not been tried.

documentedA European Parliament briefing records that KPMG began an independent special investigation of Wirecard on 31 October 2019 and reported its results on 27 April 2020, and that Wirecard AG applied for insolvency proceedings on 25 June 2020. 3

documentedIn an ad hoc announcement of 28 April 2020 Wirecard AG stated that KPMG's special investigation had found no incriminating evidence for the public allegations of balance sheet manipulation and, for the four areas examined (TPA, merchant cash advance/digital lending, India and Singapore), no findings requiring adjustment of the 2016–2018 accounts. It also said that not all data needed to prove TPA revenue for those years could be obtained because it was held by third parties, that KPMG had identified documentation and organisational weaknesses, and that publication of the annual accounts on 30 April 2020 was cancelled pending coordination with EY. 8

documentedESMA's chronology states that the KPMG report published on Wirecard's website on 28 April 2020 found the evidence insufficient to conclude either that the TPA revenue existed and was accurate or that it did not, while Wirecard said in an ad hoc announcement the same day that KPMG had found no evidence of balance-sheet manipulation. 2

documentedThe special investigators' report lists the evidence EY obtained on the TPA business: Wirecard Bank AG statements of the group companies concerned, balance confirmations from the TPA partners, unsigned Excel or PDF lists of transaction volumes, screenshots of test purchases in the partners' payment systems and, after the trust accounts were set up in 2015, trust agreements and balance confirmations from the trustee Citadelle Corporate Services Pte. Ltd. EY also made site visits to Al Alam Solution Provider Inc. in Dubai (2015), PayEasy Solutions Inc. in Manila (2016) and Senjo in Singapore (2017). 1

sources in this section

  1. Research source · src-027 identified by category only · Research
  2. ESMA fast-track peer review on the application of the guidelines on the enforcement of financial information by BaFin and FREP in the context of Wirecard European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) · 3 Nov 2020
  3. European Parliament briefing: Banking Union – Wirecard European Parliament (Directorate-General for Internal Policies) · Jun 2020
  4. Company statement source · src-024 identified by category only · Company statement
  5. Media source · src-031 identified by category only · Media
  6. Media source · src-067 identified by category only · Media
  7. Wanted notice: Jan Marsalek (Wirecard) Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA)
  8. Company statement source · src-059 identified by category only · Company statement

9EY and Wirecard: the audits from 2009 to 2019

documentedRP Richter GmbH Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft and Ernst & Young GmbH were appointed by the shareholders as joint auditors of Wirecard AG and the group for 2010; they jointly audited the 2010 individual and consolidated accounts and issued an unqualified opinion, and their fees for 2010 were EUR 455,000 (Ernst & Young) and EUR 481,000 (RP Richter). 1

documentedWirecard's 2018 annual report states that Ernst & Young GmbH Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft had audited Wirecard jointly with RP Richter GmbH from the 2009 financial year and alone from 2011, and EY's 2018 opinion states that it had served as group auditor without interruption since 2009; it was elected by the shareholders' meeting of 21 June 2018 and engaged by the supervisory board on 25 June 2018. 2

documentedA European Parliament briefing notes that Ernst & Young had itself been tasked with a special investigation into allegations of accounting manipulation at Wirecard, a mandate that enabled it to replace Wirecard's former external auditor in 2010; the briefing tabulates the auditor as RP Richter and Ernst & Young for 2010 and Ernst & Young, with unqualified opinions, for 2011–2018. The briefing also reproduces a company statement that the investor protection association Schutzgemeinschaft der Kapitalanleger e.V. (SdK) had sued in the Munich regional court to challenge the 2008 annual general meeting's discharge of the management and supervisory boards and to have the 2007 annual accounts declared void, citing alleged deficiencies; in autumn 2008 the supervisory board had Ernst & Young prepare an expert opinion, which saw no need for corrections. 3

qualification
The SdK action is described in the company's own words as reproduced in the briefing; its outcome is not in the record.

documentedErnst & Young issued unqualified opinions on Wirecard AG's accounts for 2011, signed in Munich on 16 April 2012, and for 2016, which the supervisory board approved on 5 April 2017; for 2012 the supervisory board proposed it to the shareholders' meeting as auditor again. 4 5 6

documentedThe German Finance Ministry's report to the Bundestag finance committee of July 2020 states that Wirecard AG and the group presented accounts for each financial year from 2009 to 2018 with EY's unqualified audit opinion and that none of the audits led to objections; the 2018 opinion contained a discussion of the Singapore whistleblower allegations. 7

documentedEY's opinion on the 2018 consolidated accounts was signed by Martin Dahmen, who had first signed for 2016 and was the responsible auditor from 2018, and by Andreas Budde; EY's fees were EUR 2.3 million for 2018 (EUR 2.1 million for the audit) and EUR 2.2 million for 2017. 2

documentedEY named the valuation of receivables and the recognition of revenue from acquiring partners as a key audit matter for 2018, explaining that the receivables arose from fees and commissions on transactions processed through the partners and from prefinancing of merchant payouts, and that Wirecard was treated as principal under IFRS 15 for most of them, so that revenue was shown gross. EY states that it obtained confirmation letters from the acquiring partners on the receivables and on chargebacks and fines, traced payments received from them and reconciled their settlements with transaction data, and had no objections. 2

documentedEY's 2018 opinion contains an emphasis-of-matter paragraph on the accounting treatment of allegations by a whistleblower in Singapore and of claims for damages against Wirecard AG over allegedly incorrect or late disclosures; EY states that it compared the findings with work by independent third parties and the internal compliance department, interviewed managers, suppliers, customers and lawyers with its own forensic specialists, and had no objections. 2

documentedAccording to FREP information in ESMA's report, Wirecard's auditor set its audit materiality limit at EUR 20 million for 2018 and EUR 28.7 million for 2019. 8

documentedThe Federal Court of Justice records that Wirecard's auditor since 2009, which also audited Wirecard Technologies GmbH from 2014 to 2019, issued unqualified opinions on both companies' accounts for 2014–2018 and refused an opinion for 2019; Wirecard Technologies GmbH filed for insolvency on 1 July 2020. 9

documentedThe special investigators found that EY had Burkhard Ley (chief financial officer) and Stephan von Erffa (executive vice president accounting) confirm by signature its understanding of Wirecard's role in the TPA business in a "concurrence memorandum" of 3 March 2016. The memorandum was prepared by an EY senior manager and approved the same day by an EY partner, and the working papers contain no contracts between the partners and the merchants or banks that would support the arrangement management described. 10

attributedAccording to the special investigators, the concurrence memorandum was signed by ten EY auditors including the quality-control partner, and EY's memorandum recorded that no receivable from the third-party acquirers Al Alam, PayEasy and Rising Sun had gone unpaid in 2011–2013 and that management saw no liability risks in 2014; the auditor did not consider whether the extensive collateral that Wirecard, as intermediary, gave the partners was usual in the market. 10

qualification
Findings of the special investigators in EY's working papers.

attributedEY's 2015 working papers first classified the escrow accounts as other financial assets (restricted cash) and then, in a memorandum, reclassified them as cash on the argument that Wirecard could replace them with a bank guarantee obtainable within three months with the partners' agreement; the special investigators found no evidence in the papers that such a guarantee existed or could be obtained. 10

qualification
Finding of the special investigators.

attributedIn the 2015–2016 audits EY listed external fraud risk factors such as capital-market pressure, share-price-linked management pay, EBIT covenants and money laundering at Wirecard Bank, but according to the special investigators did not include the standard risk of management override and documented no analysis of fraud indicators under German auditing standard IDW PS 210; nor did it assess in 2014–2016 whether the TPA partners were service providers for outsourced parts of Wirecard's accounting whose internal controls needed testing, although it obtained such controls reports for Wirecard Bank's provider SIX Payment Services. 10

qualification
Evaluation by the special investigators.

attributedOverdue trade receivables of the group stood at EUR 55.3 million at the end of 2016 (EUR 61.4 million a year earlier) before allowances, against total trade receivables of about EUR 190 million after allowances; the special investigators note that the ageing analysis required by IFRS 7.37a was not disclosed in the 2016 notes and EY considered the omission immaterial. 10

qualification
The disclosure point is the special investigators' evaluation.

attributedThe special investigators consider that the TPA business bore the features of a measure designed to shape the balance sheet in the sense of § 321(2) of the German Commercial Code, but that EY's long-form audit report on the 2015 consolidated accounts contains no explicit section on it, only partial descriptions in the valuation section, a remark on the high volume of unsecured receivables from third-party acquirers and Wirecard's intention to monitor them more closely. 10

qualification
Evaluation by the special investigators; EY's position on it is not in the record.

documentedAccording to the special investigators, Wirecard had known since March–April 2018 of the whistleblower information that the Financial Times published on 30 January 2019 and engaged Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP, then Fieldfisher LLP, which brought in Control Risks Group Ltd. From February 2019 EY's forensic department joined the 2018 audit; it identified more than 20 issues from the allegations and kept a file "Wirecard AG Project Tiger 2018" of more than 1,100 documents, which the investigators did not analyse in depth for lack of time. 10

documentedThe significance of the emphasis of matter in the 2018 opinion was not discussed with the supervisory board and management board, according to the special investigators; the board meeting to approve the accounts on 24 April 2019 was interrupted at 6 p.m. because of a new Financial Times article, which the auditor discussed with the supervisory board's lawyers, the supervisory board and CEO Dr. Markus Braun before concluding that it contained no new information changing the opinion. 10

attributedThe special investigators concluded on 16 April 2021 that there were indications that EY had not fully applied the IDW standards in planning and performing the audit, that a systematic analysis of fraud indicators could have led to greater professional scepticism and further procedures on the TPA business, and that the audit evidence often consisted not of third-party confirmations but of internal documents and oral statements by the management board; their report gives no overall assessment of whether the audit was properly performed. 10 3 11 9

qualification
This is the conclusion of investigators acting for a parliamentary committee, not a disciplinary or court finding; the auditor oversight body's later decision is described separately.
response
EY said in June 2020, as quoted from a news agency in a European Parliament briefing, that there were clear indications of an elaborate and sophisticated fraud involving multiple parties around the world in different institutions with a deliberate aim of deception.
outcome
Germany's auditor oversight body found on 31 March 2023 that professional duties had been breached in the 2016-2018 audits of Wirecard AG and Wirecard Bank AG and imposed sanctions; on 11 December 2025 the Federal Court of Justice largely upheld the insolvency administrator's claims for information about and access to the audit firm's working files.

documentedGermany's auditor oversight body APAS announced on 3 April 2023 that its professional-supervision decision chamber had found on 31 March 2023 that professional duties were breached in the audits of Wirecard AG and Wirecard Bank AG for 2016 to 2018 and imposed sanctions on the audit firm and five auditors; proceedings against seven further auditors ended because they gave up their auditor status. The fines were EUR 23,000 to EUR 300,000 for individuals and EUR 500,000 for the firm, which was also barred for two years from accepting new statutory audits of public-interest entities; the investigation covered 12 auditors and one firm for the 2016–2019 audits and found no breaches for 2019. 11

qualification
The announcement does not name the audit firm; Wirecard's auditor for these years was EY.

documentedESMA reports that when FREP concluded on 20 July 2020 that Wirecard's 2018 accounts were erroneous, it notified the auditor oversight body of a possible breach of professional requirements by the group auditor EY, and on 22 July 2020 sent it KPMG's full report. 8

documentedOn 11 December 2025 the Federal Court of Justice (III ZR 438/23) upheld claims of the insolvency administrator of Wirecard AG and Wirecard Technologies GmbH against their audit firm for information about and access to its working files for the audits of 2016 to 2019, for answers on the 2016 consolidated audit and on the "Projekt Ring" special investigation; claims concerning the files for 2014 and 2015 were time-barred. 9

sources in this section

  1. Company statement source · src-023 identified by category only · Company statement
  2. Company statement source · src-005 identified by category only · Company statement
  3. European Parliament briefing: Banking Union – Wirecard European Parliament (Directorate-General for Internal Policies) · Jun 2020
  4. Company statement source · src-010 identified by category only · Company statement
  5. Company statement source · src-032 identified by category only · Company statement
  6. Company statement source · src-050 identified by category only · Company statement
  7. Federal Ministry of Finance: status report on Wirecard (timeline) Federal Ministry of Finance · 17 Jul 2020
  8. ESMA fast-track peer review on the application of the guidelines on the enforcement of financial information by BaFin and FREP in the context of Wirecard European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) · 3 Nov 2020
  9. Federal Court of Justice: press release 228/2025 (III ZR 438/23) Federal Court of Justice · 11 Dec 2025
  10. Research source · src-027 identified by category only · Research
  11. APAS press release on its proceedings concerning the Wirecard audits Auditor Oversight Body (APAS) · 3 Apr 2023

10Supervisors and Wirecard: BaFin, FREP, ESMA and foreign regulators

documentedIreland's audit supervisor IAASA concluded settlements with the auditors of Wirecard UK and Ireland Limited's financial statements: a severe reprimand and a fine of EUR 19,500 for Tony Kelly and a severe reprimand and a fine of EUR 10,500 for Alison Gray. 1

documentedAccording to the German Finance Ministry's report of 16 July 2020 to the Bundestag finance committee, Wirecard AG itself provided no banking or payment services and was not supervised by BaFin as a credit, payment or e-money institution, nor classified as a financial holding company; BaFin supervised only Wirecard Bank AG, and the British subsidiary Wirecard Card Solutions Limited was supervised by the UK Financial Conduct Authority. 2

documentedESMA's chronology records that on 1 February 2017 BaFin's banking supervision and the Deutsche Bundesbank concluded that Wirecard was not a financial holding company under EU law, so that supervisors had no powers over the group as a whole; the ECB later agreed. 3

documentedThe Finance Ministry's report states that anti-money-laundering supervision of Wirecard AG was unresolved: the Lower Bavaria district government contacted BaFin on 25 February 2020 and again on 27 May 2020 as the competent authority, Wirecard AG regarded itself as a "financial undertaking" supervised by Bavaria, the Bavarian interior ministry said the classification was still open and its working level favoured denying that status, and in July 2020 the Bavarian interior minister Herrmann said he did not regard the district government as the competent supervisor. 2

documentedBaFin imposed a temporary ban on short selling of Wirecard shares in February 2019, with a positive opinion from ESMA; Wirecard's 2019 bond prospectus presented it as a response to several short-selling attacks. 4 5

documentedOn 15 April 2019 BaFin fined Wirecard AG EUR 1.52 million for breaches of financial reporting obligations under § 115 of the Securities Trading Act, partly for late publication of the 2018 half-year report and of the related notice; Wirecard accepted the fine but contested its publication, which followed a decision of the Hessian administrative court in September 2019. 2

documentedBaFin investigated market participants betting on falls in Wirecard's share price: after the Zatarra report (from 21 March 2016, with a criminal complaint to the Munich prosecutor on 12 May 2016), after a report by the short-seller SIRF (18 February to 24 May 2018) and after Financial Times publications (from 1 February 2019, with a complaint to the prosecutor on 10 April 2019). ESMA records that in February 2019 BaFin filed a complaint against market participants and two journalists on suspicion of market manipulation. 2 3

documentedIn March 2019 Wirecard AG brought a declaratory action in the Munich regional court against the Financial Times and its journalist over the use and misrepresentation of trade secrets; the company's prospectus states that BaFin had filed a complaint over suspected links between the newspaper's reports and short positions and that the Munich prosecutor was investigating Dan McCrum for market manipulation. 4

response
The Munich regional court records that the action was interrupted by Wirecard's insolvency in September 2020 and withdrawn on 28 October 2020.

documentedThe Finance Ministry reported that State Secretary Dr. Jörg Kukies met Dr. Markus Braun on 5 November 2019 without minutes being taken; the topics included the suspicion of market manipulation and the KPMG special audit that had begun. 2

documentedESMA found that BaFin sent the Finance Ministry at least 17 reports on Wirecard between 2016 and 2020 (three in 2016 and 14 in 2019–2020) on its market-abuse examinations and on proceedings concerning the issuer's transparency obligations. 3

documentedBaFin filed a criminal complaint against Wirecard with the Munich prosecutor on 2 June 2020 for market manipulation through misleading ad hoc announcements on the interim results of KPMG's special investigation, on the basis of which the prosecutor searched Wirecard's premises on 5 June 2020. On 18 June 2020 BaFin filed a further complaint on suspicion of misrepresentation under § 331 of the Commercial Code and market manipulation through false information in the 2016–2018 annual accounts, and on 20 June 2020 it opened a market-abuse analysis of recent ad hoc announcements. 2 3

documentedOn 3 June 2020 BaFin opened a market-abuse analysis of purchases of Wirecard shares by the then management board chairman Dr. Markus Braun through MB Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH; on 29 May 2020 it had reported to the Finance Ministry on his share transactions. ESMA records that on 29 April 2020 BaFin opened a market-manipulation examination of Wirecard's statements to investors that KPMG had found nothing material. 2 3

documentedOn 22 June 2020 BaFin required Wirecard Bank AG to report its liquidity daily, appointed a special representative to oversee all significant payments with group companies, placed the bank under special observation and asked foreign supervisors for assistance. 3

documentedESMA records that in 15 years FREP fully examined Wirecard's accounts four times (2005, 2011 and 2014 by sample, 2018 on risk grounds), found an error in the 2005 accounts and in 2008 began an examination of the 2007 accounts on indications of irregularities after public allegations by the head of a German shareholders' association; it was suspended because of an action to annul the 2007 accounts, which the Munich regional court rejected, and ended in June 2012 for lack of public interest, while the examination of the 2011 accounts found no errors in December 2012. 3

documentedFREP selected Wirecard's 2014 annual report by random sampling on 15 December 2014, opened the examination by letter of 15 April 2015 and concluded it on 1 December 2016 without error findings; Wirecard's 2015 accounts were not examined, and from 2015 to 2018 Wirecard was not selected on concrete risk grounds. ESMA rated the 2014 examination only partially compliant with supervisory expectations, citing serious shortcomings, material risks left unaddressed, insufficient professional scepticism and a duration of 19.5 months against an average of eight. 3

documentedBaFin learned of the Zatarra report in February 2016 and on 27 April 2016 asked FREP to include Wirecard in its risk group; on 29 September 2016 a whistleblower told FREP that the acquiring receivables and payables in the 2015 balance sheet were doubtful, which FREP's committee considered evidently unfounded on 6 October 2016. On 1 December 2016 Wirecard gave FREP a one-page interim report by an external party it had engaged, without addressee or signature, attached to a letter from its chief accountant, and FREP closed its examination the same day without error findings. 3

documentedAt a working meeting on 11 October 2016 EY confirmed to FREP that it had looked into the fraud allegations in the Zatarra report and addressed the related allegations in the Financial Times; FREP considered the matter resolved because the 2015 accounts carried a clean opinion, which ESMA criticised as reliance solely on the auditor's work. 3

documentedOn 28 February 2017 FREP's committee decided that a business magazine article about a "EUR 250 million puzzle" did not give sufficiently concrete indications of accounting breaches, although the amount and nature of rolling security reserve receivables of EUR 250 million remained unexplained; in an internal note of 15 March 2017 BaFin concluded that the 2015 annual accounts showed no concrete indications of accounting breaches and that a lack of clarity was not a breach, a view ESMA strongly disagreed with, citing IAS 1. 3

documentedIn 2019 FREP placed Wirecard in an abstract risk pool because of unusual transactions such as mergers, above-average growth, sector risks and weak corporate governance; ESMA notes that these signs, including annual revenue growth of 30% and acquisitions in Asia such as Citi's operations in 11 Asian countries in 2017, had been visible earlier. On 30 October 2019, in agreement with BaFin, FREP extended its examination to the amount and existence of TPA revenue, the classification of escrow accounts as cash and a possible "Indian round-tripping", and decided to await KPMG's results. 3

documentedBaFin required FREP (the DPR) to examine Wirecard's condensed half-year accounts at 30 June 2018 on 15 February 2019, the consolidated accounts at 31 December 2018 on 30 April 2020, the condensed accounts at 30 June 2019 on 24 June 2020 and the consolidated accounts at 31 December 2017 on 25 June 2020. On 30 April 2020 BaFin expressly cited KPMG's report as concrete indications of material accounting breaches concerning TPA revenue, the presentation of the TPA escrow accounts and the reporting of TPA risks in the management report. 2 3

documentedESMA records that in early 2019 BaFin received the preliminary Rajah & Tann report on Wirecard from an anonymous whistleblower but, citing professional secrecy, did not pass it to FREP, which obtained it from Wirecard in mid-2019; BaFin also stated that its market-abuse and financial-reporting teams were unaware of the Financial Times articles of the first half of 2019 on Wirecard's TPA partners, although they had access to the newspaper, and FREP noted that BaFin had not shared information on its market-abuse, anti-money-laundering or Wirecard Bank supervision. 3

documentedDuring the 2019–2020 examination Wirecard did not formally release its auditor from confidentiality, so FREP had no contact with EY throughout, and it also refused to release KPMG; a contract with KPMG requested in mid-December 2019 was supplied by Wirecard at the end of January 2020. 3

documentedOn 17 June 2020 FREP received from BaFin the auditor's report under Article 12 of EU Regulation 537/2014 on possibly incorrect balance confirmations for part of the TPA trust accounts. On 29 June 2020 Wirecard's management board told FREP that the reliability of information supplied earlier, especially on "third-party transactions", was in doubt and that it could not say which remained reliable. 3

documentedFREP found Wirecard's 2018 half-year report erroneous on 9 July 2020 and finalised on 6 July 2020 its findings that the 2018 half-year and annual reports were erroneous, concluding that significant assets, revenue and expenses had not been properly accounted for (breach of § 238(1) of the Commercial Code) and that the half-year report did not give a true picture (IAS 1.15). Wirecard disagreed and refused to take part in the examinations of the 2017 accounts and the first half of 2019; on 20 July 2020 FREP ended its examinations and passed them to BaFin, which took them over at the second level on 24 July 2020. 3

documentedOn 4 August 2020 BaFin for the first time published in the Federal Gazette a notice on examinations of an issuer's financial reporting, covering Wirecard's half-year and annual reports for 2018, the half-year report for 2019 and the annual report for 2017. 3

documentedOn 25 June 2020 the European Commission asked ESMA to analyse the events leading to Wirecard's collapse and the German supervisors' response; ESMA launched a fast-track peer review of BaFin and FREP, set up its committee on 6 August 2020 and approved the mandate on 25 August 2020. 3

documentedESMA's fast-track peer review of BaFin's and FREP's supervision of Wirecard's financial reporting (period 1 January 2015 to 25 August 2020, published on 3 November 2020) found a heightened risk of Finance Ministry influence on BaFin because of the frequency and detail of its reporting, that BaFin had no information on staff shareholdings and that some staff in its market-abuse team had traded Wirecard shares, and that FREP did not select Wirecard's 2015–2017 accounts for examination nor did BaFin request it. 3

attributedESMA's report summarises the public allegations against Wirecard: FT Alphaville blog posts ("House of Wirecard", 2015) raised the first doubts about the accounting for TPA partners, and a whistleblower raised concerns with FREP in 2016 about acquiring receivables at subsidiaries in jurisdictions without a licence (Dubai, Ireland); in early 2016 Zatarra Research and Investigations accused Wirecard of money laundering (mainly on information from 2006–2010), facilitating circumvention of US online-gambling restrictions, deceiving Visa and Mastercard on customer checks and overpaying for acquisitions; and on 7 June 2019 the Financial Times reported that a long-standing Wirecard customer had settled US allegations of defrauding customers of more than USD 110 million. 3

qualification
These are allegations by journalists, short-sellers and a whistleblower as summarised by ESMA; Wirecard systematically rejected them at the time.

documentedOn 26 June 2020 the UK Financial Conduct Authority imposed requirements on Wirecard's British e-money firm: it was not to dispose of assets or funds, not to carry on regulated activities, and to state on its website that it could no longer do so; the FCA cited events in Germany around the parent Wirecard AG, which it did not supervise. After it allowed e-money activity to resume on 29 June 2020, restrictions on where customer funds could be held and on transfers of the firm's own assets remained. 6 5

documentedWirecard reported at the end of June 2020 that the FCA had suspended the activities of Wirecard Card Solutions Limited (Newcastle) after Wirecard AG's insolvency filing and lifted the restrictions early on 30 June 2020, reopening several hundred thousand accounts for payments; the Estonian e-Residency programme reported that the firm issued Holvi Business Mastercard and Payoneer prepaid Mastercard cards, which were frozen and later partly restored. 7 8

documentedThe Monetary Authority of Singapore lists Wirecard Asia Holding Pte. Ltd. (domestic and inbound cross-border money transfers and merchant acquisition) and Wirecard Singapore Pte. Ltd. (account issuance, money transfers and e-money issuance) among entities that previously held a temporary exemption from licensing under the Payment Services Act but no longer do and may not provide these services. 9

documentedAccording to the supervisory board's report for 2010, at its meeting in April 2010 the board discussed, besides the 2009 accounts, the allegations made against the Wirecard group, published among other places on the gomoPa website, and the necessary countermeasures; the report does not describe the allegations. 10

documentedESMA's peer review records that Wirecard published its 2015 financial statements with an unqualified audit opinion on 6 April 2016, the day an FT article again questioned its Indian acquisition, and that on 10 December 2019 Wirecard published a statement explaining how it processed and accounted for payment transactions via routing partners; the review committee considered that exchanges between FREP and Wirecard in October or November 2019 could have prompted more detailed and transparent information in that statement and in later reports. 3

sources in this section

  1. IAASA agrees settlements with Tony Kelly and Alison Gray Irish Auditing and Accounting Supervisory Authority · 22 Sep 2026
  2. Federal Ministry of Finance: status report on Wirecard (timeline) Federal Ministry of Finance · 17 Jul 2020
  3. ESMA fast-track peer review on the application of the guidelines on the enforcement of financial information by BaFin and FREP in the context of Wirecard European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) · 3 Nov 2020
  4. Company statement source · src-012 identified by category only · Company statement
  5. European Parliament briefing: Banking Union – Wirecard European Parliament (Directorate-General for Internal Policies) · Jun 2020
  6. FCA: Wirecard can resume regulated activity Financial Conduct Authority · 26 Jun 2020
  7. Company statement source · src-048 identified by category only · Company statement
  8. e-Residency: service provider statements on Wirecard AG Republic of Estonia e-Residency programme · 30 Jun 2020
  9. MAS: entities that are no longer exempt under the Payment Services Act exemption for a specified period Monetary Authority of Singapore
  10. Company statement source · src-023 identified by category only · Company statement

11India and Singapore: the Hermes purchase, Projekt Ring and the Singapore cases

documentedOn 27 October 2015 Wirecard AG signed agreements to acquire the payment business of the Great Indian (GI) Retail Group: 100% of Hermes I Tickets Pte. Ltd., GI Philippines Corp. and Star Global Currency Exchange Pte. Ltd. and 60% of GI Technology Private Limited, for EUR 230 million in cash plus up to EUR 110 million depending on 2015–2017 results. Wirecard consolidated the three wholly owned companies from 30 December 2015 because a trust arrangement (Treuhandvereinbarung) already gave it control and economic ownership, with closing in early 2016; GI Technology was acquired at 60% from 1 March 2016. 1

attributedESMA, summarising press reports, states that Wirecard agreed to pay EUR 330 million for a group of Indian payment businesses whose key company was Hermes, although a year earlier the key assets had been valued at EUR 46 million, and that a fund, EMIF1A, had paid USD 37 million for Hermes only six weeks before bundling it into the transaction with Wirecard. According to a business magazine cited by ESMA, the price of up to EUR 340 million was 49 times pre-tax earnings; FREP told ESMA the price included an earn-out of EUR 110 million. 2

qualification
Press reporting and ESMA's summary of it; Wirecard disputed critical reporting at the time and no court has ruled on the price.

documentedWirecard's 2018 annual report records that former minority shareholders of the Indian subsidiary Hermes, acquired in 2015, were suing their former co-shareholders and Wirecard AG in the United Kingdom, claiming they had received too little for their shares, and that in March 2019 an Indian company also sued, among others, Wirecard AG; a class action by holders of unsponsored American depositary receipts was pending in California over price falls after the investigations in Asia. 3

attributedIn early summer 2016 EY learned of a conversation between an EY India audit partner and Hermes' chief financial officer, summarised in a whistleblower memo: according to it, the seller of the Hermes group, Emerging Fund1A, had itself bought the group a few months before the deal, Wirecard "senior management" was directly or indirectly involved in the fund and would receive the EUR 110 million earn-out, revenue would have to be fabricated to meet the targets, and these mechanisms were said to be directed by Stephan von Erffa. 4

qualification
These are the whistleblower's allegations as recorded by EY and summarised by the special investigators; the management board denied any involvement in the fund, and the allegations about von Erffa's role were left unexamined.
response
The management board stated that it had no interest in Fund1A, and EY accepted these statements.

documentedAt a meeting with the supervisory and management boards on 8 September 2016, Burkhard Ley (CFO) agreed to disclose his personal financial circumstances, but on 12 September 2016 he told the auditor he was not prepared to do so or to be interviewed, which EY treated as an indicator of possible management involvement. The same day the management board instructed EY's forensic service to carry out "Projekt Ring": a sample-based check of revenue, a review of at least one employee's e-mails and an optional review of personal finances for conflicts of interest; the working papers show no notable investigative work until February 2017. 4

documentedOn 2 February 2017 EY proposed a simplified alternative procedure for Projekt Ring because Wirecard had failed since September 2016 to provide a reliable transaction database, and Jan Marsalek and Burkhard Ley agreed. In an e-mail to Ley of 16 March 2017 EY recorded that revenue booked in 2015 and 2016 (Projekt Ring, Indian Hermes) was not adequately evidenced as to amount, substance and timing, that the amounts significantly affected the 2015 and 2016 earn-outs, and for the first time raised a possible qualification of the opinion. 4

documentedOn 29 March 2017 EY informed the management board (Dr. Markus Braun, Burkhard Ley and Jan Marsalek) and supervisory board chairman Wulf Matthias orally and in writing that it would qualify its opinions on the 2016 accounts unless it received evidence on more than 20 open questions, mainly concerning the whistleblower's fraud allegations; at a meeting on 30 March 2017 headed "Ring Meeting", Ley told EY that additional questions were not feasible at present. Around 30 March 2017 the memos and e-mails by which the auditor confirmed the recoverability of disputed receivables (debtors including Bytemax, Clear.IO and Pyro) were prepared or supplied mainly by Marsalek and Ley, some of them carried forward since 2014. 4

attributedAt a meeting with EY on 3 April 2017, two days before the opinion date, Dr. Markus Braun said that interested parties were putting Wirecard under pressure with targeted false reports, that investment controlling had been strengthened and the CFO in India replaced, that the whistleblower's allegations about India reflected personal animosity, and that additional transactions could affect the earn-out as long as this was in Wirecard's interest; according to the special investigators he did not address the other allegations in substance. 4

qualification
Braun's statements as recorded in EY's minutes and summarised by the special investigators.

attributedOn 4 April 2017 EY's forensic service recorded indicators of a targeted increase of EBITDA (fictitious revenue) at the Indian Hermes, while three allegations, instructions by Stephan von Erffa to Hermes' accounting, senior management's involvement in the seller of Hermes and an attempt to bribe the auditor, remained unexamined without interviews or e-mail review. EY estimated the effect of including interest and tax accounts in Hermes' EBITDA on the earn-out at about EUR 13.6 million, the amount by which goodwill would have to be reduced, but accepted the treatment, citing among other things that the due-diligence provider Baker Tilly Roelfs had not objected. 4 5

qualification
EY's internal findings as summarised by the special investigators; the open allegations were never investigated to a conclusion.
outcome
EY nevertheless issued unqualified opinions on the 2016 consolidated accounts on 5 April 2017, and according to the Federal Court of Justice the Projekt Ring investigation was broken off in 2018 at the management board's insistence.

documentedDespite the warning of 29 March 2017, EY issued unqualified opinions on Wirecard AG's 2016 consolidated accounts on 5 April 2017 and on the individual accounts on 25 April 2017; the evidence obtained consisted mainly of oral and written statements by the management board. According to the Federal Court of Justice, the Projekt Ring special investigation concerned the acquisition of three Indian companies at allegedly or actually inflated prices and was broken off in 2018 at the management board's insistence. 4 5

documentedAn EY working paper of March 2018 in the 2017 audit files records that EY's forensic team had repeatedly tried in vain, or obtained only with delay, the documents it needed, and a timeline in it states that Jan Marsalek (COO) had wanted to end Projekt Ring as early as autumn 2017. 4

documentedWirecard's 2018 annual report states that in spring 2018 a whistleblower reported irregularities in the local accounting department in Singapore and that Wirecard instructed the law firm Rajah & Tann (Singapore), whose preliminary report is dated 4 May 2018. According to the company, allegations of round-tripping, corruption, money laundering and deceiving regulators in licensing were not confirmed, but Singapore authorities were continuing their investigations and criminal liability of individual employees could not be ruled out. 3

documentedThe 2019 bond prospectus states that Rajah & Tann LLP, assisted by a forensic team from Control Risks, investigated the whistleblower allegations of round-tripping, corruption, money laundering and deceiving regulators in licensing, and, in the company's summary of its "Summary of Updated Findings" of 26 March 2019, that for 2017 revenue of EUR 2.5 million had been wrongly recognised under a sham contract and EUR 2.3 million entered in a subsidiary's ledger of old receivables. 6

attributedESMA summarises Financial Times articles of 30 January, 1 February and 7 February 2019 reporting that a senior executive of Wirecard's Singapore subsidiary was suspected of using forged and backdated contracts, that a preliminary report by Rajah & Tann pointed to serious offences of forgery, and that USD 37 million appeared to have moved in and out of Wirecard subsidiaries and external businesses in seven sets of complex transactions. 6 2 7 8

qualification
Newspaper reporting as summarised by ESMA; Wirecard rejected the reports at the time and later restated limited amounts.
response
Wirecard's 2019 bond prospectus summarised the law firm's updated findings of 26 March 2019 as limited to EUR 2.5 million of wrongly recognised 2017 revenue under a sham contract and EUR 2.3 million entered in a subsidiary's ledger of old receivables.
outcome
Singapore police charged three former employees of Wirecard Asia Holding and a director of another company on 17 August 2022; two of the former employees were convicted of criminal breach of trust on 20 June 2023.

documentedIn note 2.7 of its 2018 accounts Wirecard corrected retrospectively, in connection with the investigations in Asia, errors in 2017 revenue recognition: software purchase and sale transactions of about EUR 10.0 million had been recorded in the wrong group units with an intermediary as counterparty; 2017 revenue was reduced overall and the net effect on profit after tax was a reduction of EUR 3.6 million. ESMA notes that the adjustments reduced net assets by EUR 8.5 million at 1 January 2017 and EUR 4.8 million at 31 December 2017 and that, according to the press, the Singapore transactions concerned totalled EUR 37 million in 2015–2018. 3 2

documentedWirecard's 2019 half-year report corrected first-half 2018 revenue under IAS 8 in connection with the Asian investigations and an extended review of transactions: a software transaction of EUR 2.5 million was moved from 2017 into 2018, and revenue and costs of Citi portfolios in Asia-Pacific that had not yet been transferred were overstated and reduced by EUR 21.0 million. 9

documentedThe Singapore Police Force announced on 17 August 2022 that, after the Commercial Affairs Department investigated the activities of Wirecard AG's Singapore subsidiaries Wirecard Asia Holding Pte Ltd (WAH) and Wirecard Singapore Pte Ltd, three former WAH employees and a director of another Singapore company were charged with criminal breach of trust for allegedly conspiring between May and December 2018 with Edo Kurniawan, then WAH's vice president of controlling and finance, to misappropriate amounts of $41,200 to $100,000 from WAH, and with related offences including the falsification of four invoices totalling $184,870; Kurniawan had left Singapore before the investigation began and a warrant had been issued for his arrest. 7 10

qualification
Charges, not findings; the police release gives the amounts with a dollar sign without naming the currency.

documentedOn 20 June 2023 two former Wirecard Asia Holding employees, the international finance process manager James Aga Wardhana and the head of finance Chai Ai Lim, were convicted of criminal breach of trust and other offences and sentenced to 21 and 10 months' imprisonment; the police release describes amounts taken from Wirecard Asia's account in conspiracy with Edo Kurniawan. 8

documentedThe Singapore Police Force stated on 20 June 2023 that Edo Kurniawan, Wirecard Asia's former vice president of controlling and international finance and a signatory of its bank account, was at large, and that a warrant of arrest and an INTERPOL red notice had been issued against him. 8

documentedA business directory summarising Singapore register data records Wirecard Asia Holding Pte. Ltd. (UEN 201429281D), incorporated on 1 October 2014 at 1 Raffles Quay #27-10, as dissolved by members' voluntary winding-up, with RSM SG Assurance LLP as auditor, and Wirecard Singapore Pte. Ltd. (UEN 199906900E), registered on 5 November 1999 at the same address, as dissolved by members' voluntary winding-up. 10 11

documentedAccording to the special investigators' report, the component auditor of Wirecard Singapore Pte. Ltd., Ernst & Young LLP Singapore, reported to the group audit team that the recoverability of receivables of about EUR 8.9 million was doubtful; on 4 April 2017, one day before the date of the audit opinion, the auditor received balance confirmations for two of the receivables totalling about EUR 6.2 million. The confirmation for the debtor Centurion was signed by a person who also held a position at the TPA partner PayEasy. 4

sources in this section

  1. Company statement source · src-032 identified by category only · Company statement
  2. ESMA fast-track peer review on the application of the guidelines on the enforcement of financial information by BaFin and FREP in the context of Wirecard European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) · 3 Nov 2020
  3. Company statement source · src-005 identified by category only · Company statement
  4. Research source · src-027 identified by category only · Research
  5. Federal Court of Justice: press release 228/2025 (III ZR 438/23) Federal Court of Justice · 11 Dec 2025
  6. Company statement source · src-012 identified by category only · Company statement
  7. Singapore Police Force: four more individuals charged in connection with Wirecard investigation Singapore Police Force · 17 Aug 2022
  8. Singapore Police Force: two former Wirecard employees convicted and jailed Singapore Police Force · 20 Jun 2023
  9. Company statement source · src-066 identified by category only · Company statement
  10. Corporate registry source · src-078 identified by category only · Corporate registry
  11. Corporate registry source · src-089 identified by category only · Corporate registry

12Merchant cash advance: the OCAP loans and the Ruprecht deposit

attributedAccording to the Munich I prosecutor's indictment of 31 July 2024, OCAP Management Pte Ltd. was chosen as a supposedly neutral third party for the merchant cash advance (MCA) business although until the end of 2017 it had financed oil transports, had nothing to do with card payments and belonged to the corporate network of another accused; it was renamed OCAP only at the end of 2017 after several formal ownership changes through shell companies and then applied to Wirecard Bank for MCA financing. The prosecution says Dr. Braun personally pressed a Wirecard Bank board member who had refused, Wirecard AG gave a guarantee, and a loan of EUR 10 million was paid out but not passed on to merchants; in April 2019 the loan and guarantee were extended with retroactive effect. 1 2

qualification
Prosecution allegations in an indictment; the court decided in February 2025 not to pursue the guarantee counts further (see the trial).
outcome
In a civil case over the OCAP loan and a related bond subscription, the Munich I regional court ordered three former management board members on 5 September 2024 to pay EUR 140 million to the insolvency administrator; the judgment was not final.

attributedThe prosecution states that a Wirecard subsidiary lent OCAP EUR 115 million in September and November 2018; by autumn 2019 substantial interest arrears had built up and repayment was not in sight. On 25 March 2020, while KPMG's special audit was under way, the management board resolved without the supervisory board to lend OCAP a further EUR 100 million, when OCAP had already received about EUR 137 million and was servicing debts in the manner of a "Ponzi scheme". 1 3

qualification
Prosecution allegations in the indictments of March 2022 and July 2024.

attributedAccording to the prosecution, the EUR 100 million reached OCAP's account at Wirecard Bank AG on 27 March 2020 and was transferred the same day in full to an account of Ruprecht Services Pte. Ltd. in Lithuania, from which EUR 35 million went to "M.", who passed it on as repayment of a 2017 loan to the account of Dr. Braun's asset-management company; this repaid a Wirecard Bank loan of EUR 35 million, cancelled as of 1 April 2020, with which Dr. Braun had refinanced a EUR 150 million bank loan to his company. The prosecution puts the damage at several hundred million euros. 3 1

qualification
Prosecution allegations; "M." is the prosecution's abbreviation for a separately prosecuted person, and the account holders are named as in the releases.

attributedThe prosecution states that in December 2019, during KPMG's special investigation, Wirecard AG's management board granted the Singapore company Ruprecht Services Pte. Ltd., a penniless and later insolvent shell from the circle of another accused, a "security deposit" of EUR 40 million in total through subsidiaries, without any security, supposedly to replace the TPA partner Al Alam Solution Provider FZ-LLC in Dubai. The increase from EUR 10 million to EUR 40 million on 23 December 2019 was approved within half an hour on Jan Marsalek's e-mail proposal without a formal resolution and without involving the supervisory board; the earlier indictment says the former chief executive "Dr. B." agreed immediately and pressed the other board members, and that repayment is not expected. 1 3

qualification
Prosecution allegations; Braun's trial was continuing at the evidence cutoff.

documentedRuprecht Services Pte. Ltd. was incorporated in Singapore on 17 August 2016 with its registered office in the Ocean Financial Centre and IT consultancy as its stated activity; it is in compulsory liquidation for insolvency, with a winding-up application published on 28 January 2022, a winding-up order on 25 February 2022, a creditors' meeting on 17 May 2022 and a final meeting on 25 April 2025. The Monetary Authority of Singapore lists it among entities that previously held a temporary exemption under the Payment Services Act, for account issuance, domestic transfers, merchant acquisition and e-money issuance, but no longer do. 4 5

attributedIn the preamble to a parliamentary question answered on 18 January 2021, FDP deputies, citing a news magazine, stated that OCAP was under the influence of the TPA partner Senjo Group and of a Senjo figure, received a EUR 115 million loan in 2018 guaranteed by Wirecard AG, had Carlos Häuser as managing director, and that the loan was approved by a Wirecard employee identified as "H.". They also stated that on 18 November 2018 the management board released EUR 500 million of loans and credit lines to push the MCA business, that the Indian travel provider Gomoo received EUR 11 million from Wirecard Bank AG guaranteed by Wirecard AG, and that PayEasy received loans of EUR 270 million in 2018. 6

qualification
Statements of opposition deputies citing a magazine, not of the government; the government replied that it had no information on whether "H." had authority to approve loans since 2015.

documentedThe Federal Government's answer of 18 January 2021 (Bundestag printed paper 19/25977) states that OCAP Management Pte. Ltd. was formerly called Senjo Trading Pte. Ltd. and that loans by Wirecard Bank AG to it and to Senjo Group Pte. Ltd. as TPA partners were in the sample of the 2017 MaRisk special audit by BaFin and the Deutsche Bundesbank (portfolio "strategic loans"). 6

documentedIn November 2020 Singapore's High Court rejected an application by oCap Management to release seized funds, a lump sum of USD 1.85 million and USD 1 million a month, to repay "loans" from Wirecard and expenses; the Commercial Affairs Department had seized USD 8.63 million of oCap Management and SGD 290,000 of its Singapore subsidiary oCap Asia Pacific Holdings on 20 August 2020 as suspected proceeds of serious crime. 7

qualification
Reported by a Singapore newspaper; the seizure is an investigative measure, not a finding of guilt.

documentedIn a judgment of 13 May 2026 ([2026] SGHC 102) Singapore's High Court, on an application by oCap Management's liquidators, released from a restraint order fees already incurred of SGD 178,560.25 but refused to release about SGD 2,997,500 for future claims against third parties. The company has been in creditors' voluntary liquidation since 10 December 2020 and in court-ordered liquidation since 15 March 2021. 8

documentedThe Singapore judgment records that German authorities charged Dr Markus Braun on 10 March 2022 with embezzlement involving loans of EUR 210 million from Wirecard group companies to oCap Management, allegedly used to disguise the group's true financial position and divert money out of it; at their request the Attorney-General applied on 18 April 2023 and the court ordered on 3 November 2023 the restraint of the company's funds in two Citibank N.A. accounts, as German authorities seek confiscation of EUR 210 million. 8

qualification
The charges are allegations; the court decided only on the restraint and release of funds.

documentedAccording to the Singapore judgment, Wirecard group companies are oCap Management's majority creditors with over 97% of its debt; they funded the liquidators' investigation of the company's affairs but declined to fund claims against third parties, and recoveries for the group are pursued under the control of Wirecard AG's insolvency administrator Dr Michael Jaffé. The liquidators intended to pursue former and possible shadow or de facto directors over a questionable dividend (about SGD 10.14 million) and a company over a breach of an agreement to assign sale proceeds (about SGD 1.95 million). 8

documentedOn 5 September 2024 the 5th commercial chamber of the Munich I regional court (presiding judge Dr. Helmut Krenek, case 5 HK O 17452/21) ordered three former Wirecard AG management board members, jointly and severally, to pay EUR 140 million plus interest to the insolvency administrator, and dismissed the claim against a former supervisory board member. The case concerned an unsecured loan of EUR 100 million by a subsidiary, from Wirecard AG funds, to OCAP Management Pte Ltd. and the subscription, on Wirecard AG's instructions, of a EUR 100 million bond by a subsidiary. 2 9

qualification
The judgment was not final. The press release does not name the three board members; press reporting identifies them as chairman Markus Braun and the finance and product board members.
response
The former board members argued that they had not breached their duties, or not culpably, and that the decisions were justified in the company's interest.

documentedThe Munich I regional court put the damage from the OCAP loan at EUR 40 million, because EUR 60 million had been repaid from the bond subscription and the borrower was insolvent; it found the loan negligent mainly because of arrears of EUR 2.375 million on another loan and because, after KPMG's special audit, it was uncertain whether the third-party acquiring business closely linked to the loan existed. The bond subscription of EUR 100 million was made without financial due diligence and against a lawyer's advice, and the full amount was lost because the issuer was insolvent; loans of EUR 115 million had been granted in 2018. 2 9

documentedThe court dismissed the administrator's claim against former deputy supervisory board chairman Stefan Klestil: although he had neglected his duty of supervision, it doubted that proper supervision would have changed the management board's conduct, since the board had already disregarded the supervisory board's instructions in the past; no criminal offence is alleged against Klestil. 9

documentedThe Munich higher regional court's press release of 28 February 2025 lists among the counts in the criminal case one of breach of trust through consent to loans by Wirecard Asia Holding Pte. Ltd. to OCAP Management Pte. Ltd. in September 2018, or aiding it; prosecution of this count was discontinued on 27 February 2025. 10

sources in this section

  1. Munich I public prosecutor: press release 04/2024 on further indictments of former board members Munich I Public Prosecutor (Bavarian State Ministry of Justice portal) · 6 Aug 2024
  2. Munich I regional court: press release 10/2024 on the judgment in the directors' liability case Munich I Regional Court (Bavarian State Ministry of Justice portal) · 5 Sep 2024
  3. Munich I public prosecutor: press release 02/2022 on the indictment in the Wirecard case Munich I Public Prosecutor (Bavarian State Ministry of Justice portal) · 14 Mar 2022
  4. Corporate registry source · src-072 identified by category only · Corporate registry
  5. MAS: entities that are no longer exempt under the Payment Services Act exemption for a specified period Monetary Authority of Singapore
  6. Federal Government answer to a parliamentary question on Wirecard Bank loans (printed paper 19/25977) German Bundestag · 18 Jan 2021
  7. Media source · src-083 identified by category only · Media
  8. Singapore High Court judgment [2026] SGHC 102 (oCap Management Pte Ltd) Supreme Court of Singapore · 13 May 2026
  9. Media source · src-062 identified by category only · Media
  10. Munich higher regional court: press release 15/2025 on the Wirecard criminal trial Munich Higher Regional Court (Bavarian State Ministry of Justice portal) · 28 Feb 2025

13Wirecard's insolvency and the sale of the group

documentedWirecard AG applied on 25 June 2020 to open insolvency proceedings over its own assets, citing impending insolvency and over-indebtedness. On 29 June 2020 the Munich local court (insolvency court, case 1542 IN 1308/20) appointed the lawyer Dr. Michael Jaffé (Munich) as preliminary insolvency administrator, ordered that the debtor's dispositions required his consent and prohibited enforcement against the debtor, confirming an order of 25 June 2020. 1 2 3

documentedThe Munich local court opened insolvency proceedings over Wirecard AG on 25 August 2020 (1542 IN 1308/20), dissolving the company, and appointed Michael Jaffé insolvency administrator of Wirecard AG and of Wirecard Technologies GmbH, Wirecard Issuing Technologies GmbH, Wirecard Service Technologies GmbH, Wirecard Acceptance Technologies GmbH, Wirecard Sales International Holding GmbH and Wirecard Global Sales GmbH. Register entries record the openings for the subsidiaries under case numbers 1542 IN 1351/20 to 1356/20 and the lapse of the remaining powers of attorney; the register shows Wirecard AG in liquidation from 4 September 2020. 4 2 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

documentedThe Leipzig local court opened insolvency proceedings over Wirecard Communication Services GmbH on 31 August 2020 (403 IN 960/20), dissolving the company; the powers of attorney of Thorsten Holten, Andrea Görres and Daniel Steinhoff lapsed. 12

documentedIn early July 2020 Wirecard filed for insolvency of six further German service subsidiaries with 1,270 employees, which the administrator wanted to continue where possible; Wirecard AG itself had 250 employees. After the opening of the proceedings, about 730 jobs were cut, while 570 staff in Aschheim, 350 of them in the insolvent companies and 220 at the solvent Wirecard Bank AG, kept their jobs, according to the administrator. 13 14

documentedOn 5 July 2020 the management of Wirecard Acquiring & Issuing GmbH, in agreement with its shareholder Wirecard AG and the preliminary administrator, engaged the US investment bank Moelis & Company to run the sale of Wirecard North America. 14

documentedThe sale of the core assets of Wirecard AG and Wirecard Technologies GmbH, the European technology platform, to the Banco Santander group closed on 28 January 2021 after signing in mid-November 2020; about 500 employees moved to Santander's Getnet platform. The administrator had earlier sold Wirecard North America to Syncapay, Wirecard Brazil to PagSeguro and Wirecard Romania to SIBS. 15

documentedWirecard announced in 2020 that an agreement had been signed under which a subsidiary of PagSeguro Digital Ltd. (listed in New York) would acquire 100% of Wirecard Brazil, subject to approval by Brazilian regulators, and that Wirecard Card Solutions Ltd. had agreed in principle with Railsbank Technology Limited to sell certain customer relationships and other assets. 14

documentedOn 28 September 2020 the administrator closed the sale of all shares in Wirecard Romania SA, held by Wirecard Sales International Holding GmbH, to the payment provider SIBS, together with its subsidiaries Romcard and Supercard Solutions & Services; PT Prima Vista Solusi, PT Wirecard Technologies Indonesia and Wirecard (Vietnam) Company Limited were then in advanced auction processes. Wirecard Sales International Holding GmbH held the group's international subsidiaries, including those in Asia. 16 14

documentedThe business of the Austrian Wirecard Central Eastern Europe GmbH was sold with the insolvency court's approval to the best bidder, AURIN Investment Group GmbH (Frankfurt), with effect from 30 September 2020, according to its insolvency administrator Dr. Ulla Reisch. 17

documentedOn 30 March 2021 the administrator announced the sale of the indirect Turkish subsidiary Wirecard Ödeme ve Elektronik Para Hizmetleri to Nomu Pay, a newly formed Irish company of the financial investor Finch Capital, subject to approval by local supervisors; the creditors' committee approved the deal. 18

documentedOn 16 April 2021 the administrator announced the sale of the shares in Wirecard e-Money Philippines, Wirecard Payment Solutions Malaysia, Wirecard (Thailand) and Wirecard Payment Solutions Hong Kong to Nomu Pay Ltd, owned by Finch Capital, including assets and licences linked to the data centre of Wirecard Asia Holding and Wirecard Singapore, and of PT Wirecard Technologies Indonesia (about 360 staff) to the technology holding company of an Indonesian group; Wirecard Australia A&I Pty Ltd. had earlier been sold to an Australian payment provider. 4

documentedThe administrator's law firm describes the proceedings as continuing: by mid-2021 the core acquiring and issuing business and the valuable foreign subsidiaries had been sold for a total in the "high three-digit millions" for the estates, about 2,700 jobs had been preserved, and claims for damages were being pursued against those involved in many jurisdictions. 19

documentedIrish filings show that Wirecard UK and Ireland Limited is being wound up by the court, with a court order dated 28 October 2020, a change of directors on 8 July 2020 and liquidator's reports from 2021 to April 2026. 20

documentedAccording to the Federal Court of Justice, about 50,000 Wirecard AG shareholders filed damage claims of about EUR 8.5 billion arising from their share purchases; claims filed in total amount to about EUR 15.4 billion, including those of bondholders of EUR 500 million, against an estate of about EUR 650 million. 21

documentedOn 13 November 2025 the Federal Court of Justice (IX ZR 127/24) ruled that shareholders of an insolvent stock corporation cannot share in the distribution of the estate as ordinary insolvency creditors with their capital-market damage claims; it set aside a Munich higher regional court judgment of 17 September 2024 to that extent and restored the Munich I regional court's dismissal of 23 November 2022 (29 O 7754/21, amount in dispute EUR 2,525,414.93). 21 22

sources in this section

  1. Court record source · src-009 identified by category only · Court record
  2. Corporate registry source · src-002 identified by category only · Corporate registry
  3. European Parliament briefing: Banking Union – Wirecard European Parliament (Directorate-General for Internal Policies) · Jun 2020
  4. Company statement source · src-026 identified by category only · Company statement
  5. Corporate registry source · src-014 identified by category only · Corporate registry
  6. Corporate registry source · src-018 identified by category only · Corporate registry
  7. Corporate registry source · src-041 identified by category only · Corporate registry
  8. Corporate registry source · src-042 identified by category only · Corporate registry
  9. Corporate registry source · src-043 identified by category only · Corporate registry
  10. Corporate registry source · src-015 identified by category only · Corporate registry
  11. Corporate registry source · src-001 identified by category only · Corporate registry
  12. Corporate registry source · src-019 identified by category only · Corporate registry
  13. Media source · src-076 identified by category only · Media
  14. Company statement source · src-048 identified by category only · Company statement
  15. Company statement source · src-029 identified by category only · Company statement
  16. Company statement source · src-046 identified by category only · Company statement
  17. Company statement source · src-035 identified by category only · Company statement
  18. Company statement source · src-045 identified by category only · Company statement
  19. Company statement source · src-028 identified by category only · Company statement
  20. Corporate registry source · src-064 identified by category only · Corporate registry
  21. Federal Court of Justice: press release 211/2025 (IX ZR 127/24) Federal Court of Justice · 13 Nov 2025
  22. Munich I regional court: press release 03/2023 on the Wirecard complex Munich I Regional Court (Bavarian State Ministry of Justice portal) · 27 Jan 2023

14Civil litigation: investor suits, the model proceeding and the voided accounts

documentedOn 5 May 2022 the 5th commercial chamber of the Munich I regional court declared Wirecard AG's annual accounts for 2017 and 2018 void (5 HK O 15710/20). 1

documentedThe Munich I regional court reported that 2,251 Wirecard-related cases reached it from mid-2019 to 31 December 2022. Wirecard AG's action against the Financial Times and its reporter (39 O 4017/19, filed 22 March 2019) was interrupted by the claimant's insolvency in September 2020 and withdrawn on 28 October 2020. 1

documentedAccording to a press release of the Munich I regional court of 27 January 2023, investors began suing the auditor EY for compensation in June 2020; 1,178 such suits had been filed, handled by nine banking chambers. In March 2022 the court initiated an investor model proceeding (Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahren) against EY, conducted by the Bavarian Supreme Regional Court under case number 101 KAP 1/22. 1

documentedAn order of the Bavarian Supreme Regional Court of 13 May 2024 records that the Munich I regional court's referral order of 14 March 2022 (3 OH 2767/22) started the model proceeding, and lists eleven model defendants: Markus Braun; EY; four EY auditors who worked on the 2014–2018 audits; Alexander von Knoop; Jan Marsalek, whose whereabouts are unknown; MB Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH, now represented by its provisional insolvency administrator; Michael Jaffé as insolvency administrator of Wirecard AG; and Oliver Bellenhaus, who headed Wirecard AG's branch in Dubai. 2

qualification
The four EY auditors are not named here; the order names them only as further parties to the proceedings.

attributedEY audited Wirecard AG for the financial years 2014 to 2018 and gave unqualified opinions on the consolidated financial statements and group management reports for each of those years. According to the facts set out in the referral order, Braun is accused of having misinformed the capital market as chief executive: the consolidated statements for 2014–2018 were allegedly incorrect, required disclosures were not made and untrue ad hoc announcements were published. EY is accused of issuing false audit opinions and of aiding the alleged breaches of disclosure duties. 2

qualification
These are the claimants' allegations as summarised by the court in a procedural order; the court did not rule on them.

documentedOn 13 May 2024 the court issued three orders in the model proceeding. It held that the provisional insolvency administrator of MB Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH had become the defendant in its place and that the proceeding was interrupted against it, but not against the other ten defendants. It refused to restore EY's former party name after EY's conversion into EY GmbH & Co. KG Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft (registered on 1 February 2024), rejecting the applicants' argument that the conversion was void for breaching creditor-protection rules. It also refused to sever the proceedings against EY, against MB and against Braun, holding that severance would create two parallel model proceedings with partly identical objectives. 3

documentedOn 29 November 2024 the Frankfurt am Main higher regional court (7 U 82/22, not final; appeal on points of law allowed) ruled that the D&O insurer owed no further cover to Wirecard AG's former director of accounting, who had also been managing director of Wirecard Technologies GmbH, a subsidiary active in the third-party acquiring business in Asia. The court held that the insured event occurred in 2020, not 2019, because the circumstances he cited (critical Financial Times reporting, Singapore investigations and a US class action) had not been properly notified to the insurer; the 2020 limit of EUR 15 million had been fully paid out for covered costs of the Wirecard scandal. He had argued for the 2019 limit of EUR 25 million. 4

documentedWirecard's 2011 annual report states that the group pursued damages claims in Great Britain, in particular for fraud, against a customer and persons close to it; following a High Court judgment in London in its favour it began enforcement in 2010 and in 2011 recovered most of the outstanding money through the forced sale of a property. 5

qualification
The report does not name the defendants.

documentedThe 2019 bond prospectus discloses that the insolvency administrator of a former IT service provider was seeking to enforce a claim against a group company based on a confession of judgment from 2014, and that Wirecard had appealed against enforcement on the ground that the claim had already been settled. 6

qualification
Parties are not named in the prospectus; no outcome is in the record.

sources in this section

  1. Munich I regional court: press release 03/2023 on the Wirecard complex Munich I Regional Court (Bavarian State Ministry of Justice portal) · 27 Jan 2023
  2. Court record source · src-102 identified by category only · Court record
  3. Bavarian Supreme Regional Court: press release 5/2024 on decisions in the Wirecard model proceeding Bavarian Supreme Regional Court (Bavarian State Ministry of Justice portal) · 15 May 2024
  4. Media source · src-058 identified by category only · Media
  5. Company statement source · src-010 identified by category only · Company statement
  6. Company statement source · src-012 identified by category only · Company statement

15The criminal proceedings in Munich

attributedOn 10 March 2022 the Munich I public prosecutor charged "Dr. B." (former CEO of Wirecard AG), "von E." (former head of accounting) and "B." (former managing director of CardSystems Middle East, a Dubai-based second-tier subsidiary of Wirecard AG) before the 4th criminal chamber (commercial crime) of the Munich I regional court in a 474-page indictment; two of the three were in pre-trial detention. A later press report on the trial names the defendants as Markus Braun, Stephan von Erffa and Oliver Bellenhaus. 1 2 3

qualification
The indictment states the prosecution's case, which the court has to establish; the release abbreviates the defendants' names.
outcome
The trial began on 8 December 2022; in May 2026 the court set further hearing dates up to 23 December 2026, and no judgment had been announced by the cutoff.

attributedThe prosecution's case is that Wirecard's consolidated accounts for 2015 to 2018 were false because they included revenue said to come from TPA business with three partners in Dubai, the Philippines and Singapore, which was booked as receivables from the partners or as balances on trust accounts in Singapore but did not exist; a balance of almost one billion euros (2018) supposedly managed by a trustee "C." in Singapore never existed, and balance confirmations were forged by the trustee or by the accused "B." on the instructions of "von E.". 1 4

qualification
Prosecution allegations; at the evidence cutoff the trial had not reached a verdict.
response
Braun's defence in the trial was that the TPA business existed and its proceeds were embezzled by Jan Marsalek's circle; the presiding judge called this unsupported in September 2026 (see the trial).

attributedThe prosecution accuses "Dr. B." of professional market manipulation, including deciding alone to publish an ad hoc announcement on 22 April 2020 that falsely suggested KPMG's report would clear Wirecard of all allegations of balance-sheet manipulation; in total the indictment lists 26 counts of market manipulation for 1 January 2015 to 27 April 2019. It says that part of his pay was linked to the share price and that he personally held a substantial share of the capital, latterly about 7%, receiving dividends of about EUR 5.5 million in total. 1

qualification
Prosecution allegations; the court later dropped the market-manipulation counts (see the restriction of February 2025).

attributedThe prosecution charges six counts of professional gang fraud: banks that believed they were dealing with a successful and creditworthy DAX company paid out four loans of about EUR 1.7 billion, and two bonds of about EUR 1.4 billion were issued, on the basis of figures that included non-existent receivables from TPA partners and trust account balances. 1

qualification
Prosecution allegations; the banks are not named in the release.

documentedThe main trial before the 4th (grand) criminal chamber of the Munich I regional court (4 KLs 402 Js 108194/22) began on 8 December 2022. On 27 February 2025 the chamber, at its own suggestion and with the prosecutor's agreement, limited the case (§§ 154(2), 154a(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure); for the remaining counts of breach of trust and fraud each carries up to ten years and an aggregate sentence up to fifteen years. The discontinued counts include false 2015 consolidated accounts, guarantees by Wirecard AG for Wirecard Bank AG loans to OCAP Management Pte. Ltd. (December 2017 and April 2019), Wirecard Asia Holding loans to OCAP (September 2018), fraud in extending and increasing the syndicated loan led by "C. AG" on 21 March 2016 (EUR 725 million) and 15 February 2017 (EUR 1 billion), fraud in issuing the EUR 500 million bond (ISIN DE000A2YNQ58) and 26 counts of market manipulation through the 2015–2019 accounts. 2 5

documentedPress releases of the Munich higher regional court show the criminal case against "Dr. Markus B. and others" continuing in 2026: on 26 May 2026 the presiding judge set hearing dates up to 23 December 2026, stating that this allowed no conclusion about when the trial would end, and on 19 June 2026 the court published the next hearing dates after a move of premises; no judgment had been announced. 3 6

attributedAccording to a press report of 14 September 2026, presiding judge Markus Födisch said in the trial (4 KLs 402 Js 108194/22) that there were "no indications whatsoever" that the TPA business with partners in Dubai, Singapore and the Philippines existed, and called Braun's account that the profits had been embezzled by Jan Marsalek's circle untenable "speculation"; Braun had then been in pre-trial detention without interruption since July 2020. The judge formally warned the three defendants that proceeds could be confiscated if they were convicted: almost EUR 39 million in Braun's case, most of it held by his personal investment company, more than EUR 6 million for the key prosecution witness Oliver Bellenhaus, who had confirmed the indictment in its essential points, and more than EUR 600,000 for the former chief accountant Stephan von Erffa. 4

qualification
Statements by the presiding judge during the trial as reported in the press; they are not a judgment, and the defendants are presumed innocent until a final verdict.
response
Braun maintains that the TPA business existed and that its proceeds were embezzled by others.

attributedOn 12 December 2023 the Munich I prosecutor indicted the former chief financial officer of Wirecard AG, "L.", for misrepresentation, market manipulation, professional gang fraud, breach of trust and aiding these offences: he is accused of having joined Dr. Braun, "von E.", "B." and "M." in simulating the TPA business, of signing the 2015 and 2016 accounts as CFO, of acting as a perpetrator in 2015–2017 and, after leaving on 1 January 2018, of aiding the others with advice, and of breach of trust through Wirecard AG's guarantee of a Wirecard Bank MCA loan to a Singapore company. 7

qualification
Prosecution allegations; the release abbreviates the name, and the description matches Burkhard Ley, finance director until 31 December 2017. The 12th commercial crime chamber was to decide whether to open the trial; no decision is in the record.
outcome
According to the prosecutor, the 12th commercial crime chamber of the Munich I regional court was to decide whether to open the trial; no decision is in the record.

attributedOn 31 July 2024 the Munich I prosecutor indicted two further former Wirecard AG board members, "von K." (finance) for several counts of breach of trust and aiding breach of trust and "S." (product development) for several counts of breach of trust, concerning the December 2019 security deposit and the OCAP loans; the 12th commercial crime chamber of the Munich I regional court was to decide whether to open the trial. 8

qualification
Prosecution allegations; the release abbreviates the names, and the posts match Alexander von Knoop and Susanne Steidl. No decision on opening the trial is in the record.

attributedAccording to a July 2022 press report based on another newspaper's information from people familiar with the matter, Stephan von Erffa admitted to prosecutors that in early 2020 he had fabricated, after the event, an e-mail and a trustee request form for the EUR 50 million transfer Wirecard received in 2018 supposedly from an Asian trust account, documents that were passed to KPMG and EY; he called the forgery a one-off. According to the prosecutors as reported, the EUR 50 million came from an Asian partner that had borrowed EUR 100 million from Wirecard and returned half through a chain of opaque companies. 9

qualification
Second-hand press account of an admission and of investigators' findings; no court finding.

documentedThe Munich I prosecutor closed its investigation into Wirecard's former treasurer Thorsten Holten, as his defence lawyer confirmed in July 2024, saying the accusations had proved entirely false; the reported source does not give the legal basis for the closure. 10

attributedA newspaper reported on 21 May 2021, citing an e-mail from his lawyer to the Bundestag committee of inquiry, that the Munich prosecutor had formally opened an investigation into former supervisory board chairman Wulf Matthias, among other former supervisory board members, following complaints by investors (case 402 Js 199828/20); An FDP deputy suggested the investigation might concern breach of trust by omitting required controls, while stressing the presumption of innocence. 11

qualification
Opening of an investigation as reported by a newspaper; no charge or outcome is recorded.
response
Through his lawyer, Matthias told the committee that he would make use of his comprehensive right to remain silent.

documentedAt the Bundestag inquiry committee's session of 19 November 2020, Dr. Markus Braun invoked his right not to incriminate himself, said the courts should establish where the embezzled company funds had gone and announced a detailed statement to the Munich prosecutor; Oliver Bellenhaus, who had run the group's card-payment subsidiary in the Middle East and joined from prison, also declined to answer, but described events as a "huge catastrophe" and apologised to those harmed. 12

documentedThe Singapore Police Force stated on 31 March 2026 that Germany had requested the provisional arrest of Brigitte Häuser-Axtner on 24 October 2025, that a Singapore court issued a warrant on 3 November 2025, that she was arrested on 4 November 2025, that a formal extradition request followed on 24 December 2025 and that she consented to extradition on 10 February 2026; she was extradited to Germany on 30 March 2026, where she was wanted on suspicion of involvement in a criminal organisation, computer fraud and money laundering connected with the Wirecard group. At the time of her arrest she worked for an unrelated Singapore company. 13 14

qualification
Suspicions stated in the extradition proceedings; Singapore police said she was not accused of offences in Singapore.

attributedAccording to a news agency report of 6 July 2020, the Munich prosecutor said it had questioned the chief executive of Cardsystems Middle East FZ-LLC, Wirecard's Dubai-based subsidiary, and arrested him on a warrant after he travelled from Dubai and turned himself in; the arrest was on suspicion of conspiracy to commit fraud, attempted fraud and aiding and abetting other offences, with a risk of flight or tampering with evidence. The prosecutors did not name him. 15 1 9

qualification
Arrest on suspicion; the later charges and trial are described with the criminal proceedings.
outcome
On 10 March 2022 the prosecutor charged "B.", a former managing director of CardSystems Middle East, together with Braun and von Erffa; a July 2022 press report identifies the head of the Dubai subsidiary who turned himself in in July 2020 as Oliver Bellenhaus, who acted as a principal prosecution witness.

sources in this section

  1. Munich I public prosecutor: press release 02/2022 on the indictment in the Wirecard case Munich I Public Prosecutor (Bavarian State Ministry of Justice portal) · 14 Mar 2022
  2. Munich I regional court: press release 03/2023 on the Wirecard complex Munich I Regional Court (Bavarian State Ministry of Justice portal) · 27 Jan 2023
  3. Munich higher regional court: press release 39/2026 on the Wirecard criminal trial Munich Higher Regional Court (Bavarian State Ministry of Justice portal) · 26 May 2026
  4. Media source · src-060 identified by category only · Media
  5. Munich higher regional court: press release 15/2025 on the Wirecard criminal trial Munich Higher Regional Court (Bavarian State Ministry of Justice portal) · 28 Feb 2025
  6. Munich higher regional court: press release 42/2026 on the Wirecard criminal trial Munich Higher Regional Court (Bavarian State Ministry of Justice portal) · 19 Jun 2026
  7. Munich I public prosecutor: press release 09/2023 on the indictment of the former chief financial officer Munich I Public Prosecutor (Bavarian State Ministry of Justice portal) · 14 Dec 2023
  8. Munich I public prosecutor: press release 04/2024 on further indictments of former board members Munich I Public Prosecutor (Bavarian State Ministry of Justice portal) · 6 Aug 2024
  9. Media source · src-067 identified by category only · Media
  10. Media source · src-061 identified by category only · Media
  11. Media source · src-074 identified by category only · Media
  12. Bundestag text archive: third committee of inquiry hears Markus Braun and other witnesses German Bundestag · 19 Nov 2020
  13. Singapore Police Force: former Wirecard employee extradited to Germany Singapore Police Force · 31 Mar 2026
  14. Media source · src-081 identified by category only · Media
  15. Media source · src-094 identified by category only · Media

16Jan Marsalek

documentedThe Munich I public prosecutor is investigating Jan Marsalek on suspicion of professional gang fraud, aggravated breach of trust and other financial and economic offences; the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and Munich police have issued a public appeal for his arrest and consider it very likely that he is abroad. The BKA also states that he is suspected of having bought shares in a company at an inflated price, contrary to his duties to the Wirecard group, damaging its assets. 1

qualification
Suspicions, not charges proved in court; Marsalek has not been tried.

documentedAccording to the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), Jan Marsalek worked at Wirecard AG from January 2000 as a project manager for payment systems and was a member of the management board from February 2010 to June 2020; as chief operating officer he was responsible for all operations including sales and, from at least 2015, chiefly for the Asian business and the TPA business. 1

documentedA registry aggregator links Jan Marsalek in the German register to Click2Pay GmbH, Wirecard AG, Wirecard Global Sales GmbH, Wirecard Sales International Holding GmbH and Wirecard Technologies GmbH and to the deleted Trustpay International AG and Wirecard Technologies AG, without naming his role in each. 2

documentedAn extract from an EY compliance check, reproduced in OCR form in the special investigators' report, records that Jan Marsalek was appointed a director of E-Credit Plus Pte. Ltd., the earlier name of the Singapore company later called Wirecard Asia Pte. Ltd., on 18 March 2010. 3

qualification
The extract is an optical-character-recognition rendering of an image whose words, including the date, are split across a recognition table; the compliance check's source for the appointment is not given.

documentedIreland's Corporate Enforcement Authority reports that the liquidators of Wirecard UK & Ireland Limited recommended disqualifying its two remaining directors, Jan Marsalek (spelt "Marsalak"), the company's chief executive and the Wirecard AG group's chief operating officer, and Markus-Konrad Fuchs, its sales director and the group's head of sales and acquiring. Because of the grave nature of the allegations the authority declined to offer them undertakings and instructed the liquidators to seek disqualification in the High Court; Fuchs was disqualified for nine years, while the case against Marsalek was adjourned with liberty to re-enter because he could not be served. 4

documentedA sanctions and wanted-persons database lists Jan Marsalek on the BKA wanted list and on INTERPOL's red notices, with the BKA page as its source; among the alternative names in the record are Alexander Michaelowitsch Nelidov and German Baschenow. 5

qualification
A screening record that repeats official wanted notices; the alternative names are those recorded in the notices, not names he is known to use lawfully.

attributedAn investigation published on 18 July 2020 by an investigative outlet with two partner media, based on Russian and Belarusian border data, reported that Jan Marsalek entered Belarus by private jet in the first minutes of 19 June 2020 and, according to the records, never left; it also reported that, according to Philippine authorities, records of a trip to Manila on 23 June had been a red herring and immigration records had been falsified. 6 1 7

qualification
Media findings from leaked border data; no official confirmation is in the record.
outcome
He remains wanted: the BKA's notice asks for information on his whereabouts since June 2020, and an order of the Bavarian Supreme Regional Court of May 2024 lists him as of unknown whereabouts.

attributedThe same investigation reported that Marsalek travelled to Russia more than 60 times in ten years and that his Russian migration file runs to 597 pages; that on 15 September 2017 the FSB border service refused to let him leave Moscow on a private jet; that from 2015 to the end of 2018 an FSB database tracked all his international trips except intra-EU travel; and that the file lists a diplomatic passport "issued to a non-citizen" (number DA0000051) by an unnamed state. 6

qualification
Media findings from leaked Russian records; the outlet interprets the tracking as a special interest of the FSB.

attributedAccording to the July 2020 investigation, from 2015 Marsalek pursued projects in Libya, including an investment in the Libya Cement Company, and discussed "humanitarian reconstruction" plans with Russian advisers and European officials; his adviser on the Libyan initiative was a Russian expert on the Arab world whom, according to the outlet, Western intelligence services believe to be a former senior GRU officer. 6

qualification
Allegations by an investigative outlet; no response from Marsalek is in the record.

attributedAn investigation published on 19 July 2022 by an investigative outlet with a German newspaper reported that a request for special handling of Marsalek at Minsk airport attached a copy of a Grenadian diplomatic passport in his name, although he was not known to hold Grenadian citizenship; that his escape on 18–19 June 2020 was organised by Martin Weiss, a former head of operations of Austria's BVT intelligence agency who had worked with him since 2019, and by the former Freedom Party MP Thomas Schellenbacher, who chartered the private jet; and that Austrian investigators believe another former BVT officer drove him from Germany to Austria. 8

qualification
Media allegations; the record contains no response from the persons named and no court finding on the escape.

attributedThe same 2022 investigation reported that Marsalek lives in Moscow under round-the-clock FSB protection, acquired Russian citizenship and an internal passport on 10 June 2021 and later changed his identity to that of "German Bazhenov"; the outlet could not find this passport in the Russian passport database. 8

qualification
Media allegations that the outlet itself could only partly verify.
response
The outlet notes that Marsalek has consistently denied any links with Russian intelligence.

documentedIn sentencing remarks of 12 May 2025 in R v Roussev and others at the Central Criminal Court (Old Bailey), a case of conspiracy to spy for Russia under the Official Secrets Act 1911, the judge recorded the prosecution's case that the Russian agent using the alias "Rupert Ticz" was Jan Marsalek, an Austrian national who fled Germany to avoid arrest for fraud, and that his communications with Orlin Roussev referred to the GRU, FSB and KGB. Roussev's basis of plea did not accept that "Rupert Ticz" was Marsalek, while agreeing that this did not matter. 9

documentedThe sentencing remarks record that on 23 February 2022 Marsalek messaged Roussev that he was applying for EUR 1 million as a "search and capture budget" for a target, that there was evidence of substantial cryptocurrency payments from Marsalek to Roussev, and that between July and September 2021 they discussed surveilling the investigative journalist Christo Grozev and kidnapping him and taking him to Moscow. 9

sources in this section

  1. Wanted notice: Jan Marsalek (Wirecard) Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA)
  2. Corporate registry source · src-007 identified by category only · Corporate registry
  3. Research source · src-027 identified by category only · Research
  4. Corporate Enforcement Authority: Annual Report 2025 case studies Corporate Enforcement Authority (Ireland)
  5. Sanctions list source · src-004 identified by category only · Other
  6. Media source · src-075 identified by category only · Media
  7. Court record source · src-102 identified by category only · Court record
  8. Media source · src-086 identified by category only · Media
  9. Sentencing remarks in R v Roussev and others (Central Criminal Court) Judiciary of England and Wales · 12 May 2025

17Wirecard Bank AG

documentedAccording to ESMA's chronology, Wirecard bought XCOM in 2006 and renamed it Wirecard Bank, thereby obtaining Visa and Mastercard licences to issue credit cards and handle money on behalf of merchants. A European Parliament briefing describes Wirecard Bank AG as holding a full German banking licence, supervised by BaFin and a member of the Deposit Protection Fund of the Association of German Banks. 1 2

documentedWirecard AG's 2011 annual report states that Wirecard Bank AG was a principal member of MasterCard and Visa and a member of JCB International, with licences for card issuing and merchant acquiring, and held online-acquiring licences for China UnionPay and Discover/Diners Club. The 2019 bond prospectus adds that the bank also held acquiring licences for American Express. In the half-year report for 2019 the Acquiring & Issuing segment comprised Wirecard Bank AG, Wirecard Acquiring & Issuing GmbH, Wirecard Ödeme ve Elektronik Para Hizmetleri A.Ş., Wirecard Brazil S.A., Wirecard Card Solutions Ltd. and Wirecard North America Inc. 3 4 5

documentedAccording to the Federal Ministry of Finance's timeline, Wirecard Bank AG applied to BaFin on 8 May 2018 for approval of a restructuring that would make the bank a direct subsidiary of Wirecard AG; this started an owner-control procedure involving BaFin, the Bundesbank and the European Central Bank, and the application was finally approved in January 2019. Because Wirecard did not meet the deadline for the restructuring, it had to file a new application in January 2020. 6

documentedAccording to the Federal Government, a 2017 special audit of Wirecard Bank AG under the minimum requirements for risk management (MaRisk) by BaFin and the Bundesbank found weaknesses in lending: no risk classification procedure for strategic loans, weaknesses in loan approval (collateral valuation and debt-service capacity), incomplete disclosure of financial statements for risk-relevant exposures and no evidence of regular impairment tests on collateral. The Finance Ministry's timeline lists several special audits of the bank under section 44 of the Banking Act between 2010 and 2019, including one of its lending organisation from 3 June to 21 July 2017. 7 6

documentedBaFin carried out a special anti-money-laundering audit of Wirecard Bank AG in early July 2019 and on 15 July 2019 placed the bank under intensive anti-money-laundering supervision, a classification that, according to the ministry, resulted from a differentiated risk analysis and was unrelated to the allegations against the parent company. On 3 June 2019, after press reports that the bank processed payments for operators of fraudulent trading sites, BaFin asked the public prosecutor and the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) for further supervisory information. 6

documentedThe Finance Ministry reported that the FIU had received more than 500 suspicious-transaction reports from Wirecard Bank AG concerning the bank's customers and held more than 1,000 reports or items of information with links to Wirecard; after re-screening them on 22 June 2020, 72 reports were, as of 9 July 2020, possibly connected with the current allegations against Wirecard AG. 6

documentedBy decision of 13 January 2021 BaFin imposed two administrative fines totalling EUR 60,000 on Wirecard Bank AG under section 56(2) no. 5 of the Banking Act; the decision became final on 2 February 2021. 8

documentedAccording to the company's statement of 25 June 2020, cited in a European Parliament briefing, Wirecard Bank AG was not part of the insolvency proceedings and BaFin had appointed a special representative for it. Estonia's e-Residency programme reported that the bank assured customers that deposits were protected by two schemes up to EUR 19.7 million per customer, and that the service provider Xolo, which had offered e-residents Wirecard Bank IBAN accounts since March 2020, suspended opening new accounts. 9 2

attributedA news report of 2 July 2020 citing insiders said Deutsche Bank intended to help the then still solvent Wirecard Bank and was thereby positioning itself for a possible takeover; BaFin had installed the Bundesbank as special representative to ensure that no funds flowed to the parent company. According to the report, Aldi Süd had moved its customers' card payments to Payone (part of Ingenico) from early July, keeping only its gift card with Wirecard Bank, and the bank's 2018 annual report showed total assets of EUR 1.6 billion and customer savings of almost EUR 1.4 billion, protected by statutory deposit insurance and the private banks' fund. 10 11

qualification
Insider account in a press report; no statement by Deutsche Bank is in the record and no takeover followed in the record.
outcome
The record shows no takeover by Deutsche Bank; the bank was later renamed WDB Abwicklungs AG.

sources in this section

  1. ESMA fast-track peer review on the application of the guidelines on the enforcement of financial information by BaFin and FREP in the context of Wirecard European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) · 3 Nov 2020
  2. European Parliament briefing: Banking Union – Wirecard European Parliament (Directorate-General for Internal Policies) · Jun 2020
  3. Company statement source · src-010 identified by category only · Company statement
  4. Company statement source · src-012 identified by category only · Company statement
  5. Company statement source · src-066 identified by category only · Company statement
  6. Federal Ministry of Finance: status report on Wirecard (timeline) Federal Ministry of Finance · 17 Jul 2020
  7. Federal Government answer to a parliamentary question on Wirecard Bank loans (printed paper 19/25977) German Bundestag · 18 Jan 2021
  8. BaFin: administrative fines imposed on Wirecard Bank AG Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) · 10 May 2021
  9. e-Residency: service provider statements on Wirecard AG Republic of Estonia e-Residency programme · 30 Jun 2020
  10. Media source · src-076 identified by category only · Media
  11. Corporate registry source · src-065 identified by category only · Corporate registry

18Wirecard's acquisitions, 2009–2018

documentedOn 16 December 2009 Wirecard AG signed an agreement to buy 100% of E-Credit Plus Pte. Ltd. of Singapore and its subsidiaries; the transfer of shares closed on 28 December 2009, and Wirecard obtained control under IFRS 3 on 1 January 2010, so the stake was carried as an associate at the end of 2009. The 2010 annual report puts the fair value of the E-Credit group, and the purchase price, at EUR 13.283 million. 1

documentedWith effect from 13 January 2011 Wirecard AG took over Procard Services FZ LLC of Dubai, a provider of payment processing, card acceptance and card issuing services, for EUR 670,000 plus assumed debt of EUR 11.561 million. In December 2011 the group bought Systems@Work Pte. Ltd. of Singapore, known for its TeleMoney brand, with its subsidiaries Systems@Work (M) Sdn Bhd (Kuala Lumpur) and Safe2Pay Pte. Ltd. (Singapore), for cash of EUR 34.726 million plus two earn-out components of up to SGD 22.5 million. 2

documentedAlso in December 2011 the newly formed British subsidiary Wirecard Card Solutions Ltd. took over the prepaid card issuing business of Newcastle Building Society, about 1.5 million prepaid cards in six European countries, in two phases: first as outsourcing provider for the main functions, then taking control once the UK Financial Services Authority authorised it as an e-money institution. The chief executive's letter for 2011 also notes that Wirecard Bank was the first non-Chinese bank to offer China UnionPay's online acquiring licence and that the platform processed EUR 15.5 billion in 2011. 2

documentedThe purchase of Citi Prepaid Card Services, announced on 29 June 2016 as a combined share and asset deal, closed on 9 March 2017 with control over Ecount Inc. and the individual assets; the transaction vehicle Kestrel Mergers Acquisitions Corp. of Conshohocken, Pennsylvania, merged into Wirecard North America Inc. on closing. On 6 March 2017 Wirecard AG bought all shares in MyGate Communications Pty Ltd. of Cape Town, a payment service provider with about 20 staff, for an agreed price of EUR 13.1 million. 3

documentedOn 13 March 2017 Wirecard agreed with the Citigroup subsidiaries Citibank, N.A. and Citibank Overseas Investment Corporation to acquire the customer portfolios of Citi's card-acceptance business in eleven Asia-Pacific markets, with more than 20,000 merchants; the portfolios for Malaysia were taken over on 31 January 2018, for India on 31 August 2018 and for Australia and New Zealand on 25 October 2018. In 2018 Wirecard thus acquired customer portfolios of Citigroup's card acceptance business in Asia-Pacific, in particular in Malaysia and India; mainly as a result, goodwill rose by EUR 39.7 million to EUR 705.9 million at 31 December 2018 (2017: EUR 675.8 million). EY treated the acquisition as a key audit matter because management had to exercise judgement on whether it was a business combination under IFRS 3, on the purchase price allocation and on valuing liabilities from customer contracts. 4

documentedThe 2018 annual report describes a strategic partnership with Crédit Agricole Payment Services (CAPS) to offer e-commerce payment acceptance and processing services, mobile and other point-of-sale solutions across Europe, and a partnership with Mizuho Bank under which customer relationships were concluded with Japanese retailers in Singapore and Hong Kong. 4

sources in this section

  1. Company statement source · src-023 identified by category only · Company statement
  2. Company statement source · src-010 identified by category only · Company statement
  3. Company statement source · src-020 identified by category only · Company statement
  4. Company statement source · src-005 identified by category only · Company statement

cite this dossier

DossierTwist, “Wirecard AG: the missing EUR 1.9 billion and its aftermath”, dt.041, 26 October 2026, https://dossiertwist.com/dossiers/wirecard-ag/

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